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ABSTRACT
The overarching theme of the thesis is the urban ‘racial’ restructuring of the East 
Rand during the first twenty-five years of apartheid. The thesis examines the adoption 
and implementation o f apartheid state’s social engineering strategy, especially its 
strict racial segregation of the urban areas. In this context, the creation o f ‘modern’ 
African townships and group areas is emphasised. The thesis focuses attention on the 
implementation of urban apartheid in Benoni, particularly the establishment of the 
‘model’ township, Daveyton. Benoni’s experiences in implementing apartheid 
policies are compared to that of its municipal neighbours. The thesis contends that 
local authorities were important role players in the implementation of apartheid. Thus, 
the ways in which the changing relations between the local and central tiers of the 
state influenced the making of apartheid at regional and local levels are foregrounded 
throughout this study. The impact of apartheid policies on the ‘multi-racial’ 
populations of the urban ‘black spots’ and their responses to these policies are 
primary concerns in the narrative provided here. The diverse reactions of people 
affected by forced removals -  from acquiescence to militant resistance -  in the 1950s 
and 1960s are analysed. A central focus of this study is the making of apartheid in the 
1960s, the so-called golden age of apartheid. Finally, the thesis discusses the 
introduction and effects o f ‘separate development’ and ‘community development’ as 
principal interventions by the state to politicise ethnicity and ‘race’ during the period 
of ‘high apartheid’.
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INTRODUCTION
The creation of group areas and ‘modern’ African townships were a 
central feature of the ‘making of apartheid’ in the 1950s and 1960s. They 
combined the government’s principal aims of stabilising and controlling the urban 
black population, while simultaneously imposing strict ‘racial’ segregation. 
Historians and other social scientists have interrogated and debated these issues 
since the 1970s.1 Early writings which addressed themselves to the issues o f the 
making and character of apartheid were dominated by debates between 
revisionists and liberals over the relationship between apartheid and capitalism.2 
Revisionist historians, who wrote from a marxist perspective, were concerned 
mainly to counter the liberal view that apartheid was dysfunctional to capitalism.3 
Although neither the revisionist nor the liberal views were uniform,4 the former 
emphasised the imperatives of capital accumulation and dominant class interests 
in the shaping of apartheid. For the revisionists apartheid was an attempt by the 
white state to address the mounting contradictions and crises that faced capitalism 
during the 1940s. They highlighted the role played by cheap labour and coercion 
to maximise capital accumulation. One of the main foci in this debate was the 
analytical primacy of either race or class in analysing and understanding 
apartheid.5 Radical scholars insisted on the primacy of class as the analytical tool 
with which to comprehend the meaning of apartheid.6
While acknowledging the pioneering work of these early revisionist 
scholars, social historians have criticised the reductionism of their analyses,7 
arguing that “the dynamics which moulded apartheid were far more broad-ranging 
and intractable than the early revisionist writers allowed, and that apartheid, as a
g
consequence, is much more complex and contradictory.” Social historians have 
challenged the notion of apartheid as having issued from a preconceived master 
plan (the Sauer Report) that was simply imposed on the black population after 
1948. They contended that the meaning of apartheid was hotly contested within 
the state and the Afrikaner establishment. Thus no single view, let alone a ‘blue-
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print’, of apartheid existed. These writers have also stressed the role of popular 
struggles, which they maintain “both shaped the terrain traversed by political 
movements and played a decisive role in the rise and fall of apartheid.”9 Social 
actors, especially the African working class, are accorded a primary role in this 
narrative. The part playeded migrancy, culture, gender and ethnicity in shaping 
the process of proletarianisation is also foregrounded in these accounts.
This thesis takes its cue from the radical historiography and particularly 
from the w'ork of social historians. It builds on the analyses of these writers and 
also attempts to fill significant gaps in their work. The overall theme of the thesis 
is the urban transformation of the East Rand during the first twenty-five years of 
Nationalist rule. It focuses on the implementation of urban apartheid in the 1960s, 
a period that has been grossly neglected by historians and other social scientists 
alike. The influential role played by local authorities in the implementation of 
apartheid policies is another important theme in the analysis presented here. The 
popular struggles by black urban dwellers are also emphasised throughout the 
thesis. In particular, the impact of apartheid policies on the ‘multi-racial’ 
populations of the urban ‘black spots’ and their responses to these policies are 
considered.
The East Rand and Benoni
Social historians only began to give serious attention to East Rand from 
the 1980s despite its economic and political importance. Since then a number of 
path-breaking studies have been conducted on various aspects of the region’s 
history.10 Even so, the scholarly literature on this region still pales into 
insignificance when compared to the mountain of research that has been 
conducted on Johannesburg, its more famous and dominant neighbour. This 
neglect is unfortunate. The East Rand was one of the country’s leading gold 
producing regions and by the 1960s had established itself as the heartland o f the 
country’s engineering industry. The region consists of a large number o f major 
urban centres and a dense concentration of population that played a central role in 
the struggles against white domination and apartheid. At various points since the
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1940s, political and civic organisations and trade unions on the East Rand have 
been in the forefront of black popular struggles.11
The existing literature on the East .Rand concentrates on particular events 
or on the history of individual towns. None has yet attempted to generalise its 
analysis to encompass the entire region. This thesis begins to address this 
shortcoming. It provides an overview of the region’s economic development from 
the end of the 19th century through to the 1970s. The popular struggles that flared 
up in the 1940s in virtually every ‘black spot’ in the region are highlighted to 
show the prominent role played by the East Rand’s urban black population in 
challenging white domination and in campaigning for social improvements. In the 
1950s the locations of the East Rand, especially in Benoni and Germiston, 
established themselves as strongholds of the black liberation movements. 
However, the region’s importance extends beyond its pivotal role in the anti­
apartheid struggles. From the 1950s the government identified the East Rand as 
one of the main centres where its urban social engineering schemes had to be 
implemented. In 1951 the black population of the region numbered over 400 000, 
most of whom lived in ‘black spots’, white suburbs and peri-urban areas. Over the 
course of the following two decades the majority of these people were forcibly 
relocated from these areas to townships and group areas. This represented a huge 
intra-regional displacement of people. The process of the disestablishment of at 
least eight urban ‘black spots’ and the creation of three large African township 
conglomerations (Kathorus, Kwatsaduza and Daveyton), as well as the 
establishment of two regional group areas (Actonville and Reiger Park, for 
Indians and coloureds respectively) was a was a central component of the national 
urban social engineering schemes of the government.
Within this regional focus, the thesis pays special attention to the ‘racial’ 
restructuring of Benoni and particularly the building of Daveyton. In the 1950s 
the Benoni Council emerged as a leading implementer of urban apartheid. Its 
creation of Daveyton, which was praised as the ‘model’ African township, is 
especially remarkable and worthy of detailed analysis. A central focus of the 
thesis is therefore on Daveyton’s exceptional development. Two major official 
publications address themselves to these subjects. J.E. Mathewson’s (Benoni’s
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Director of Non-European Affairs), published doctoral thesis on the establishment 
of Daveyton12 was for long regarded by many as the pre-eminent description of 
township development, and received praise from political friends and foes alike. 
Mathewson's thesis which concentrated on the planning, layout and infrastructural 
development of Daveyton, in which he played a central role, was unambiguously 
situated within the broad political framework established by the government. 
Although the book is about the creation of an African township, the inhabitants of 
the township appear only as part of the general statistics produced to demonstrate 
and laud the Council’s success in creating it. The second publication was an 
official history of Benoni.13 This text was mainly concerned with the history of 
the white inhabitants of the town from the turn of the century to the mid-sixties. 
However, the brief chapter on ‘The Bantu and other Non-Whites in Benoni’ 
provides a limited and flawed overview of the history of the town’s black 
residents as well as some discussion on the disestablishment of Benoni Old 
Location and of the establishment of Daveyton. Among the numerous 
shortcomings in these publications, the marginalisation of the major role played 
by the black population in shaping the town history is the most serious.
Bonner’s series of seminal articles on popular struggles among Benoni’s 
African population has contributed considerably to redressing this imbalance.14 
These articles place the town’s African population at the centre of the struggles 
that enveloped the entire Rand from the mid-1940s. They reveal the complex 
process of urbanisation and the diverse character and dynamic lives of the urban 
African population. This thesis draws its inspiration from Bonner’s research and 
attempts to build on it in a number of respects. First, it includes more centrally in 
its analysis the other black people of Benoni, namely coloureds and Indians, than 
Bonner has done. Second, an analysis is provided of black popular struggles in the 
1950s and 1960s, which complement’s Bonner’s focus on the 1940s and early 
1950s. Third, urban restructuring and its impact on Benoni’s entire black 
population from the early 1950s to the early 1970s are central considerations in 
the thesis.
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Local government-central government relations
Pose! has argued that especially from the late 1950s, as the Native Affairs 
Department consolidated its position in the state, the government mounted a 
‘major offensive against local authorities’. This process began in the early 1950s. 
The promulgation of the Native Resettlement Act in 1954 was designed 
specifically to circumvent the Johannesburg City Council’s objections to the 
implementation of the Western Areas Removal Scheme.15 Throughout the 1950s 
the government engaged in a number of public disputes with leading 
municipalities (including Johannesburg, Durban, Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth) 
over its urban apartheid policies.16 The Bantu in European Areas Bill of 1960, in 
Posel's view, represented a ‘singularly aggressive attack on the powers of local 
authorities’.17 In 1973 the government finally wrested control of the management 
of urban African townships from white local authorities when it established the
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Bantu Affairs Administration Boards. These new bodies, one of which was 
established on the East Rand, were directly accountable to the central government. 
The implications of these issues on the local government-central government 
relations have not been explored.
Mabin and Parnell have recently alluded to the absence of historical 
research on local government.'9 They have challenged some of the underlying 
assumptions that inform the existing literature on the role of local government in 
implementing apartheid policies. In particular, they have questioned the notion 
that municipalities were merely ‘watchdogs’ of the central government.20 The 
thesis takes up this challenge by analysing the varied relations that existed 
between municipalities on the East Rand, especially Benoni, and the Nationalist 
government. It rejects the notion that the relationship between United Party- 
dominated local authorities and the government was mainly adversarial, as the 
existing literature implies. Thus Bekker and Humphries have argued that 
“Disagreement and conflict between the municipalities and the Department 
became much more marked as the newly elected National Party government 
began to implement wide-ranging changes in policy.”21 This thesis contends that 
on the East Rand in the 1950s the conservative wing of the United Party, which
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dominated the municipalities of Benoni, Germiston and Springs, developed 
unusually co-operative relations with the Nationalist government, which at the 
time was dominated by the proponents of practical apartheid. By contrast, the 
/?»m/-inclined Nationalist sympathisers who dominated the municipalities of 
Boksburg and Brakpan were reluctant to implement practical apartheid policies, 
which emphasised the stabilisation22 of the urban African population. The 
consequence of this unusual political alignment was that United Party-dominated 
councils were able to establish their African townships relatively quickly, while 
Boksburg and Brakpan lagged behind.
Benoni especially developed a remarkably close relationship with the 
government in the 1950s. J.E. Mathewson’s role as the main link between these 
two tiers of the state significantly facilitated the development of their co-operative 
relationship. Mathewson was a critic of the Nationalist government, but endorsed 
its practical apartheid policies. As the local official responsible for the 
establishment of Daveyton, his views largely shaped the development of the 
township. The Benoni Council’s enthusiasm for practical apartheid urban policies 
won it the government’s support, which resulted in resources (especially finance) 
being made available to it relatively easily. Under the direction of Mathewson, 
Daveyton became the first African township to utilise the site-and service scheme 
and to implement ethnic divisions. Its rapid development also resolved the serious 
squatter problem that had arisen in Benoni in the early 1950s. For all these 
reasons, Daveyton was praised as the ‘model’ African township.
By focusing on the role of local authorities in the implementation of 
apartheid, the thesis reveals a more complex set of relations between the local and 
central tiers of the state than has hitherto been perceived in the literature. It 
especially examines how these varied relations affected the implementation of 
urban apartheid regionally and locally.
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The emergence of ‘modernist apartheid’: the Group Areas Act and ‘proper 
planning’
One of Posel's main criticisms of some of the early writings on apartheid 
is that they implicitly posited the notion of the “development of apartheid as 
having been fundamentally linear and cumulative, each step building on the 
success of the other.”23 She and other social historians have rejected the argument 
that the Nationalist Party came to power with a ‘blue-print’ or ‘grand plan’. Posel 
does, however, agree that apartheid was characterised by more planning.24 This 
thesis concurs with these views and places specific emphasis on the emergence of 
a modernist planning discourse in the pre- and post-1948 state. The arguments 
presented are based on the recent work of Mabin and Wilkinson, as well as other 
geographers and town planners, who have shown how the state drew on 
international planning policies to address the urban crisis of the 1940s and 
1950s.25
Mabin and Wilkinson have concentrated their research on the period prior 
to 1950. This thesis extends their arguments into the early 1950s and discusses the 
flurry of activities initiated by the state to produce detailed plans for the ‘racial’ 
restructuring of the urban areas. In the process, ‘proper planning’ became a 
leitmotif of the state’s urban policies. The GAA was a cornerstone of apartheid. 
The consequences of the GAA, namely, forced removals and the creation of group 
areas have been well documented. The voluminous Surplus People’s Project 
estimated that up to three and a half million people were subjected to forced 
removals.26 Numerous other scholarly and popular works have highlighted the 
hardships experienced by blacks as a result of the implementation of the GAA.27 
Undoubtedly, the disruption of established communities and their displacement 
were black people’s primary experiences of the GAA. However, the emphasis on 
these issues has resulted in a limited and one-sided understanding of the origins of 
the GAA, of black people’s varied responses to it and of the complex processes 
involved in its implementation.
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Mabin’s recent exposition on the ‘roots’ of the GAA argues that it had a 
‘complex genesis’.28 The most common view of the GAA is that its primary aim 
was to enforce compulsory ‘racial’ segregation. This is indisputable. However, 
there were two other crucial objectives of the GAA. Firstly, the GAA was based 
to a large extent on the Pegging Acts that were promulgated by the Smuts 
government in the mid-1940s. The main aims of these Acts were to curtail the 
burgeoning Indian trade (especially in Durban) and to protect white small 
businesses. Thus, Maharaj has argued that this objective was the main influence 
on the GAA.29 Mabin also locates the origins of the GAA in the broader context 
of the state’s emphasis on ‘proper planning’ as a central means to assert control 
over the black population in general.30 It is argued that these three imperatives 
were inextricably linked in the production of the GAA, which included each of 
their objectives. This became clearer from the late 1950s when group areas were 
implemented more systematically.
One of the main shortcomings in the literature on the GAA is the one­
sided view of black people’s responses. Existing studies suggest that the 
overwhelming majority of black people opposed the GAA. This was far from true 
on East Rand where a number of groups came out in support. Their reasons were 
various. Poor coloured and Indian people some times requested the establishment 
of group areas because they saw it as a way of gaining access to houses. Likewise 
African lodgers and squatters willingly moved to the new townships because it 
provided them with an escape from the overcrowding in the locations where 
unscrupulous landlords often exploited them. This thesis explores these 
multifaceted reactions.
A major question also addressed in this thesis is why it often took so long 
for group areas to be implemented. With the notable exception of Meshtrie’s31 
work none has explored the problems associated with the implementation of the 
GAA in the 1950s, let alone in the 1960s. Meshtrie concentrates on the 
administrative difficulties confronted by the Group Areas Board in the 1950s. 
Many of these were however resolved by the mid-1950s. Subsequently, the 
authorities faced further problems in its attempts to create group areas.
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In general, all the East Rand's municipalities supported the GAA.
I lowever, they differed over where these group areas should be located and over 
whether their respective coloured and Indian populations should be removed. The 
varying approaches adopted by the local authorities were shaped by their local 
economic and political interests, which did not always accord with the 
government’s ‘grand plan’ for the creation of regional group areas on the East 
Rand. The emergence of opposition from a host of local white institutions, 
especially in Benoni, to the government’s group areas scheme is explored here. 
Especially noteworthy was the opposition, albeit ephemeral, from the local 
National Party branch and Afrikaner organisations. As a result group areas could 
only be proclaimed in the 1960s. After this the government succeeded in 
implementing most of its regional and group areas plans. However, it took until 
the 1970s for this to be effected and even then the government was forced to 
abandon its regional ‘grand plan’. The reasons behind this are discussed in some 
detail.
Resistance and identity in the East Rand’s ‘black spots’
The history of popular struggles from the late 1930s to 1960 has been 
extensively discussed.32 The inhabitants of the ‘urban black’ spots have featured 
prominently in many of these struggles. This research provides an overview of the 
struggles that occurred in the leading ‘black spots’ on the East Rand from the 
early 1940s until their disestablishment in the late 1950s and early 1960s. One of 
the main concerns here is the impact of urban restructuring on the urban black 
population, and their reactions to it. The analysis provided here proceeds from a 
discussion on the ‘lived experiences’ of the population of the ‘black spots’ -  
Africans, coloureds and Indians. The objective is to scrutinise the opposing 
notions that these areas were characterised either by ‘racial’ tension (the official 
view) or by ‘racial’ harmony (the view expressed by many former inhabitants). 
The social and political relations between the ‘racial’ groups and classes of 
Benoni Old Location are discussed in detail. Class interests and ‘racial’ 
perceptions intersected to produce a complex set of relations that defy simplistic
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characterisation. Numerous points of tension existed in the location: between 
unscrupulous landlords and lodgers, between location youth and migrants, 
between different gangs and between aspirant African entrepreneurs and Indian 
traders -  all of which were aggravated by pervasive poverty and overcrowding. At 
times these tensions flared into open conflict. Most often they were counter­
balanced by a generally harmonious and peaceful set up in the location.
The thesis analyses the influence of these varied relations on the politics of 
the locations, especially on the Congress Movement. It discusses the impact of 
open conflict between sections of the African community and Indian traders on 
the political alliance between the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC). In contrast to the close political relations 
between the ANC and TIC, the coloured community of the East Rand generally 
remained aloof from all politics, including the resistance movements until the late 
1950s. It is suggested here that any explanation of this phenomenon requires an 
analysis of the complicated issues of ‘coloured identity’.
This has been one of the most vexing issues in South African history and 
consequently has received considerable scholarly attention.33 Goldin argues that a 
distinct coloured political identity has been the outcome o f ‘divide-and-rule 
tactics’.34 Goldin’s analysis focuses on the state’s attempts to promote a coloured 
identity. However, he acknowledges the role of “resistance of sections of the 
[coloured] population to the erosion of their position” in the promotion of this 
identity.35 Dugmore also emphasises this point and argues that ‘being coloured’ 
meant exemption “from lower wages, pass laws, certain taxes, residential 
restrictions and, at some levels, particular types of social and police abuse and 
harassment.” Goldin and Lewis’s research is based mainly on the coloured 
population of the Western Cape, which they too readily assume to be 
representative of coloureds from other parts of the country. Dugmore’s analysis of 
the construction of coloured identity in Johannesburg’s Malay location provides a 
valuable correction but is limited to one small section of the Rand and to the 
period prior to the Second World War. This thesis extends Dugmore’s analysis in 
both directions.
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Both Goldin and Dugmore, while admitting to the complexities of a 
coloured identity, conclude that such an identity was indeed constructed. That is, 
they tend to reify the notion of a coloured identity. The experience of coloureds 
on the East Rand in the 1950s and 1960s reveals that the construction of a discreet 
coloured identity was difficult to achieve and was also subject to challenge. The 
construction of a ‘coloured identity’ in the urban areas of the Witwatersrand was 
more diverse and fluid than is allowed for in the existing literature. This had much 
to do with their close ‘lived experiences’ with Africans, a phenomenon that was 
almost entirely absent in the Western Cape. In the ‘black spots’ of the East Rand 
the ‘racial’ demarcations between coloureds and Africans were often very blurred. 
In these instances other social divisions assumed greater significance. Even in the 
‘racially’ exclusive coloured group area of Reiger Park in the 1960s, the 
government found it difficult to engender support for a common coloured identity. 
Nevertheless, there were groups of coloureds who promoted the idea of a distinct 
coloured identity and who petitioned the government to separate them from 
‘uncivilised natives’. These instances however confirm the extreme divergences 
among coloureds about their supposed ‘racial’ identity. This contributed to the 
difficulties in mobilising coloureds for political purposes. Only when radical 
organisations began campaigning on social issues, especially housing, did they 
succeed in drawing coloureds closer to the Congress Movement.
The importance of the 1960s
The 1960s, the decade o f ‘high apartheid’, is among the most under­
researched areas in the history of apartheid.37 Even Lodge’s work,38 which covers 
the period from 1945 to the late 1970s, deals only with the struggles that occurred 
in the immediate aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre. The rest of the decade is 
dealt with as part of chapters on the guerilla struggle and exile politics. The causes 
of this neglect might be ascribed mainly to two issues. First, until recently 
researchers have not readily had access to the archives covering this period. A 
large part of this thesis is based on primary sources that have hitherto not been 
used. Second, the absence of mass struggles during this period has made it an
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unattractive area of research compared to the decades that preceded and succeeded 
it.
Nearly two decades ago Bloch questioned the view of the 1960s as being a 
‘time of silence and defeat, almost without history’. He argued that such a 
perception ‘gives too straight and untextured a view of the decade’.39 By contrast 
he claimed the 1960s as having been ‘dialectically rich’. Bloch’s own attempt to 
find the ‘sounds in the silence’ fell some distance short of substantiating this 
claim. Since then the decade has continued to languish in virtual obscurity and, as 
a result, our collective understanding of the making of apartheid remains limited. 
Bonner and Segal’s study on Soweto provides excellent insight into the 1960s, but 
their account is based primarily on secondary sources.40
This research attempts to prove that the 1960s were indeed a ‘dialectically 
rich’ period in our history. It shows that struggles continued well into the mid- 
1960s despite the harsh repression. Resistance might not have occurred on a mass 
scale comparable to that of the 1950s, but it did not disappear completely. The 
resistance that did materialise mainly took the form of local struggles, such as 
against forced removals in Benoni Old Location, and ultimately failed. Opposition 
to state-created institutions in group areas was also a frequent occurrence. In the 
coloured group areas, including Reiger Park, politics experienced an early rebirth 
in the mid 1960s with the formation of various political parties which contested 
the 1969 Coloured Representative Council elections. Many old coloured activists, 
as well as new militants rallied behind the newly-formed Labour Party because of 
its explicitly oppositional policies. From the early 1970s many of these militants 
began to gravitate towards the emerging Black Consciousness Movement.
A new breed of conservative politicians also emerged in the 1960s. They 
were given the opportunity to establish themselves as leading local figures 
because of the repression of radicals. Furthermore, the government created pseudo 
local government structures in the African townships and group areas in 
accordance with its policies o f ‘separate development’ and ‘community 
development’. These were intended to politicise ethnicity and ‘race’ and provided 
vehicles for the political advancement of conservative politicians.
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A key proposition posited about the 1960s is that the state failed to win 
significant support for its 'racial' policies, despite its dominance over the black 
population. Coercion proved insufficient to engender compliance to the state’s 
group area policies. The reasons for this are discussed and located primarily in the 
context of black people’s deep resentment of forced removals and the lack of 
social development in the group areas. Nevertheless, until the mid-1960s the 
government largely succeeded in stabilising the urban African population. In 
many townships, the African population even experienced some improvement in 
their living conditions and especially in employment. However, these gains were 
undermined by the policies of'high apartheid’ which promoted the development 
of'homelands’ and neglected the urban townships. As a result the few ‘rights’ 
enjoyed by urban Africans came under attack. Equally serious was that the living 
conditions in all the East Rand’s townships began to decline rapidly from the late 
1960s. The ensuing social deterioration contributed significantly to the uprising 
that gripped the country from the mid-1970s.
Chapter Outline
Chapter One provides an overview of the dramatic economic transformation 
experienced by the East Rand from the time when the first coal mines were 
opened at the end of the 19th century through to the manufacturing revolution in 
the 1940s, which laid the basis for the region’s emergence as the country’s leading 
engineering centre. The East Rand’s emergence as a centre of industrial 
development made it a primary destination for workseekers, especially Africans. 
As a result, by the 1940s most towns in the region had experienced a demographic 
revolution, as the urban-based African population came to outnumber the white 
population. The chapter shows that local authorities were woefully incapable of 
dealing with this multi-faceted transformation, which caused overcrowding and 
poverty to become pervasive in the locations. In response black communities 
mounted struggles to improve their lives. The ensuing crisis posed a serious threat 
to the local authorities and the government in general.
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Chapter Two discusses the ways in which the state responded to this urban crisis. 
It is argued that the Smuts government laid much of the ground work of the state’s 
strategy to deal with the urban crisis. For example, the research and reports of the 
Social and Economic Planning Committee and the promulgation of the Pegging 
Acts introduced a modernist discourse o f ‘proper planning’ and strict ‘racial’ 
segregation that formed the basis of the Nationalist Party’s GAA and African 
township development. There were thus important continuities between the 
policies of the United Party and Nationalist Party, especially in relation to the 
critical objective of asserting control over the urban black population. The chapter 
finally focuses attention on two key initiatives introduced by the apartheid 
government to formulate and elaborate detailed plans for its urban restructuring 
schemes, namely, the Mentz and Subsidiary Planning Committees. The 
recommendations of these committees produced the regional ‘grand plan’ for 
restructuring of the East Rand.
Chapter Three traces the implementation of the GAA and the regional ‘grand 
plan’ from their inception to the early 1970s. It shows how the government 
initially enjoyed little success in implementing group areas because of numerous 
administrative impediments and the resistance of the South African Indian 
Congress. However, by the late 1950s the government had introduced a number of 
new laws and amendments to the GAA to take account of these obstacles. When it 
seemed that the regional plan for group areas would be implemented, further 
opposition emerged from local authorities and other white institutions. It took the 
government until the early 1960s to deal with this opposition, after which it was 
able to implement most of its regional ‘grand plan’. The chapter finally discusses 
how this regional plan came unstuck because the areas identified as the regional 
group areas for coloureds and Indians proved too small to accommodate all these 
people in the region. As a result the ‘grand plan’ was abandoned in the 1970s.
Chapter Four concentrates on the establishment of Daveyton and addresses the 
question of why this township came to be regarded as the ‘model’ African 
township. It is argued that the close relationship between the United Party-
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dominated local authority and the Nationalist government created the conditions 
that allowed for the rapid development of Daveyton according to the principles set 
out by H.F. Verwoerd. The chapter then discusses how Daveyton was developed 
first as a site-and-service settlement and then how it benefited from a huge 
financial injection to build more than 8000 houses in only a few years. In addition, 
Daveyton was the first township to be divided along ethnic lines. The role o f J.E. 
Mathewson as an intermediary between the government and municipality is 
highlighted. The experience of Daveyton’s development is compared with that of 
its neighbours. It is argued that in the early 1960s the government succeeded in 
stabilising the African working class through repression, the provision of housing 
and as a result of better employment opportunities being available to them.
Chapter Five continues to trace the evolution of Daveyton and focuses mainly on 
the 1960s. It discusses how the government’s shift towards promoting ethnic 
‘homelands’ from the late 1950s adversely affected urban townships. Throughout 
the 1960s black urban ‘rights’ came under concerted attack and African women 
especially were marginalised. Even the compliant UBCs found the government 
reluctant to confer additional powers on it. In the government’s view Africans 
could only exercise ‘rights’ in the ‘homelands’. Furthermore social conditions 
entered a steep decline as finances and other resources were diverted to the 
‘homelands’. By the early 1970s African townships on the East Rand began to 
suffer from overcrowding and deteriorating social conditions. Even Daveyton 
could not escape this downward spiral and thus rapidly lost its reputation as the 
‘model’ township.
Chapter Six discusses the introduction of the concept of community 
development, the coloured and Indian version o f ‘separate development’. These 
policies were initiated because the government realised that its emphasis on 
forced removals had alienated the majority of coloureds and Indians. As a result 
its racial policies engendered little support among these people. In the early 1960s 
Indians were formally recognised as ‘citizens’ of the country, albeit without 
political rights. The chapter deals in detail with the government’s policy changes
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towards the Indian population. It discusses the various proposals mooted to deal 
differently with the question of the future of Indian traders, who were among the 
most severely affected by group areas. However, the government’s early gestures 
towards a more developmental programme for coloured and Indians failed to 
materialise in the 1960s. On the contrary, as the chapter demonstrates, they 
experienced further declines in their standard of living in the new group areas. 
Finally, the government introduced ‘racialised’ local government structures in an 
attempt to add some legitimacy to its segregationist policies.
Chapter Seven discusses the social and political life in the urban ‘black spots’. It 
considers the relations between various groups in these locations and especially 
Benoni Old Location. The chapter pays some attention to the causes and impact of 
1952 ‘race riots’ in Benoni Old Location. It shows how the political elite o f the 
African National Congress and Transvaal Indian Congress reacted to this violence 
and how they managed in the succeeding period to build a reasonably successful 
political alliance. The coloured residents of the location entered this alliance much 
later because of their reluctance to become involved in political struggles. In the 
late 1950s the Congress Movement had established itself as the dominant political 
voice of the majority of the old location’s residents and became a stronghold of 
the anti-apartheid movement.
Chapter Eight looks at the struggles conducted by residents of Benoni’s Old 
Location against forced removals. It shows how the campaigns by Africans, 
coloureds and Indians coalesced in the late 1950s, but were torn asunder by the 
repression of the 1960s and the internecine squabbles in the organisations leading 
these struggles. The chapter discusses the reconstitution of politics in the group 
areas. The demise of the TIC paved the way for the emergence of conservative 
politicians in Actonville. The rise to prominence of personalities such as Abram- 
Mayet was facilitated by the introduction of the Indian Consultative Committee 
(ICC). However, this committee was wracked by controversy from the outset. A 
few former TIC members organised opposition to the ICC in the hope of replacing 
the allegedly corrupt leaders. The situation in the coloured group areas, Reiger
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Park, developed along very different lines. The government’s attempt to construct 
or impose a coloured identity was largely unsuccessful because of the numerous 
social divisions that existed among residents and because of the almost universal 
objection to group areas. As a result the Coloured Consultative Committee failed 
to make an impression on the area. However, in the late 1960s politics in Reiger 
Park came alive as various parties contested for seats on the CRC. Most of these 
parties were pro-government, but the Labour Party openly criticised the 
government’s policies. As a result it became a focal point of opposition politics in 
the area.
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CHAPTER ONE
Urban Transformation and Crisis on the East Rand
South Africa’s urban centres experienced fundamental transformation during 
the 1940s and 1950s, the principal manifestations o f which were the extraordinary 
industrialisation of the economy and the ensuing large influx o f blacks to the towns. 
The huge urban-bound migration of African people was also a consequence o f the 
progressive impoverishment in the rural areas which drove thousands o f destitute 
people off the land to the towns where the prospects of work and survival seemed 
more promising. It was during this period that urban centres stamped their 
indisputable domination on the economic and socio-political landscape o f the 
country.
Until the late 1930s the majority o f Africans on the Witwatersrand were single 
male migrants working in the mines and living in compounds. This situation reflected 
the dominance of mining in the national economy, as well as the relative success o f 
influx control measures. As a result, the ratio between permanently urbanised blacks 
and whites remained finely balanced and stable for most o f this period. This was 
remarkable considering the overwhelming preponderance o f the African population 
nationally. The state was thus able to preserve the towns as centres o f white privilege 
and power partly by keeping the vast majority of Africans confined to the rural areas 
through measures such as the influx control system.
However, the massive influx of black people into the urban centres during the 
1940s confronted the authorities with a range of new and serious social and political 
challenges which they proved, at least initially, incapable o f resolving. The response 
of the state (especially at a local level) was characterised by ineptitude, neglect, and 
poor judgement as well as being primarily reactive. It would take another decade, and
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a new government, before the state would begin to regain control o f the towns. The 
East Rand, with its unparalleled concentration of seven of the country’s leading 
towns, was a crucial arena in which these processes unfolded. This chapter surveys 
the industrialisation o f the East Rand and its effects on the different towns and their 
populations. It reveals not only the rapid transformation of the region, but also the 
extent to which it became a centre o f intense political contestation in the 1940s and 
early 1950s. For all these reasons the East Rand emerged during this period as a 
region o f strategic national importance. The regional scope of the crisis (albeit with 
important differences between the towns) in the years after the Second World War 
also placed the East Rand in a unique position that earned it unprecedented attention 
from the state, especially after the Nationalist Party assumed power in 1948. This 
chapter draws on some o f the most important research conducted previously on the 
crises and struggles on the East Rand during the forties and early fifties. These 
studies have mainly focused on popular struggles in specific towns.1 Here the aim is 
to paint a picture o f how these various processes unfolded on a regional basis.
Industrialisation and urbanisation
The East Rand’s economic history conformed closely with the trajectory of 
the national economy from the opening of the first coal and gold mines at the end of 
the nineteenth century to the period of intense industrialisation during the Second 
World War. Because the East Rand has existed so much in the shadow of 
Johannesburg, its economic transformation has received far less attention than it 
deserves.2 Yet, by the mid-1960s the region had emerged as the country’s engineering 
heartland and in the process the towns of Germiston, Benoni, Alberton, Boksburg and .... 
Springs became pivotal cogs in the national manufacture-dominated economy.
Until the 1930s the South African economy was dominated by mining and 
agriculture, with only limited manufacturing development having taken place in the 
preceding decades. Even then the emerging industrial sector was mainly linked to 
mining and was concentrated in only a few centres, with Johannesburg
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overshadowing everything else. All of the East Rand’s major towns originated as 
mining settlements at the end of the nineteenth century. A year after the discovery o f. 
gold at Langlaagte in Johannesburg, mining'operations commenced in Nigel and
Benoni. In the case of the latter the farms Vlakfontein, Kleinfontein and
•>
Modderfontein were among the most prominent digging sites. In Brakpan and 
Springs coal mining dominated early mining activities, but was superseded in the 
1910s by gold mining.4 The fortunes of gold mining fluctuated from its inception, 
influenced both by the vagaries of the international economy and the problems 
associated with deep level mining on the Witwatersrand. Gold mining on the East 
Rand proceeded tentatively in its formative years compared to the more dynamic 
progress in Johannesburg. However, after overcoming this rather unspectacular 
genesis the East Rand became the primary centre o f gold mining in the country from 
the mid-twenties to the early fifties.5 Between 1924 and 1949 the region produced 
more than half of the country’s gold, surpassing the dominant role played by 
Johannesburg’s gold mines in the early decades of the century.6 At different times 
mines in Brakpan (the State Mines in the 1930s) and in Springs (Daggafontein in the 
late 1940s) were leading gold producers in the country.7 In Benoni gold mining 
boomed between 1912 and 1930, then declined for four years, and was later rescued 
by the hike in the price of gold in 1935, which rendered operations profitable for the 
subsequent fifteen years and allowed it to stutter along thereafter until the early 
sixties. Although a couple of mines (New Van Ryn and New Kleinfontein) operated 
profitably throughout the fifties, gold mining had by this time entered a period o f 
terminal decline and by the mid-1960s the industry ceased to exist in the town.8 The 
history o f gold mining in the other East Rand towns followed a similar pattern o f 
highs and lows, and finally experienced long term decline in terms of its relative 
contribution to the region’s economy. Notwithstanding its ultimate fate, gold mining 
contributed hugely to the initial transformation of the East Rand from a sparsely 
populated and undeveloped region into one the country’s leading economic zones. It 
also shaped the unique urban conurbation of the region, comprising six or seven of
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the country’s leading towns. But perhaps its most significant legacy was to lay the 
basis for the later industrial revolution o f the region.
The outbreak of the Second World War provided the initial critical impetus to 
the country’s relatively undeveloped manufacturing sector, resulting in a massive 
expansion of secondary industry. The disruption caused to the world economy, 
especially to the leading industrial nations, and the concomitant increase in demand 
for consumer goods by the embattled Allied countries spurred the South African 
government to adopt a more aggressive import substitution policy.9 As a result 
manufacturing output grew by an impressive 5,1% per annum between 1936/7 and 
1946/7.10 The relative importance of secondary industry soared during this period 
reaching a crucial milestone in 1943 when it overtook mining as the single largest 
contributor to the gross national product.11 By the end of the war the national 
economy had undergone a veritable revolution and established South Africa as the 
leading industrial economy on the African continent.
The Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) complex led the way in the 
processes of industrialisation and modernisation. The strength o f this region’s 
industrial economy was graphically illustrated by the presence in 1948/49 o f a third 
o f the country’s industrial establishments (and 44% of industrial employees) in this 
area. Although Johannesburg remained the dominant economic centre throughout 
the period, the East Rand benefited tremendously from its proximity to the country’s 
industrial hub and rapidly asserted itself as a key emerging manufacturing centre. By 
the end of the 1940s the East Rand already employed approximately one third o f 
industrial employees on the Witwatersrand (82 954 out of 243 007), while the East 
Rand’s industrial employee population easily outstripped the combined total o f 
Pretoria and Vereeniging, the two other important industrial centres o f the PWV
13region.
Genniston experienced industrial expansion earlier than other East Rand 
towns mainly because o f its proximity to Johannesburg. From the early 1920s, light 
industries (especially in the clothing sector) began to establish themselves in the 
town. An important consequence o f this development was the establishment o f one o f
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the country’s major railway junctions in Germiston.14 As a result o f these factors, the 
town was ideally placed to benefit from the country’s economic growth during the 
Second World War. Benoni and Boksburg experienced particularly rapid 
manufacturing development during the war, to such an extent that by the mid-1940s 
these two areas combined had the highest density of industrialisation in the country.15 
Spurred on by wartime military requirements, Benoni’s existing heavy industries 
massively increased output. For example, Dunswart Iron and Steel produced a 
staggering 1 Vi million mortars and 60 000 bombs to augment the arsenal o f the Allied 
forces. Other companies such as Head Wrightson & Co., Standard Brass, Burmco and 
Delfos also reaped spectacular benefits from gearing their production to the war 
effort.16 Benoni’s reputation as a burgeoning centre of manufacturing attracted 
substantial new investment. During the war a number of important new enterprises 
were established in the town, including United Cotton and Textile Company (Amato 
Textiles) and Cape Asbestos Insulations. In the immediate aftermath o f the war new 
investment into Benoni was even more impressive as a number o f heavy industrial 
companies such as General Electric relocated their main operations to the town. The 
transformation of the town’s economy was undoubtedly spectacular and in 1947 
Benoni was widely recognised as a leading centre of heavy industry in the country.17 
In 1951 the metal and engineering sectors accounted for 57,2% and 65,9% of the total 
number of industrial employees in Benoni and Boksburg respectively , which 
vividly demonstrates the growing dominance of manufacturing in those towns and the 
region as a whole. Germiston19 established itself as an important manufacturing 
centre before the rest of the region and Springs did not lag far behind. The industrial 
expansion of Benoni and Springs was hugely aided by their respective council’s 
aggressive campaigns to attract new investment. For example, Morris Nestadt o f 
Benoni was a prominent figure in promoting industrialisation o f his town and the East 
Rand.20
Further evidence of the robust expansion of industry on the East Rand was the 
growing demand for industrial land in the fifties. In 1954 most of the major industrial 
towns in the region had each used 70% or more of the industrial land available for
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this purpose. Especially in Benoni, the rapidly expanding industries quickly gobbled 
up most available industrial land. Only Springs had utilised less industrial land 
(60%).21 The apparently insatiable demand for industrial land often placed the 
region’s leading industrial towns at loggerheads with the central government because 
o f the latter’s determination to control industrial growth in order to curb the influx o f 
Africans into the towns. Collectively these developments represented an important 
qualitative shift in the character o f these local economies and were symptomatic o f 
the region’s industrial transformation.
The East Rand’s dynamic economic development made it an important 
destination for work-seekers. From the time the first mines started operating and the 
first mining villages developed, prospective miners and labourers and entrepreneurs 
streamed to the region in search o f work or fortune. By the turn o f the twentieth 
century thousands o f black and white miners had congregated in the nascent mining 
towns. During the first three decades of the twentieth century the region’s population 
grew relatively consistently. Where dramatic growth spurts occurred, as was the case 
in Benoni and Brakpan between 1921 and 1936, they were usually associated with the 
changing fortunes in the gold mining industry in those towns. This applied to both the 
African and white populations. In Benoni and Brakpan the white population 
registered substantial increases of 45% and 144% respectively. The African 
population grew by large but slightly different proportions, (see Table One). In 
contrast the coloured and Indian populations increased only modestly, growing only 
by virtue of the low natural increase in their numbers. Only negligible migration o f 
these populations took place from Natal and the Cape, where their numbers were 
concentrated.
In general the expansion of the towns of the East Rand mirrored the broader 
national process of urbanisation. The increase in the proportion o f each population 
group residing in the urban areas between 1921 and 1936 reveal a steady flow o f 
people to the urban centres. Thus the percentage of whites in the main urban centres 
increased from 44,5% to 55,5%, coloureds from 34,4% to 41,6%, Asiatics from 
45,4% to 58,6% and Africans from 9,9% to 14,5%.22 As these figures indicate the
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African population in the mid-1930s resided overwhelmingly in the rural areas: two 
million stayed in the Reserves, 2,2 million on farms (mainly white owned farms) and 
only one and a half million in towns.23 Furthermore, the urban-based African 
population was also mainly migrant and male. The relatively low figure for urban 
coloureds reflected the high rural coloured population in the Cape, in contrast to the 
Transvaal where the relatively small coloured population mostly lived in the towns.
A profound shift in the character of the urban population profile was to occur 
from the later 1930s as the number o f Africans settling permanently in the towns 
increased rapidly. Nationally, in the decade between 1936 and 1946 the African urban 
population increased by a huge 50% from 1 141 642 to 1 794 212. W omen featured 
especially prominently in the new wave of urban migration, resulting in a near 
doubling in the numbers of African women in the urban areas from about 350 000 to 
650 000. Notwithstanding a plethora o f measures instituted by the government to 
stem the tide o f urbanisation, the African urban population soared even higher in the 
late forties and fifties, reaching a total o f 3,5 million in I960.24
What these bare statistics do not reveal adequately is the pronounced shift that 
occurred in the character of the urban-based African population in the 1940s from 
being primarily a mine-based and migrant population to being a more permanently 
settled urban proletariat.25 The almost insatiable demand for labour by the rapidly 
expanding secondary industry attracted hundreds of thousands of African workers. 
Between 1936 and 1951 the number of African male workers employed in industry 
increased by more than 100% from 272 641 to 590 929, a phenomenal increase by 
any measure.26
An important milestone was reached in 1946 when the number o f African 
industrial employees for the first time outnumbered the number o f African miners 
(448 687 to 425 884). Five years later the gap between the two had widened even 
further as the number of African industrial employees surged ahead to reach 590 929, 
whereas mining employment registered an insignificant increase o f less than 13 
000. O f equal importance was the ever-widening chasm between the proportion o f 
black and white industrial employees as part of the total work force.
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TABLE ONE
East Rand population per magisterial district, 1921 - 193628
African Coloured Indian W hite Total
1921 1936 1921 1936 1921 1936 1921 1936 1921 1936
Benoni 31629 53854 1049 1876 570 959 14483 21071 47731 77760
B oksburg 24318 32405 625 1051 620 754 12416 15916 37979 50126
B rakpan 17331 37106 186 319 39 31 7108 17355 28664 54811
Springs 14518 67190 187 606 207 642 4488 18436 19400 86874
G erm iston 25623 40442 565 1199 470 722 15697 25779 42355 68142
Total 113419 230997 2612 5051 1906 3108 54192 98557 172129 337713
TABLE TWO
Total Population and Industrial Employees on the East Rand, 195129
Benoni Boksburg Brakpan Germiston Nigel Springs
Population 113 025 65 397 85 040 177 034 46 698 152 283
Industrial 15 034 7 702 3 966 41 907 1 624 12 721
Employees
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TABLE THREE
East Rand population per magisterial district, 1946 —195130
African Coloured Indian White Total
1946 1951 1946 1951 1946 1951 1946 1951 1946 1951
Benoni 5081 1 67147 2997 3917 1289 1683 30193 36738 85290 109481
Boksburg 32547 36931 1218 1599 838 1161 22028 24625 56631 64316
Brakpan 55678 54939 363 415 47 45 27368 29703 83456 85102
Springs 84387 85849 687 978 744 997 25323 31558 111141 119382
Germiston 87804 99946 2075 2509 1260 1915 57507 74384 148646 178754
Total 311227 344812 7430 9418 4178 5801 162419 197008 336488 378281
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Prior to the war, African male industrial employees outnumbered their white 
counterparts by 102 746. In 1946 this difference more than doubled to 237 882 and 
by 1951 it stood at 347 635, which amounted to more than double the number o f 
white industrial employees.31 O f the 819 658 industrial employees listed nationally in 
1952/3 nearly two-thirds (512 782) were black.32 Since the PWV was the indisputable 
centre of industrialization, it was here where African industrial employment was most 
pronounced. Between 1936 and 1951 African industrial employment rocketed by 
270% (from 80 378 to 217 022).33
The declining importance of mining and the growth of the industrial sector 
had the combined effect of substantially reducing the proportion o f migrant labour 
within the total African urban population. From the 1940s the number o f  African 
people deciding to settle permanently in the urban centres increased substantially. An 
important manifestation of this trend on the East Rand in the late 1940s was that the 
number of Africans residing in locations exceeded those living in compounds. In 
Benoni, for example, in the late 1930s there were 32 278 African mineworkers 
compared to 23 200 non-miners. In 1950 a reversal of these proportions had taken 
place as the number of African miners declined by nearly half to 17 927 and the non­
mining sector increased to 28593.34 Springs was a notable exception to this trend due 
to the continued importance o f gold mining. Although the town’s urban-based 
population experienced a similar explosive growth as other East Rand centres (to 33 
000 in 1952), the number o f African miners remained exceptionally high at 53 321
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(1560 women) all of whom lived in compounds. It should also be noted that the 
official figures tended to underestimate the population o f the locations. For example, 
a survey by the Benoni municipality conducted in 1948 found that the African urban 
population was 40% higher than the official statistics.36 Similar discrepancies 
occurred in the recording o f Payneville’s population by various official bodies.37
Thus at the start o f the 1950s the East Rand’s urban centres looked 
substantially different from their appearance before the outbreak o f the war. The 
social and political consequences of this relatively rapid and radical transformation 
are the subjects of the following section.
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U rban socio-economic decay
South Africa’s impressive industrialisation and urban expansion in the 1940s 
signified the country’s integration into the modern (capitalist) world economy. This 
process of modernization had differential effects on the country’s population. The 
ruling class experienced an accelerated accumulation of wealth and the white 
population generally attained substantial improvements in their standard o f living. In 
contrast, the living conditions o f the majority of blacks either stagnated or declined. 
Although some sections of the African industrial workforce benefited from wage 
increases, they were unable to escape the physical degradation that pervaded the 
locations. These opposing trends were most glaringly obvious in the towns, which 
were both symbols o f modernity and simultaneously centres o f deprivation.
The East Rand’s municipalities enthusiastically endorsed and promoted their 
respective town’s economic progress. However, they proved far less zealous about 
providing for the social and material needs of the black workforce congregating in 
large numbers within their municipal boundaries, on whom the prosperity o f local 
industries so heavily depended. In particular, the local authorities failed to provide 
adequate accommodation and other social services, which resulted in rapid 
deterioration in the living conditions of most urban blacks. The locations, which were 
the primary places of destination for urban-bound black migrants, suffered especially 
severely under the strain of rapid population growth and utter neglect by the 
municipalities.
Most of these locations were established in the early part of the century and 
from the outset were characterised by the absence of planning, and by squalor and 
overcrowding. Some improvements were effected to the locations in the 1920s 
following the promulgation of the Native (Urban) Areas Act and the ensuing
1 0
formalisation of location management. Even then, however, the housing and 
services provided for blacks were rudimentary and limited to meeting only a bare 
minimum of their immediate needs. Many the houses built in the urban locations 
were owned by the municipalities and were rented or leased to residents. These
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houses were usually small and invariably lacked basic amenities such as running 
water, electricity and sanitation. Residents in some locations were able to build their 
own houses on leased land. Such stand-holders, as they were termed, generally rented 
rooms in their houses or their in the backyards to tenants. For these landlords, rack- 
renting was lucrative, especially as there was a huge demand for such accommodation 
because of the lack of housing provided by the municipalities. As a result a familiar 
tale o f overcrowding, impoverishment and unhealthy conditions developed. These 
were the conditions that pertained to varying degrees in every location on the East 
Rand.
Payneville in Springs was a case in point. The location was designed from the 
outset to accommodate only 8000 people. Until the early 1930s the location’s population 
remained well under this limit (eg. in 1933 the population was 5441). However, by the 
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the African population had nearly doubled 
to 10 000.39 Even this huge leap paled into insignificance compared to the rapid 
population growth experienced during the 1940s. In 1952 the official figure for the 
African population of Payneville stood at 33 OOO.40 This figure represented a staggering 
overpopulation rate of 400%. A further 800 coloured people were squeezed into a 
section of the location known as Cape Stands and approximately 1000 Indians lived in 
the Asiatic Bazaar, which was separated from the location by a street.41 The Springs 
Council, which vociferously promoted the town’s industrialisation (and thus consciously 
solicited an influx o f African labour) responded to this exceptionally rapid growth of the 
town’s urban black population by doing absolutely nothing. Most seriously it failed to 
erect a single house for blacks between 1939 and 1951.42 As a result overcrowding 
became ubiquitous and the location experienced a mushrooming o f backyard shanties. A 
survey o f black Council employees revealed the average number o f people living in a 
room was 6.1, but it also admitted that there were instances o f up to ten people 
occupying a single room.43 The situation was even worse than suggested by the official 
statistics. In 1950 the Council indicated there were only 1000 lodgers in the location.44 
But this was clearly a gross underestimate. In 1953 the town clerk calculated the number 
of lodgers to be 8000, some while after hundreds of mainly lodgers had been removed
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to the new townships, KwaThema 45 Banzi Bangani, renowned jazz trumpeter (for the 
African Inkspots) of the fifties and sixties recalls the conditions on his father's stand:
My father had a stand in Payneville, which he bought from a previous 
owner. The main stand had four rooms and at the back we had three 
rooms. So you could say we had a seven-roomed house. In the main stand 
we had nine people and at the back there u'as a man with his wife and also 
a single man in one room. There were about 16 to 18 people on our stand.
There was not very much space left on the stand. Maybe just enough to 
hang up the washing.46
The conditions in other locations across the East Rand were equally deplorable. 
Sapire has painted a vivid picture of the misery that afflicted residents o f the Brakpan 
Location where “unemployment and pauperdom was rife” 47 The lack o f housing in this 
location forced over 10 000 inhabitants to cram into housing facilities designed to 
accommodate only 6000 people. Germiston was much the same. Its rapid economic 
expansion in the late thirties and especially during the war made it a favourite 
destination for workseekers. As a result the town’s location, Dukathole, experienced a 
population explosion earlier than other East Rand towns and by 1938 already had a 
population of 15 000. The continued influx into the area and the lack o f  housing 
provision resulted in massive subletting (about 85% of the location’s standholders sublet 
in 1940). By the end of 1942 approximately 18 000 people were crammed into a 
location designed for only 6000. Stirtonville experienced its population explosion only 
in the forties when Boksburg’s industrial expansion gathered pace. Until then the 
location was perceived as a ‘model location’ boasting amenities such as water-borne 
sewerage not found in any other location. But the demand for labour boosted the 
location’s population to ten thousand by 1946 and despite the opening o f a new section 
to the location that year, overcrowding rapidly became the norm 49 Alberton Location 
was seemingly the only location in the region that managed to escape a similar steep 
decline in its living conditions. This was a consequence o f the lack o f industrial
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development and consequently a slower rate of growth of its black population in the 
1940s, which meant that less pressure was exerted on the limited resources of the 
location.''’0
Possibly the worst affected areas on the East Rand were Benoni Old Location 
and the adjacent Asiatic Section. The extent of overcrowding in the old location was 
evidenced by the presence o f about 1900 lodger families living in backyard shacks on 
the stands of most of the 1 179 houses there. Usually 3 to 4 families occupied yards and 
often a single 50 x 50 feet plot housed between eight to twelve families. It was not 
uncommon to find up to twelve people squashed into a single room.51 The 
overcrowding in the old location soon spilled over to the neighbouring Asiatic Section 
as homeless African residents desperately sought any available accommodation, which 
was mostly readily supplied by landlords in that area. Rack-renting became a relatively 
lucrative source of income for landlords from the location and the Asiatic section. In 
1945 an official report lamented the fact that the desperate lack o f accommodation in the 
‘location proper’ caused the Asiatic section to be transformed into a location in its own 
right.52 A report by the Native Social Worker described the Asiatic Section as ‘the 
most undesirable place to live in by the law-abiding person, both Native and 
European ways of living are being violated to extremes.’53 In 1945 it was estimated 
that more than 2500 African and 1000 Indian residents were crammed onto the 120 
50 x 50 feet stands in the area.54 By 1950 the African population in the section had 
doubled to 5003 causing unimaginable overcrowding, including in one case a stand 
being occupied by 111 people.55 Such conditions were not confined to the African 
section o f the location. A not entirely dissimilar situation prevailed in Parktown, a 
small area set aside for coloured residents of Benoni. In 1946 residents complained that 
in the 25 years o f the area’s existence the only improvement effected there was the 
connection of water pipes. Houses in the area were falling apart and were as 
overcrowded as those in the African section. They accordingly demanded that the 
Council provide electricity and proper sanitation so that they could enjoy a decent
i • • 56living.
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Overcrowding, poverty, the lack of adequate sanitation and proper medical 
services consigned the locations to being cesspools of disease. In the late 1940s the 
Medical Officer o f Springs regularly complained of the dangers o f outbreaks o f poverty- 
related diseases in Payneville. His fears were confirmed in 1950 when there was an 
outbreak of diphtheria57 and over 800 tuberculosis cases were reported,58 which by any 
account should have constituted an epidemic. The alarmingly high rate of infant 
mortality was particularly chilling. In 1952/53 the infant mortality rate among Africans 
and coloureds was 383.77 and 166.66 per thousand live births respectively, compared to 
only 41.01 for whites.59 In the mid-1940s Benoni’s Medical Officer of Health also 
warned of the serious danger of epidemics as tuberculosis, pneumonia and intestinal 
diseases constantly threatened to become uncontrollable. Infant mortality among 
Africans was as high as in Payneville, with 33% of new-borns not living beyond their 
first birthdays.60 In Brakpan where houses lacked bathrooms and even taps in the yards 
infant diarrhoea and enteric fever was widespread. It was also estimated that more than 
75% of the population suffered from malnutrition.61 The experience of black residents 
on the East Rand, like their counterparts elsewhere in the country, was thus 
characterised by poverty, deprivation and disease.
Locales beyond control
One o f the principal features o f the 1940s and early 1950s was the state’s 
diminishing ability to exercise effective control over the urban black working class, 
which was becoming increasingly oppositional and combative. Previously the 
combination o f influx control, segregation and a battery of coercive laws proved 
reasonably successful in maintaining stability and order. But an increasingly large 
and refractory urban black population gradually punched holes in this structure. The 
diminution, and often break-down, of state control occurred at multiple levels: influx 
control was habitually floutedf urban segregation was increasingly transgressed and a 
host of location regulations aimed at controlling inhabitants were brazenly and 
regularly violated. Most seriously, perhaps, was the growing political militancy that
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engulfed locations in which radical organisations such as the Communist Party of 
South Africa (CPSA) and later a more militant African National Congress (ANC) 
played crucial roles. The East Rand’s locations featured prominently in the 
proliferation o f these ‘subversive’ activities especially in the immediate aftermath o f 
the war.
The state’s ability to maintain urban centres as domains o f white privilege and 
power depended in large measure on the effectiveness o f its influx control policies. 
Until the late 1930s the state succeeded in keeping a relatively stable balance between 
the urban black population and local labour requirements. This was in large part due 
to the preponderance of the mining sector, which relied very heavily on migrant 
African labour. The influx control system was however thrown into disarray by the 
burgeoning manufacturing sector. Municipalities increasingly concentrated on 
meeting the labour requirement o f their local industries at the expense o f influx 
control, which was the responsibility of the central government (particularly the 
Department of Native Affairs). For local authorities the provision o f an adequate 
supply of cheap black labour was crucial to their ability to attract industry to their 
respective towns. On the East Rand where towns also competed against each other for 
the status of being the region’s pre-eminent industrial centre, influx control virtually 
collapsed prompting considerable tension between the central government and local 
authorities. A formal complaint by the Native Commissioner in the late 1940s over 
the conduct of the Benoni Council reflected a common perception among state 
officials that local authorities were responsible for the failure of influx control: “Ever 
since my arrival in Benoni”, he lamented to his superiors in the Department o f  Native 
Affairs, “I availed myself of every opportunity o f warning the Council o f the 
seriousness o f the position and that it was deteriorating rapidly as a result o f  the 
Industrial expansion of Benoni and the apparent reluctance on the part o f the Council 
to control the influx of natives into the area. After three years in Benoni I can only 
say that conditions are as bad as ever...” The East Rand more broadly mirrored this 
trend.
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The mass entry of black people into the towns generated fear and anxiety 
among the authorities and the white population in general.63 In Springs in 1946 the 
death of a number of white youth during a gang fight with black youth caused a major 
panic among white residents, who convened a ‘black peril’ public meeting to demand 
that the authorities assert control over the black population.64 Although the fear over 
the so-called swart gevaar did not reach the same intensity elsewhere in the region, 
there was nonetheless widespread concern among whites that Africans were 
swamping the towns. The Nationalist Party successfully manipulated these concerns 
during the 1948 election campaign.
Pass laws were routinely flouted by those whose movements they aimed to 
control. African males in search of work regularly circumvented the system. Those 
entering towns ‘illegally’ invariably sought refuge in the locations where the 
likelihood of detection by the state were less than elsewhere. Sometimes they could 
not secure ‘legal’ employment and were forced to enter one o f the many ‘illegal’ 
trades of the township in order to survive. Those who were caught in one o f the 
regular pass raids and who were jailed or deported (to the rural area o f  their origin), 
invariably returned to the urban area as soon as it became possible, entering 
‘illegally’ and living on the margins of society to avoid detection. The government’s 
insistence on imposing highly restrictive influx control measures forced many people 
to employ a variety of evasive strategies to avoid deportation to the impoverished 
rural areas.
The more general absence o f control over the urban black population living in 
the locations caused even greater consternation. A number o f writers have drawn 
attention to the myriad experiences o f the newly urbanised (or urbanising) black 
population.65 These contributions have highlighted the multi-faceted nature o f  urban 
life and have revealed often in vivid detail the trials and tribulations, the poverty, the 
struggle for survival and rebellion that characterised the lives o f black urban dwellers. 
A common thread running through these accounts is the extent to which the urban 
existence o f a large number of blacks, especially Africans, was characterised by 
opposition to attempts by the authorities to assert control over them. Overt political
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resistance under the auspices o f national or local political organisations and unions 
punctuated the entire period, but a far more persistent challenge to the authorities 
came from the range of daily ‘illegal’ and ‘anti-social’ activities. The ubiquitous 
socio-economic deprivation in the locations coupled with the restrictive laws that 
controlled virtually every aspect of the lives of African urban dwellers produced a 
culture of opposition as residents sought ways to survive and overcome the 
oppressive and impoverishing conditions of life.
‘Illegal’ beer brewing by African women was perhaps the quintessential and 
most pervasive example of such unplanned ‘subversive’ and ‘anti-social’ activities. In 
every location scores of women daily defied the law in this way and in so doing 
presented the authorities with one of their most serious and persistent problems o f 
control. Employment options for African women in the formal economy were very 
limited and the sectors where they were employed, mainly as domestic workers, were 
notoriously exploitative. Wages for African men were only marginally better which 
meant the majority of urban African families were constantly engaged in a struggle to 
survive. Under these conditions many women were forced to engage in alternative 
activities to supplement their inadequate family incomes. These pressures, together 
with the high demand for the various concoctions brewed in the backyards o f the 
locations, made domestic brewing a highly popular and relatively lucrative enterprise. 
Despite continuous harassment by the authorities shebeens sprang up in backyards all 
over the locations and they became the meccas of social life in the locations. Over 
weekends location residents, migrants from the compounds and workers living in the 
white parts o f the towns would flock to their favourite shebeen for drinks, music, 
dancing and sex. Some shebeen queens would sell ‘white liquor’ to their patrons, 
another deliberate but also lucrative act o f defiance.66 Little wonder then that the 
authorities blamed shebeens and beer brewing for being the principal causes o f  the 
high incidence o f ‘anti-social’ behaviour in the locations. Shebeen queens and beer- 
brewers suffered constantly at the hands of authorities who were determined to stamp 
out ‘illegal’ brewing. Beer-raids were so common they became part o f the life o f the 
townships and all brewers expected discovery and even prosecution at some point.
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During these raids the police would often confiscate thousands o f gallons o f  beer, 
destroy brewing utensils and arrest brewers. But they rarely succeeded in terminating 
the activity and brewing normally continued unabated until the next raid. Beer 
brewers also devised various measures to avoid detection, including most commonly 
digging underground caverns in which to hide their beer and employing youth as 
look-outs to warn them of raids. The regular confrontations between beer brewers and 
the authorities contributed to the growth of a culture of resistance in the locations.
Crime also flourished in many locations on the East Rand, which were home 
to an array of gangs, which primarily consisted of urban youth. These gangs usually 
adopted colourful names such as the Mau Mau from Stirtonville, Ringo Stars and 
Mashalashala from Payneville and the DMGs, Vultures and Fast 11s from 
Dukathole.67 Tsotsis roamed the locations preying on locals and regularly fought 
with each other. One of the most feared gangs that emerged on the East Rand was the 
notorious Ma-Rashea (Russians) a mainly migrant Basotho gang which fought among 
themselves and especially against location tsotsis. Benoni was one of the main 
centres where the Russians were to be found in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Formed there in 1947, they often fought bloody pitched battles in the location and
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Asiatic Section. The existence of these gangs reflected the propensity among 
location and other youth to be anti-authoritarian and ‘anti-social’. The authorities 
were unable to assert any effective control over these youth and especially failed to 
draft them into menial, low-paying industrial labour. Although these gangs were 
mainly apolitical (a source of tension between them and the local political leadership) 
they represented a significant informal and largely uncontrollable force o f opposition.
The 1945 report of Benoni’s Native Social Worker vividly depicted the 
squalor in the location as well as white officialdom’s utter despair about the ‘social 
evils’ so pervasive in the Asiatic Section:
Each room is occupied by 3 so-called families together with children 
of about 10 to 16 years of age; the result of this delinquency. Female 
children soon take up their own rooms conditionally with any Mine
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labourer who will be in a position to pay rent whilst she is getting 
established to be independent by means of persuading other young 
women to share the room with her for.easy rent. The rooms at the 
Indian Section are not all occupied for living, some are used for 
gambling, stocking of stolen property, liquor and various ways of 
immorality. Some natives occupying these rooms are the unruly 
daughters and sons of location residents... Nothing whatsoever is 
considered about the laws of health.... this place is a disgrace to the 
Bantu race, what prevails is not accepted by any society.69
This kind of near-hysterical perception of the locations was common at all 
levels of the government. White officialdom’s attitude was succinctly and graphically 
captured in the description of the locations as ‘black spots’, a pejorative label alluding 
to their ‘racial’ make-up, politically ‘troublesome’ character and the widespread 
poverty and disease that plagued them. In short the locations were regarded as 
blemishes on the white and modern urban landscape. Urban ‘black spots’ had clearly 
become the antithesis o f what the authorities intended them to be. Instead o f places 
where the authorities could exert tight control over the African population, they were 
sites of defiance, subversion and resistance. Within the locations the backyards or 
rounds were effectively beyond the control of the authorities. More often they were 
under the sway of a shebeen queen, gang or a landlord. A particularly salient feature 
of these spaces in the location was the important role played by women in their socio­
economic life, which in turn often placed them in the forefront o f  resistance against 
attempts by the authorities to intrude on and control the activities occurring in the 
backyards.
Segregation undermined
Another crucial area of concern for the authorities was the extent to which the 
carefully constructed segregation o f the towns was being broken down by the mass 
influx o f blacks. Residential segregation was the norm in all towns on the East Rand
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(as well as nationally) from the time of their inception. In the 1920s the government 
intervened (through the passage o f the Native (Urban) Areas Act o f 1923) to reinforce 
residential segregation between black and whites, and to tighten municipal control 
over the black population. The success o f these measures always varied between 
towns and within towns the boundaries o f control and segregation also varied over 
time. The existence of compounds, where the majority o f Africans resided until the 
late thirties, also reinforced segregation. The main emphasis o f the authorities during 
the early years was to ensure segregation between whites and blacks, with much less 
consideration being given to segregation between black people. For example, in 
locations such as Payneville and Stirtonville coloureds lived in the same location as 
Africans. In the former they were housed in a separate section right in the middle o f 
the location in an area known as ‘Cape Stands’. But these were not very serious 
attempts to impose segregation and under the circumstances where there was a 
serious shortage of houses people lived wherever they could find accommodation. 
The East Rand was also interesting because of the existence o f a relatively high 
number of the so-called Asiatic Bazaars, which were formally governed by a different 
set o f regulations (the Asiatic Bazaar regulations). These Bazaars were normally 
located adjacent to the municipal locations and became important trading centres. The 
relationship between these areas varied across the East Rand. In Springs, a relative 
stricter segregation was maintained between Bakerton (the Asiatic Bazaar) and 
Payneville. The opposite occurred in Benoni where the two areas virtually blended 
into one large location.
The lack of housing development in the locations forced many people to seek 
accommodation elsewhere. The result was that urban segregation was flouted, first in 
the broader locations (namely, the municipal locations and adjacent Asiatic Bazaars) 
but the also in the white sections o f the towns. Traditionally, the authorities accepted 
the occupation of backrooms by domestic workers but tried to keep a tight rein on this 
form of ‘mixed’ occupation of properties in white-areas. The extreme housing shortage 
prevailing at the end of the war affected not only the African location but also the 
coloured area, to such an extent that numerous coloured families began occupying
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rooms and shacks in the white areas of Benoni. The council was deeply concerned by 
this influx of coloured people into white suburbs and even considered invoking the 
Volksraad Besluit of 1871, a piece of legislation promulgated by the old Transvaal 
Republic, to prevent coloureds and whites occupying the same place. It decided against 
this course of action because the removal of these families would have obliged it to 
provide alternative accommodation. Moreover, when families were removed others
71desperate for any form of housing immediately took their places.
Peri-urban areas also became important sites of occupation especially for new 
arrivals who used the farms adjacent to the urban areas as safe haven from where they 
would regularly attempt to find permanent accommodation in the location. People 
endorsed out of an urban area would often also relocate to a peri-urban site instead of 
returning to the rural areas or reserves, waiting for an opportunity to return to the 
location.
The 1936 census figures for the East Rand give some indications of the 
dilemmas and problems that were about to unfold before the authorities. The 
preponderance of the African population still living in the compounds (Benoni -  40 
591, Brakpan -  28 594, Boksburg -  22 324) seemed to confirm the success o f  urban 
segregation. The place of residence for the majority of non-mining Africans was also 
in the locations. However, an increasing number of blacks were already living outside 
these designated segregation zones. In Benoni the number of Africans living outside 
the location (excluding the hostels) nearly equalled the number officially residing in 
the location. At the time the location’s population stood at 11 375, the number o f 
Africans residing in the town itself amounted to a substantial 6 489 and those living 
in the rural (peri-urban) areas adjacent to the town numbered nearly four thousand.72 
In the late 1930s the municipality pressured white farmers to evict black families 
from their properties. In many of these cases the farmers allowed and even 
encouraged these illegal occupations because of the income they derived from 
charging rent. In Boksburg, Germiston and Brakpan the non-location African 
population actually exceeded the official location population.
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Thus by the 1940s the authorities exercised less control over where black 
people resided. Moreover, once a family had occupied a particular place, it was not 
easy for the authorities simply to remove them. Under the existing legislation the 
authorities were obliged to provide alternative accommodation to all residents legally 
employed in a particular municipality. Even where black people were employed in 
towns other than the place where they lived, it became nearly impossible for an 
individual municipality to eject them because of the fear that such action would result 
in retaliatory ejections from neighbouring towns.
As the numbers of the emerging black working class soared and the 
authorities failed to provide the requisite accommodation, areas outside the 
designated segregated locations were increasingly occupied by black people. 
Moreover, these areas were in varying degrees converted into centres o f rebellion 
against the authorities. Although the overall segregation o f the towns was not 
threatened, the carefully crafted racial zoning of the previous decades was routinely 
being transgressed. This considerably heightened the fear among whites that they 
were being swamped by an unstoppable wave of African migration. O f even greater 
concern however was the central role played by this urban black working class in the 
struggles that engulfed towns all over the country, and especially those in the East 
Rand.
Radicalisation and struggles in the 1940s
The Second World War not only acted as a major catalyst for the country’s 
industrial development: it also marked the end of a decade of relative political 
quiescence.73 War-time conditions favoured black workers who used the opportunity 
to struggle for higher wages and against the oppressive regimes in the work-places. 
The establishment in 1941 of the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) 
was symptomatic of the growing confidence of the urban black working class. The 
struggle for socio-economic improvements in the factories spilled over into the 
locations. Among the most renowned struggles of the forties were the Alexandra bus
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boycotts, the squatter movements in Soweto, the miners strike of 1946 -  all o f which 
confirmed the salience of ‘bread-and-butter’ issues - and the anti-pass campaigns o f 
the early 1940s. The struggles on the East Rand might have been less well-known but 
were no less significant politically. During the 1940s every location in the region was 
drawn into one form of resistance or another.
Struggles against control were usually most intense in those locations where 
conservative local officials attempted to enforce municipal regulations strictly. In the 
old Alberton location the new superintendent, Van Coller, who was appointed to his 
position after the war, immediately enforced stricter permit controls. This step caused 
outrage in a community not known for its political activism. Women were in the 
forefront of the ensuing struggle that quickly turned violent and resulted in the 
replacement o f Van Coller.74 However, it was in Brakpan where the ‘inflexible’ 
regime of the Manager of Non-European Affairs, Dr Language, caused the greatest 
outcry. From the mid-1930s the authorities of Brakpan had imposed strict control 
over the location, including erecting a fence around it. Resistance to these measures 
arose from the outset, but failed to overturn the authoritarian local regime. In 1944, 
the hard-line approach that characterised the administration o f the new location 
superintendent, Dr F.J. Language, ignited an already tense situation in the location 
when a community and Communist Party o f South Africa (CPSA) leader, David 
Bopape, was dismissed from his teaching post. The obvious persecution o f a key 
political figure in the location and the leading role played by Language in that 
decision unleashed a period o f unprecedented and intense struggle, including a one 
day stay-away that involved the entire location population and a highly successful 
school boycott. Although Language was not replaced, the community underwent a 
rapid radicalisation and over the next period routinely challenged the oppressive 
conditions in the location.75
As mentioned previously, a prime source of conflict between the authorities 
and location residents was the former’s attempts to stamp out domestic beer brewing. 
Raids against brewers were almost daily occurrences and were often met by 
resistance from outraged victims. In the main such opposition was isolated and
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confined to individual brewers. On occasion, however, whole communities were 
mobilised against what they perceived as fundamentally unfair harassment by the 
authorities. A case in point was the struggle'in Payneville in the mid-1940s. In 1937, 
the Springs municipality established a municipal beer hall in an attempt to 
monopolise the lucrative beer drinking market in the location. The beerhall instantly 
became a derided symbol in the location provoking regular calls for its closure. 
Women bore the brunt of the municipality’s actions and it was therefore not 
surprising that they were in the forefront of the struggles against municipal control. 
Many o f the struggles in Payneville during this time were led by the dynamic 
communist stalwart, Dinah Maile. Maile had emerged as a prominent figure in the 
struggles against municipal controls in the late 1930s and was the head o f the 
influential African Protection League, which, according to Bonner, ‘became the 
vehicle for a new kind of organised political consciousness that began to be distilled 
in the Payneville community.’ She was also one of the few female Advisory Board 
members on the Rand and is remembered by former Payneville residents as the 
principal political organiser in the location. In 1945 the women o f the location, led by 
Dinah Maile, called for a boycott of the beerhall. On July 8 o f that year the CPSA 
called a public meeting where Maile’s defiant speech and support for domestic 
brewing received ‘rapturous’ applause. Seemingly oblivious o f the growing anti- 
beerhall mood in the location, an unknown male decided to frequent the beerhall the 
day after the public meeting. Whether this was a deliberate act of defiance against the 
boycott or not, it nevertheless set in motion a series of events that culminated in the 
most violent riot in the location’s history. Women were understandably incensed by 
the man’s action and stoned him as he left the beerhall. The police intervened and 
arrested three women. That night Dinah Maile led five hundred women in a march to 
the police station to demand the release of their imprisoned comrades. Over the 
following two weeks the location was a hive of protest activities: demonstrations, 
marches and meetings took place regularly as the pressure to close the beerhall 
mounted. On July 22 matters reached a bloody climax. On that day two thousand 
women demonstrated in front of the beerhall to prevent men from entering. The
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typically violent dispersal of the demonstrators by the police immediately sparked a 
riot that quickly engulfed the whole location. What started out as a relatively 
peaceful demonstration against the beerhall was thus rapidly transformed into a 
location-wide uprising against municipal control. The local police were unable to 
control the situation and reinforcements were rushed from all over the East Rand to 
quell the uprising. In the ensuing battle between police and residents, which lasted 
most o f the day, four residents were killed, eleven hospitalised and scores were 
injured, including twenty policemen. The main demand of the protestors for the 
closure o f the beerhall was not acceded to. As a result protests continued throughout 
the 1940s, albeit on a smaller scale. In 1949 the Residents Protest Committee was 
formed to campaign against the 'indirect method of taxation’ represented by the 
beerhall82 but failed to convince the local authority to compromise on the matter. At 
the same time the authorities were also not able to stop domestic brewing which 
continued unabated. The rising militancy of the residents, especially women, made it 
far more difficult for the authorities to impose their restrictions.
The intensifying housing shortage in the locations was another primary source 
o f conflict in the 1940s. Everywhere the demand for proper accommodation became a 
rallying cry o f thousands of residents. Although the Springs Council in 1939 already 
acknowledged the ‘dire necessity o f having to provide additional accommodation for 
natives in the area’, little was done in practice to alleviate overcrowding. 
Notwithstanding constant demands by residents for more houses and the growing 
concern among industrialists about the possible deleterious effects the absence o f 
accommodation would have on a much needed workforce, the municipality proved 
impotent throughout the forties to address this key crisis. In March 1950 a  protest 
meeting was held in the location to highlight the desperate housing shortage. It was 
decided to march to the centre of Springs to demand houses from the authorities.
Fifty people left the meeting place to embark on the march. By the time they reached 
the police station on the outskirts o f the town their ranks had swelled to over a 
thousand, illustrating the political volatility around the question o f housing. The
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residents of Payneville were clearly no longer willing to tolerate the congestion and 
squalor in which they were living.
For the Springs municipality, as for local authorities generally and the central 
government, the housing problem constantly threatened to spiral out o f control. As 
early as the 1930s it was becoming apparent that the housing crisis on the East Rand 
required urgent attention from the authorities. But their unwillingness or inability to 
address the mounting crisis in any fundamental way contributed substantially to the 
extremely volatile situation that prevailed in most locations. An early sign o f the 
impending political struggles around housing shortages occurred in Dukathole, where 
lodgers organised themselves against the exploitation by stand holders. Raphael 
Palime organised a Lodgers’ Association to lobby the government to peg or reduce 
rents. The Association also campaigned for the creation of a site on which lodgers 
could build houses. Palime and his followers succeeded in convincing the authorities 
to give them preference in the allocation of houses in the new township at 
Natalspruit.84 This was no better illustrated than in the events that rocked Benoni in 
the aftermath of the war.
In the years following the war Benoni experienced a particularly intense crisis 
over housing. The municipality’s half-hearted attempt to address the housing shortage 
for black residents in 1939/40 combined with its political ineptitude thrust the town 
into the forefront of the urban crisis engulfing the region. A key consequence o f these 
factors was the eruption of one of the largest and most significant squatter 
movements on the Witwatersrand at the time. Bonner has provided the m ost detailed 
and vivid account of the struggles that consumed Benoni in the forties and which 
placed the town at the centre of the political storm that swept across the East Rand in 
the aftermath o f the war.83 Here it is only possible to provide a schematic overview o f 
these events which not only transformed politics in Benoni but also impacted 
significantly on the government’s post-1948 urban restructuring policies.
The Benoni local authority, like its Brakpan counterpart, enjoy ed~a measure o f 
success in imposing some control in the location during the thirties. ‘Illegal’ residents 
and shebeen queens bore the brunt of the disciplinarian actions o f the authorities. But,
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as Bonner explains, the municipality’s success in this regard had the effect of
displacing these problems to the Asiatic Section rather than solving them. Harassed
residents o f the African location (Twatwa) simply moved across the road to live in
the rooms and backyards o f Indian landlords, where their lives were unfettered by the
strict municipal regulations applicable in the location. As a result the African
population o f the Indian Bazaar more than trebled from 600 to 2139 and the two areas
86became virtually indistinguishable from each other.
The Asiatic Section very soon also displaced the old location as the most 
troublesome thorn in the side o f the local authority. The authorities were particularly 
perturbed that the situation in the Asiatic Section would adversely affect their ability 
to maintain control o f the African population in the old location. Thus in 1945 the 
Council’s Native Affairs Committee declared that conditions in the Asiatic Section 
“have a strong reactionary effect upon the natives resident in the Location proper, 
which renders the maintenance of law and order, and the proper administration of 
native laws and regulations a matter o f extreme difficulty... Any disciplinary trouble 
arising in the location proper would be greatly aggravated by the prevalence of 
undesirable conditions in the Asiatic Area, and in fact there would be a greater 
tendency for trouble to arise, particularly if it originated in the Asiatic Area.”87 The 
Manager o f Non-European Affairs agreed that ‘the Asiatic Section constitutes a 
menace to the Native Section and to law-abiding native in general’ and argued the 
problem would persist until the Asiatic Section ‘is finally liquidated.’88
Towards the end of the 1940s the Council attempted to address the housing 
crisis by beginning the construction of a 123 sub-economic housing scheme in an 
area later to be known as Wattville. This was a paltry number considering the huge 
overcrowding in the town and confirmed the inability of the municipality to resolve 
the housing crisis. Having failed to provide enough houses, the council then 
proceeded to compound its own problems by bungling the allocation o f these houses. 
The council had previously made a deal with Indian landowners that the new houses 
would be allocated to lodgers from the Asiatic Section in an attempt to alleviate the 
congestion and social problems in the area. However, this was unacceptable for the
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thousands of lodgers from the old location, many of whom had their names on the 
council’s housing waiting list for up to a decade.89 The council’s folly detonated a 
train o f events that culminated in the ‘illegal’ occupation o f these houses by lodgers 
and the largest squatter land occupation movement on the East Rand. In all o f these 
developments the council stumbled from one blunder to the next, exposing its 
ineptitude, and was repeatedly outmanoeuvred by politically more skilful and wily 
location leaders.
Foremost among these was Harry Mabuya, an entrepreneur (he was an 
undertaker and restaurant owner), Advisory Board member and squatter leader -  the 
East Rand’s own James Mpanza. The council’s official history described him as 
‘essentially an opportunist’, but grudgingly also admired his achievements and 
acknowledged he was the ‘uncrowned king of the location’ in the late 1940s.90 In 
1945 Mabuya set up the African Housing and Rates Board to deal with the housing 
crisis in the location. He quickly won wide support especially among women and 
later that year he led his followers (lodgers from the Asiatic Section and location) to 
establish a squatter camp. By the end o f 1945 more than one hundred families had 
settled in Mabuya’s Tent Town. The council attempted to undermine the squatter 
camp by establishing its own ‘legal’ Tent Town but could manage to attract only a 
few families. In contrast the ‘illegal’ Tent Town rapidly mushroomed and by the end 
of 1948 was 4000 strong (in 820 tents) compared to a mere fifty-seven in the legal 
Tent Town.91 Even more troubling to the authorities was the complete absence o f any 
control by them in the ‘illegal’ camp. Mabuya had in fact established his own system 
of local governance in Tent Town, which included rent collection, keeping the camp 
clean and controlling its political life. According to Bonner, Tent Town therefore 
represented a rival source of authority and administration. Such an open challenge 
to the authority of the local state presented the authorities with a serious dilemma. 
Yet, the forcible removal of the thousands of squatters could not seriously be 
considered because most of them were employed in the local industries and 
legislation required the authorities to provide alternative accommodation in the event
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of such a removal. The existence o f the camp between 1945 and 1948 effectively 
narrowed the scope of the municipality’s control over the black population.
In May 1948 the council seemed finally to regain the initiative when it 
established the new Wattville Emergency Camp, to which the squatters from both 
Tent Towns were removed. Mabuya’s more co-operative relations with the council 
(he became a nominated member o f the Advisory Board from 1950) seemed to 
confirm this. However, it was abundantly clear that the underlying problems of 
homelessness and overcrowding had not been overcome. The number o f lodgers in 
both the location and the Asiatic Section had continued to register steep increases. 
More than 5000 people were crammed into the Asiatic Section.93 Once again this 
situation caused alarm among the authorities. In September 1949 the Chief Inspector 
o f the South African Police wrote to the council to complain about the ‘very 
unsatisfactory state o f affairs in the Asiatic Bazaar’. He warned the council that ‘the 
place has become a breeding place o f crime and violence, which may one day lead to 
racial clashes with serious consequences.’94 In June 1950, J.E. Mathewson, the 
manager of Native Affairs reported to the council that 4 400 African families required 
houses.95 Clearly the conditions that gave rise to the squatter movement in 1945 
remained, and in many respects had become worse. It was only a matter o f time 
before a new crisis hit the town.
The Council was not unaware of the gravity of the situation unfolding in the 
town and began considering plans to provide some accommodation for the town’s 
African population. However, its immediate proposal to alleviate the rapidly 
increasing number of homeless Africans was merely to create another Emergency 
Camp. This proved to be hopeless dithering in the face of a serious crisis and soon the 
council was again overtaken by events. On 23 June 1950 a few African families 
established a squatter camp at Apex. As was the case five years before the council 
was paralysed by the tactics of local leaders, who were determined to force the 
authorities to provide housing for the black residents of the town. Confronted by the 
inaction o f a supine local authority, homeless families flocked to the Apex squatter 
camp in very similar fashion to the way in which their predecessors established Tent
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Town. At the end of July 632 shacks had been erected, accommodating over 5000 
souls. By the time Daveyton was established the population o f Apex squatter camp 
stood at a massive 23 225.96
A survey conducted at the Apex camp found that 50% of the squatters had 
come from peri-urban areas around Benoni, 25% were from the town’s white areas 
and 22% came from the old location and Asiatic Section. What these figures reveal 
is the extent to which the town’s problem of overcrowding had spread to the peri­
urban areas. Despite continued attempts by the authorities to evict black people from 
these small white-owned farms, the practice became more common in the late 1940s 
as the housing situation deteriorated even further in the location. At the beginning of 
1949 the Council attempted to evict the approximately 150 families squatting on 
various plots in Brentwood Park. By the end of that year complaints of squatting 
were flooding in from other peri-urban sites, including Varkfontein, Ysterfontein, 
Putfontein and Zesfontein." In 1949 the council received numerous reports 
confirming the extent o f the squatting problem in the peri-urban area. The Local 
Native Commissioner expressed his disquiet about the situation to the council in 
September 1949:
1 am concerned about the increased number of complaints received 
by me in regard to illegal squatting in the Municipal Areas and on 
surrounding plots and small farms... In every case which I have so 
far investigated the majority of squatters claim to be employed in the 
Municipal area but are unable to secure accommodation in your 
Location owing to the shortage of houses.100
In one case a farmer, Mr. C.J. du Plessis had permitted sixty families to squat 
on his farm. The council threatened to prosecute the offending farmer but realised 
such a step would require the provision of alternative accommodation in the urban 
area, which was not available.101 Thus by 1950 the Benoni council was besieged on 
all fronts by the consequences o f its failure to provide houses to the town’s black
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population. The political turmoil that centred around the struggle for socio-economic 
improvements was most concentrated in this town, which also made it a prominent 
centre o f political mobilisation in the subsequent period.
Popular struggles in the 1940s were characterised mainly by their focus on 
local ‘bread-and-butter’ issues and against municipal control. The localised 
character o f these struggles was perhaps most graphically illustrated on the East 
Rand, with its various towns in such close proximity, but where there seemed to be 
neither any planned nor spontaneous moves to co-ordinate the struggles. Moreover, 
these struggles were mostly contemporaneous and the issues at the heart o f them were 
remarkably similar. Nonetheless, these popular struggles had the general effect o f 
producing considerably more radical political movements and leaders in the locations.
The CPSA had a headstart over the ANC in its involvement and influence in 
the popular struggles at the time because of its earlier role in the unionisation o f black 
workers. The Party also actively recruited African workers into its ranks during this 
time. It therefore emerged as the most prominent and influential national political 
organisation in the region, with a number o f key local political figures either being 
members or supporters. Dinah Maile of Payneville was a prominent CPSA member. 
David Bopape of Brakpan was the most notable communist leader in the region. It is 
unclear whether the CP’s membership grew significantly in the locations, but it 
certainly enjoyed extensive influence among leading figures in the region. It held 
public meetings, organised marches and regularly sent petitions to the authorities. 
There is evidence that in Benoni’s old location the CPSA held regular public 
meetings on Sundays in the mid-1940s. On at least one occasion it organised a public 
meeting (attended by about 1000 residents) to press the council to introduce a sub- 
economic housing scheme.103 After that the Party’s influence and activity seemed to 
have diminished rather rapidly.104 A number of CPSA-aligned lawyers continued to 
assist various community and political organisations.
The ANC’s involvement in the struggles of the 1940s was very limited. In 
Benoni it briefly featured in the struggle for housing and supported the occupation of 
the new houses by lodgers. However, the lodgers and squatters, who were in the
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fore front of the struggles during this period, were not the traditional base of the ANC. 
Its main support lay with the established residents of the old location, who did not 
fully endorse the action taken by squatters. As a result the ANC’s foray into squatter 
movement, the most significant political movement in Benoni in the mid-forties 
proved to be short-lived.105 Although the ANC’s involvement in these struggles was 
uneven, these initiatives did have a radicalising effect on the organisation, which in 
turn helped nurture a more militant leadership. From the early fifties the ANC 
displaced the CPSA as the most influential organisation on the East Rand (partly due 
to the banning of CPSA in 1950). The importance of the region was underlined by the 
ANC’s decision to launch the Defiance Campaign of 1952 in Stirtonville. From that 
time the ANC won considerable support in the East Rand, especially among the 
residents of the old locations.
The pressure of the struggle from below and the radical politics o f the CP 
affected other location organisations. In particular, the Advisory Boards became 
important targets of intervention by radical political leaders. Under the pressure of 
local struggles the Advisory Boards were shaken out of their political slumber and 
acquiescence, and often transformed into important sites o f struggle between the new 
radical activists and the old conservative political elite. In the 1940s and 1950s 
radicals managed to gain control over some of the Advisory Boards using them as 
effective weapons of mobilisation against the authorities. In Payneville Dinah Maile 
and Absolom Kliumalo dominated the Advisory Board for a few years. In Stirtonville 
the more radical leadership of Nebojah Mokgako, Benjamin Mvabasa and Peter 
Motloung controlled the Advisory Board in the mid-forties and adopted a more 
confrontational approach to the local authority. Marches and boycotts were organised 
to oppose liquor raids and demands better services and Mokgako effectively 
controlled the township at the expense of the local authority.106 Similar struggles 
occurred over the control of the Katlehong Advisory Board.
The Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) also re-emerged as a prominent 
opponent o f the government and ally of the ANC. In January 1946 the TIC organised 
a public meeting in Benoni’s Asiatic Section to protest against the Council’s plans to
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compel Indian residents to sign monthly tenancy forms.107 It was from the early 
1950s though that the organisation made a real impact on the political scene with 
vocal and effective opposition against apartheid laws, especially the Group Areas 
Act. On the East Rand the TIC gained significant support in the Benoni’s Asiatic 
Bazaar and in Bakerton (Springs).
By the early 1950s the East Rand had emerged very prominently on the 
country’s socio-economic and political landscapes. The industrialisation of the region 
placed it in the forefront of the country’s economic development. At the same time 
the region was also a crucial arena where the consequences o f the rapid economic 
expansion unfolded. The struggles waged by the emerging black working class 
highlighted the extent to which local authorities had neglected the well-being o f black 
urbanites. The political ineptitude of the authorities in the 1940s further aggravated 
the crisis and by the time the NP assumed power in 1948 there was a clamour from 
various quarters for state intervention to restore control and order in the urban areas. 
The state’s response to the urban crisis is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
State response to the urban crisis: 
the origins of ‘modernist apartheid’
The intensity of the crisis in the 1940s brought into sharp relief what was 
perhaps the major dilemma facing South Africa’s ruling class and state: how to deal 
with the economy’s increasing dependence on African workers. Secondary industry 
required a stable and more skilled workforce, which meant the acceptance of a much 
larger permanently urbanised African population, as opposed to the previous reliance 
on a mainly migrant African labour force. But this shift brought with it numerous 
problems for the state. Massive (and virtually uncontrolled) urbanisation, widespread 
popular struggles for social improvements and growing demands for political rights 
by the black majority posed serious threats to the status quo.1 The state was thus 
forced to grapple with the vexed issue of how to modernise the economy (and itself) 
while simultaneously protecting white privilege and, more broadly, capitalism.
The state’s responses to this multi-faceted dilemma from the mid-1940s and 
especially in the early 1950s are the principal concerns of this chapter. It focuses on 
the ways in which the state reconfigured the urban centres, especially on the East 
Rand, as a means of attaining its main objectives. In the 1940s the state’s response 
was habitually tentative and devoid of a clearly defined vision, with the result that it 
enjoyed only limited success in countering the mounting urban crisis. By the early 
1960s, however, the situation had been almost completely reversed as the state 
imposed an extremely authoritarian control over the black population. It is widely 
acknowledged that the brutal suppression of the black opposition movement in the 
aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre fundamentally shifted the balance of political 
forces in favour of the state. Under the severely repressive conditions of the 1960s 
the state was able to implement its social engineering schemes virtually
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unchallenged. However, even before this crucial turning point had been reached the 
state had already begun implementing important aspects of its policies, especially in 
relation to urban restructuring. Notwithstanding its manifest shortcomings, the 
United Party (U.P.) laid the foundation for these schemes in the 1940s. But it was the 
ideologically driven Nationalist Party (N.P.) which systematised state policies in the 
early 1950s and which from the mid-1950s began to put them into practice, albeit 
with varying degrees of success.
The N.P.’s historic electoral victory in 1948 introduced a number of far- 
reaching alterations in the state’s overall strategy and modus operartdi. The political 
differences between the U.P. and the N.P. have been the subject of debate among 
historians and politicians for a long time.2 Certainly these parties offered differing 
proposals particularly in respect of the critical question of the role of African 
workers in the economy and the implications of that, namely, their residential and 
political statuses in the ‘white’ urban areas. Yet, as the debate has revealed, the 
policies of these parties were also remarkably similar in important respects. The 
continuities in the state’s response to the urban crisis before and after 1948 were 
especially noticeable, as has been argued recently by scholars from a variety of 
disciplines/
The U.P. and N.P. shared a similar analysis of the causes of the urban crisis 
and drew on the same local and international policy precedents to formulate 
responses to it. Most important, both parties were keenly interested in suppressing 
black opposition and securing white privilege and power. In contrast to the 
traditional liberal argument that deemed apartheid as essentially backward, anti­
modern and inimical to capitalist development, it is argued here that apartheid, 
although steeped in racism, was fundamentally also concerned with managing the 
contradictions thrown up by a modernising (capitalist) economy and safeguarding its 
development.
The NP’s emphasis on ‘proper planning’ of urban areas drew extensively on 
the modernist discourse current in Europe and the United States, where governments 
were pre-occupied by the formulation and implementation of effective post-war 
reconstruction policies. The interweaving of these ‘modernist’ notions with the
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state’s commitment to segregation and racial oppression produced what Mabin has 
termed ‘modernist apartheid’.4 A key feature in this process of policy formulation 
was the increasingly interventionist role played by the central state in directing urban 
development and management. This important change was reflected in, among other 
things, the shift from ‘ad hoc’ to ‘proper planning’ as well as the deliberate efforts by 
the N.P. government in particular to diminish the pivotal role played by local 
authorities in matters dealing with the urban black population. In pursuance of these 
objectives the government promulgated numerous pieces of legislation to enable and 
facilitate urban restructuring5 and appointed a number of commission comprising 
hand-picked experts to translate these laws into practice. Posel has shown that this 
did not happen instantly and the N.P. did not assume power with a blue-print of 
apartheid.6 However, she agrees that more planning did ensue.7 This chapter shows 
how the government was able to implement these plans from the mid-1950s, 
eliminating the integrated locations and imposing modern African townships and 
regional ‘racial’ group areas. This did not occur without struggles between different 
factions in the state, between the central government and some local authorities and, 
most importantly, between the state and the black population.8 All of this will be 
explored in the context of the East Rand.
Early state intervention: Ad hoc urban planning
State intervention to direct and control urban development has featured 
centrally in the history of South Africa’s towns and cities. The levels and intensity of 
these interventions in the pre-1994 period may have varied considerably, but the 
objectives of segregation and control were always primary. In particular control over 
the urban black working class was the central thread running through the various 
incarnations of the state’s urban policies. From the end of the 19th century when the 
modern (capitalist) town’s had their genesis, the government’s urban policies were 
directed primarily to effecting ‘racial’ segregation.9 Both the colonial governments 
and the Boer Republics introduced legislation to determine the course of private and 
municipal developments. Towns such as Johannesburg and Cape Town, where there
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already existed sizeable black populations, were subjected early on to segregationist 
measures. Separate locations were set aside for black people, thereby creating the 
(racist) template on which future urban segregation would be elaborated.10 In those 
early days the mine compounds were the primary means by which segregation 
between whites and blacks were effected.11 Mining compounds continued to be the 
main form of accommodation for African residents on the East Rand until the 1940s. 
Another frequently overlooked component of urban segregation that had its roots in 
the 19th century was the creation o f ‘Asiatic Bazaars’.12 The Transvaal government 
set aside small portions of land, normally in close proximity to the black location or 
compounds, for the minority Indian population who were allowed to engage in small 
scale businesses in these areas. In terms of Law 3 of 1885, Indian occupation was 
restricted to certain streets ‘for the purposes of sanitation’. The Precious and Base 
Metal Act of 1908 similarly circumscribed Indian trading. The Lange Commission 
of 1919 endorsed these pieces of legislation and called for a ‘system of voluntary 
segregation’, which would allow ‘local authorities to lay out residential, as well as 
trading, areas for Asiatics’.13 The ‘Asiatic Bazaars’, of which the East Rand 
probably had the largest concentration, were governed by special ‘Asiatic Bazaar’ 
regulations. Initially, the small coloured population of the Witwatersrand were 
governed by the same legislation as urban Africans and were often placed in the 
same locations, albeit in specially demarcated zones.
The formation of Union in 1910 opened a new chapter in the relationship 
between white rulers and the subjugated black population. The key piece of 
legislation passed by the new Union government was the infamous Land Act of 
1913, which codified on a national scale the dispossession of the African population. 
In terms of the Act, African people who comprised 80% of the population could not 
acquire or own land outside the reserves. The same law by implication determined 
that urban areas would be reserved for white ownership and occupation. The Land 
Act did not, however, specifically prevent blacks from enjoying various forms of 
tenure, including freehold and leasehold, in the urban areas. The Native (Urban 
Areas) Act of 1923 however explicitly denied Africans the right to hold individual 
title (freehold) in the ‘native villages’ or locations,14 but a further loophole existed in
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the legislation. It did not stop Africans from buying property in ‘white’ areas outside 
the locations. This loophole was only closed by the Native Laws Amendment Act of 
1937.15 As a result Africans in some locations were able to acquire freehold title, a 
matter that remained a source of serious contention over the following decades. The 
possibility of Africans owning land or property in the urban areas was an extremely 
sensitive issue to white policy-makers because it directly affected the general status 
of Africans in urban areas. According to Parnell, ‘No other issue demonstrated so 
vividly African urban impermanence than their inability to claim fixity of land 
holding’.16
Until the end of World War One urban growth proceeded unevenly and 
haphazardly. Under the impact of a wave of militant struggles by black workers and 
in the context of the devastating impact of the 1918 influenza epidemic the state was 
spurred into more decisive action. Some town planners attempted to import the 
notion of the ‘garden city’, which advocated greater public direction over the mainly 
uncontrolled private development that characterised urban life in the early part of the 
century.17 A key concern from the outset for urban planners and government 
officials was the uncontrolled, and therefore potentially politically volatile, growth of 
towns. Over the next few decades government interventions would be directed at 
overcoming this persistent problem.
In 1919 the government established a Housing Committee, whose primary 
function was to investigate the question of state financial assistance for local 
authorities to undertake public housing programmes. Its recommendations led to the 
passage of the 1920 Housing Act, which created a Central Housing Board, tasked 
with the responsibility of disbursing housing funds to municipalities on behalf of the 
government. Its major concern was to provide segregated housing for poor whites. 
Although mechanisms were set in place to provide housing to black people the 
questions of where such accommodation would be located and who would qualify 
for them still had to be resolved.
The principal law governing the status of African people in the urban areas 
was the Native (Urban) Areas Act of 1923. The Act was a hybrid piece of 
legislation. In many respects it espoused the principles enunciated by the Stallard
68
Commission of 1922, which had infamously declared that Africans “should only be 
allowed into the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he 
is willing to enter and minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart 
therefrom when he ceases so to minister.”19 However, the Act also recognised the 
presence of a more permanent urban African population when it empowered local 
authorities to set aside land for black occupation. Parnell has argued that an objective 
of this piece of legislation was ‘to create a reliable, manageable supply of semi­
skilled labour through the social differentiation of the African urban population’. A 
corollary of this aim was to improve the living conditions of urban dwellers.20 From 
the early 1930s local authorities on the Witwatersrand began discussing the viability 
of introducing regional planning as a means to address the urban woes of the 
country. In 1932 a conference of Witwatersrand municipalities agreed that regional 
planning would be advantageous and in 1934 the province even appointed a 'regional 
planner'.21 But little was done in practice to pursue these initiatives.
In 1934 the Slums Act was promulgated specifically to empower local 
authorities to destroy areas (or properties) deemed unsafe or unhealthy (in other 
words a slum). This piece of legislation was used primarily to benefit poor whites.22 
However, Africans, especially those living outside Johannesburg rarely benefited 
from the ameliorative intentions of this piece of legislation. Local authorities were 
the main culprits in this neglect of the living conditions of Africans. Many of them 
also resisted implementing the ‘welfarist components’ of the Native (Urban Areas) 
Act of 1923,23 mainly because of the additional costs that they would have to incur 
in the provision of alternative accommodation to people who were evicted from 
declared slums. As a result, the locations on the East Rand experienced a flourishing 
of shack letting. One of the main problems that confronted the authorities throughout 
this time was their slackening control over the influx of Africans from the rural 
areas. The migration of women especially registered significant increases at the time. 
Various pieces of legislation, such as the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937, 
were introduced to curb this influx and to empower local authorities to prosecute and 
remove ‘idle and disorderly’ persons.24 These laws, however, failed to meet their 
main objectives.
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Thus local authorities proved to be woefully unprepared, politically and 
materially, to deal with the myriad problems unleashed on them from the late 1930s. 
In fact, the impotence of many local authorities both to anticipate and halt the crisis 
of the 1940s was regularly cited by the government as a key contributor to the 
intensification of the volatile situation that prevailed in urban areas after the war.
Modernism in vogue
From the late 1930s the Smuts government regularly raised its concerns over 
the apparent 'irregular' urbanisation, especially of Indians and coloureds. The 
Thornton Report of 1940 expressed its dismay at the “occupation of land and 
buildings irrespective of race with the result that Europeans were found to be 
occupying premises and living cheek by jowl with non-Europeans”.25 However, the 
government’s focus on the war effort precluded immediate and decisive intervention 
to address these concerns. Towards the end of the war the government’s efforts 
turned towards post-war reconstruction paralleling developments occurring in 
Britain and other war-time belligerents. In 1942 the Smuts government convened the 
Social and Economic Planning Council (SEPC) whose primary objectives were to 
prepare for post-war reconstruction and to promote the country’s rapid 
industrialisation. The significance of this body had less to do with its immediate 
impact on legislation than what it indicated about the changed direction of 
government thinking. The SEPC was an inter-departmental, non-statutory body and 
was given a broad mandate by the government to advise it on social and economic 
policy matters in order to promote “the balanced development of the resources of the 
Union and its external and internal trade as well as the prosperity and well-being of 
its population as a whole.”26 It consisted of 13 part-time members under the 
chairmanship of a prominent moderniser, Dr. H. J. van Eck, the Managing Director 
and Vice-Chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation.
During the ten years of its existence the SEPC produced a number of reports 
on issues ranging from public works programmes to urban planning and even the 
compilation of statistics.27 Perhaps the most prominent theme emerging from the
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reports of the SEPC was its advocacy of an interventionist role for the state. This 
was succinctly captured in its third report where it argued that
the modern state can no longer content itself with the exercise 
of the traditional functions of maintaining law and order and of 
restraining anti-social acts... As the highest collective organ, 
the State is, therefore, held accountable for bridging the gap 
between the potential capacity to produce and the minimum 
standards of consumption which will ensure freedom from
want... In the general interest, the State is in growing measure
28impelled to assist, to guide, to regulate and to initiate.
The SEPC’s proposals for post-war reconstruction echoed international 
trends, which inclined towards the adoption of Keynesian ideas, which were 
characterised by social democratic and welfarist policies. A central theme of 
Keynesian policies was that the running of the modem (capitalist) economy could 
not be left solely in the hands of the capitalist class. The Council’s calls for local 
public works programmes to generate employment, economic development and to 
rebuild society reflected an endorsement of the principle of state intervention to 
ensure social development.29 The SEPC insisted that “while it is widely accepted 
that the special advantages of the private enterprise system should be preserved, it is 
also accepted more and more widely that it is necessary and proper for the State to 
control it as to make sure that important social objects will be attained.” These 
objectives, which it went on to enumerate, included minimum standards of life, full 
employment, ‘that man be not allowed to exploit man’ and ‘that equality of 
opportunity and greater equality of income and wealth are prime essentials of true 
democracy’31 -  all of which were core components of the ‘modernist discourse’.32 
Surprisingly, these egalitarian views were initially articulated with little reference to 
the systemic racial oppression in South Africa and there was an implicit suggestion 
that reconstruction and state welfare should benefit the whole population. However, 
the South African realities soon silenced these hints of equality from the 
reconstructionist agenda. In its place emerged a conception of urban restructuring
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that was steeped equally in the international modernist discourse and the highly 
racialised and discriminatory practices that dominated local policies.
The SEPC was probably the first official body explicitly to articulate a well- 
defined programme of modernisation. Locally the wide acceptance of these ideas 
was rooted in the conditions created by industrialisation and urbanisation, which 
demanded a set of policies very different from those employed by a mining- 
dominated economy. There were, for example, growing calls for proper co­
ordination and planning of land use to assist the development of a ‘modern industrial 
economy’. An important corollary of these ‘modernist’ notions was a renewed 
emphasis on regional planning, which the SEPC viewed as a central plank of state 
intervention. It asserted that “Physical planning will be essential if in future the State 
is to promote the orderly development of the nation’s resources and to strive towards 
a sound distribution of population. This will have to occur on a regional basis. Purely 
local planning will be too narrow.”33
The Council’s third report recommended the creation of a Department of 
Physical Planning and Regional Development. Its fifth report reiterated the call 
insisting “It is only by such wider approach that the distribution of economic activity 
and population can be soundly influenced.”34 The Housing Act of 1944, which 
allowed for the formation of a regional planning commission, suggested some 
sympathy with the SEPC’s approach but otherwise its proposals were 
unsympathetically received by politicians and policy-makers who appeared pre­
occupied by more pressing concerns.35 The government nevertheless remained under 
pressure to deal with urban problems. In 1947 the National Resources Development 
Council was established to co-ordinate the regional planning of townships in the 
Orange Free State goldfields. However, similar planning by the Council was not 
undertaken anywhere else in the country. In Natal and the Cape, Councils 
independently moved towards more regional planning.36 Although regional planning 
was gaining acceptance among urban planners and local authorities, there was very 
little co-ordination of efforts to implement such plans on a national basis.
Ultimately a desperate housing situation impelled the authorities in the 
direction of co-ordinated and central planning. In 1944 the Housing Act was
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amended to allow for the establishment of the National Housing and Planning 
Commission in place of the Central Housing Board. In addition a National Housing 
Council, consisting of Provincial executives and municipal associations, was set up 
to advise the Minister.37 Despite this, the number of African families living without 
accommodation outside locations more than doubled between 1936 and 1951, from 
86 000 to 176 000. In 1947 it was estimated that more than 150 000 family houses 
and 106 877 units for single male workers were required in the urban areas.38 The 
inability of the authorities to address the housing shortage exposed the utter 
inadequacy of existing housing legislation and strategies.39
Individual municipalities on the East Rand (Benoni, Germiston and Springs 
in particular), attempted to resolve the problem on their own by making plans for the 
establishment of new African locations, but found the acquisition of land for that 
purpose rather difficult.40 In March 1947 a meeting of local authorities from Pretoria, 
the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging proposed the establishment of a Witwatersrand 
Regional Committee to consider the issue of African housing in the whole region. In 
May of that year the proposal was accepted and the Witwatersrand Advisory Council 
for non-European Housing was formed.41 The initial focus of its discussions was the 
establishment of “jointly-sponsored native towns to serve the whole Reef’, including 
one for the East Rand towns of Brakpan, Springs, Benoni and Boksburg.42 Little 
came of this initiative. Local authorities complained about the heavy financial 
burden such development would place on their shoulders and since they enjoyed the 
sole power to initiate public housing schemes,4j their non-compliance blocked any 
progress.
Pegging Acts and WARS
Modernist principles, with their international precedents, made a clear 
impression on state policies. An equally important factor, rooted in the local 
experience, was the renewed emphasis from the mid-1940s on urban racial 
segregation. These two issues became more intimately interwoven from the mid- 
1940s and created the framework within which the future attempts of urban social
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engineering took place. One worrying symptom of the ‘disorderly’ urbanisation at 
the time was the perceived threat by local and other authorities of black 
encroachment on white areas. Although the national government again proved slow 
in responding to these pressures, UP-controlled municipalities took the lead in 
formulating policies to address the concerns of the white electorate. The initiatives 
embarked on by the Durban and Johannesburg Councils in the mid-1940s would 
have profound consequences for urban racial segregation policies over the next two 
decades.
The Durban Council’s policies towards the local Indian population had 
especially far-reaching consequences. From the early 1940s Durban’s Indian 
population became a prime target of the United Party's urban racial zoning. For 
some while whites, especially small businessmen, had voiced their concern about the 
competition from Indian traders. In 1940 Smuts appointed the first 'Penetration' 
Commission to investigate the apparent encroachment by Indian traders on 
predominantly white areas since 1927.44 The investigation had twin concerns: the 
transgressions of racial segregation and the perceived threat posed by Indian traders 
to white small businesses. A second commission was appointed in 1943 to 
investigate the acquisition by Indians of land in Durban. As a direct outcome of these 
commissions the government passed the Trading and Occupation Land (Transvaal 
and Natal) Restriction Act of 1943 which forbade changes in ownership between 
Indians and whites without ministerial permission.45 This measure was intended not 
only to curb business exchanges between whites and Indians, but also to preclude 
further acquisition of land by the emerging Indian middle class. The subsequent 
passage of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act in 1946 was a 
watershed in the development of residential segregation.46 It allowed for the 
identification of land for Indian occupation outside of which they could not acquire 
or occupy property. In a profoundly significant move the government also 
established the Land Tenure Advisory Board (LTAB), staffed by an inspectorate, to 
oversee the segregation of Indians.47 These ‘Pegging Acts’, which initially applied 
only to Durban were the principal legislative precursors to the Group Areas Act 
(GAA). Maharaj has understandably made a strong case for the pre-eminent role
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played by Durban in shaping the GAA.48 However, this emphasis has tended to 
understate the other equally important influences on the GAA, such as modernist 
principles.
The second important initiative occurred in Johannesburg where the UP- 
controlled council formulated the Western Areas Removal Scheme to get rid of 
Sophiatown and its neighbouring locations. Van Tonder has exposed the centrality of 
this scheme in the Johannesburg City Council’s (JCC) strategy to deal with the urban 
crisis.49 The western areas of Sophiatown, Martindaie and Newclare were 
particularly problematical for the JCC not only because of their racial integration but 
because they were generally beyond the control of the authorities and were in many 
respects the centre of black opposition in Johannesburg. From the point of view of 
the JCC it was vital that these 'black spots' be removed. Instrumental in the removal 
plans of the western areas was prominent United Party member, Sarel Tighy, who 
according to Van Tonder advocated the removal of Sophiatown as far back as 
1 9 3 9  5° rj'ig|1y«s constituency consisted largely of white working class and lower 
middle class residents. The proximity of the black western areas was a constant 
source of concern to this community who continuously pressured the JCC and 
government to remove these areas. In 1944 the JCC proposed a ten year programme 
for the removal of the western areas but its implementation was delayed because of a 
severe shortage of funds.51 Thus Van Tonder concludes that there were some 
elements in the United Party who were “as dedicated to the ideals of urban and 
spatial (racial) segregation as were the Nationalists”.52 In fact, the UP’s strategy 
anticipated in great detail future NP policies of forced removal of urban ‘black 
spots’.
Despite numerous policy and practical initiatives undertaken during the 
1940, the UP was manifestly unable to resolve the urban crisis. In part this was due 
to factors beyond its control, such as the war. However, it was also hamstrung by a 
combination of local political obstructions as well as internal party problems. Local 
authorities, it has already been noted, often resented central government interference, 
fearing a loss of autonomy. This attitude hampered attempts to introduce centralised 
planning and regional co-ordination.53 The UP was also wracked by internal political
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squabbles and lacked a clear political strategy to deal with the multiple crises faced 
by the country after the war. All these factors combined to render the UP’s response 
to the urban crisis ineffectual. It was left to the NP to implement the wide-ranging 
social engineering policies for which the UP had laid much of the groundwork in the 
half decade before.
The Group Areas Act
The electoral victory of the NP in 1948 represented an important turning 
point in urban management. A central plank in the party’s election platform was its 
promise to restore strict segregation in the urban areas. Thus, on assuming power, it 
was vital for the NP to demonstrate unequivocally that, in contrast to its predecessor, 
it would assert control over the urban black population. The Malan government 
proceeded speedily to formulate national legislation to give effect to its election 
promises. Within months of its historic victory the new government established two 
committees under the chairmanship of D.S. van der Merwe, chairman of the Land 
Tenure Advisory Board, to investigate the future of 'Asiatic land laws'. The 
investigation also addressed itself to the broader application of these pieces of 
legislation, an exercise that culminated in the drafting of the Group Areas Bill.
In March 1950 the minister of the interior, T.E Donges, presented the Group 
Areas Bill to the House of Assembly and by September of that year the GAA 
became law. Its primary aim, as the name suggests, was to establish 'group areas' for 
the different 'races'. The government’s vision of the role and aims of the GAA was 
illustrated in a memorandum:
The Group Areas Act is virtually only a form of town planning 
and no town planning scheme can ever be carried out without 
dislocation and inconvenience and even loss...
The main object of the Group Areas Act is to create the 
possibility of an orderly society in a country inhabited by 
various race groups which differ so much from one another as 
regards degree of civilisation, cultural development, way of life
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and habits and economic ability that a society without race 
grouping and group areas can only lend to racial friction and 
race riots, chaos and the eventual disappearance of Western 
Civilisation.54
Unlike the Asiatic Land Acts of the 1940s, the GAA applied to all people 
classified as white, coloured and Indian, throughout the country: segregation would 
be compulsory and comprehensive. The Act also allowed for the reversal of existing 
integration to ensure that all residential areas would become 'racially-exclusive'. As a 
first step, the Act provided for the "preservation of any particular area from further 
penetration by one group or the other" and "for the control of the acquisition of 
immovable property and the occupation of land and premises".55 These provisions 
were clearly designed to freeze existing residential patterns pending proclamation of 
a 'group area'.
The GAA instituted procedures to be followed before the proclamation of 
'group areas'. The first was the establishment of controlled areas. Within such an 
area property could not be exchanged between different 'groups' without ministerial 
permission. In such an area it was compulsory that the occupant of any property be 
of the same 'racial group' as the owner.56 The declaration of a controlled area was 
the prelude to the proclamation of a 'group area'. However, the state recognised that 
initially it would be impossible fully to implement controlled areas because of all 
the anomalies that would arise. For example, unless people were immediately 
removed from a controlled area, which was not intended for their occupation, they 
would automatically be in breach of the law. But they could not be removed before 
‘group areas’ were established. In order to deal with such dilemmas the government 
allowed for specified areas to be declared. In such an area the status quo regarding 
ownership and occupation would be frozen. This permitted the continuation of 
integrated areas until such time that complete segregation could be enforced. It also 
meant that there could be no exchange of properties between different 'racial groups', 
while allowing for exemption from the harsher provisions applicable in controlled 
areas. The Act also established defined areas, which could apply to parts of a
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property. For example, if a house was declared a defined area any extension to it 
could only be occupied by the 'group' for which it was declared. Occupation by 
anyone else required ministerial permission.
The Act stipulated that there would be three types of'group areas': for 
occupation only, for ownership only and for occupation and ownership.57 In practice 
this meant that blacks could be placed in a group area with only occupation rights. 
But it also meant that whites could own properties in areas not for their occupation. 
In general white 'group areas' were always declared for ownership and occupation to 
avoid the possibility of blacks owning properties in such areas. Once an area was 
proclaimed for a certain 'group' all those from other 'groups' became 'disqualified 
persons' and normally had to vacate the place within a year.58 The LTAB, which was 
created by the United Party, now became the main body overseeing the 
implementation of the Act. Finally the GAA established an inspectorate whose 
responsibility it was to ensure that the provisions of the Act were not violated. The 
GAA thus seemed to be all encompassing and well thought out.
The GAA was arguably the emblematic piece of legislation of apartheid. In 
the words of apartheid’s first prime minister, D.F. Malan, the GAA “was 
apartheid”.59 However, like other iconic pieces of apartheid legislation such as the 
Mixed Marriages Act its importance was more symbolic and anticipatory. At the 
time of its promulgation the country’s most urban centres were already up to 90% 
segregated.60 Thus Maylam has argued that the GAA’s significance as the key 
segregationary piece of legislation has probably been overestimated.61 In addition, 
the lack of a clear strategy to realise the objectives of the GAA (reflected in the 
absence of a plan for compulsory segregation in the Sauer report), meant that it took 
some years before the Act was actually implemented.
To appreciate the full significance of the GAA, it should be viewed not only 
as a piece of racially-inspired legislation, but also as a central plank in the broader 
strategy of the government to achieve order and control over the urban black 
population. This became evident in the early 1950s as the various aspects of the 
government’s intervention began to coalesce into a more coherent plan of urban 
restructuring. The various laws promulgated in the early 1950s enabled the
78
government to address the entire gamut of problems it perceived as underlying the 
urban crisis. The key provisions of these Acts were incorporated into the details of 
the local and regional plans formulated in the early 1950s. It is to the elaboration of 
the ‘grand plan’ for urban restructuring of the Witwatersrand and the East Rand in 
particular that this chapter now turns its attention.
Laying the basis for regional African townships
The time has come to review the whole position with the aim 
of re-planning the townships of the Witwatersrand, as far as it 
is possible.... The bigger centres on the Witwatersrand are all 
strongly industrialised and mainly dependent on Native labour.
It is necessary in virtually all of these centres to acquire more 
land for location purposes... In view of the fact that land 
requirement for Natives will be much greater than that for 
Asians or Coloureds, this Department is particularly interested 
in regional planning of any sort...
62T.E. Donges, Minister o f the Interior, September, 1950.
The concentration of the urban crisis on the Witwatersrand, the economic and 
political heartland of the country, made it the focus of state intervention. The most 
serious problem faced by the state, and alluded to by Donges, was how to deal with 
the presence of large numbers of African people in the urban centres. It was to the 
resolution of this particular issue that the Native Affairs Department (NAD), under 
the guidance of H.F. Verwoerd, turned its attention with singular vigour from the 
early 1950s. Over the next decade, as Posel63 has explained, the influence of the 
NAD in government and its public stature as the arm of government principally 
responsible for dealing with Africans grew significantly. So too did the political 
fortunes of its leader, Verwoerd. Increasingly, Verwoerd and his acolytes in the 
NAD became the primary source of ideological pronouncements and policy 
formulation for the government as a whole.
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In the early 1950s the pressure mounted on the government to translate its 
ideological commitment into effective policies. Despite the promulgation of 
important laws there was little evidence of progress on key planks of its election 
platform, namely, control of the black urban population and the imposition of 
compulsory segregation. In addition, the pace of black urbanisation continued 
virtually unchecked. Equally serious from the perspective of the white population, 
was the growth of black political opposition in the early fifties. The 1950 stayaways 
and the 1952 Defiance Campaign augured badly for the new government, which had 
based so much of its 1948 swart gevaar campaign on taming the ‘unruly’ black 
population. Thus, partly in anticipation of the election in 1953, the government 
stepped up a gear and made concerted efforts in 1952-3 to formulate plans for the 
development and restructuring of the Witwatersrand. A number of commissions 
were formed to investigate matters relating to the siting of African locations, 
prospective industrial development and the future of coloureds and Indians in the 
region. These were the years in which the policies of social engineering took shape. 
The first indication of the direction in which Verwoerd was heading was the 
appointment of the Nel Commission in 1952 to investigate the siting of African 
locations in Pretoria. This commission represented an important first step towards 
the systematic planning of the entire Witwatersrand.
In 1952 Verwoerd appointed the Mentz Committee to ‘investigate the 
question of townships for Natives in the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging regions’. 
The decision to form this committee was taken after a meeting held in Pretoria at the 
end of 1951 with hand-picked ‘interested parties' to discuss the planning of African 
locations64. The Mentz Committee was ostensibly created to “thoroughly investigate 
the different proposals in an attempt to make recommendations which would have 
the unanimous, or at least the majority support of the participants”.65 The terms of 
reference of the committee were not specified and Verwoerd presented it as a fact­
finding body.66 Yet, as will be shown, the recommendations of this 'fact-finding 
body' became the main guidelines for government policy in the planning and 
development of African locations on the Witwatersrand, and in particular on the East 
Rand. Certainly, Verwoerd had very clear ideas about the conclusions he expected to
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emanate from the committee. In his announcement of the formation of the Mentz 
Commission, he unambiguously stated his preferred solution to the urban crisis:
Squatter chaos, overcrowding of existing Native plots, illegal 
lodging in white yards, the removal of those who refuse to 
work and thus don't belong in the city, can only be combated 
once large enough legal townships for Natives are established 
close to the towns... The most complicated problem of this 
character in the Union, exists in the area from the north in 
Pretoria to the Vaal River, and in the east from Springs till far 
in the west to Krugersdorp and Randfontein... 67
The composition of the committee suggested Verwoerd had a more ambitious 
objective in mind for it than the expressed aim of information gathering. The 
chairman, F.E Mentz, was a member of the Native Affairs Commission, J.H. 
Moolman was a leading figure in the Natural Resources Development Council, M.C. 
Barker was prominent in the Land Tenure Advisory Board and C.A. Heald was an 
important figure in the Native Affairs Department. These men were therefore all key 
figures in matters relating to 'native affairs' and were instrumental in the formulation 
and application of government policy on the Witwatersrand.
The Mentz Committee formally began work in August 1952 and by the end 
of that year it had completed its investigation. In terms of its mandate the Committee 
convened hearings in each of the five designated sub-regions of the Witwatersrand to 
consult with local authorities, businesses and interested individuals.68 The principal 
aim of these meetings was to discuss with local authorities their respective proposals 
to accommodate Africans in new townships and in the process to incorporate each 
local plan into a regional scheme. The government at this stage deemed it necessary 
to consult local authorities because it had not yet acquired the authority and control 
over them simply to impose its policies. Some local authorities also jealously 
guarded their relative autonomy over local policy matters and were opposed to any 
undue state intervention in their affairs. The shifting balance of power between the 
central and local tiers of the state over matters relative to the urban black population
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featured prominently in the decade and a half following the NP’s accession to power. 
The creation of the Mentz Committee was an early signal of the direction the central 
government was heading in its relations with local authorities. Although it 
necessarily had to consult local authorities, the Mentz Committee operated strictly 
within a framework developed by the NAD and would not tolerate any deviation 
from it. The Mentz Committee hearings were therefore not consultations about the 
basic principles of urban restructuring, but about how local plans could fit into the 
general framework. The formulation of important national policies became the 
function of closed committees such as those of Nel and Mentz.69 Regional and local 
planners were generally not involved in their activities, unless they shared 
Verwoerd's vision.
Verwoerd sketched his vision for the future siting and planning of African 
townships in the Senate in May 1952. The basic principles he enunciated in this 
regard were:
1. The site should be at an adequate distance from the 
European town;
2. It should preferably adjoin the location of a 
neighbouring town, so as to decrease rather than 
increase the number of Native areas;
3. It should preferably be separated from the European 
area by an industrial buffer where industries exist or 
are being planned;
4. It should have provision for an adequate hinterland 
for expansion stretching away from the European 
area;
5. It should be within easy distance of the town or city 
for transport purposes, by rail rather than by road;
6. It should have a road of its own connecting the 
location site with the city, preferably running through 
the industrial areas;
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7. It should possess open buffer zones around the 
proclaimed location areas, the breadth of which 
should depend on whether the location borders upon a 
densely or sparsely occupied European area; and
8. It should be at a considerable distance from main, and 
more particularly national roads, the use of which as 
local transport routes for the location should be totally 
discouraged.70
These ideas were not entirely new. For example, the siting of townships such 
as Orlando and Natalspruit, were guided by these principles before they were 
articulated in Verwoerd's speech. Nevertheless, his announcement in parliament 
effectively elevated these ideas to government policy. So, while the committee 
entertained representations from different bodies, it did not accept anything that did 
not comply with these principles. The committee met with little opposition from 
municipalities or employer representatives on the East Rand. The Boksburg Council, 
for example, concurred that industrial areas should serve as the main buffer between 
African locations and white residential areas. In the case of the East Rand this meant 
white areas would generally be located in the north and African locations in the 
south, with the industrial areas and the main railway line separating the two.71 Part of 
the rationale behind this requirement was that it obviated the need for Africans to 
travel through 'white areas' to their places of employment. In addition, the industrial 
areas and railway line were regarded as useful buffer zones, an absolutely essential 
aspect of town planning. The municipalities were particularly sensitive about the 
proximity of locations to their white residential areas. Thus the Farmers’ Association 
of Roodekop strongly objected to the idea of expanding Natalspruit too close to their 
areas. Fleidelberg, on the other hand, objected to this expansion because it would
72bring the location too close to the national road.
In November 1952 the Mentz Committee met all the municipalities o f the 
East Rand as well as various mining and industrial companies to discuss the 
establishment of regional African townships. All the municipalities submitted plans
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for township development, which reflected their local concerns about where to 
establish the new townships. The meeting first considered a submission from the 
Brakpan municipality to create a single African regional township for Brakpan, 
Benoni, Boksburg and Springs, which it proposed should be located in the north- 
eastern corner of the region. Other municipalities, the Mentz Committee and the 
owners of smallholdings in the area where it was proposed to create the regional 
township all rejected this proposal. White farmers and residents were especially 
concerned that any new African township be created sufficiently far from their areas. 
Benoni and Springs objected to the proposal because they had already developed 
plans for the creation of their own townships, which did not accord with Brakpan’s 
proposal.75 Both towns had already acquired the land for township purposes and, in 
the case of Springs, had already begun building houses in its new township. 
Germiston’s development of a new township was even more advanced. It had 
already established Natalspruit in 1949 and wanted that area to be further developed 
as a regional township complex. The headstart enjoyed by these three municipalities 
put them in an advantageous position to influence where the regional townships 
would be situated. The Mentz Committee also endorsed their existing plans and 
made them the basis of its proposals for regional townships in the region.76 In 
contrast, Boksburg and Brakpan did not yet have any such plans and thus lagged 
behind in the planning and development of new African townships. The Committee 
proposed that Brakpan’s new township be located adjacent to KwaThema. The 
Brakpan municipality initially disagreed with this idea and suggested a different site 
for the township, but the Committee rejected its counter-proposal.77 Boksburg was 
perceived as the most problematic case.78 Initially it was suggested that the old 
location (Stirtonville) be expanded and developed to accommodate the town’s entire 
African population, but Rand Mines objected to this proposal. As a result o f these 
difficulties a special sub-committee was created to investigate the creation o f a 
township for Boksburg’s African population, which was expected to need between 
46 600 and 76 000 houses once the town’s anticipated industrial expansion had been 
completed. After considering a number of options, the committee concluded that 
Boksburg’s township should be created as part of the Natalspruit complex. Although
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the Brakpan and Boksburg local authorities accepted the proposals of the Mentz 
Committee, it took them a few more years to formulate plans and begin the 
construction of their respective townships.
The final Mentz Report, which was published in December 195 3,80 provided 
a blue-print for the establishment of regional townships on the East Rand. Its 
primary recommendation was that all existing locations in the region (as well as on 
the whole Witwatersrand) should be disestablished and be replaced by fewer 
regional townships. For the authorities the old locations epitomised uncontrolled 
urbanisation, which combined with their residents’ propensity for militant struggles 
and their proximity to the ‘white’ towns, made them prime targets for removal. It is 
for this reason that the Mentz Committee was popularly known as the ‘black spots’ 
committee. The government also believed the concentration of Africans in large 
regional townships would facilitate the monitoring and control of the urban African 
population.81
After considering the specific proposals from the various municipalities the 
committee concluded that there were three areas which lent themselves to natural 
planning o f ‘Native locations’.82 'Natural planning' of course meant that the locations 
could be developed in accordance with the principles set out by the government. In 
August 1955 the NAD announced the Mentz Committee ‘grand plan’ for the East 
Rand. Two large regional townships were to be established: first, the people from 
Payneville (Springs) and the Brakpan and Dunnotar locations would be relocated to 
the new township of KwaTsaDuza (KwaThema , Tsakane and Duduza) and second, 
residents from old locations of Germiston, Alberton, Boksburg and Elsburg were to 
be relocated to Kathorus (Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus).83 The committee also 
approved Benoni’s plans to establish a separate township (Daveyton) to the North- 
East of the town. As was expected, the government gave the Mentz Committee’s 
proposals a ringing endorsement:
Every area has been planned with a view to the creation of the 
necessary buffer zones and availability or possible provision 
of the necessary transport services, so that the Natives living
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there will be able to get to work with the least inconvenience...
The Mentz Commission has thus completed the planning of 
the whole Reef area from Heidelberg to Vereeniging, and 
found solutions to both the short and the long-term problems.
The local authorities can now go ahead on this basis with no
84uncertainty about the future.
It took nearly two years for this announcement to be made from the time 
when the final report was submitted to the government. The reasons for this delay 
are unclear. It is likely, however, that the government awaited the completion of the 
work of other committees so that the plans for African locations could be integrated 
into the broader plans for the restructuring of the Reef (see below for the discussion 
on the Subsidiary Planning Committee). Beyond that the plan to remove 'black 
spots' all over the Reef was probably held in abeyance pending the implementation 
o f the Western Areas Removal Scheme. It was here that black resistance was fiercest 
and potentially subversive of the government’s plans. The successful removal of 
residents from Sophiatown represented an important turning point in the 
government’s national urban restructuring strategy.
The United Party opposed the recommendations of the Mentz Committee
and established its own Tucker Committee to formulate alternative plans.85 In March
1954 this committee announced its recommendations which coincided largely with
those in the Fagan Commission.86 It called for the recognition of Africans as
permanent residents in the urban areas, but also agreed that influx control was
necessary. The Tucker Report specifically rejected the Mentz Committee's proposal
to remove Africans from various integrated locations. However, by 1954 the
United Party was wracked by internal division, especially over the Western Areas 
88Removal Scheme.
Objections to the Mentz report from municipalities were few and far 
between. Where criticisms arose, as in the case of Springs, these were directed more 
at the perceived high-handed intervention by the central government in matters 
traditionally perceived as falling within the competence of local authorities. Jack
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Ellis, a leading Springs councillor and UP member, was especially indignant about 
the undermining of the role of local authorities:
We as Municipalities know the best place for our locations, 
but in the future somebody from Pretoria, who knows nothing 
about our conditions, will tell us where to put our locations 
whether it is convenient for us or not... The whole thing is like 
a vicious circle,... You cannot establish an area for a future 
location unless you have the funds for Native Housing on 
hand. Industrial expansion will mean an influx of native 
labour, an influx of native labour means new locations and
new locations provide the labour for industrial expansion. Stop
89the establishment of new locations and you stop everything.
Most local authorities, however, accepted the underlying principles 
propounded by the government in relation to urban planning and the development of 
African locations in particular. These also gained currency among other planners on 
the Witwatersrand. A.J. Cutten, a liberal town planner, concurred with the essence of 
the government's thinking. In a memorandum dealing with township development he 
agreed that since “the entire economic structure of European life in South Africa is 
so dependent upon Native labour, it is important that such labour be housed in 
townships located conveniently close to the labourer's place of work”.90 Locations, 
he argued, could only be established in the south or north because the main urban 
development on the Reef occurred along an East - West line.91
While the Mentz Committee was formulating its ‘grand plan’ for the urban 
African population living on the Reef, the government initiated a parallel process to 
develop a similar plan for coloureds and Indians. The decision to disestablish all 
‘black spots’ also encompassed coloureds and Indians, who according to the 
Population Registration and Group Areas Acts, could no longer reside in the same 
residential area.
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The Subsidiary Planning Committee: regional planning of group areas
The idea of centralised regional locations for coloureds was first raised in 
November 1951 at a conference to discuss the position of coloureds in the 
Witwatersrand. The conference, convened under the auspices of I.D. du Plessis, 
Commissioner of Coloured Affairs, was attended by municipalities from all over the 
Witwatersrand, as well as by senior politicians, including prime minister Malan, P. 
Sauer (acting minister of Internal Affairs) and W.W.M. Eiselen (Secretary for Native 
Affairs).92 Du Plessis explained that there was a growing concern about the future of 
coloureds in a province where they formed only a miniscule proportion of the 
population (1,5% of the total population in the Transvaal and 3% in the 
Witwatersrand).93 The “coloured man”, he averred, “found himself in a very special 
position that had already been described as 'a brown island in a black sea'.”94 In his 
opinion, “This problem required immediate attention in view of the fact that it was 
the Government's policy that the coloured community in the Transvaal alos (sic) be 
enabled to develope (sic) as an independent group.”95 In response to his 
impassioned plea that special consideration be given to the plight of coloureds, the 
conference resolved
that the principle of centralised ... residential areas be adopted 
for the East, Central and West Rand Areas, respectively, and 
that all aspects and implications of this motion be investigated 
in consultation with local and other authorities with a view of 
drafting concrete proposals.96
The following year the government acted on this suggestion and took 
decisive steps in consolidating the numerous laws and proposals affecting the urban 
situation into a coherent and implementable plan. On December 2, 1952, the acting 
Minister of Economic Affairs, J.F. Naude, announced the establishment of the 
Subsidiary Planning Committee (SPC) under the chairmanship of Dr J.H. Moolman, 
who was also a member of the Mentz Commission. According to Naude the idea of
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creating a permanent planning committee for the Witwatersrand area originated with 
Verwoerd, for whom a co-ordinated approach to the restructuring of the whole 
region was essential.98 Although it was declared to be merely an advisory body, the 
SPC was also expected to “provide a lead in the planning of the region on a much 
wider basis.”99 This emphasis on co-ordinated planning was further confirmed by the 
decision to place the SPC under the auspices of the Natural Resources and 
Development Council (NRDC). The chief planner of the NRDC was acutely aware 
of the inter-relationship between the implementation of urban apartheid and urban 
planning in general:
I acknowledge that race zoning, that is the creation of locations 
and residential areas for coloureds and Asiatics, is of cardinal 
importance in our country, but it cannot be separated from 
simultaneous planning of white areas, industrial areas, traffic 
systems, the recovery of natural resources, etc.100
The presence of senior members from the Departments of Mining, Native 
Affairs, Transport and Internal Affairs on the committee also highlighted the extent 
to which the government wanted to integrate the work of its different departments 
into a single, coherent strategy.101 At its first meeting held in January 1953, the 
chairman of the NRDC, F.J. du Toit explained to delegates the main purpose of the 
new committee:
In the past the one department or local authority seldom knew 
what its neighbours were planning and each one was just 
carrying on its own.... this Committee will provide an 
opportunity for automatic consultation with the result that 
various aspects of development will no longer clash with one 
another.102
It was envisaged that the SPC would play a key role in co-ordinating the 
future development and planning of industry, mining, transport and residential areas
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on the Witvvatersrand. As one delegate proposed it “should aim at the preparation of 
a master plan within which private enterprise can operate... Development can follow 
the pattern outlined by the Committee.”103 This proposal reflected the dominant 
thinking among policy-makers and government officials. In an important sense 
therefore the modernist principles first propounded by the SEPC, and which at the 
time received only a lukewarm reception, had become universally accepted.
The members of the SPC discharged their responsibilities with enthusiasm. 
They agreed that “co-ordination can only be achieved through voluntary co­
operation”, but were prepared to invoke the authority of the government if such co­
operation was not forthcoming. In terms of the legislation governing the functioning 
of the NRDC, the government could of course proclaim an area a controlled area, 
which would make consultation with the SPC compulsory.104 Significantly, one of 
the first policy pronouncements by the new committee was to endorse the 
recommendations of the Mentz Committee. At a conference held in Johannesburg to 
inform other role players of the establishment of the SPC, Du Toit promised that his 
committee would urgently give attention to the big problem of residential racial 
integration.105 The SPC viewed itself and the Mentz Committee as the two 
components of the government’s double-pronged strategy to restructure the urban 
areas of the Witwatersrand. Whereas the former dealt with the majority African 
population, it would do the same for coloured, Indians and whites.
The SPC created a number of sub-committees to investigate the different 
aspects of urban and regional planning for the Witwatersrand. Two of the most 
important of these committees were the Minerals and Mining committee, and the 
Group Areas committee. M.C. Barker, another member of the Mentz Commission, 
chaired the latter. Other members of the committee were drawn from the 
Departments of Native Affairs, Coloured Affairs and National Housing. This 
committee played a key role in the division of the region into 'group areas' for 
coloureds, Indians and whites. The committee’s report has no record of public 
hearings or investigation similar to those conducted by the Mentz Committee, 
suggesting that there was at best only minimal consultation with local authorities. By
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this time the government had dispensed with the formalities of public hearings and 
left urban planning in the hands of its committee-men.
The SPC’s basic ‘principles and work methods’ not surprisingly coincided 
largely with those laid out by the Native Affairs Department. In accordance with the 
GAA, the committee aimed to devise a system of “planning that would allow each 
group the opportunity to develop on their own and at the same time to ensure the 
most convenient transport to workplaces without the need for one group to move 
through the area of another group to reach their workplaces.”106 The sub-committee 
on group areas completed its work in 1955 and produced detailed plans for carving 
the region into group areas. Its report on the East Rand included maps with clear 
demarcations of'group areas' for the region as well as for the individual towns. The 
committee argued that in respect of the East Rand
the present number of non-whites, excluding natives, in the 
different municipalities is so small and the fact that separate 
schemes for such small groups in these towns would be 
uneconomical, the committee attempted as far as possible to 
combine the racial groups of two or more municipalities into a 
single region.
The committee extended the Mentz Commission's regional planning of 
African townships to coloureds and Indians on the East Rand. In its report on 
Springs it suggested that the coloured population from Germiston, Springs, 
Boksburg and Brakpan be moved to one township. It was proposed that this regional 
township be located south of Boksburg, not too far from where Reiger Park is 
situated today. This area was regarded as suitable because of its proximity to the 
industrial areas which would serve as an adequate buffer between coloureds, 
Africans and whites.109 The committee also suggested that the 510 'malays' of the 
East Rand be located in a single area, within the proposed coloured township.110 It 
was calculated that the 'malay' population would probably grow to about 4000 in 60- 
70 years and that enough land had to be made available for future expansion of their
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residential area.111 The planning of residential areas for Indians and Chinese likewise 
proposed the creation of townships on the Far East Rand and in the 
Germiston/Boksburg area.112 The Mentz and Subsidiary Planning Committees plans 
were thus central components in the government's schemes to restructure the 
Witwatersrand. Their recommendations, which fused racial segregation with urban 
planning in an industrialising country, guided state policy for the next two decades.
The initiatives by the government to institute and co-ordinate greater regional 
planning were not the only ones attempted on the Witwatersrand. There were also 
independent plans initiated by municipalities on the Reef to co-ordinate their policies 
in relation to blacks. In 1952 a conference of Reef municipalities proposed the 
formation of a regional body - the Witwatersrand Regional Planning Council - 
"whose function would be to plan on a regional basis the provision of Native 
housing on the Witwatersrand with due regard to the present and future industrial 
and other development of the areas."113 These initiatives were indicative of the 
successful conversion of most town planners to the idea of regional planning by the 
mid fifties. The early initiatives of the central government ensured that the important 
decisions on the planning of regional development and co-ordination for blacks 
would rest with it and would occur within the political framework set out by the 
National Party. These principles came closest to representing a blue print for urban 
development, and to a large extent they determined the racial restructuring of the 
cities in the fifties and sixties.
The difficulties initially experienced by the government support the 
argument that the making of apartheid was a complex and contradictory 
process.114 This was particularly evident during the first few years of Nationalist 
rule when it engaged in almost frantic efforts to formulate an effective response 
to the urban crisis. At the same time the struggles by black opposition 
movements were intensifying, posing a serious challenge to the authorities. In 
this context, the ruling party, whose electoral position was not yet consolidated, 
could hardly impose its will on the black population. State policy was indeed 
contested at every level of society. However, as this chapter has tried to illustrate, 
the government was able -  despite numerous difficulties -  to consolidate support
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for its vision among state officials, planners and local administrators. 
Notwithstanding continued debate over important issues such as the role of 
African workers in the ‘white’ economy, the support for decisive state 
intervention, proper urban planning, compulsory segregation and the 
establishment of regional townships -  all principal components o f ‘modernist’ 
apartheid -  grew dramatically in the early 1950s. In this way too, the state was 
itself strengthened especially as even opposition-controlled local authorities (for 
example, Benoni) endorsed the government’s strategies. As a result the 
government was able to proceed more expeditiously to implement its grand plan 
for the restructuring of the East Rand, albeit in the face of new forms of 
opposition. These latter issues are the subjects of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
Group Areas and Regional Restructuring 
on the East Rand
By the mid-1950s the government had achieved one of its key objectives 
in the formulation of detailed restructuring plans for the Witwatersrand. Among 
the main aims of these plans were the disestablishment o f ‘black spots’ and the 
relocation of their inhabitants to ‘racially’ exclusive townships or group areas.
The local authorities of the East Rand endorsed these basic objectives and 
formulated their local plans accordingly. The government had also managed to 
overcome many of the legal and political obstructions, which initially hindered the 
smooth functioning of the Group Areas Board. It appeared at the time that the 
government would relatively quickly be able to implement key components of its 
social engineering policies on the East Rand. The forced removals of 
Sophiatown's residents and the establishment of Davcyton and KwaThcma in the 
mid-1950s seemed to confirm this perception. Yet it took the government until the 
late 1960s successfully to implement the main features of the East Rand's regional 
plan and a further decade before the final forced removals of residents from ‘black 
spots’ were effected.
This chapter analyses the process of implementation of the government’s 
regional ‘grand scheme’ on the East Rand. It discusses some of the myriad local 
factors that influenced the pace at which this scheme was introduced regionally 
and in the different towns. It argues that, notwithstanding the National Party’s 
zealous commitment to compulsory ‘racial’ segregation and the central 
government’s increasing control over local authorities, it was more difficult than 
the government might have expected to implement policies according to plan. 
Indeed, the period between the late 1950s and mid 1960s proved to be a crucial 
time for the implementation of urban apartheid. It was at this point that local
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opposition was especially pronounced. The most important source of resistance 
emanated from the local black populations -  the victims of urban apartheid -  and 
their political organisations.1 However, an often neglected source of opposition, 
albeit on fundamentally different grounds from the former, emerged from a host 
of local white interest groups. The chapter focuses on the opposition posed by 
local authorities and other white interest groups, which the government could 
neither dismiss as irrelevant nor repress as it did with black opposition. In this 
context the tension that arose between the central government and local 
authorities was not primarily over the principle of segregation. Rather, local 
authorities proposed plans that reflected their particular interests and which, at 
times, contradicted the government’s regional plans. The effects of the multiple 
and diverse forms of opposition to the government’s regional group area scheme 
were first to delay its implementation, then force a review of substantial parts of it 
and eventually cause its abandonment in the 1970s.
The Group Areas Act in the 1950s: from inertia to consolidation
During its first term of office the NP experienced mixed success in its 
attempts to grapple with the urban crisis. On the one hand, it proceeded speedily and 
deliberately to create an enabling legislative framework and to formulate detailed 
plans to intervene in the crisis. On the other hand, its ability to implement these plans 
proved more complicated than it might have expected. This was nowhere better 
illustrated than in the case of the Group Areas Act (GAA).
The GAA empowered the Nationalist government with the legal means to 
effect compulsory segregation and to reverse existing practices of racial 
integration. The rapid and successful establishment of group areas was a matter of 
paramount importance to the government, which committed itself in 1948 to a 
programme of rapid enforcement of residential segregation. However, the 
promulgation of the GAA in 1950 was not followed by immediate successes. 
Between 1950 and 1957 the government faced numerous obstacles to and 
inadequacies in its own plans. The GAA was in practice relatively deficient in its
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exposition of plans for the creation of group areas. The government only appointed 
the Mentz Committee and the Subsidiary Planning Committee in 1952 to advise it 
on the details of creating townships and group areas. The weaknesses of the group 
areas policy framework was vividly illustrated by the virtual absence of group area 
proclamations in the early 1950s: six years after the promulgation of the GAA only 
five group areas had been declared, that is, less than one a year.2 Various factors 
contributed to this delay.
The implementation of the GAA was initially retarded by administrative 
shortcomings. One of the first obstacles faced by the Land Tenure Advisory Board 
(LTAB), which was responsible until 1955 for supervising the implementation of 
the GAA, was uncertainty over the number of ‘racial groups’ identified by the 
government. The Population Registration Act of 1950 identified three main ‘racial 
groups’, namely, white coloured and ‘native’.3 These arbitrary divisions proved 
inadequate and the government made provision for more racial subdivisions. 
Coloureds, for example, were further subdivided into Chinese, Indians, coloureds 
and malays. The process of racial classification was both tragic and farcical. In 
1951 Indians and Chinese were officially recognised as separate groups in all 
provinces except the Orange Free State. Malays were also officially recognised in 
a number of Cape municipalities. However, once they left these areas they were no 
longer malays but became either Cape coloured or other coloured!4
Once this process of racial classification was sufficiently advanced the 
LTAB could proceed with the declaration of controlled, specified or defined areas, 
the precursors to the establishment of group areas. When a locality was earmarked 
for group area demarcation, permits had to be issued to those people (‘disqualified 
groups’) who resided in the ‘wrong’ location. Similarly, businesses operating 
outside their designated group area also had to apply for permits. Each permit 
application had to be investigated, which took up a considerable amount of time. In 
1951-52 the LTAB issued 581. such permits but by 1958-59 this figure had leapt to 
3395, which demonstrated the enormous bureaucratic burden involved in the 
administration of the GAA.5 These administrative difficulties were not foreseen by 
the government and impeded the implementation of the GAA. The GAB was
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initially far more involved in these myriad administrative duties than in preparing 
recommendations for the proclamation of group areas.
More significant, however, was the opposition organised by the South 
African Indian Congress (S.A.I.C.) which effectively exploited the administrative 
shortcomings in the GAA to stall its implementation. This was possible because 
LTAB hearings to decide on group area demarcations were initially open to all 
affected parties. For example, in 1953 the S.A.I.C. demanded that members of the 
LTAB sitting at Lydenburg should recuse themselves because they were not 
impartial. Although this was not acceded to, the LTAB was forced to test the 
matter in court. This resulted in a delay of nine months before the Board could 
proceed with its plans. Interventions of this kind occurred in many centres with 
Indian populations and frustrated the smooth operation of the LTAB.
Objections from white local authorities also caused delays in the 
establishment of group areas. For example, the refusal by the Uitenhage Council to 
implement the GAA because it would adversely affect coloured, Indian and 
Chinese businesses delayed the creation of group areas in that town.6 Elsewhere 
individual councillors opposed the GAA in principle, and in some cases succeeded 
in stalling the implementation of group areas. Other Councils opposed the GAA 
because they were reluctant to carry the financial burden of implementing group 
areas.7 However, by the mid-fifties many liberal councillors and town planners 
supported the government's plans to restructure urban areas, in which the creation 
of group areas was pivotal. Mabin has argued that many planners were ‘seduced’ 
by the Nationalist's commitment to bring about order to the urban areas.8 Many of 
them also shared the National Party's commitment to assert greater control over the 
black population.
The initial successes scored by these forces in delaying the implementation of 
group areas was perhaps more indicative of the relative weakness of the National 
Party in the early fifties vis-a vis the local authorities and the increasingly militant 
black urban population. The government was then still obliged to conduct open 
hearings, consult widely with local authorities and even tolerate objections from 
the black population. But as their electoral position strengthened in 1953 and 1958, 
and the inability of the black opposition to prevent forced removals became
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apparent after the implementation of the Western Areas Removal Scheme, the 
Nationalists were able to proceed more systematically and autocratically with their 
plans.
The opposition from the S.A.I.C. and some liberal-controlled Councils also 
alerted the government to shortcomings in the GAA. The Act was amended on 
numerous occasions and in 1957 the Group Areas Amendment Act was passed, 
incorporating all the amendments made to the original Act. In addition the Group 
Areas Development Act, which established the Group Areas Board, was passed in 
1955. The cumulative effect of these amendments was to give the central 
government and the Group Areas Board specifically, greater power to ensure 
compliance from local authorities. These amendments, for example, empowered the 
GAB to prohibit from its hearings anyone who did not propose the establishment of 
a group area, thereby excluding opposition groups. The 1957 Act represented a 
turning point in the establishment of group areas, Over the next two years the 
number of group areas declared increased to 170.9 An important trump card held by 
the central government was its threat to withhold finance for housing, without 
which Councils would not have been able to tackle the black housing crisis. In this 
way it was able to force compliance from Councils. These seemingly consolidated 
the legislative foundation on which the government could construct and elaborate 
the edifice of racially divided urban centres.
Local interests versus the central grand plan
Nearly a decade after coming to power the Nationalist Party thus seemed on 
the verge of fulfilling one of its main promises to the white electorate. However, the 
government was confronted at the time by a new set of dilemmas and obstacles in 
the form of opposition emanating both from the black population as well as local 
white groups. It is on the role of the latter that the chapter focuses its attention.10 As 
noted previously a consensus had been established in the early 1950s between the 
government and local authorities on the general principles of the racial restructuring 
of the urban areas and particularly on the creation of group areas and regional black 
residential areas. But this political consensus belied important differences that
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existed between these tiers of the state, especially over the practical and financial 
implications of the government's schemes.
One of the most important disputes over the implementation of the GAA 
occurred between the Durban City Council and the government. The Durban 
Council’s aim from the 1940s of halting and reversing ‘Indian penetration’ placed 
the city in the forefront of those advocating urban ‘racial’ segregation11 and 
throughout the 1950s it was among the most vocal supporters of the GAA.
However, the local authority baulked at the prospect of having to take on the 
financial responsibility for the implementation of group areas in its own backyard. 
As a result it called for the creation of group areas in the city to be postponed.12 
This example reveals an important source of tension between the government and 
local authorities over which of them should bear the financial responsibility for 
forced removals and the creation of group areas.
Another contentious issue was the divergent attitudes of some local 
authorities towards their black populations. Generally, local authorities across the 
country displayed a partiality towards coloureds and Indians, as opposed to 
Africans. In practice they were willing to support the forced removals of Africans, 
blit were oflcn ambivalent about the application of such policies to coloureds and 
Indians. Consequently, local authorities more readily accepted the government’s 
policies affecting Africans than those affecting coloureds and Indians. However, 
another level of discrimination pervaded the policies and attitudes of national and 
local authorities. They were invariably far more favourably disposed to coloureds 
than Indians. This discrimination often meant that local authorities insisted on 
keeping coloureds in their towns, whereas they rarely displayed such commitment 
to their local Indian population. On the contrary, many of them actively encouraged 
the government to remove Indians. The hierarchy of discrimination against black 
people, especially in relation to the application of group areas, underpinned many of 
the disputes that occurred between municipalities, and between them and the 
government over the issue of forced removals.
A case in point was the Uitenhage Council, which fully supported the 
removal of African people from its old location but opposed similar treatment of 
coloureds and Indians. It argued that the businessmen and property owners from
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these communities would be especially adversely affected if they were removed 
from their existing residential area.13 That African residents were not given the 
same consideration underscores the universal support by local authorities for the 
confinement of urban Africans to new townships, irrespective of the hardships they 
would endure in the process.
A similar set of issues influenced the relationship between the local 
authorities and the government over the creation of group areas on the East Rand. 
During the GAB hearings held on the East Rand in 1957/58 important differences 
emerged between the local group area plans devised by municipalities and the 
regional plan, which the Subsidiary Planning Committee recommended and the 
government endorsed. At the centre of this disagreement was the Benoni, Springs 
and Boksburg Councils’ proposals to create group areas for coloureds and Indians 
in their respective towns. At the hearing held in Springs in 1957 the Council 
proposed that Payneville and Bakerton be set aside for coloureds and Indians 
respectively. In support of its recommendation, the Council argued that it had 
invested considerable capital over many years in these areas and therefore opposed 
their intended destruction. Furthermore, it objected to incurring any cost that would 
arise from the removal of these people to new sites.14 At the Benoni hearings the 
local authority deployed similar arguments for keeping coloureds and Indians in the 
town: it recommended that a coloured group area be created in Wattville and that 
the local Indian population be accommodated in the Benoni Old Location.15 In 
1959 the Boksburg Council, which was politically closer to the government than 
the more liberal councils of Springs and Benoni, proposed that Zindabad, the area 
occupied by Indians, be declared a group area for them.16
Although the local blue-prints presented at the group areas hearings 
closely followed the general prescription laid out by the government for the 
creation of group areas,17 they simultaneously reflected local political and 
economic interests of the respective municipalities. One of the main concerns 
emerging from the municipalities’ submissions was the possible disruptive effect 
of group areas on the supply of labour to their local industries. This problem was 
raised especially in relation to the coloured workforce. Thus Benoni and Springs 
objected to the removal of coloureds because many of them were employed in
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local industries and were generally regarded as reliable workers. Their attitudes to 
Indians were totally different. Indians were mainly involved in commerce and 
were not perceived as important to industry. The Councils were consequently less 
enthusiastic about their support for the retention of the local Indian population 
than for coloureds.
Most interesting, was the GAB’s response to these proposals. The Board’s 
executive endorsed the recommendations presented by the East Rand’s local 
authorities, despite the fact that they contradicted the government’s regional 
scheme. In November 1958 the GAB formally accepted the Benoni Council’s 
plans18 and soon after the Boksburg hearings the chairman of the Transvaal 
Committee of the GAB, M.P. Prinsloo promised that his committee ‘will press for 
the development ofZindabad’ [as an Indian group area].19
It is inconceivable the GAB would not have been aware either of the 
regional plans that were devised earlier by the Mentz and Subsidiary Planning 
Committees or of the government’s commitment to regional townships. M.C. v.t. 
Barker, an executive member of the Board, served on the Mentz Committee. The 
GAB did not, however, serve on the Subsidiary Planning Committee,20 which 
recommended the creation of regional group areas for coloureds and Indians on 
the East Rand. The disjunctive between plans proposed by the municipalities and 
the stated objectives of the government seemed to have arisen because the SPC, 
while having endorsed the principle of regional group areas, did not propose a 
detailed plan for the creation of such group areas on the East Rand. It suggested 
simply that the coloured and Indian populations from two or three municipalities 
be combined into regional group areas.21 And, equally important, the government 
did not formally endorse the recommendations made by the SPC. As a result, the 
municipalities and GAB did not have a blue-print to guide them. Although 
municipalities were expected to take account of the principle of regional group 
areas, there were no mechanisms in place to co-ordinate the process of 
formulating local plans on a regional basis. This meant that each local authority 
devised its own group area plans without much, if any, reference to the parallel 
processes taking place in neighbouring towns.22 Notwithstanding the involvement 
of various government bodies in the process of urban restructuring, none of them
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assumed (or was given) the responsibility of harnessing their various proposals 
into a single plan for the East Rand. The GAB, however, seemed best placed to 
play this role.
The main functions of the GAB and its predecessor, the Land Tenure 
Advisory Board, were to advise the government on the establishment of group 
areas and to administer the implementation of the GAA. In discharging these 
responsibilities the GAB had to liaise with all interested parties, especially local 
authorities and business groups. The GAB was therefore conceived at the outset 
as an intermediate body between the government and local authorities. One of the 
challenges facing this body was to strike a balance between the demands placed 
on it by the central and local tiers of the state. Prior to group area hearings on the 
East Rand in the late 1950s, the GAB focused its attention on gaining agreement 
from local authorities on the principles o f ‘group areas’ and on urging them to 
formulate local group area plans. Although the Board supported the principle of 
regional planning, it had neither formally endorsed it nor made any attempt to 
reconcile local group area plans (for coloureds and Indians) with the regional 
restructuring scheme endorsed by the government. The hearings revealed a 
number of inconsistencies between these plans and it immediately became 
apparent that the central government would not endorse, let alone proclaim, the 
group areas proposed by the East Rand’s local authorities. The government had 
meanwhile begun promoting the idea of creating single regional group areas for 
coloureds and Indians.
In response to this dilemma the executive of the GAB resolved to hold in 
abeyance the implementation of the group areas proposals until the completion of 
an investigation into the creation of group areas on the East Rand.23 A special 
committee comprising members of the GAB and the National Housing 
Commission was created to investigate and elaborate on the establishment of 
single regional group areas for coloureds and Indians.24 The first objective of the 
committee was to bring the GAB’s policies in line with that of the government, 
which it achieved by formally adopting the principle of establishing regional 
group areas for coloureds and Indians.25 This step marked an important shift in the 
relationship between the Board and the East Rand’s local authorities. Thenceforth
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it more vigorously advocated the government’s schemes and worked towards 
achieving compliance with them from local authorities. The shift in the GAB’s 
policy placed it at odds with the East Rand’s municipalities. By so doing the 
Board also became more of an agent and conduit for central government policies, 
and ultimately was incorporated into the newly formed Department of Community 
Development in 1963.
Once the GAB had gone through the ritual of formally endorsing the 
principle of regional group areas, it proceeded to identify the places where these 
could be established. The investigating committee made specific proposals in this 
regard. The ‘black spots’ of Benoni (Benoni Old Location, the Asiatic Bazaar and 
Coloured Section) and of Boksburg (Galeview, Stirtonville and Zindabad) would 
be consolidated and developed into the group areas for Indians and coloureds 
respectively. According to the committee these locations were ideally suited for 
this purpose because they were either sufficiently distant from white residential 
area or there existed acceptable buffer zones to separate them from the white 
areas.26 According to government policy, the presence of adequate buffer zones 
was a primary prerequisite for the establishment of a black residential area. In 
Boksburg the buffer zones included the huge East Rand Proprietary Mines 
complex as well as the Cinderella Dam. The existence of a large slime dam of 
between 250-300 acres between the proposed coloured group area and the white 
town of Elsburg ensured the suitability of this particular site.27 The ‘black spots' 
of Benoni were similarly separated from the white town by industrial areas.
The GAB motivated its support for regional group areas on the grounds 
that there were too few coloureds and Indians on the East Rand to make the 
creation of group areas in individual towns financially feasible.28 The local 
authorities refuted this argument and showed that the process of relocating people 
from various parts of the East Rand to single group areas would be more costly. 
For example, the Benoni Council argued that the removals would become a 
serious financial burden on local authorities because of the compensation they 
would have to pay to people being relocated.
Once the GAB decided where the new group would be located, it 
proceeded to formulate detailed plans to put together the different parts of the
regional group areas puzzle. The most important steps in this plan were the speedy 
disestablishment o f ‘black spots', their proclamation as ‘group areas’, the removal 
o f ‘disqualified’ persons from them and the development of the proclaimed ‘group 
area’ according to the perceived needs of the people assigned to it.29 It was 
therefore the recommendation of the special investigating committee rather than 
the findings of the GAB hearings that launched the group areas restructuring 
process on the East Rand.
In Boksburg, Africans had to be removed from Stirtonville and Galeview, 
and Indians from Zindabad and the Asiatic Bazaars, in order to the clear the area 
for occupation by coloured people from all over the region. The local African 
population was destined for the new ‘modern’ township, Vosloorus, and the 
Indian population was to be relocated to Actonville, the proposed Indian regional 
group area.30 But this plan was beset by a number of problems. The ‘black spots’ 
of Boksburg, whose suitability was largely premised on it being surrounded by 
buffer zones, proved too small to accommodate all the coloured people on the 
East Rand, and was prevented from further expansion by these selfsame buffer 
zones. The area had a limited capacity of 2400 family units. The government 
expected that 1600 families from all over the region would move into the new 
group area in the early 1960s and that full capacity would be reached within 15 
years.
The Boksburg and Bcnoni Councils readily agreed to the proposed 
removal of Africans from their old locations to Vosloorus and Daveyton 
respectively. These removals were initially recommended by the Mentz 
Committee and were central components of the regional plan for creating African 
townships. However, when it came to the proposals regarding coloureds and 
Indians a number of controversies arose, which would impede the speedy 
implementation of the regional group area plans. The opposition emanating from 
Benoni proved to be the most serious problem confronting the government in this 
regard.
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Bcnoni’s white opposition to the regional plan
The government’s group area plans for Benoni provoked opposition from 
various and diverse quarters. On the one hand, were those organisations that 
rejected the whole concept of group areas. These were drawn overwhelmingly 
from the town’s black community and were mainly organised under the banner of 
the Congress Alliance. On the other hand, there were those organisations that 
supported the principle of group areas, but opposed specific aspects of its 
implementation at the local level. Foremost among the latter were the local 
chapters of the official white opposition parties, namely, the United and Labour 
Parties, which traditionally dominated white politics in Benoni.31 These parties 
were particularly vocal about their opposition to the removal of coloured people 
from the town. The demand to keep the local coloured population was, most 
interestingly, also supported by an alliance of Afrikaner organisations. The 
Council’s proposal to create a coloured ‘group area’ in Wattville won approval 
from these organisations. Local industrialists were also keen to retain coloureds in 
the area because they were an important source of artisanal labour. The 
significance of the opposition that emanated from these diverse constituencies was 
the extent to which local interests often contradicted the government’s national 
plans. A secondary, but important, feature emerging out of this process was the 
differential attitude of various groups to different ‘racial groups’.
The Benoni Council was especially concerned about the financial 
implications of the proposed forced removals. It criticised the government’s plans 
as being ‘uneconomical’ because it recommended a staggered removal process of 
Africans, first from Benoni Old Location and then, after three decades32, from 
Wattville.33 J.E. Mathewson, the Director of Non-European Affairs, was 
particularly adamant that the town’s interest would be best served if all Africans 
were immediately removed to Daveyton. Such a move, it was argued, would 
minimise the cost to the Council and would mean that the Old Location could be 
revamped as part of the Indian group area. Coloured people would also be moved 
to Wattville where they would be accommodated in the houses vacated by 
Africans, without any major additional costs.34 The anticipated cost of the
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removal was not insignificant: it was estimated the removal of Africans alone 
would cost approximately R1 million, an amount which the Bantu Affairs 
Department wanted covered from the Council’s general account.33 The 
implication of this was that local white taxpayers would carry the financial burden 
of implementing the government’s plans, something most local authorities were 
reluctant to accept.
The government remained unperturbed by the complaints of the Benoni 
Council. As far as it was concerned the financial costs of the removals were 
outweighed by the political importance of effecting regional group areas. The 
government also accused the Benoni authorities of placing its local interests above 
regional and national concerns. The government at the time refused to consider 
any exceptions to its regional plans and remained adamant about creating the 
regional Indian group area in Benoni, the implication of which was that coloureds 
would have to move.36
The Benoni Council was initially equally determined to retain its local 
coloured population and in mid-1962 proposed what it called a ‘new deal’ to 
achieve its objective. The town’s white political leaders viewed themselves as 
pioneers of developing innovative plans to alleviate the living conditions of black 
people and now suggested to the government that it be allowed to implement 
another of its ‘winds of change’ experiments.37 The local authority believed it was 
ideally placed to establish a local Coloured Affairs Department and to allow 
coloureds a measure of local self-government, including in time, the creation of a 
Management Committee.38 The government had at the time begun formulating 
policies for the development of such racialised local government structures for 
coloureds and Indians. The Council’s plans were therefore hardly original and its 
proposed ‘New Deal’ thus represented an endorsement of the government’s 
policies. But it hoped that by enthusiastically embracing these plans, its own plans 
would be more favourably received by the government. However, the government 
remained unimpressed by this overture and insisted that Benoni’s coloured 
population be removed to the regional group area in Boksburg.
A politically significant development at the time was local Afrikaners’ 
opposition to the government’s plans. In February 1961 an article in the Benoni
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City Times made some astute observations on the motivations of different interest 
groups’ support for keeping coloureds in Benoni, and also commented on the 
importance of the ‘Afrikaans support for local coloureds’:
Benoni’s 6000 Coloureds already have a staunch champion who will 
try and persuade the Group Areas Board not to remove them from the 
town. But it is not the voice of industry (who likes them as workers), 
nor the voice of the municipality (to whom they are a source of 
reliable revenue) nor, as yet, that of any other predominantly English 
speaking group in the town. The fist champions of the Coloureds are 
a strong combination of local Afrikaner organisations whose 
energetic approach has already secured them an interview with the 
Group Areas officials.39
This Afrikaner alliance comprised the local chapters of some of the most 
important organisations in the Afrikaner establishment. The most prominent 
among these were the N.G. Kerk and the Benoni National Party branch, which 
together with a number of social organisations and Afrikaner Councillors formed 
the Committee of Coloured Affairs, whose main aim was to campaign against the 
government’s plan to remove coloureds. The committee, like most other white 
organisations, supported the policy of group areas, but concurred with the view 
espoused by the Council that coloureds were beneficial to the town.40 The 
difference in their attitude towards the Indian population was striking. The 
committee argued, more explicitly than any other organisation, that if any ‘group’ 
had to be moved it should be the local Indian population. In its memorandum to 
the GAB, the committee advanced an argument that revealed a strong bias in 
favour of coloureds.41 It claimed that historically coloureds had a stronger claim 
to residential rights in South Africa than Indians.42 According to this view 
coloureds should therefore be given preferential treatment in the allocation of land 
or residential areas. Echoing the views of other organisations, the committee 
argued that coloureds would be severely inconvenienced if they were relocated 
because they would have to travel longer distances to and from their workplaces. 
Indians, the committee averred, did not work in industry and would adapt more
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easily to the hardships of being relocated.43 The local Afrikaners’ attitude echoed 
a general antipathy among whites and officialdom generally towards Indian 
people, who were perceived as politically troublesome, a threat to white small 
businesses and of little value to industry. The committee also argued that the 
removal of Africans from Wattville and their replacement by coloureds would 
alleviate the congestion in Benoni Old Location.44
The local Afrikaner opposition was significant enough to prompt a visit in 
November 1961 to Benoni by the Minister of Community Development, P.W. 
Botha. The stated purpose of the visit was to allow the government to explain to 
its constituency the importance of its group areas plans.45 It was one thing for the 
government to be criticised by its political foes, which dominated the Benoni 
Council, but opposition from within the ranks of the ruling party and the dominant 
Afrikaner church was not a situation it could tolerate. This local dispute assumed 
special significance as it occurred at the time when the National Party (and the 
Afrikaner establishment as a whole) was involved in an acrimonious internal 
struggle over the issue of direct coloured representation in parliament.46 
According to O’Meara there was strong support in the National Party for the idea 
of coloured representation by coloureds in parliament, including support from the 
usually conservative sections of the party (leaders of the Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State).47 It is unclear where the Benoni branch of the National Party stood in 
this debate. The existence of such public and fierce contestation in the ruling party 
would, however, have created the space for local branches publicly to voice their 
opposition, at least on issues relating to the position of coloureds.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the government acted swiftly to address the 
concerns raised by local Afrikaners. Interestingly, Verwoerd had elevated P.W. 
Botha to a full Cabinet rank in August 1961, specifically to deal with the 
recalcitrant voices in the Cape Province division of the party.48 Botha’s visit to 
Benoni was therefore highly significant and would have sent a clear message to 
local party supporters of the gravity with which the government viewed their 
opposition. During the discussions the Minister reiterated the government’s 
commitment to regional group areas and insisted that its plan was more cost 
effective because the provision of basic services to a single large group area
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would cost less per capita. The direct intervention by a senior government 
Minister seemed to have convinced the Afrikaner alliance, the local Chamber of 
Commerce and the local National Party branch to abandon its opposition.49 From 
this point on this important constituency fully supported the government’s plans 
for Benoni.
In 1963 the Council made one last attempt to deflect the government’s 
plans. Under the pretext of the need to expand its industrial land, the Council 
opposed the development of the Indian residential area, the expansion of which 
would occur on the land now earmarked for industrial development.50 The Bantu 
Affairs Department (BAD) vehemently objected to the proposal and saw it as 
nothing more than a manoeuvre by the Council to impede the declaration of an 
Indian group area. The government accused the Council of reneging on 
agreements it had previously made with BAD and threatened to withhold any 
further financial assistance to the council. The government insisted that the 
Council would only be permitted to use the Native Revenue Account for the 
payment of compensation if it agreed to the aforementioned land for Indian 
residential purposes.51 This was a serious threat and forced the Council to 
reconsider its position. One of the main complaints previously raised by the 
Council was that the cost of the removal (including paying compensation to those 
African residents who owned property in the Benoni Old Location) should not be 
paid from the General Account.52 The Group Areas Development Board in a 
similar vein threatened to withdraw its co-operation and support unless the 
Council agreed to the expansion of the Indian residential area.53 The threat to 
withhold financial support proved to be the government’s trump card when it was 
confronted by opposition from local authorities. The Council began to buckle 
under this enormous pressure and divisions emerged in ranks over the issue of 
developing an Indian group area. At least one Councillor, P.W. Smith, accused the 
Management Committee of discriminating against Indians.54
The one consistent oppositional voice from the white community was that 
of Leo Lovell, the Labour Member of Parliament from 1949 to 1958.55 Unlike 
other white opponents of the government’s plans, Lovell opposed the removal of 
Africans from Wattville. He was also the legal representative of the Benoni
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Coloured Vigilance Association, which led the campaign against the removal of 
coloured people from Benoni. Lovell also argued that the removal of coloureds 
and Africans from the old location would have adverse effects on the Indian 
traders, who were dependent on the local clientele for their businesses. The 
residents of Benoni Old Location viewed Lovell as an ally and he often addressed 
public rallies, called to mobilise against the forced removal, in the location.56 
Lovell opposed group areas but was also prepared to use any legal argument to 
achieve his immediate objective of stopping the removal of black people from the 
old location. For example, he argued at the GAB hearings that Wattville was 
already a completely segregated residential area and therefore conformed to the 
government’s prescriptions, making it unnecessary to remove Africans from that 
township.57 In 1959, Lovell organised a petition to oppose the removal of African 
people from Benoni Old Location to Daveyton. Nearly four hundred white 
residents signed the petition, which reflected the widespread sympathy that 
existed for Lovell’s campaign. Lovell succeeded in mobilising opposition among 
white residents mainly because he exposed the financial burden they would have 
to bear in the process. Me had calculated that removals would cost white taxpayers 
approximately £3,7 million.58 But Lovell was concerned by more than the 
financial implications of the removal, lie seemed genuinely interested in fostering 
amiable ‘race relations', which lie believed would be undermined by the 
removals. This much is apparent from his petition:
The question of human discontent is of paramount importance. The 
Native inhabitant of the Old Location and Wattville are a settled and 
happy community. Their removal from deep rooted associations and 
well established homes and gardens must stir resentment even in the 
most peaceful and docile people ... the general community of the 
Town of Benoni, European and Non-European will suffer seriously 
as a result of the removal both in good relations and in the 
impoverishment of their resources by virtue of the unnecessary
59expenditure involved.
By the early 1960s Lovell had however become a lone voice of opposition 
in the white community. The United Party-led council and the alliance of 
Afrikaners had resigned themselves to the inevitable implementation of the 
government's regional plans. Nonetheless, in the short period between 1958 and 
1962 Benoni offered some of the most serious and possibly portentous local white 
opposition to critical aspects of the government’s urban apartheid scheme. In the 
event, the different strands of the opposition were themselves too divided 
seriously to contemplate a united stand against the ruling party. As a result, the 
government could deal separately with each of them and was able to undermine 
the threat each of them posed. Nonetheless, it took nearly seven years from the 
time of the GAB hearings before the government was in a position to proclaim 
group areas in Benoni.
Boksburg's feeble opposition
The situation in Boksburg differed markedly from the oppositional fervour 
that characterised Benoni in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In contrast to Benoni, 
the opposition to group areas in Boksburg, came almost exclusively from the 
Indian community. The Boksburg Council supported the government’s regional 
plans and was especially pleased about the creation of the coloured regional group 
area in the town. Although the local authority initially supported the creation of an 
Indian group, it jettisoned the idea when the GAB pressed for the removal of 
Indians from the town. As a result the Indian population received very little 
support for its campaign from any official quarters, which reflected the weakness 
of white opposition parties in the town compared to Benoni. The African 
population of Stirtonville and Galeview received even less support and there is no 
record of any white opposition to their removal to Vosloorus.
Since the late 1940s the Boksburg Council had supported the creation of a 
separate residential area for Indians. In 1948 Zindabad was identified for 
exclusive Indian residential occupation under the Land Tenure Act. However, the 
development of the area was postponed due to the government’s intention to 
introduce the GAA, which the Council anticipated would affect the status of
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Zindabad. The proclamation of the GAA in 1950 seemed to have spurred on the 
Council to develop the area. In that year the Council took transfer of the area 
specifically to develop it as a residential area. The following year Zindabad was 
provisionally approved for township purposes and in 1952 this step was 
formalised.60 When the Administrator of the Transvaal empowered the Council to 
sell stands to Indian residents, the local authority and residents understandably 
assumed the area would in due course be proclaimed an Indian group area. 
However, the government refused permission for the area formally to be 
proclaimed as such while it was still formulating its detailed plans for the racial 
restructuring of the entire region.
At the group areas hearing in 1959 the Council again recommended the 
development of Zindabad and the surrounding areas for the purpose of an Indian 
group area. It also suggested that Indians living elsewhere in the town (for 
example, in Boksburg North, where a number of families had been living and 
trading for many years) be relocated to the proposed group area.61 After years of 
stalling the Council appeared adamant about the development of the Indian group 
area and publicly stated that it was ‘absolutely essential that the group area for 
Indians be proclaimed in Boksburg’.62 The endorsement of this recommendation 
by the GAB seemed to confirm the future of the area.
But the Boksburg Council's support for an Indian group area proved to be 
very brittle. Almost immediately after the group area hearings it apparently 
reversed its position. When the government announced its racial demarcation 
scheme for the town at the end of 1959 no provision was made for an Indian 
residential area.63 That this announcement was made when there still existed some 
uncertainty over the regional group areas plans (which were then still under 
investigation) suggests the government had already won the support of the 
Council and GAB for its plan. The complete absence of any opposition from the 
local authority to the government’s announcement confirmed its acquiescence.
Some white residents did however voice their disapproval of the intended 
removal of Indians. In the early 1960s a number of white residents of Boksburg 
North publicly supported the demand by Indian residents living and trading in 14th 
Avenue to remain in the area. According to these residents it was unnecessary to
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move the small group of Indians because they were ‘model citizens’ and ‘well 
behaved’.64 The attitude of white traders and shoppers in the area directly 
contradicted one of the main reasons the government advanced to support the 
removal of Indian traders, namely, that they represented unfair competition to 
white small businesses. Local white traders acknowledged the stiff competition 
posed by Indian traders, but were surprisingly philosophical about the situation, 
arguing that ‘business is business’. White shoppers were even more aggrieved 
over the loss of Indian traders because many white working class families enjoyed 
the benefits of credit facilities at the Indian shops.65 But these impassioned 
appeals were not only ephemeral, they were also confined to a small minority of 
Boksburg’s white population. The dominant view among white residents and 
authorities was strong support for the government’s policies.
The fate of Boksburg Indian community is best understood in the context 
of the government’s determination to resist and break any opposition emanating 
from Indians over group areas. According to H.S.J. van Wyk, the chairman of the 
Southern Transvaal Committee of the GAB, the ‘Asiatic problem was a big 
problem’ and its resolution required the full attention of all Councils.66 In this 
view the success of the group areas resettlement programme hinged on the 
authorities’ ability to overcome the resistance by Indians. The relocation of the 
entire East Rand’s Indian population into a single regional group area was thus 
perceived as a primary objective.67 The removal of Indian traders from various 
parts of Boksburg, but especially those living in the so-called Asiatic Bazaar No.2 
and Boksburg North, became a priority because of their proximity to white 
residents. Under the weight of the government’s determined pursuit of its plan to 
evict all Indians from Boksburg, the already weak resistance offered by Indian 
residents and the feeble support from a small number of whites quickly crumbled.
In contrast to its lacklustre and ephemeral support for the cause of the 
local Indian population, the Boksburg Council displayed considerably more 
enthusiasm over the prospect of having the regional coloured group area located 
in its town. As early as 1963 it approached the BAD about the establishment of an 
additional industrial complex in the municipality in order to create more jobs for 
the expected influx of coloured workers.69 At this point the government was
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divided over the issue of proclaiming new industrial areas on the Witwatersrand. 
The BAD was generally averse to such steps because it wanted to stern the influx 
of new African workers from the rural areas. The Department of Community 
Development was more supportive of the proposals (it was more interested in the 
welfare of coloureds than BAD), but insisted that special legislation would have 
to be introduced to ensure that coloureds and Indians would be employed in any 
new industries. Although the existing legislation discouraged the employment of 
Africans, it neither encouraged nor compelled industrialists to employ coloured or 
Indian workers in their place.70 The Boksburg authorities hoped the influx of 
thousands of coloureds into the area would improve its industrial labour pool and 
thus encourage the establishment of new industries in the town.
However, local industrialists were divided in their opinions about the 
desirability of coloured workers. Some of them refused to employ coloured 
workers (presumably because they were perceived to be ill-suited for hard labour) 
and expressed their reservations over the influx of coloured workers into the area. 
They feared these workers would merely be ‘surplus labour’ and therefore be a 
burden on the town.71 The Boksburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry held a 
very different view, It was far more favourably disposed to the idea of the 
establishment of a ‘coloured city’ and believed that the town’s commerce and 
industry would ‘dramatically’ improve as a result.72 The Chamber was less 
optimistic about employing coloureds in local industries but was confident that 
they would spend their income in Boksburg, which it was hoped would cause a 
‘general business boom' in the town.73 The Boksburg and Benoni local authorities 
therefore campaigned for the right to have the coloured regional group area in 
their towns primarily because of coloureds' supposed suitability (and reliability) 
as industrial workers and because they were a reliable source of revenue. During 
the period under discussion the two municipalities publicly and often vociferously 
vied for the right to have the coloured group area. Neither made much of an issue 
of having the regional Indian group area. The effect of the tussle between these 
towns was to cause further delays in the implementation of group areas.
By the end of 1962 the government had grown extremely impatient with 
the slow progress being made by the East Rand’s local authorities in giving effect
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to its regional scheme. Rather than facilitating this process, the municipalities of 
Benoni and Boksburg were perceived as creating unnecessary obstacles. In order 
to expedite the implementation of its plan, the government adopted a more 
uncompromising stance in relation to the municipalities as well as other 
oppositional voices. The GAB and the Minister of Community Development 
believed the proclamation of Actonville as an Indian group area was imperative to 
send a clear signal to the coloured residents of that area that their opposition to the 
removals was futile.74 They called for an acceleration of the process of preparing 
for and declaring group areas in Benoni. The authorities expected coloureds from 
Benoni Old Location to resist their removal and recommended their forcible 
expulsion from the area.74 The government’s change in attitude was also reflected 
in its advice to the Benoni Council to forcibly evict all coloured families living in 
the backquarters of the Asiatic Bazaar.76 Not even the compliant Boksburg 
Council managed to escape the wrath of the government. P.W. Botha, who had 
taken a personal interest in the progress of the establishment group areas on the 
East Rand, threatened to give the Boksburg Council a ‘rude awakening’ by 
creating the coloured group area elsewhere unless it proceeded speedily to 
implement the government's plan.77
The regional plan is revised
The government’s renewed drive to instil urgency into the process of 
restructuring the East Rand was, however, not immediately successful. One of the 
main difficulties the government confronted was that the different (local) parts of 
the regional puzzle were so intimately linked that any delay in one caused the 
postponement of the entire plan. This was evident in the early 1960s when the 
government attempted to hasten the removal of black residents from various 
‘black spots’ to the new townships or group areas. The development of Reiger 
Park was a pivotal piece in the regional puzzle because the removal of coloured 
people from the other ‘black spots’ was a prerequisite for the conversion of those 
locations into group areas. For example, the old locations of Benoni and 
Germiston could not be disestablished as ‘native locations’ and reproclaimed as
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‘group areas’, let alone be developed as long as coloureds still lived in them. 
Benoni was especially affected by this: in order for its old location to be 
proclaimed and developed as an Indian group area, the coloureds living there had 
to make way for Indians from other parts of the region.
None of this could materialise in the early 1960s because of the delays in 
removing the African population of Galeview and Stirtonville (which were to 
form the main parts of Reiger Park) to Vosloorus.78 First, the Boksburg Council 
took until 1957 to identify the land on which it intended to build the new African 
township. Most of the East Rand’s municipalities had by then already begun 
developing their townships (Daveyton, KwaThema, Katlehong) or were in the 
process of doing so (Thokoza). However, once the land was identified a number 
of further delays occurred, which were not entirely the Council’s fault. The most 
important causes of the long delay in developing Vosloorus was the dispute with 
the local mining company over compensation for mineral rights and problems the 
Council encountered over the provision of water to the new township.79 The 
protracted negotiations over the former issue precluded even the laying down of 
basic infrastructure until the early 1960s. The Council’s problems were 
exacerbated by the meagre income generated from the Service Levy Fund, which 
proved insufficient for the financing of services and amenities in the township. 
The Council required permission from the BAD to cover the shortfall from its 
Bantu Beer Account. Blit this involved them in another bureaucratic process of 
protracted negotiations.80 Only once these negotiations were successfully 
concluded and the finances were made available could the Council proceed to 
develop Vosloorus. In 1964 the township was completed and the removal of 
African residents from the old location was set to take place in March and April of 
that year.
However, on the eve of the removals another dispute between the Council 
and the government flared tip, this time over the transport cost involved for 
African workers commuting between Vosloorus and the Boksburg industrial 
areas. For its part the Council refused to subsidise these new travelling costs.81 
Once again the issue of financing apartheid emerged as a sticking point: the 
Boksburg local authority had consistently proved to be a loyal ally of the central
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government, but even so was not prepared to carry the financial burden of the 
government’s policies. The Council found the government’s transport subsidy 
inadequate. The Government Transport Levy Fund offered a subsidy of one cent 
out of every ten cents towards the cost of bus fares, but the Council rejected the 
offer and insisted the government increase its offer to four cents.82 The cost of 
transport from the new townships to workplaces was a contentious issue for 
African workers on the East Rand. Previously, the majority of them had lived 
within walking distance from the industrial areas and town centres. The new 
townships were created far from these areas, thereby imposing a considerable 
financial burden on a workforce, which generally received low wages. Residents 
of Vosloorus could now expect to pay at least 20 cents for a bus trip between the 
township and Boksburg.83 The Boksburg Transportation Department, which was 
responsible for operating the bus service, also could not carry the financial burden 
of further subsidisation because it was operating unprofitably, having incurred a 
loss of approximately R100 000 in 1963.84 After intensive negotiations between 
the various parties, it was agreed that African commuters would pay R3, 90 for a 
monthly ticket and that the Government Transport Levy Fund would provide a 
subsidy of I'A cents per daily ticket.8S The delay caused by this particular dispute 
was not great, but it reflected the extent to which the regional restructuring 
process was beset by numerous dilemmas, some of which were unexpected, as in 
the above case.
The dust had hardly settled on the transport dispute when the Boksburg 
Council was faced by another and potentially more serious controversy. The 
authorities had previously recognised that the land allocated in Reiger Park for the 
coloured group area was inadequate to cater for future population growth. The 
successful development of that area in the long term depended on the availability 
of more land. However, the East Rand Proprietary Mines (E.R.P.M.)86, which held 
the mining rights in the area, opposed the expansion of Reiger Park because it 
required the land for further mining purposes. In 1965, when the African 
population had been removed from the old location, the authorities estimated that 
a further 4500 houses would be required over the following two decades to 
accommodate the increase in the coloured population of the East Rand.87 More
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land was thus required on which to build these houses. But the mining company 
was adamant about retaining its rights over the land. E.R.P.M.’s attempt to 
prevent the expansion of Reiger Park was the result of the changing fortunes of 
local mining. In 1948 it was estimated that the life expectancy of the mine was 
only two years, but within a year that prognosis was completely reversed. The 
devaluation of the currency in 1949 markedly increased the value of gold and as a 
consequence the life expectancy of the Boksburg mine was increase to 24 years. 
This meant that the company expected to continue mining in the area until the 
mid-1970s.88 Besides needing the land in question for mining, the company also 
wanted to use some of the adjacent land for the disposal of water and waste. The 
impl ication of this position was that Reiger Park could not be extended for at least 
a decade, making it impossible to accommodate the East Rand’s entire coloured 
population there as envisaged in the government’s plan.
Faced by these obstacles, the government was forced to reconsider how it 
would implement its regional group areas scheme. Instead of meeting its objective 
of speedily implementing the whole regional plan, the government acknowledged 
it would have to delay and stagger its implementation. The first step undertaken 
was to identify which removals could be delayed. For example, because the 
coloured populations of Alberton, Kcmpton Park and Edenvale were relatively 
small and lived in separate sections in the African locations of those towns, their 
continued presence in these locations was not perceived as a serious threat to the 
government's plans. It was agreed therefore to delay their removal.89 The removal 
of Indian residents from Alberton and Kempton Park was delayed for similar 
reasons. However, in Edenvale where Indian-owned shops occupied the same area 
as white residents, their removal was regarded as urgent. In Germiston the twenty- 
one Indian families and three coloured families living among white residents were 
also obliged to move. By contrast, the removal of coloureds and Indians living in 
Germiston’s coloured location and Asiatic Bazaar respectively was no longer 
regarded as a priority because those areas were earmarked for future industrial 
development and not as a white group area. In Benoni the removal of the coloured 
population was made the priority in order that the Indian group area of Actonville 
could begin to take shape.90 At this stage no time limit or plans were put in place
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for when and where those coloureds and Indians who were not immediately being 
removed would be relocated.
Once these new plans and priorities had been agreed to, the Benoni and 
Boksburg Councils, together with the Departments of Community Development, 
Coloured Affairs and Indian Affairs, recommended that the Minister declare 1 
April 1964 as the date for the commencement of the removals of coloureds from 
Actonville. This was seen as the first and important step in kick-starting the 
revised regional removal scheme. P.W. Botha duly endorsed the 
recommendation.91 From this time the opposition to the removals quickly 
dissipated as it was realised the government was determined to proceed with the 
implementation of its plans and would use every means at its disposal to ensure 
their realisation. The process of removals accordingly accelerated. By the latter 
half of 1964 the Boksburg Council had already resettled 2 500 African families in 
Vosloorus and expected to lift the figure to 3000 before the end of the year. The 
Council had simultaneously relocated 92 Indian families in Actonville. The 
removal of Africans from Galeview and Stirtonville opened the way for the 
resettlement of Bcnoni’s coloured population, which by the end of 1964 had 
already amounted to 784 families.92 A government progress report circulated in 
early 1965 indicated that rapid progress was being made with the removals: only 
1150 coloureds families still had to be resettled in Boksburg compared to the 2076 
families at the end of the previous year. The same report showed that all the 250 
stands put up for sale in Reiger Park had been bought and on 64 of those private 
houses had already been erected. At the same time 1575 coloured families had 
occupied houses vacated by African families.93 As these figures illustrate the 
forced removals programme on the East Rand reached its apogee in the mid- 
1960s. By the late 1960s most black people in the region had been forcibly 
relocated into their respective ‘racial’ residential areas. In particular, Actonville 
and Reiger Park were eventually converted and proclaimed as regional group 
areas as the government intended from the early 1950s. Despite these successes, 
however, the government had only partially achieved its grand plan for the region. 
Many coloured and Indian people still remained outside these regional group
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areas. The situation in Springs, Gerniiston and Alberton represented important 
exception to the regional blue-print.
Springs -  the end of the regional grand plan
The Springs Council's policy towards group areas for its coloured and 
Indian population was characterised by dramatic shifts from the early 1950s. In 
1952 the Council wanted Payneville to retain its coloured and African populations 
but by the time of the GAB hearings in 1957 it recommended that the old location 
be converted into group areas for coloureds and Indians. By the mid-1960s the 
Council had executed another about turn and wanted the whole town, excluding 
KwaThema, to be proclaimed a group area for whites. The vicissitudes in the local 
authority’s group areas policy, the delays in completing the regional plans and 
opposition from local mining companies all combined to detach Springs from the 
regional group areas scheme.
As was the case in other East Rand towns, the Springs municipality was 
confident after the 1957 GAB hearing that its plans for group area demarcation 
would be effected very quickly.94 The plan agreed to by the GAB was that all 
African residents would be relocated to KwaThema and that Payneville and 
Bakerton would be declared coloured and Indian group areas respectively. In 
November 1959 the Council sought ministerial approval for the disestablishment 
of Payneville as a ‘native location' and confidently anticipated that the way would 
be cleared for the creation of group areas.95
However, the Springs Council expected neither the negative response by 
the government or the ‘strenuous opposition’ that came from the local mining 
houses (Grootvlei and Geduld). Grootvlei Proprietary Mines especially objected 
to the proposed use of the land as residential areas for coloureds and Indians.96 
The company contended that unless the land was reserved for a ‘native location’, 
for which purpose the Council was originally granted occupation, then it should 
regain full use of the land.97 As was the case with E.R.P.M. in Boksburg, the 
Springs companies proved unco-operative in making land, over which they 
exercised some control, available to black people. The negotiations with these
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highly influential mining groups prevented local authorities planning any 
residential development for coloureds and Indians. As a result, the Springs 
Council was forced to recommend that the disestablishment of Payneville be 
postponed.98 Despite a series of intense negotiations between the Council, the 
GAB and various government departments and a decision by the Department of 
Mines to support the Council’s proposed demarcation of Payneville,99 the mining 
companies remained steadfast in their opposition. The GAB attempted to 
circumvent their objections but failed100 and the Council was therefore unable to 
implement its own recommendations.
By 1960, the Council had altered its opinion about creating group areas for 
coloureds and Indians in the town. Partly at the pressure of the government to 
allow only regional group areas, the Council advised the GAB it was no longer 
keen to have an Indian group area. Instead it supported the removal of the local 
Indian population to Actonville.101 The Council’s antipathy to Indian people 
echoed the sentiments of its regional neighbours. So too did its positive attitude to 
the coloured population. At the time the Mayor of the town argued,
that it might be to the advantage of Springs if all the Coloureds were 
to establish themselves in Springs. Coloureds have attained a higher 
level of development and were more reliable than natives. Coloureds 
usually earned higher wages and would accordingly have a greater 
purchasing power.102
But the changes in the political balance of forces in the Council that 
occurred in 1962/63 produced another dramatic shift in the Council’s policy. In 
particular, the National Party’s ascendancy in the Council had a profound 
influence on the political positions adopted by the Council from the early 
1960s.103 In 1963 the new mayor of Springs, Mr. Dyssel, explained his Council’s 
changed attitude to coloureds. He admitted the Council initially believed 
coloureds would be suitable replacements for African labour but had since 
reached the conclusion that coloureds would never be beneficial to the town’s 
industrial development.'04 Consequently, the local authority endorsed the removal 
of coloureds to Reiger Park. The Council’s policy vicissitudes caused immense
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uncertainty over the future of the local coloured and Indian populations.
Ironically, its support for the government’s regional plan seemed to end that 
uncertainty, even though coloureds and Indians rejected the plan.
On 21 February 1964 the government officially proclaimed Springs as a 
white ‘group area’.103 At the same time the Payneville/Bakerton complex was 
provisionally proclaimed a ‘controlled area’, pending the eventual removal of 
coloureds and Indians. In terms of the proclamation those Indian businessmen 
operating in the town could continue to do so for a limited period, but had to find 
residential sites in an Indian ‘group area’.106 At this point the Springs Council was 
adamant that Payneville and Bakerton should eventually be declared a white 
‘group area’,107 which would leave KwaThema as the only area in the town 
legally occupied by black people. According to the Council the residents of 
KwaThema, namely African workers, would fulfil the town’s labour requirements 
and, therefore, no other blacks were needed.108
In an ironic twist of fate, the Springs Council’s zealous commitment to 
move coloureds and Indians to their respective regional ‘group areas’ was 
thwarted by the government’s inability to implement its regional scheme. Over the 
next decade Springs, more than any other Bast Rand town, was left in limbo about 
its future. Meanwhile, there were signals that the government was prepared to 
deviate from its regional ‘grand’ plan. In 1967 the authorities suggested that it 
might be necessary to create a second coloured group area in the region.109 In May 
1968 the GAB advertised its intention to proclaim Bakerton a coloured ‘group 
area’, much to the chagrin of the Springs municipality, which immediately 
rejected the recommendation.110 The early 1970s witnessed even more dramatic 
fluctuations in the official policies regarding the future of Payneville and 
Bakerton. In 1971 the campaign to proclaim those locations as a white ‘group 
area’ gained new momentum when the Departments of Indian Affairs, Coloured 
Affairs, Mining and Development came out in full support of the proposal. These 
Departments argued that this proclamation would accelerate the resettlement of 
the location’s black residents to their rightful ‘group areas’ in the region.111 In 
February 1973 the Council conducted a social survey of the old location and, not 
surprisingly, found the place to be ‘dilapidated’ and ‘impossible to clean
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properly’." 2 The Council argued that it would be too expensive to upgrade and 
clean the area and proposed to erect temporary dwellings in KwaThema for 
coloureds. Punt Janson, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Affairs, supported the 
proposal but the local coloured population rejected it.113
Strangely, at the time the latter recommendations were being aired the 
Council also held top level discussions with the government. At a meeting in 
February 1973 between the Council and various ministries, the government’s 
commitment to its regional scheme was reiterated. However, government 
delegates acknowledged that the plan would not immediately come to fruition and 
agreed that Indians would have to live in Bakerton until at least the late 1970s and 
coloureds in Payneville for another three years.114 By the end of 1973 the 
government acknowledged that its vacillation over these issues was untenable. In 
October 1973 it eventually agreed that Indians living in Springs and Nigel would 
not be forced to move to Actonville because there simply was not enough space 
there for them. The government was especially concerned that any further 
procrastination on its side would alienate the Indian population.115 Bakerton was 
then identified as the site for a new Indian group area. Only the future of the 
coloured population from Springs still hung in the balance. When coloured 
residents of Payneville rejected the proposed, albeit supposedly temporary, move 
to KwaThema, the Council agreed to invest some money in the area to effect 
minimal improvements,116 This was done largely in acknowledgement of the 
atrocious conditions that prevailed in the location. But the Council’s intervention 
was a case of much too little, too late. When Helen Suzman, the Opposition 
Member of Parliament, visited Payneville in the late 1970s she described it as ‘the 
worst slum in the Transvaal’." 7 At this stage the terrible conditions in Payneville 
were threatening to become a serious political embarrassment for the government, 
which hastened the process of relocating coloureds to the new coloured ‘group 
area’ in the region, namely Geluksdal.
In the late 1960s coloureds and Indians who were living in the near East 
Rand towns of Germiston, Alberton and Edenvale had not yet been relocated to 
the regional group areas. As a result, these towns began considering the creation 
of further group areas for coloureds and Indians. In 1969 the Alberton Industries
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Association urged the municipality to proceed with its proposal to create a 
coloured group area. The Association concurred with the government’s objective 
to “maintain a reasonable ratio between Bantu and other workers in urban 
industrial areas”. In their opinion, it was “obvious that every attempt should be 
made to encourage Coloured workers in any given areas in order to maintain the 
desired ratios.”118 A meeting of the Association noted that there were only a few 
coloureds employed in the area because of the lack of accommodation for them 
and that some of these workers travelled from as far as Pretoria. In a veiled threat 
the Association indicated that industrialists were “[reviewing] their programmes 
very critically particularly with regard to future expansion” because of the lack of 
labour caused by the imposition of quotas by the Department of Planning.119
In 1970 the government eventually relented and agreed to establish a 
coloured group area on the near East Rand to accommodate coloured people from 
the central Witwatersrand, which comprised the towns of Germiston, Alberton, 
Elsburg, Kempton Park and Edenvale.120 The new area, which was named Eden 
Park, was established five miles from the Alrode industrial and adjacent to 
Thokoza.121
At the same time a similar process was unfolding in respect of the Indian 
population on the near East Rand. In 1969 the Inter-Departmental Committee for 
the Transport of Non-Whites reported that the government had agreed in principle 
to establish a new Indian group area for the near East Rand towns.122 However, 
two years later the government reiterated its stance that Actonville would be the 
only regional group area for Indians. Referring to the representations made to it by 
the Council and Indian community of Germiston for a group area, the Department 
of Community Development conceded only that Indians from Germiston be given 
first preference for relocation to Actonville.123 In the late 1970s, however, the 
government was forced to reverse this position and agreed to establish an Indian 
group area adjacent to Eden Park.
The creation of Bakerton, Geluksdal, Eden Park and Palm Ridge as the 
new group areas for Indians and coloureds respectively brought to an end a long 
and tortuous journey during which the government continually reiterated its 
commitment to the regional grand scheme devised in the 1950s. However, it was
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apparent in the mid-1960s already that this grand plan would not be realised. But, 
it required the vastly different political situation of the 1970s to force the 
government into formally changing its policy.
This chapter has demonstrated that the Nationalist government had 
devised detailed plans -  a regional grand plan -  for the implementation of group 
areas on the East Rand by the early 1950s. It had even succeeded in ‘seducing’ 
many of its political adversaries to support the main principles and practical 
proposals of this plan. However, the practical implementation of these policies 
proved to be complex and arduous. The assertion of local interests by a variety of 
local white interest groups undermined key features of the regional grand plan. 
Few of these groups, however, opposed the principle of group areas. The chapter 
has argued that the relationship between the different tiers of the state was rather 
complex. In relation to the implementation of group areas, local authorities often 
facilitated but sometimes also obstructed their creation, The complex role of local 
authorities and key local administrators in relation to the majority African 
population is explored further in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The emergence of ‘modern’ townships: 
The Daveyton model
The massive and virtually uncontrolled influx o f Africans into the country’s 
urban areas was arguably the most urgent and vexing issue that confronted the white 
ruling class and electorate during the historic 1948 elections. The Nationalist Party 
(NP) successfully mobilised around this issue o f oorstroming and promised the white 
electorate it would expeditiously deal with the apparent threat of the so-called swart 
gevaar. The N P’s apartheid policies were rooted in racist segregationist ideology, but 
were also a response to the mounting demands from different sections o f the white 
population in the 1940s for the authorities to bring the urban black population under 
control. Industrialists were concerned about the disruptive effects to production o f the 
high labour turnover and wanted the growing industrial militancy of black workers to 
be curbed. Employers therefore demanded that the government intervene decisively 
to ensure a reliable supply o f cheap and docile black labour. White residents for their 
part were worried about the ‘overrunning’ of the urban areas by blacks and their 
propensity to be involved in militant political struggles.
Once in government the NP earnestly set about the task of converting its 
‘apartheid ideology’ and the promises made to its constituencies into practical 
policies. Until then, as Posel has argued, there was no blue-print for apartheid.1 
Furthermore, the ‘meaning of apartheid’ was highly contested between the ‘purist’ 
and ‘practical’ factions in the state and the Afrikaner establishment more generally. 
The ‘purists’ stood for total economic segregation between whites and blacks, 
whereas the proponents of ‘practical’ apartheid acknowledged the indispensable role 
of African workers in the economy and hence their permanent presence in the urban 
areas.2 Although these debates continued throughout the 1950s, the government’s
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policies during the period -  the first phase o f  apartheid - were dominated by the 
principles of ‘practical apartheid’.
A multitude of measures and laws were introduced to achieve these aims. The 
tightening of influx control legislation was an important component in this strategy, 
the aim o f which was to stem the tide o f African urban migration. The creation o f 
‘modern’ townships was another central feature o f apartheid policies, the primary 
objectives o f which were to stabilise and control those Africans residing in the towns 
(that is, those who were deemed necessary to the urban economy) and to impose 
effective urban ‘racial’ segregation. In the early 1950s the government engaged in a 
process o f formulating plans to establish new and better-controlled townships for 
Africans, especially on the Witwatersrand. This process culminated in the 
government adopting the Mentz Committee’s recommendation to create regional 
African townships. This chapter focuses on the implementation of these plans on the 
East Rand.
The main subject of the chapter is the establishment o f Daveyton, which was 
regarded as the ‘model’ African township in the 1950s and early 1960s. An 
interesting feature of Daveyton’s early history was the extent o f its conformity to the 
government’s prescriptions for township development. This was surprising because 
of Bcnoni’s reputation as a bastion of opposition white politics. Thus when an official 
history o f Benoni published in 1965 glowingly described Daveyton as the “Product of 
the Policy o f Separate Development”3, it accurately captured the underlying political 
processes that shaped the township’s emergence as well as the municipality’s 
endorsement of a crucial tenet o f apartheid policy. A principal reason for the 
convergence between supposed political adversaries is to be found in the concurrence 
between Benoni’s local interests and the government’s national aims. Politically this 
was expressed in the convergence between the conservative wing o f the United Party, 
which controlled the Benoni Council, and the proponents o f ‘practical apartheid’ in 
the Nationalist Party, who dominated the government at the time. J.E. Mathewson, 
the Director o f Non-European Affairs, played a principal mediating role in forging 
this co-operative relationship. Similar relations between the government and other
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opposition municipalities on the East Rand, namely, Germiston and Springs, also 
developed during the 1950s. The Benoni Council’s success in creating Daveyton 
relatively quickly and with a minimum of complications is compared in this chapter 
to the more difficult process involved in creating other East Rand townships, 
especially those in Boksburg and Brakpan whose local authorities were under the 
control o f Nationalist Party sympathisers.
The chapter finally considers the extent to which the African population was 
stabilised in the new townships. It argues that the African population of the East 
Rand, and of Daveyton in particular, experienced some improvements in their lives in 
the first half o f the 1960s. This was largely a consequence o f the availability o f better 
job opportunities for them in the burgeoning industrial economy of the 1960s, which 
also yielded in higher earnings.
Daveyton: T h e  Model ‘Modern’ Township
As the new ‘modern’ townships began to take shape in the mid-1950s and 
especially in the early sixties municipalities repeatedly marvelled at their 
achievement in creating an ordered urban environment out of the pre-existing urban 
slums and squatter camps. The Benoni Town Council’s self-appraisal in 1963 of its 
accomplishments in the establishment and development o f Daveyton was typically 
self-congratulatory:
When one considers that in a few days time... Daveyton will be eight 
years old, and when one thinks of what has been achieved and of the 
vast amount of money and effort which have been spent, the present 
happy position of the Native Revenue Account is indeed remarkable.
The presence of this well-developed Bantu Township on such a large 
area of land -  land which was merely part of a farm eight years ago -  
remains a tribute to all those many people whose foresight, faith and 
energy made this modern miracle possible. It is good to know that the 
Council’s enterprise in this difficult field of national development has
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been amply rewarded, so that Benoni is, in this respect, the envy of 
many local authorities in the Republic. It is no wonder that Daveyton 
has proved a most popular attraction, particularly to overseas 
visitors... This publicity will undoubtedly play a big part eventually in 
attracting industrialists to Benoni, where adequate labour is available 
and everyone is anxious to assist in the economic resurgence of the 
Republic.4
Other East Rand municipalities celebrated their achievements in a similar 
manner. The Springs Council likewise presented its new African township, 
KwaThema, as a ‘model township’. KwaThema was established in 1952s prior to the 
work of the Mentz Committee, which endorsed it as an ideal regional township.6 The 
Springs Council’s meticulous approach in the planning and establishment o f 
KwaThema was held up as model o f how other councils should proceed to establish 
their new townships. The municipality conducted detailed research on African 
housing needs, engaged in careful planning o f the new township and was among the 
first to employ African labour on a large scale in the construction of houses in 
KwaThema. It also boasted that KwaThema was the only African township which 
had streetlights installed all over.
But it was Daveyton that stood out as the prime product of apartheid urban 
social engineering on the East Rand. ‘Native administrators’ nationally acclaimed 
Daveyton as a ‘model township’, a view echoed by politicians from across the 
spectrum of official politics.8 Most significantly, H.F. Verwoerd in his capacity both 
as Minister of Native Affairs and Prime Minister routinely praised Daveyton. 
According to the ‘architect o f apartheid’ Benoni had set an example to the rest of the 
country in the ‘speedy progress’ it made in solving the African housing problem.9 
Verwoerd was especially impressed by Benoni’s expeditious resolution of one of the 
country’s largest squatter problems in the early fifties. Moreover, Benoni, a leading 
United Party-controlled municipality, was probably among the most diligent
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executors o f apartheid policies, which provided Verwoerd with invaluable political 
ammunition to counter the criticisms by the parliamentary opposition.
Why did Daveyton emerge as the ‘model’ African township in the 1950s? The 
answer, it is suggested in this chapter, lies in the coincidence o f various factors during 
the early development of Daveyton. First, the planning of the township coincided 
with the work of the Mentz Committee, and incorporated its recommendations 
centrally in its ‘grand plan’ for new African townships on the East Rand. Second, 
was the political convergence between the Benoni Council and the government on a 
range of issues affecting the development o f Daveyton and especially the position o f 
urban Africans. Despite Benoni’s reputation as a leading opposition dominated 
municipality, it developed a better working relationship with the government than its 
pro-Nationalist neighbours. In all these matters, J.E. Mathewson, the Director o f  Non- 
European Affairs in Benoni, played a crucial role as an intermediary between the 
local authority and the central government. He was the principal local official 
responsible for directing the development of Daveyton. Mathewson’s political views 
and ambitions brought together the government’s aims and the Council’s local 
interests.
The role of local authorities in the implementation of apartheid
The question of which tier of the state should exercise political control over 
African townships featured prominently in the relationship between the central 
government and local authorities from the time the National Party came to power in 
1948. Despite its obvious importance the central-local government relationship has 
generally been neglected in the historiography of apartheid. Mabin and Parnell have 
highlighted the absence of analysis on the local state and have suggested that “One of 
the reasons ... urban researchers have not drawn sufficient attention to this in South 
Africa is that they have consistently underestimated the part played by the local state 
in mediating conflicting ideological and material imperatives.” 10 They argue that this 
gap in the literature has contributed to local authorities being portrayed merely as
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‘toothless watchdogs of the central government’. For them, “The most worrying 
consequence of this kind of treatment of urban history, where urban development is 
explained with reference to the ideology of the ruling parties, is that there is no 
conception of the fact that state policies do not always translate neatly into 
practice.”11 This chapter builds on Mabin and Parnell’s insights but extends the range 
of party politics to embrace both central and local government. It rejects the 
characterisation of the local authorities as either mere conveyor belts for or as 
principled bulwarks against state policy. It shows how on the East Rand in the 1950s 
municipalities often had very varied relations with the government (Benoni and 
Boksburg provided examples of this contrast). These relations were influenced by a 
host of factors such as local economic interests, party politics, resistance (or the lack 
thereof) by the local black population, the extent of the housing crisis and national 
politics.
The period under review witnessed a transition in the central-local state 
relationship from one in which local authorities enjoyed considerable autonomy in 
the way they governed the African population under their jurisdiction to the situation 
where they were gradually stripped of that responsibility, until in 1973 the 
management of the townships came directly under the control of government directed 
Administration Boards. It is within this transitional milieu that a host o f previously 
unanswered questions need to be addressed: Were municipalities merely transmission 
belts for Nationalist policies? What was the nature o f the opposition, if  any, 
emanating from opposition-controlled municipalities? Did these municipalities in any 
significant way augment or undermine the policies of the government at the local 
level? How did party politics affect the relations between the different tiers o f the 
state? And, how did these issues influence the establishment o f the new ‘modern’ 
African townships? The interrogation of these will hopefully shed more light on 
nature o f apartheid during this period.
The success o f urban apartheid depended heavily on the ability o f the 
Nationalist government to ensure the co-operation of municipalities in the 
implementation of its policies. Since the official opposition controlled some o f the
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most important local authorities in the country such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, 
Durban and Benoni, their response to the government’s desire for stricter control over 
urban Africans assumes particular relevance. There were a number of much 
publicised confrontations between leading UP-controlled municipalities and the 
government in the 1950s. The most important of these involved the Johannesburg
i
Council over the Western Areas Removal Scheme. Durban, too, after initially 
endorsing the forced removals under the Group Areas Act opposed aspects o f the 
government’s policies in the late 1950s.13 These high profile conflicts might suggest 
there was serious disharmony between the Nationalist government and all UP- 
controlled municipalities. Until recently this was a commonly held view. Bekker and 
Humphries, in their study o f the Administration Boards published in 1985, argued 
that the relationship between the government and the municipalities underwent an 
important shift once the National Parly came to power. According to them, in the pre- 
1948 period disagreements between these tiers of government were “not of the order 
to suggest that opposition or reaction from municipalities to central government 
policy was ever sufficiently resented... to cause them to centralise more tightly the 
administration o f policy”. However, in their opinion, after 1948 “Disagreement and 
conflict between the municipalities and the Department became much more marked 
as the newly elected National Party government began to implement wide-ranging 
changes in policy.”14 These disagreements apparently covered a range of issues such 
as housing, finance and influx control. This conflict also assumed party-political 
dimensions between United Party-controlled municipalities and the Nationalist 
government.
The National Party’s determination to bring African townships directly under 
the central government’s control and administration was probably the principal factor 
influencing the central-local government relations in the first two decades of 
apartheid. Initially the Nationalist government attempted to implement its policies by 
persuading municipalities to co-operate with it. Until the mid-1950s the ruling party 
did not possess the political and administrative capacity to enforce its will. Thereafter 
when confronted by what it perceived to be political obstruction it moved quickly to
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introduce legislation to strengthen its hand vis-ct-vis recalcitrant municipalities. Much 
of the legislation promulgated during the 1950s was aimed at shackling the capacity 
of opposition groups to oppose government policies. The various amendments to the 
Group Areas Act, especially in 1955 and 1957, were examples of this trend. Similarly 
the Native Resettlement Act o f 1954 was specifically promulgated to allow the 
government to circumvent the Johannesburg Council in its quest to implement the 
Western Areas Removals Scheme.13 More generally the government asserted its 
authority by threatening to withhold funds for housing and development from 
recalcitrant local authorities. This measure, perhaps more than any other, forced 
compliance from the majority o f local authorities who understood that without state 
financing they would not be able to deal with the enormous and urgent black housing 
problems.
After the 1953 elections the Nationalist Party asserted more insistently its 
prerogative as the sole source o f ‘native policy’. “The Government”, Verwocrd 
lectured delegates at 1956 conference of the Institute of Administrators of Non- 
European Affairs (IANA), “ is the body responsible for formulating Native policy and 
it does not usurp but merely fulfils its own obligations when it issues its directives 
and when it exercises its supervisory functions over the local authorities which 
neglect to carry out their duty in regard to Native Affairs.” 16 Verwoerd was at pains 
to delineate the scope of such intervention and to affirm aspects of local government 
autonomy, observing that “I am not discussing the autonomy of Local Authorities in 
other fields. I am confining myself to this clear specific issue [i.e. ‘Native Policy’]. 
The facts must be very clear because the position exists o f necessity not only for 
conformity but for the sake o f peace and good order in the country so as to obviate 
confusion and conflicting attitudes in our dealings with the large number o f Natives 
for whom we are responsible in our cities and towns.” At a further endeavour at even- 
handedness he went on to extol the virtues of co-operation between the two tiers of 
the state: “In spite of my saying that the local authorities have certain obligations to 
the State which is responsible for formulating policy, it is nevertheless true that 
friendly co-operation rather than just performance of duty is of supreme importance.
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Even though the State has the right and power to announce and enforce its policy, one 
cannot expect much success from that alone.”17 He nevertheless concluded by 
insisting that the government must govern and that delegates had to “realise that the 
State must formulate policy and to put it bluntly the Local Authorities are the agents 
that must (faithfully) implement it.”18
By the end of the 1950s the government shifted tone and shifted gear.
Probably buoyed by the N P’s electoral victory in 1958 where for the first time it won 
a majority of votes, Verwoerd’s successor as Minister o f Bantu Affairs, De Wet Nel 
instructed delegates attending the 1959 IANA conference that they should “carry out 
the policy laid down by the State.” While acknowledging that these officials were in 
the service of the local authorities, the Minister reminded them they were “also 
subject to the authority of the State -  that is why you are licensed by the Minister of 
Bantu Administration and Development.”19 De Wet Nel then proceeded to add a 
veiled threat that, “This is a requirement because he has to perform functions for 
which the State as a whole has to be accountable and must see that the policy laid 
down by the State is carried out, which is why the State has the right o f supervision.
It is, therefore, important that the State, in its own interest, has the right to withdraw a 
licence if a municipal official does not perform the function entrusted to him 
properly.” One of the most serious challenges to the powers o f local authorities 
came in the form of the 1960 Bantu in European Areas Bill. This was the first 
legislative attempt by the government to centralise control o f townships in the Bantu 
Affairs Department and was made in response to the government’s perception that 
opposition dominated municipalities were not controlling urban Africans. Although 
the Bill was not passed it clearly demonstrated the intention o f the government to 
usurp control and administration from the municipalities. The repression o f the 
opposition movement in 1960 -2  and the growing compliance o f local authorities 
made it less urgent to pursue this policy. It was only in the late sixties that the 
government proceeded to draft new legislation to give effect to this aim. Therefore, 
during the course of the 1960s the government progressively asserted greater control 
over local authorities and was more easily able to assert its policies on them.
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However, in the 1950s the government-municipal relationship was determined far 
more by the willingness of local authorities to co-operate with the government. The 
nature of these relations played a crucial role in shaping the way that apartheid 
policies, especially urban segregation, were implemented in urban centres across the 
country.
Party  Politics and Local Governm ents
Such discussion as has taken place on the relationship between local and 
central government in the 1950s has been dominated and coloured by the particular 
experience of Johannesburg. In the early 1950s the Johannesburg City Council and 
the government publicly differed over the Western Areas Removal Scheme. It 
seemed as if the United Party-controlled municipality was standing in the way of the 
Nationalist government’s zealous pursuit of urban segregation.22 This party political 
partisanship is then all too often and readily read off on to other municipal- 
government relationships on the Rand. Thus the Nationalist-controlled Brakpan is 
assumed to be more in tunc with the government while the United Party controllcd- 
Benoni is the reverse. However, neither the United Party nor the Nationalist Party or 
their respectively politically affiliated municipalities were as politically homogeneous 
as this crude reading would suggest. The United Parly had its progressive and 
conservative wings, while the Nationalist Party, as Posel has shown, was divided 
between the ‘purists’ and ‘practical’ tendencies. During the 1950s the Native Affairs 
Department was under the direction of the ‘practical’ minded Minister H.F. Verwoerd 
and the Secretary of Native Affairs, W.M. Eiselen. They advocated stabilisation of 
the African urban population and strict influx control. National Party municipal office 
bearers in Brakpan and Boksburg, and more specifically their Nationalist Party 
sympathising Non-European Affairs Managers (F.J. Language and A.S. Marais), by 
contrast were ‘purist’ in inclination and objected to African urbanisation and 
stabilisation. The ironic consequence of these intra-party divisions was that 
municipalities controlled by conservative United Party administrators (for example in
151
Benoni), often were more in sympathy and enjoyed more productive working 
relationships with the Native Affairs Department than did their counterparts in 
Brakpan and Boksburg.
Dr. F.J. Language, the manager o f ‘native affairs’ in Brakpan had been a 
member o f the neo-fascist Ossexvabrandxvag in the 1940s and consistently 
propounded the desirability for ‘total separation’ between whites and blacks. 
According to Sapire, the ‘guiding principles’ that were central in Language’s thinking 
were the ‘reconstitution o f the original tribal order in the reserves’, total separation 
between whites and ‘natives’ and ‘the elimination of Africans from the white 
economic system’.23 Both Brakpan and Boksburg, who employed the equally ‘purist’
A.S. Marais to manage its ‘native affairs’ had come under the control o f the 
Nationalist Party much earlier than their neighbours,24 which reflected the more 
conservative political views o f their white populations and politicians. Language and 
especially Marais repeatedly declared their loyalty to the government. These towns 
placed greater emphasis on influx control because of their determination to limit and 
reverse the urbanisation o f Africans. In Boksburg, for example, influx control had 
been tightened to such an extent that new arrivals found it almost impossible to 
secure houses and family accommodation. The ‘native administrators’ o f these 
towns tended to pay less attention to the development of their ‘native’ locations, than 
on imposing stricter control measures on the inhabitants o f these locations. 
Consequently, conditions in Stirtonville and Brakpan location continued to 
deteriorate. In the early 1950s Brakpan also experienced a squatter problem, although 
not to the same extent as in Benoni. However, the municipality responded very 
slowly to the housing crisis. In 1954 it managed to build only between 8-10 houses a 
month for its African residents. In Boksburg only a few hundred additional houses 
were provided in the same period. Brakpan and Boksburg likewise lagged behind in 
the establishment o f new townships, which was only commenced in 1957 and 1962 
respectively.
By contrast the United Party sympathising Non-European Affairs managers of 
Benoni, Germiston and Springs emphasised the stabilisation o f urban Africans, for
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which solving the black housing problem and the building of new townships became 
imperative. As J.E. Mathewson pointed out to the 1953 I ANA conference, “It has 
been demonstrated that the turnover in Native labour is very largely reduced where 
some semblance of permanence is introduced into employment... Experience has 
indicated that where satisfactory accommodation is provided for the employees to 
live with their families, the turn-over factor is reduced by two-and-a-half times.”26 
Local industrialists enthusiastically endorsed these views and promised to raise £150 
000 for African housing to avert labour shortages. The Benoni Town Council was 
especially cognisant of the importance properly to house and control African labour 
because of the town’s growing importance as an industrial centre. It was estimated 
that between 1947 and 1957 the local economy virtually trebled.28 For the local 
economy to flourish the local African workforce had to be housed and controlled. 
This imperative resulted in an unusually co-operative relationship between a leading 
United Party municipality and the central government which was committed to the 
same aims. This contributed to the relatively uncomplicated process o f establishing 
Daveyton.
Germiston and Springs were similarly concerned with the need to stabilise 
their African workforce. Germiston led the region’s industrial development and by 
the mid-1930s the town’s location, Dukathole, already experienced overcrowding. It 
had begun planning the development of a new township since the mid-1930, but the 
plans were held in abeyance due to the war. Eventually in 1949 Natalspruit was 
created to deal with the huge overcrowding in the old location.29 The Springs Council 
established KwaThema in 1952 to accommodate the thousands of African workers 
that had been attracted to its burgeoning economy during the 1940s.30 The local 
Chamber of Commerce fully supported the local authority in its efforts and noted that
Inter-related with the industrial and mining development is the urgent 
problem of housing... We have to catch up on a cumulative position 
of shortage... As businessmen employing large numbers of natives, 
this position is of vital importance to us in that the natives cannot be
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expected to seek employment and consequent spending power in a 
town where they cannot obtain suitable accommodation.31
The ideological differences between administrators were highlighted in the 
heated debates on the state of Advisory Boards and on the subject o f African 
urbanisation at the 1958 IANA conference. Marais, in his address to the conference, 
lamented what he perceived to be the tendency among local authorities to dissociate 
themselves from government policies and to pursue ones that would ultimately clash 
with those o f the government. A ‘purist’ and an ardent supporter o f influx control, he 
insisted that Africans could only reside in urban areas on a temporary basis and 
accused industrialists of undermining this fundamental tenet of government policy by 
desiring the stabilisation of African labour in ‘white urban areas’.32 Mathewson, 
Bourquin (Durban) and representatives of the Chamber of Industries gave heated 
rebuttals to Marais’ arguments. For them African urbanisation was an inevitable 
consequence of industrialisation. The representatives from industry insisted that 
African labour was necessary for the country’s expanding economy: “If the 
industrialist wants to manufacture and produce he must have labour. In 1948 with the 
expansion, o f necessity, o f secondary industry... the only labour available was Non- 
European and had Industry not accepted this raw material but have requested the 
importation of experienced white labour, then... import control would have failed and 
[a] depression... would have resulted. We would have had no urban native problem... 
and, of course, we would not be enjoying the comfortable living we have today.”33 
Mathewson supported this view and accused Marais o f suffering from political 
myopia. He strongly favoured the permanent urbanisation o f an African labour force 
to cater for the needs of secondary industry.
M athewson and Daveyton
The building of Germiston’s township o f Natalspruit (later known as 
Katlehong) was underway by 1949, and the basic principles upon which this would
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proceed had already been worked out. These partly conformed to the new 
government’s evolving policy on group areas and township development, but were 
also partly at variance. In 1953 this created some friction between the local authority 
and the government over the latter’s introduction of the site-and-service scheme.34 
Germiston had already begun building houses for its African population and viewed 
the new scheme as regressive. However, the dispute was speedily resolved and in 
1954 building in Katlehong resumed. The planning of KwaThema also began in the 
late 1940s and thus preceded the adoption o f new policies by the Nationalist 
government. Benoni had likewise resolved its first squatter crisis in 1949 with the 
building of Wattville. In 1950 however it was enveloped with another after the land 
invasion at Apex. It therefore had to fashion a programme with a Nationalist 
government already in power and once its plans for group areas had already been 
worked out. It succeeded on a scale greater than any other municipality and was 
widely viewed as playing a pioneering role in developing ‘modern’ African 
townships. A large part o f this reason for this success was the role played by 
Mathewson.
Mathewson was appointed as Director o f Non-European Affairs in Benoni in 
1948 and over the following two decades played a key role in the affairs o f the black 
population o f the town. He established himself as a leading figure in urban ‘native 
affairs’ by the way he tackled the resolution o f the squatter problem at Apex and the 
creation of Daveyton. Mathewson’s political stance on the position of African 
workers in the urban areas and his views on the role of administrators in integrating 
Africans into urban society fundamentally shaped his approach to the development of 
Daveyton.
Mathewson was driven by paternalistic convictions, regarding his (and other 
whites) role as guardians of the ‘bantu’, responsible for their upliftment and 
‘civilisation’. Mathewson believed that “the destiny of our country depends upon the 
extent to and speed at which the Bantu are allowed to play their part in the 
administration of their own areas in accordance to the policy to which we and our 
descendants are irrevocably committed.”35 He saw the “urban centres, both in
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European and Bantu areas, play[ing] a part of supreme importance in the political 
evolution of the Bantu.”36 He was convinced that as the Director of Non-European 
Affairs he and his department had a pivotal role to play in this process because for the 
time being “the state o f development o f the Bantu is such that the governmental 
system applicable to more civilised people requires modification, under the direction 
o f officials whose training qualified them for administering Natives.”37 The new 
townships, Mathewson argued, should form a ‘’’convenient training ground for the 
Bantu, provided the organisational set-up o f urban native administration departments 
is so shaped as to prepare for the assumption by them of full control.
Daveyton became Mathewson’s personal fiefdom -  his empire -  the place 
where he could put into practice his notions o f what was beneficial for the 
‘upliftment’ o f urban Africans. For him ‘progressive’ Benoni (read Mathewson and 
his political cohorts) had established a ‘unique system of Bantu administration’ based 
on the objective o f developing administrative autonomy for Daveyton. Beyond that 
he saw a second tier o f autonomous self-government for Daveyton’s Africans in the 
form of self-governing ‘homelands’. He castigated those local administrations that 
were content with only having African “labourers, drivers, teachers, clerks and 
traders”. Daveyton’s Africans, he boasted were being trained for greater things: “You 
must have every human material from which to form a governing class including 
professional men and politicians.”39 Thus the training of Africans in Daveyton was 
inextricably linked to the broader project of developing the ‘homelands’.
Beneath this veneer o f benevolence and apparent enlightenment there 
nevertheless lurked deep-seated convictions both about Mathewson’s roles as 
supervisor and gatekeeper, as well as what Africans had to do to advance. “It is 
obvious”, Mathewson lectured delegates at the 1956 1ANA conference, “that for the 
foreseeable future the highest posts in a Bantu township will continue to be occupied 
by the more experienced and better qualified Europeans. While the entry to the upper 
grades should not be closed to the Bantu, it must not be automatic but earned by 
proven ability. The door o f opportunity must be laid open to those Bantu who evince 
the required standards of efficiency, integrity and devotion to duty.”40 Thus in
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Mathewson’s view Africans were not yet capable of running their own affairs. 
Furthermore, those Africans who wanted to benefit from the benefits and 
opportunities available in Mathewson’s fiefdom, had to convince white 
administrators of their reliability.
Mathewson jealously defended his modus operandi. In response to criticisms 
from other township administrators that his project was an unashamed exercise in 
‘empire building’, Mathewson retorted imperiously: “I happen to be an Empire 
builder, and I have no intention of parting or doing away with my Empire. I am not 
Mr. Attlee, I am like Mr. Churchill. What I have got, I keep.”41 Despite these 
criticisms of his ambitions, Mathewson could confidently proceed with his plans 
because he enjoyed the support of the government. More than any other ‘native’ 
administrator, his views on township development, the objectives o f which he argued 
were the “maintenance of the health of the occupants; environment designed to 
discourage social malpractices; permanence with a minimum of maintenance; and 
self-sufficiency”42 coincided most closely with the government’s policies.
As a result his ‘empire’, Davcyton, became the model o f township 
administration, which other municipalities were urged to emulate. H.F. Verwocrd 
regularly praised Bcnoni’s achievement in establishing Davcyton. Verwocrd’s 
address to the 1956 I ANA conference typified his attitude to the Benoni municipality:
Benoni completely and totally under the control of people who hold a 
political view contrary to those of the present government, carried 
out and put into effect exactly what I have said here today [referring 
to apartheid urban policies] to be a basic principle of the legislation 
of our country and which forms part of the structure of the State. Its 
Town Council adopted the attitude that they were faced with a local 
problem in connection with Native Affairs more specifically poor 
and illegal housing and that they were prepared to ascertain what the 
Government’s policy was in this respect and implement it with the 
Government’s assistance. As a result of their willingness to carefully 
adhere to the country’s policy and to co-operate in a spirit of
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friendliness, the Town Council of Benoni, notwithstanding their 
political difference, has in a short space of time made immense 
progress in the solution of its problem. In fact it has set an example to 
the whole South Africa not only of co-operation under apparently 
difficult circumstances, but also of such speedy progress that it 
behoves every town to go and inspect it.43
The government often threatened those municipalities (especially those under 
United Party control) which were perceived to be recalcitrant and slow in building 
new townships, but Benoni was seemingly excluded from the government’s list of 
problematic local authorities. On the contrary, leading government officials singled 
out Benoni for its pioneering contribution to resolving the urban ‘native problem’.
The government’s public support for Benoni allowed the municipality to build 
Daveyton relatively quickly and without any serious hindrances.
The Ethnic Division of Daveyton
Although the government concentrated on the implementation o f ‘practical 
apartheid' policies in the 1950, it did not entirely abandon the ideal o f ‘total 
apartheid’. The policy o f ‘separate development’, which became the leitm otif of the 
1960s, was already applied to urban Africans in the new townships from the mid- 
1950s. The government signalled its intention to promote and politicise ethnicity with 
the promulgation of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, which aimed to elevate the 
political status of ‘tribal’ leaders in the reserves. This piece of legislation did not 
apply to the urban areas, but was a harbinger of the fate awaiting urban Africans. A 
novel feature of the townships established in the fifties and sixties was their partition 
into ethnically defined areas, The government pursued this policy to give effect to its 
ideologically-driven decision to promote ethnic differences among Africans.
In 1956 H.F. Verwoerd motivated his government’s decision to pursue this 
urban version of ‘separate development’:
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Another policy aspect which is important although it is frequently 
denied is the housing or establishment of the Native, including the 
urbanised Native, on an ethnic basis. Originally it was supposed to be a 
pipe dream, an absurdity or a source of conflict and strife. It has 
nevertheless been put into effect and where it has been or is being 
applied, only beneficial results have been experienced. It promotes 
better satisfaction among the Natives... Ethnic grouping has not been 
introduced capreciously (sic) or arbitrarily but to serve as the 
foundation for the advancement of essential services and control.44
The main purpose o f ethnic zoning was to impose ‘tribal authorities’ on urban 
Africans. The sub-division of townships along ethnic lines would reinforce contact 
with ‘tribal authorities’ and consequently enhance their influence and authority 
among the urban populace. The Native Affairs Department expressed its hope that 
‘Such leaders will be inclined to maintain discipline and insist upon law and order 
similar to that in their home environments.’45 Tor the government, therefore, ‘separate 
development’ and control of urban Africans were inextricably linked objectives. The 
Bcnoni Council’s endorsement o f this policy was a striking example of the extent of 
its political agreement with the Nationalist government.
Mathewson was one o f the most ardent advocates of ethnic divisions and 
Daveyton became the first township to be partitioned in this way. Daveyton became 
known as the ‘£7 000 000 Ethnic Bantu Township’. Mathewson provided one o f the 
most important and detailed expositions in support of ethnic grouping, which he 
contended held three key advantages. First, it would supposedly ensure proper 
administration because “It is axiomatic that the best representation of a group of 
people is by one who is a member o f that particular group, for he can understand in 
full measure the needs and trends o f thought of his electorate.” Ward committees, led 
by an ethnic-based councillor and his supporters, were inaugurated to facilitate the 
new townships’ administration. Second, it would enhance education because 
instruction in the ‘mother tongue’ would simplify teaching and result in higher
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standards and lead ‘to the development of an intensified community spirit.’ Third, in 
Mathewson’s ‘expert’ opinion, Daveyton was ‘ethnologically planned to re-establish 
the natural pattern of Bantu life in which the social bonds o f the ethnic groups have 
been taken into account.’ Mathewson concurred with the government’s view that 
urbanisation had various deleterious effects on Africans because it undermined their 
‘traditional’ way of life, which was characterised by ‘discipline and order in both 
family and tribal life.’46 From the outset, therefore, Daveyton was planned according 
to the principles of ethnic divisions.
Critics of the proposed ethnic division of the townships argued it would 
intensify the threat o f ‘tribal clashes’ and heighten antagonism between different 
‘races’. The Benoni Branch of the Congress of Democrats was especially vociferous 
in its criticisms. In a letter to the Benoni City Times they argued that,
Up to now one lias thought with pride that Benoni was determined to 
afford its African workers housing facilities and social amenities in a 
manner befitting a progressive town. This is apparently not the true 
position. We intend to divide these workers into racial groups 
substituting racial differences for feelings of common citizenship.
We are to fall in with the Government policy of dividing people. Not 
only is there to be European against European: European against 
Non European: Non-European groups against each other but also 
African against African.47
Their fears seemed to be confirmed when Benoni experienced so-called ‘tribal 
clashes’ soon after the introduction o f ethnic grouping in Daveyton. Between 
December 1956 and March 1957 sporadic clashes between youth from the Xhosa and 
Swazi/Ndbele areas took place, resulting in eight reported deaths and numerous 
injuries. These clashes were triggered by the attack on a party in the Xhosa area by 
Swazi youth. A series of retaliatory clashes inflamed the situation, resulting in the 
mobilisation o f scores of youth (although some adults were also involved) from the 
two sections. The township manager claimed reports o f the clashes were exaggerated
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and concluded a report on the disturbances by asserting that, “ethnic grouping was 
not even a contributory cause of the trouble.”49 His attempts to underplay the 
seriousness of the clashes were however contradicted by evidence in the report 
supplied by the authorities that nearly two hundred houses were damaged (97 in the 
Xhosa area and 100 in the Swazi/Ndebele area). On one occasion approximately one 
hundred Xhosas were mobilised. The municipality was especially keen to deny ethnic 
grouping as a factor promoting the clashes. Mathewson insisted that the main 
underlying cause of these clashes was the existence o f ‘unsatisfactory living 
conditions’, itself an indictment o f his claims that Daveyton was one o f the best 
serviced townships in the country. The solution, therefore, was to provide adequate 
housing and “properly organised leisure activities and opportunities for the churches 
to exercise their influence.”50 The town manager blamed tsotsis from both areas. 
Whatever the underlying causes might have been, it is clear that once the initial 
clashes occurred residents from both areas mobilised along ethnic lines to defend 
their respective areas against attacks from the opposing ethnic group. The existence 
of ‘tribal division’ in the township would almost certainly have facilitated ethnic 
mobilisation.51
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Mathewson’s approach was his 
rejection of the argument that urban Africans were ‘detribalised’. Although he 
supported urbanisation as a necessary condition of modernity, he also agreed with 
apartheid ideologues that it was important to retain and encourage ‘tribal’ affiliations. 
Whereas at the IANA conferences Mathewson extolled the virtues of the urbanisation 
of Africans, emphasising the ‘modernising’ effects it would have on Africans (as 
against the Nationalist supporters who opposed urban migration), within the Benoni 
context he argued that it was erroneous to regard Africans as ‘detribalised’. 
Apparently basing himself on observations of the local African population, 
Mathewson argued that recent immigrants preferred to reside among people from the 
same ethnic background because the ‘Bantu in general’ would disclaim any inference 
that they were ‘detribalised’. There is no evidence that Mathewson even consulted 
residents of the squatter camps on this matter. Moreover, the majority of the town’s
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African population -  the residents o f the old location - had for many years chosen to 
live in a mostly integrated environment. Even the objections o f the Advisory Board 
were ignored. It was certainly true that new arrivals in urban areas sought out 
people from their rural homes for various reasons, including gaining access to 
resources and work. But the authorities used these practices as pretexts to cloak 
political imperatives.
Mathewson’s enthusiasm exceeded even the government’s support for its own 
policy. “Ethnic grouping was revolutionary”, he claimed in 1959 and represented “a 
bold step towards restoring and preserving the dynamic forces considered essential in 
the building up of any people in order to take its rightful place in the hierarchy of 
nations.”53 Among the principal advantages of ethnic divisions were discipline and 
control: “delinquent practices are more effectively controlled, immorality is kept at a 
minimum, complaints are justly dealt with and tribal clashes, if any, are more easily 
controlled.”54
The local authority paid detailed attention to the ethnic division of Daveyton. 
Surveys were conducted of the Apex squatter camp and of lodgers in the old location 
and statistics were compiled about the ethnic composition o f the new township. 
Equipped with the necessary statistical information, the Council decided to divide 
Daveyton into the following ethnic proportions: 50% Nguni, 40% Sotho and 10% 
o th e r. The latter miscellaneous group consisted mainly o f Shangane and Venda, but 
it was felt that if the size of this group did not justify a separate area they could be 
absorbed into the Nguni group ‘because of its ethnic similarity’.55 This reveals the 
often-spurious basis on which people were grouped. Most curious was the 
municipality’s arbitrary amalgamation of Ndebele/Swazi. Here people with little 
common cultural or political history56 were grouped together primarily for pragmatic 
and political reasons.
After dividing Daveyton into Nguni and Sotho sections, the township was 
further subdivided into seven distinct ethnic areas, namely, Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, 
Sotho, Swazi/Ndebele and Shangane . The concept o f ‘radial planning’ was 
introduced in the township to ensure that any future expansion of the different areas
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would occur independently o f each other. In this way the primary aim of separate 
development would also be assured. Mathewson insisted the planning o f townships 
had to operate from the premise that ‘Each sector must be looked upon as an entity of 
its own and be provided pro rata with school, church and trading sites.’57 By the mid­
sixties, the ethnic division o f Daveyton was proclaimed a resounding success. 
Benoni’s official history declared that,
By grouping the population on an ethnic basis each Bantu Councillor 
together with his Ward Committee, is able effectively to represent 
his ward in matters of day-to-day administration. It appears also to 
have reduced the incidence of such widespread social problems as 
tsotsi-ism and illegitimacy, and improved family cohesion... ethnic 
grouping has exerted a positive beneficial influence on family life in
Daveyton and has contributed materially to the happiness and
58contentment of the community.
In the late 1950s other East Rand towns followed Benoni’s example. As early 
as 1954 the Brakpan Council decided it would divide Tsakanc into eight ethnic 
sections.59 The new sections o f KwaThema and Katlchong were similarly divided 
despite objections from residents and in Germiston’s case from its Manager o f Non- 
European Affairs.60 In Thokoza, which was laid out from 1957, ethnic divisions were 
imposed from the outset, leaving residents with little choice about where they would 
reside. In Vosloorus, which was the last near East Rand township to be constructed 
the Council’s elaborate apartheid vision failed to be implemented. The Council had 
hoped to divide the new township into seven sections (Zulu, South Sotho, Xhosa, 
Swazi, Tswana, Ndebele and North Sotho) but only succeeded in creating two 
sections, namely, Nguni and Sotho. The sticking point was the pressure to remove 
Africans quickly from Stirtonville. As a result ‘a methodical move of the families 
[along ethnic lines] was not possible’.61 The authorities considered relocating 
residents into the abovementioned ethnic groupings after they had all been settled in
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the new township but acknowledged that ‘a further removal into tribal groupings
62would cause dissatisfaction amongst the settled residents’.
The politics of laying out the ‘modern’ townships
From the outset the planning of Daveyton conformed to the principles 
enunciated by Verwoerd on the establishment of African townships. One o f the first 
and most important issues that had to be resolved in the establishment o f the new 
townships was where they would be located. The Benoni Council identified land on 
the north-east boundary o f the municipality for Daveyton, which was sufficiently far 
from most white residential areas. There were nevertheless complaints from the 
Geduld branch of the Nationalist Party63 and white residents o f the surrounding areas, 
who objected to a ‘black spot’ being created in their area because it would devalue 
their properties.64 Although the demand by some white residents that the new 
township be ring-fenced was not acceded to, the Benoni Council ensured that there 
were adequate buffer zones around Daveyton. Furthermore, access to the township 
was tightly controlled. On this issue Mathewson again concurred with the 
government’s policies that access roads were crucial to controlling the movements of 
township inhabitants. Thus lie insisted “there should be only one main road to a 
native township. This will depend largely upon local circumstances and the general 
flow o f traffic. A separate access road should enter the nearest opening o f the native 
township. The link road between the European area and native township should 
traverse the shortest distance between the two areas and be so located that it will be 
used principally by persons wishing to proceed to and from the native township 
only.”65
Once the siting and layout of the townships were finalised, the issue o f 
housing was tackled. The government’s approach to the African housing crisis was to 
provide cheap accommodation as speedily as possible. In 1954 H.F. Verwoerd 
expounded the government’s policy at a conference of the Federated Chamber of 
Industry. His starting premise was that building houses for all urban Africans would
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be an ‘impossible task’ because of the exorbitant cost.66 “What must be done?” he 
enquired from his audience, “Must we build for 5 per cent or 10 per cent and forget 
the other 90 per cent? Must we have them as illegal squatters or illegal lodgers either 
in Bantu residential areas or European backyards?” An ‘alternative method’ must be 
found, he contended, “by which we can aid the whole 100 per cent to some extent as 
rapidly as possible with the object of them effecting further improvements gradually.” 
The solution was site-and-service schemes. According to W.M. C. Mocke, the Senior 
Urban Areas Commissioner, local authorities were patently unable to provide even 
the normally ‘austere’ housing to the burgeoning urban African population. Therefore 
even ‘more austere standards’ were necessary to resolve the ‘gigantic [housing] 
problem’.67
The Benoni Council was one o f the first municipalities to adopt this scheme 
as a means to deal with its local housing shortage for Africans. Daveyton was 
officially declared a township in July 19 5 468 and less than a year later the first 
residents from Apex Squatter camp moved there. Within three months o f the first 
arrivals Daveyton was transformed into the first township consisting entirely o f site- 
and-service plots. Malhewson’s description of early Daveyton paints a vivid picture 
of the site-and-service scheme to which residents were introduced:
In Daveyton a site-and-service scheme has been introduced on a large 
scale. After the areas had been laid out as a model township, the sites 
surveyed, pegged and numbered, the necessary internal roads were 
graded. Water reticulation was lain on and standpipes interspersed at 
points approximately 1000 feet apart... The next step was to allocate a 
site 45 ft by 75 ft to a family who erected a temporary ‘shack’ of old (or 
new) corrugated iron or split poles in one corner of the site... Each site- 
holder was given a number to affix to his shack and issued with a refuse 
bin.69
The town’s official history added that each plot “was supplied with a tap and 
latrine consisting of a superstructure with a seat over a large deep hole bored by a
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drilling machine.”70 The provision of only such rudimentary services initially caused 
an outcry from opposition parties. Many of the large United Party-controlled 
municipalities opposed the site-and-service scheme, accusing it of falling far short of 
meeting the housing requirements o f African families. Johannesburg, for example, 
refused initially to implement the scheme in Soweto.71 The site-and-service schemes 
were criticised for perpetuating squatting (albeit controlled squatting) and viewed as a
•y\
substitute for proper housing. Verwoerd dismissed these objections and insisted that 
site-and-service was the “only method of facing the problem squarely instead of
T\turning our back on it.”
Verwoerd’s intransigence in the face of these criticisms is partly explained by 
deep concern of the authorities over the proliferation of squatter camps in the towns 
of the Witwatersrand. The rapidity with which the Apex Squatter camp sprang up on 
the outskirts of Benoni shocked the municipality and the government alike. Verwoerd 
took a personal interest in the matter and informed the municipality of his desire to 
see urgent action taken to remove the squatter camp.7'1 Me also promised the council 
his “whole-hearted assistance in the approval of the allocation of increased funds for
•je
Native houses” if they acted expeditiously.
Benoni broke ranks with its political allies on the issue of site-and-service 
schemes because it endorsed Verwoerd’s view that the introduction o f such a scheme 
in Daveyton would be the most effective means to eliminate squatting and to 
overcome the huge housing backlog for Africans.76 Besides the tremendous 
overcrowding in the old location, Benoni probably had the largest squatter population 
o f any town on the East Rand. The Council’s primary aims were to remove the 20 
000 plus residents of the Apex Squatter and to eliminate the overcrowding in the old 
location. Other East Rand towns followed the example set by Benoni. For example, in 
1955 the Germiston Council embarked on a massive site-and service scheme, albeit 
after initially objecting to the scheme.77 The Brakpan Council also resolved in 1954 
‘to implement the policy o f the Department relating to site-and-service as far as 
possible’.78
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When the government first mooted the concept of site-and-service schemes it 
did not yet have in place the policies or mechanisms for the construction o f large 
scale housing for urban blacks. Instead it proposed that the transformation o f site-and- 
service plots to proper houses would be dependent on the ability of residents to pay 
for such development. As Verwoerd explained, “Those in need of homes are given 
the first essentials: a serviced plot, and can then systematically although gradually, 
improve their position under supervision and mostly with further assistance.”79 At 
this stage the government’s priority was the immediate elimination of overcrowding 
and squatting, not the provision of houses. It was this formula for township 
development that caused the most consternation among opposition parties, who 
feared that urban Africans would not be able to afford to build houses and would 
consequently end up in similar conditions to the squatter camps from which they had 
been removed.
However, by the mid-fifties the government had set in place the mechanisms 
and unlocked the requisite financial resources to proceed with mass housing
o / \
projects. The site-and-service schemes were henceforth regarded only as temporary 
measures. Each plot was now earmarked for the erection o f a municipal house. 
According to the Bcnoni Council, the “Scheme must be treated as an embryo native 
township and the residents given every encouragement and assistance to develop it 
decently... Control is of paramount importance to ensure that a site-and-service 
scheme develops into a proper Bantu township.” The timing of Daveyton’s 
establishment was therefore fortuitous. Almost as soon as people were settled in 
Daveyton, the construction o f the first major housing scheme o f 8184 houses 
commenced. Mathewson proudly reflected on his Council’s achievements:
Concurrent with the move extensive home building activity was 
taking place by both the Council’s building section and by private 
contract. No sooner had a family arrived and settled than building 
material was dumped on the site, excavations commenced and 
building proceeded. The psychological reaction on seeing one’s
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future home being erected right on the spot with little or no delay can 
well be imagined. The site holder himself jealously guarded against 
the pilfering of building material which has been experienced on
g?
other housing schemes.
The Council’s housing department and a firm of contractors completed the 
housing programme in record time. For example, the private firm erected houses at 
the phenomenal rate of seventeen a day.83 As a result it took just over three years for 
this massive housing programme to be completed. The significance o f this 
achievement is apparent when one considers that in KwaThema only 6000 houses
O 1
were constructed in eight years.
The speed at which this mass housing programme was completed was 
facilitated by the various measures which the government introduced in the early 
1950s. The Building Workers Act of 1951 and the Native Services Levy Act o f 1952 
in particular aimed at reducing the cost o f African housing, raising funds from the 
private sector for infrastructural development and accelerating the construction o f 
houses in the new townships. For example, the employment of African builders in 
place of white workers radically reduced the cost of erecting a house from anything 
between £300 and £800 to as little as £178.85
The Native Service Levy Act applied to those urban centres where the African 
population exceeded 20 000 and imposed a levy of 2/6 a week on employers o f 
African workers as a contribution to the provision of services in the townships.
Within the first four years of its application approximately £8,5 million was raised.86 
Between 1952 and 1960 expenditure of over £15 million was approved from the Levy 
Fund nationally. Benoni’s approved expenditure was the fifth largest in the country at 
£968 634.87 Some of the most important essential services provided in Daveyton from 
this source between 1955 and 1965 were Roads (R658 116), Water (R394 865), 
Sewerage (R871 610) and Electricity (R275 128).88 The infrastructural development 
of the townships was immensely assisted by the annual income from the Service 
Levy Fund of about £80 000.89
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Once these measures were in place the government’s expenditure on African 
housing increased dramatically. Between 1949 and 1957 nearly R40 million was 
spent on housing from state funds alone.90 The effects o f this huge injection o f funds 
into township development were evident in Daveyton. Between 1952 and 1962 a total 
o f R13 364 754 (approximately £6, 7 million91) was spent on the township’s 
expansion. O f this total approximately R4 million was spent on the construction o f 8 
184 houses, R3 million (£1,5 million) on the provision of electricity and sewerage 
networks.92 Besides these core developments a further R332 000 (£166 000) was 
spent on the erection o f a beer hall, R71 000 (£35 300) on the building o f shops R50 
000 (£25 000) for a clinic, R52 000 (£26 000) for a creche and R6000 (£3 000) on the 
library.93
The government’s decision to phase out state-subsidised or sub-economic 
housing in favour of economic housing for Africans was another important policy 
shift intended to make more funds available. From the outset all the houses 
constructed in Daveyton were on an economic basis. The state’s refusal to continue 
subsidising housing for Africans meant that Daveyton’s residents had to repay the 
interest on the loans, as well as the actual loans, at economic rental rates.94 The effect 
was substantially higher rents in Daveyton compared to what residents had previously 
paid either in the squatter camps or backyards. For former Apex squatter residents 
rentals soared from 15s. to £3 a month95, imposing increased hardships on already 
cash-strapped African workers.
The Benoni Chamber of Commerce was sufficiently concerned by the extra burden 
imposed on African workers to request the Assocom Congress of 1959 to adopt a 
resolution to the effect that African residents earning less than £20 a month should 
have their rents reduced and that Daveyton be converted to a sub-economic township 
to reduce the rental paid by residents.96 The recommendation was supported by the 
Councils General Purposes Committee, which suggested the term of repayment be 
extended from thirty to forty years. The implementation o f this policy, it argued, 
would result in a reduction of 2s. 9d. a month in the rents paid by Daveyton’s 
residents.97 These appeals for leniency by some employee organisation did not
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however detracting from the implementation o f the government’s policy, which was 
to shift the financial burden o f housing onto the shoulders of African residents. The 
government argued that if African townships were financially self-sufficient it could 
make more economic housing loans available to municipalities. The thirty-year loan 
agreement with the government also meant that income from rents primarily went to 
paying off the loan. The result was that very little, if any, income could be raised 
from this source for township development.
Stabilisation of the urban African population: housing
The provision of housing in the new townships represented progress to many 
urban Africans. For many o f Daveyton’s first residents, who had previously lived 
either in squatter camps or in backyards in the old location, the occupation o f a house 
(albeit very rudimentary and o f questionable quality) represented a marked 
improvement on their previous abodes. Although J.II. Mathewson’s (Benoni’s 
Director of Non-European Affairs) prediction made in 1955 that Davcyton would 
become a ‘garden city’ with its streets lined by trees was unlikely ever to be 
realised, the township’s early development nonetheless represented real progress. The 
Daveyton Advisory Board regularly commended the authorities for their 
accomplishments in relation to Daveyton. Thus when Councillor Moutloatsi claimed 
the Benoni Council had achieved a ‘miracle’ by converting ‘dead stones into 
habitable houses’"  he expressed a relatively popular perception of Daveyton at the 
time.
Positive sentiments about the new townships were fairly common among 
lodgers and squatters for whom these townships often represented an escape from 
unbearable overcrowding, lack o f basic facilities and exploitation by rack-renting 
landlords in the old locations and squatter camps. African residents who had been 
sub-tenants ‘were delighted by the ownership of houses’ in the new townships. The 
application of the 30-year leasehold scheme also offered residents greater security of 
tenure.100 A resident of Payneville remembers the rush by lodgers for houses in
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KwaThema, because people ‘would rather be a landlord somewhere in the bundu than 
be subservient to a landlord in the location’.101 The insalubrious conditions in the old 
locations made the new townships attractive to young people. Banzi Bangani recalls 
that
It was a relief when the Council said you are now going to get your 
own place. You’ll have your own toilet and you can put in your own 
bathroom. People said this is nice. Young and middle aged people 
owned no stands in Payneville, and particularly those who lived in 
the backyards. All of them, they welcome the idea of coming to 
KwaThema township.102
One o f the main attractions of the new townships was the possibility of home- 
ownership. In 1956 Verwoerd explained the government’s policy regarding home- 
ownership for urban Africans:
The Native cannot acquire any property rights in the European area 
and therefore also not in the Location or Native Township. He 
cannot acquire any freehold rights there because that would clash 
with the basic principle of separation and separate development.
On the other hand he can certainly acquire certain forms of 
possession which do not have any characteristics of permanency, 
such as home ownership and even home ownership based on a 
lease of the land on which the house is erected for a guaranteed 
number of years. He can acquire this because there is nothing in it 
which imports to it anything of the essence of permanency such as 
property ownership.103
Notwithstanding the ambiguities in the government’s policy, home-ownership 
provided urban Africans with a degree of security. There were three types of tenancy 
available in Daveyton. First was the renting o f municipal-built houses, which meant
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that the Council retained ownership of the house and let it to tenants on a monthly 
basis. These tenants were given residential permits and had to pay rents ranging from 
R4,70 to R5,20. The second form of tenancy was leaseholding. Under this system 
tenants purchased the right of occupation of a house for a period normally o f thirty 
years (the so-called thirty year leasehold agreement), which was the most common 
form of tenancy. An advantage of leasehold tenancy was that occupation could be 
transferred subject to permission from the local authority. Tenants in Daveyton were 
expected to pay ten percent of the purchase price as a deposit and pay the outstanding 
amount over a thirty year period in monthly instalments of approximately R4,50.104 
Finally, residents had the option of building their own homes, albeit according to 
specification determined by the authorities.
Initially the demand for owner-built houses was very low in Daveyton. Until 
1961 only forty-four such houses were built, ten of which churches erected for their 
ministers.105 A Council survey in 1955 of the lodgers in the old location and squatters 
of the Apex Emergency Camp found that less than one percent o f them preferred to 
build their own homes and only 11,75% were interested in purchasing the houses 
built by the Council. The overwhelming majority therefore indicated a preference for 
renting municipal houses.106 This situation remained virtually unchanged until the 
mid-1960s. A Council campaign to promote home-ownership attracted only four 
buyers in eighteen months in 1964-65.107 The relatively low income earned by 
Daveyton’s residents diminished their capacity to invest in their own homes. The 
depressed demand for home-ownership also suggests that the slow emergence o f a 
better-off elite was during the first decade of Daveyton’s existence. It was only when 
residents from the old location were relocated to Daveyton that the demand for home- 
ownership increased dramatically. These people were often home-owners in the old 
location and were paid compensation for these houses, which meant many of them 
could afford to pay a deposit for a new house.
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Stabilisation of the u rban  African population: employment
The 1960s also witnessed further transformation o f the East Rand. The 
continuing industrialisation o f the region caused a steady increase in population: 
between 1960 and 1970 the region’s overall population grew by nearly 80% from 504 
513 in 1960 to 909 680 in 1970 (see tables below). This large increase was primarily 
due to the continued influx into the region by Africans and whites to meet the 
growing demand for industrial jobs.
Tabic Four
East Rand population, I960109
African Coloured Indian W hite Total
Male 221 965 4 736 3 301 80 352 310 354
Female 107 572 4613 3 243 78 731 194 159
Total 329 537 9 349 6 544 159 083 504 513
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Table Five
East Rand Population, 1970110
African Coloured Indian White Total
Male 319 739 9 478 5 746 164 904 499 867
Female 230 379 10 139 5 716 163 579 409 813
Total 550 118 19617 11 462 328 483 909 680
A comparison o f those figures reveals a number of important shifts in the 
demographic patterns of the region. Firstly, the African population increased, 
although at a slower rate than in the previous period. Secondly, the white population 
more than doubled during the 1960s rising from 31,5% to 36% of the overall 
population compared to a 5% in the contribution of the African population. Expressed 
differently the region’s white population amounted to less than 50% of the African 
population in 1960, while a decade later it had increased to nearly 60%. Although 
African urbanisation into the region had neither been halted nor reversed, the 
government’s objectives of reducing the rate of African urbanisation and 
simultaneously increasing white urbanisation had thus achieved a measure o f success.
These statistics, however, conceal even more important shifts in the character 
of the population of this region than those that they disclose. In 1960 mining still 
retained its pre-eminence in the region’s economy, employing more African males 
than in other industry (96 681 out of 145 040 labourers).1" By 1970 mining in the 
region had experienced a precipitous decline, which was reflected in its shedding of 
nearly two-thirds o f its African male employees to an historic low figure o f only 33
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613.112 Despite this massive reduction in mining employment, the total number of 
African male labourers grew from 145 040 to 165 238 during the decade, reflecting 
the huge leap in the number o f African males employed in industry from under 50 
000 to 131 628.113 By the early 1970s African and coloured workers constituted over 
80% of production workers in the metal industry on the East Rand.114 These figures 
confirm the growing dependence of industry in the ‘white economy’ on African 
workers.
The official employment statistics for Daveyton likewise show a steady 
increase in male employment throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1962 the 
number of registered African males employed in Benoni stood at 19 754 and by 1973 
the figure had increased to 27 877.115 A parallel decline in the rate o f African male 
unemployment was also registered, dropping to less than ten percent and at the height 
of the economic boom in the mid-sixties to between 1,5 -  3,0%.116 African women 
also bencfitted from this trend as their numbers in formal employment grew from 
34818 in 1962 to 10 382 in 1969. They nevertheless remained the most vulnerable to 
the vagaries o f the economy and were the first to be adversely affected when the 
economy began to slow down in the early 1970s. Thus in 1973 the number o f 
registered African women employed in Benoni had declined to approximately 
8000.117
Perhaps the most significant change that occurred during the 1960s was the 
massive expansion in the number o f African males in semi-skilled occupations in 
industry. This was taking place nationally but was particularly pronounced on the 
East Rand. Crankshaw and Sitas have argued that in the late 1960s the shortage of 
white artisans led employers to accelerate the fragmentation o f skilled trades, hitherto 
monopolised by white skilled workers who used their craft unions to block the entry 
o f black workers into these grades, and to promote African employment in the newly 
created operative jobs. Crankshaw’s seminal study reveals the entry nationally of 
African workers into the existing and newly created semi-skilled occupations. This 
pattern o f upward mobility as Crankshaw emphasises was restricted to specific 
classes previously dominated by white workers.119 The statistics for the East Rand
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largely confirm Crankshaw's analysis but suggest that the rate o f upward mobility by 
African workers on the East Rand was probably more advanced than in other parts of 
the country. A number of semi-skilled categories in the region’s industries seem to 
have experienced a particularly huge influx of African workers. Tables four and five 
show some o f the changes that occurred in the course o f the 1960s.
Generally, the figures for 1960 show that white males overwhelmingly 
occupied skilled and semi-skilled jobs. In none o f these categories did the number of 
African male workers exceed 25%. The differences between the 1960 and 1970 
figures are striking. Although white workers continued to play a pivotal role in 
industry, dominating skilled jobs, their position in many semi-skilled categories 
showed a precipitous decline. In those categories where some direct comparison is 
possible, such as Welder and Cabinet Maker, the proportion o f African workers 
increased seven-fold and nearly four-fold respectively. The chemical industry’s 
robust expansion on the East Rand is reflected in the huge increase in its employment 
figures. The predominance o f African workers in this relatively skilled sector o f the 
economy was also marked. Similarly, the high proportion o f Africans who were tool- 
makers indicate their centrality in the metal industry.
Until the 1960s African women played a negligible role in the secondary 
industry of the East Rand. In 1960 only 977 African females were employed in the 
formal secondary economy. Domestic work remained the most important sector of 
employment for African women, absorbing 18 514 out of 29 896 economically active 
African female workers. A much larger proportion of coloured and Indian females 
(33,8% and 60% respectively) was employed industry compared to African and white 
females (3,2% and 8,1% respectively), which was probably consequent upon the huge 
exodus of white female employees from the garment and textile industries. However, 
during the 1960s the numbers of African women employed in industry in various 
occupations ranging from cleaners to operators increased more than nine-fold.
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Table Six
Male employment in the main industrial occupations on the East
Rand, I960120
Total African (%) White (%)
Fitter and turner 4 459 330 (7,4%) 4 038 (90,5%)
Furnacemen 1 241 103 (8,2%) 1111 (89,5%)
Mechanic 1 613 92 (5,7%) 1 498 (92,8%)
Welder 2 170 135 (6,2%) 2 009 (92,5%)
Carpenter 1 464 224 (15,3%) 1 145 (78,2%)
Bricklayer 1 698 417 (24,5%) 1 221 (71,9%)
Chemical Worker 872 59 (6,7%) 697 (79,9%)
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Table Seven
Male employment in the main industrial occupations on the East
Rand, 1970121
Total African (%) White (%)
Machinery Fitter 14 505 4 184 (28,8%0 9 930 (68,5%)
Welder/Plumbcr 12 082 5 385 (44,6%) 6 121 (50,6%)
Chemical Processor 8 027 7 052 (87,8%) 728 (9%)
Bricklayer 12 008 7 829 (65,2%) 3 938 (32,8%)
Cabinet Maker 1 520 887 (58,4%) 336 (22,1%)
Tool Maker 13 455 9 149(68%) 3 150(23,4%)
Electrical Fitter 8 300 3 316 (40%) 3 595 (43,3%)
Glass Former 3 850 3 243 (84,2%) 312 (8,1%)
Transport
Equipment Operator
17 496 13 571 (77,6%) 3 216(18,4% )
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In 1962 the Bureau for Market Research conducted a survey on incomes 
among African people living in Benoni. The findings of the survey highlighted 
several developing trends. Firstly, it confirmed the high proportion of Africans who 
had settled permanently in the urban area. In September 1961 the African population 
o f Benoni stood at 91 300 of which approximately 80 000 were living under 
‘household conditions’, that is, they were residing in family accommodation in one o f 
the three townships of the town. Only 6 000 African males were still accommodated 
in mine compounds, which reflected the demise o f the mining industry and the 
consequent displacement of the local migrant population.122
More than 40% of African household heads in all three townships o f Benoni 
were employed in the manufacturing sector, confirming the industrial character o f  the 
African population, In comparison only 16,4% of Pretoria’s African workforce was 
employed in the manufacturing sector, which highlights the extent o f industrialisation 
on the East Rand and Benoni specifically. The proportion o f semi-skilled workers 
residing in each of the three townships varied somewhat. Davcyton had a higher 
proportion of unskilled workers than Wattville and BBT (69% compared to 55,4% 
and 65,8% respectively), and a smaller proportion of semi-skilled workers (14,9% 
compared to 21,8% and 16,5% respectively).124 This was because Daveyton’s 
population consisted primarily of relatively new migrants in the urban area who had 
entered industry at the lowest employment rungs. The older locations had far more 
established urban populations who had worked in industry for longer periods and 
were thus more likely to have acquired experience and skills.
The differences in occupation skill levels affected the average incomes in the 
different townships. The discrepancy between wages earned by semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers was huge: the former earned an average o f R50,32 compared to 
only R31,20 by the latter. By contrast the average earnings o f skilled workers 
(R54,14) differed only marginally with the earnings of those doing semi-skilled 
workers.125 These wage differentials affected household incomes in the townships. 
The average monthly income per household in Wattville was R66,42 compared to 
only R47,68 in Daveyton.126 Although comparative figures for Benoni Old Location
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were not provided in the survey, it may be assumed that the average income in the old 
location would have been between than o f the other two townships.127 The survey 
found that the average monthly income of household heads (as opposed to 
households) in Benoni was R36,31, implying that their incomes was supplemented by 
an average of R15,85. As most household heads were male, it may be assumed that 
these supplementary incomes were mainly derived from their wives, who in many 
instances were employed as domestic workers but were also at the point o f entering 
industrial occupations.
The survey showed African households in Benoni as spending approximately 
72% of their income on basic necessities (42,4% on food alone and as expending their 
entire income each month.129 Any unexpected expenditure or sudden increase in one 
of the basic necessities was thus liable to throw residents into debt from which they 
found it difficult to escape. The survey fails to factor in differential transport costs, 
flattening them out to average R5 when most residents from Wattville and Benoni 
Old Location walked to their workplaces and therefore spent very little on transport. 
Residents of Wattville and Benoni Old Location were clearly better off than their 
counterparts in Daveyton. As the Benoni City Times reported
Daveyton might be a model township with a handsome civic centre, 
modern brewery and an all-Native town council -  but it was also a 
city of people existing on starvation wages.130
The lower income earned by Daveyton’s residents was reflected in the high rental 
arrears that accumulated during the first few years of the township’s existence. The 
monthly rental of £3 proved too expensive for many, resulting in a high proportion of 
under-payment or non-payment during the first few years o f Daveyton’s existence.
Up to a thousand residents were interviewed a month by the township superintendent 
for being in arrears.131 By the early 1960s the total arrears for the township stood at 
R60 103.132 However, over the following few years this figure declined to an all time 
low of R33 181 in 1965133 before increasing again to R63 706 in 1966.134 Overall,
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therefore, the arrears figures increased by only about R3000 in the mid-1960s, which 
suggested a modest increase in prosperity and contrasted sharply with increases in 
rental arrears registered in the late 1950s. The improvements in income levels were 
also reflected by the decline in the number o f electricity cut-offs in the mid-1960s. In 
the early 1960s an average o f up to thirty households a month were affected by 
electricity cut-offs due to non-payment, but by 1965 that number had decreased to 
only nine households a month.135 The lives of the residents o f Daveyton had 
improved discernibly since the establishment o f the township in 1955. In this respect, 
their experiences mirrored that o f many urban Africans during this period. Despite 
these material improvements, urban Africans generally remained poor and their 
incomes and standard o f living lagged far behind those o f their white counterparts.
As the populations o f the new townships became more settled, social 
differentiation among them emerged more clearly, albeit unevenly. The entry o f more 
Africans into semi-skilled and skilled jobs in industry, the expansion of township 
administrations and the initial opportunity to secure of home-ownership, among 
other factors, contributed to the emergence o f new and the reinforcement of old forms 
of social differentiation. These incipient class divisions manifested themselves 
unevenly in the different townships on the East Rand. For example, home-ownership 
and the type of house being occupied, which were important markers o f social 
differentiation affected townships very differently. In Natalspruit/Katlehong some of 
the class differences were transplanted from the old location. Site-holders and lodgers 
from Dukathole were relocated in separate sections. The former were generally given 
larger plots and encouraged to build their own houses. In this way a visible social 
differentiation was imposed from the outset in the new township.136 Brandel-Syrier’s 
study of the elite in this township noted that “social differentiation was expressed and 
emphasised in residential differentiation”.137 The situation in Daveyton, where there 
were very few home-owners, differed markedly from this. It seems that initially there 
was a greater social differentiation between the different African townships of 
Benoni, than within Daveyton. According to Brandel-Syrier, the ‘managerial elite’ 
formed an important component o f the new township elite. In this category Daveyton
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(where only 1,5% of household heads were categorised as being managerial) also 
lagged behind Wattville (6,9%).138
Daveyton was thus not marked by the same degree of social stratification as 
those of other townships, whose residents were drawn primarily from the old 
locations. The relative social homogeneity of residents was reinforced by the high 
percentage o f unskilled workers among them. As a result it took much longer for 
class divisions to make a serious imprint on Daveyton’s population. The influx o f 
residents from the Benoni Old Location in the mid-1960s certainly contributed to a 
greater social heterogeneity in Daveyton’s population.
However, even before that the process of social stratification was already 
under way. By the early 1960s there was a relatively well established, albeit small, 
entrepreneurial class in the township. There were already thirty trading sites 
(primarily trading stores), that were owned by the new residents.139 This was 
significant because in the other townships, traders from the old locations were usually 
able to acquire trading sites in the new townships and thus continue their monopoly 
o f trading there.140 Malhewson’s insistence on establishing a large township 
administration in Daveyton created more scope for the emergence of a ‘new elite of 
public servants’.141 As a result, Daveyton boasted a higher proportion of public 
administration staff than either Wattville or Benoni Old Location.142 Daveyton’s 
fifteen schools, twenty-one churches, clinic, post office and two banks143 would also 
have contributed to the growth of a professional stratum in the elite. Here again 
Daveyton outstripped the longer established Wattville.144 Daveyton lagged behind 
other East Rand townships in a number o f respects in so far as the prestige and well­
being of its population was concerned. However, it was also catching up fairly 
quickly. Daveyton, perhaps more than any other township in the region, was the best 
example of the state’s success in stabilising sections of the urban African population 
(squatters and lodgers), which had previously caused it serious concern.
The government’s objectives set out in the 1950s to stabilise and control the 
urban African population was largely achieved in the early 1960s. The repression 
following the Sharpeville massacre played a huge role in achieving this aim.
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However, the creation of the large modern townships also contributed significantly to 
this process. Notwithstanding the comparatively low quality accommodation and 
services provided to urban Africans as well as the severe social dislocation 
accompanying the disestablishment of the old locations, the move to the new 
townships was improved conditions for many. Daveyton and other townships became 
what the government set out to achieve: urban reservoirs o f reliable labour. The 
process of stabilising the African working class was reinforced by its improved status 
in the economy as many were drawn into semi-skilled jobs. As a result o f this wages 
improved, although they remained low in comparison to the earnings o f their white 
counterparts. But, as the policies o f ‘practical’ apartheid policies began to bear fruit, 
the government began introducing important policy changes designed specifically to 
undermine the achievement o f creating a permanently urbanised and stable African 
working class.
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CHAPTER FIVE
High apartheid in the 1960s: 
the decline of ‘modern’ townships and urban rights
From the late 1950s the government introduced changes to central aspects of 
its policies, which inaugurated a period that Posel has described as ‘apartheid’s 
second phase’.1 The government embarked on the road o f ‘high apartheid’ because of 
the perceived failure o f its previous policies to stem the tide o f African urbanisation 
and to limit the dependence o f the ‘white’ economy on African workers. The black 
proletariat’s political militancy in the late 1950s exacerbated these dilemmas for the 
ruling class. Whereas in the earlier period of apartheid the government insisted on a 
strict differentiation between ‘dctribalised’ (urbanised) and ‘tribal’ (rural) Africans, 
now it abandoned this distinction and assigned all Africans to one or other rural-
•j
based ethnic group.
A renewed emphasis on ethnicity therefore characterised the decade o f ‘high 
apartheid’. The promulgation o f the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 
1959 signalled the government’s intention to politicise ethnicity. Henceforth all 
Africans would be tied to a ‘tribal’ community and authority. Two implications 
flowed from this piece of legislation. The first was that Africans were denied a 
permanent status in the urban areas and, consequently, also any urban rights. The 
second was that the different ‘races’ or ‘nations’ of South Africa had to develop 
separately. This concept o f ‘separate development, according to Posel, ‘was largely 
the ideological means to legitimise the denial of the franchise to Africans.’3 A central 
aim of these new policies was to reverse African urbanisation. As a result in the 
1960s various pieces of legislation were introduced to push Africans back to the
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reserves. In the words of a leading government minister, M.C. Botha all ‘natives 
without work or who, as approved workers, have misbehaved, must disappear out o f 
white South Africa, back to the reserves.’4 Many of the main ‘concessions’ made to 
Africans in the 1950s, such as Section 10 rights and home-ownership, came under 
attack in the 1960s. African women found their position in the urban areas rendered 
even more precarious and vulnerable to being ‘endorsed out’ of the towns. The 
promotion o f ‘homelands’ also resulted in a massive re-allocation of resources away 
from the urban areas to the reserves. As a result, from the late 1960s African 
townships in the urban areas suffered from neglect and entered a spiral o f socio­
economic decline.
This chapter again focuses on the fate of Daveyton in this period. The reasons 
are the same. If any township should have been a model of ‘separate development’ it 
was Daveyton. Daveyton was laid out from the beginning according to apartheid 
principles. The government and the Benoni municipality worked in close harmony 
over township issues, which ensured in the early days that Daveyton would be 
relatively well funded. Finally, the overwhelming bulk of Davcyton’s population 
were relatively recent arrivals in the urban areas. If any urban black community 
should have been amenable to the government’s ‘separate development’ project, it 
should have been this.
Local authorities brought under control
J.E. Mathewson’s address in 1960 to the Institute o f Administrators o f Non- 
European Affairs (IANA) conference entitled ‘The role of Urban Bantu 
Administration as a basic component of the policy of separate development’ 
explicitly aimed at reconciling his aims o f utilising the administration o f Daveyton as 
training for Africans with the government’s ‘homelands’ policy. He also seemed 
persuaded by Verwoerd’s declaration that ‘homelands’ would have their own cities 
“where self-rule will apply in the towns, with the management entirely in the hands of
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the Bantu.”5 Thus Mathewson’s concern that Africans be urbanised seemed to be 
catered for in the government’s ‘homelands’ strategy. This ideological convergence 
marked a further consolidation of the relationship between Benoni’s Council and the 
government and ushered in a period of unprecedented co-operation.
This rapprochement between the municipality and government should also be 
viewed in the context of the United Party’s shift to the right and consequent 
conciliatory attitude to the ruling party. After the split in the United Party (UP), 
which resulted in the formation o f the Progressive Party in 1959, the UP remained the 
official opposition but proved even more supportive of Verwoerd than critics in his 
own party.6 The United Party partly justified its label as ‘Loyal Official Opposition’ 
by arguing that the government’s introduction of Urban Bantu Councils amounted to 
an adoption o f policies it had been advocating since the early fifties. It believed the 
N P’s new policies acknowledged the permanent urbanisation o f Africans and 
township residents’ ability to handle certain aspects of their own local governance.7
The fracturing and weakness o f the parliamentary opposition was inversely 
proportionate to the growing strength and authority o f the Nationalist Party (NP). 
While the 1958 elections consolidated the ruling party’s hold on white politics, the 
successful crackdown against the black opposition movement after 1960 significantly 
reinforced its power. This trend was confirmed by the success of the republic 
referendum and subsequent elections, nationally and locally. The East Rand was a 
good example of the growing domination of the NP. Until the mid-fifties the UP not 
only controlled most of the local authorities but also won most of the areas’ 
parliamentary seats. However, the balance of power began to shift in the N P’s favour 
and by the mid-sixties it held the political sway. Benoni was one of the last towns on 
the East Rand to succumb to the NP electoral juggernaut, remaining a UP 
parliamentary seat until 1966. The NP won the parliamentary seats in Brakpan in 
1953, in Boksburg in 1958 and in Springs in 1966. This meant that political co­
operation by local authorities was almost guaranteed.
The ruling party’s increasing control over local authorities was further 
enhanced by changes to the structure and functioning of Transvaal’s municipalities.
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The Local Government (Administration and Elections) Ordinance of 1960 centralised
Q
authority in the hands o f smaller and less accountable Management Committees.
Until then Councils operated by means o f various standing committees which were 
responsible for carrying out different municipal functions. From the beginning of 
1961 the functions of these standing committees were all taken over by the 
Management Committee. The running of Council business became the responsibility 
of the five members of the Management Committees who were elected by the 
Councillors after each municipal election. Under the new system council election 
were to be held only every five years, instead of the existing three years, thereby 
reducing the influence the electorate might have on Councillors
The avowed aim of these changes was to introduce greater efficiency at local 
government level. It was argued that the longer period of office for Councillors would 
give them more time to carry out their mandates efficaciously. However, these 
changes also tended to make them less responsive to the electorate. More serious 
perhaps was the concentration of power in fewer hands. Although the Council 
retained the power to pass a motion of no confidence in the Management Committee, 
the latter tended to act as a cabinet without regular reference to the rest of the 
Council. Meetings o f the Management Committee were closed affairs unless it gave 
other councillors permission to attend. In early 1961 there was considerable 
enthusiasm about the new system.10 However, by the end of that year the editors of 
Municipal Affairs, a prominent magazine for local authorities, complained that “The 
statutory powers given to management committees arc such that they easily become 
dictatorial powers - indeed, signs o f  a dictatorial attitude here and there have not been 
wanting.”11 The centralisation o f authority in the councils mirrored the concentration 
of power in the higher echelons o f the state. In both instances opposition was 
consciously marginalised and rendered increasingly ineffective. At a local level, the 
N P’s electoral advances plus the creation o f Management Committees tended to 
transform municipalities into compliant executors of government policy.
The effects of the national political realignment were of enormous 
consequence for Benoni, especially its African population. Notwithstanding the
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continuing existence o f differences between Benoni and the government, the 
municipality proved to be an even more reliable local arm of the state than it was in 
the fifties. When confronted by critical enquiries from the Daveyton UBC, 
Mathewson retorted that “An Act o f parliament could not be changed by the Council 
no matter how it felt nor could it be changed by him even if he liked to do so... It was 
his duty to carry out the State’s policy and he could not fight against it.” For his co­
operation with the government, Mathewson continued to win accolades from his 
Nationalist opponents. Blaar Coetzee, the Minister informed the UBC that they were 
fortunate to have “at their disposal [someone who] was looked upon as one o f the 
most capable administrators in Bantu Affairs in South Africa.” 13
The primary consequence of the growing collegial relations between the local 
authority and the government was that control over urban Africans became easier to 
effect. Government policies affecting African townships and their residents were 
henceforth implemented virtually without opposition from the municipalities.
Urban Bantu Councils
Advisory Boards were established to serve as mechanisms of liaison between 
location residents and the authorities. They were explicitly denied any real power and 
their overall functions were limited to an advisory capacity. In addition local 
authorities were neither obliged to consult the Advisory Boards nor take into account 
any recommendations by them. The usefulness of Advisory Boards depended on the 
willingness of local authorities to consult them on township administration matters.14
During the 1930s the conservative-dominated Advisory Boards were able to 
perform their perfunctory roles without too much opposition. In the subsequent two 
decades the Communist Party o f South Africa (CPSA) and the African National 
Congress (ANC) sought to utilise the Advisory Boards as platforms from which to 
propagate their views and to mobilise residents in campaigns to demands 
improvements from the authorities. As a result, from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s
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in numerous townships Advisory Boards ceased to function according to the 
government’s prescription.
Under the pressure of these struggles conservative township politicians and 
some municipalities began to call for Advisory Boards to be given more powers. 
There was also a growing disquiet among municipalities that a main “grievance 
among the Bantu is that they are not always consulted on matters affecting their 
interest.” 15 Benoni’s answer to this problem was to engage in ‘constant consultation’ 
with the Daveyton Advisory Board. “It is imperative” Mathewson insisted, “to avoid 
placing the advisory board in a position where the members have no function but to 
sit back and criticize knowing that there is little possibility o f their being called upon 
to face any repercussion arising from the implementation o f the policy they may 
enunciate.” 16 But even the more liberal and paternalist Benoni Council had no 
intention of allowing the Advisory Board to influence important policy decisions. The 
issues Mathewson had in mind for them were “many matters of a non-contentious 
nature which could with advantage be referred to advisory board for their views and 
bring them ‘into the picture’. A feeling is thus created that they form part o f  the 
machinery responsible for the progress of their own town.” 17
Arguments to abolish the Advisory Board system were vented more 
frequently in the late 1950s. Local officials attending IANA conferences regularly 
bemoaned the failure of the Boards. Even Eiselen admitted that “The urban Bantu 
population is not even interested in the election of its Board members -  in Pretoria for 
example only between 33,4% and 36,4% of the registered inhabitants make use o f 
their voting rights.” The government openly acknowledged the pervasiveness o f 
‘malpractices’ in the Advisory Boards. These included “pre-election promises, [the] 
use of delaying tactics when amendment o f regulations or estimates are considered, 
[the] influence of Shebeen Queens on elections [and the fact that] supporters o f  the 
majority group are almost exclusively recommended for the granting o f business 
licences.” 18 In Verwoerd’s view this was a recipe for disaster: “Any Advisory Board 
which has no responsibility must o f necessity become a body which makes all kinds 
of demands, and requests and cherishes all kinds o f expectations. The greater the
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demands made by such a body are, the better their chances are for re-election to 
membership thereof... This naturally forms a basis for agitation and strife.”19 The 
government openly distanced itself from the Advisory Boards when it refused to 
attend the annual congress o f the Advisory Boards in 1956 on the grounds that these 
congresses were discussing political matters. A consensus was developing among 
state and municipal officials that the Advisory Boards system was inadequate and had 
to be replaced. Precisely what should replace them became the subject o f much 
debate in the late fifties and early sixties.
Initially, when the alternatives to the Advisory Boards were being considered 
it seemed that the granting of some urban representation and more substantive powers 
to the successors of the Boards might be possible. In the immediate aftermath o f the 
Sharpevilie massacre when a wide spectrum of white politicians, including prominent 
members of the NP, and leading Afrikaner businessmen attempted to impress on 
Verwoerd the necessity of making concessions, there seemed a real chance that the 
ruling party might choose the road of reform. Once Verwoerd recovered from the first 
assassination attempt on his life this was quickly quashed. Probably, the most 
important change in the direction of the government’s policy was the decision to 
promote and develop the ‘homelands’.21 The ideology o f ‘separate development’ had 
little to do with the actual physical, social and economic development o f the reserves. 
Its main aim was to deny Africans political rights in ‘white South Africa’ by creating 
ethnically defined political entities where all Africans would supposedly have the 
opportunity to exercise the franchise. From this point on the government was 
determined to associate, by whatever means, the political aspirations o f African 
people to the ethnic ‘homelands’.
The parliamentary debate on the Urban Bantu Council Bill revealed both the 
government’s objectives in establishing UBCs and the flaws inherent in them. In his 
motivation for the Bill, the Minister o f Bantu Administration and Development 
argued that the government was “creating the possibility for the Bantu to take the 
initiative themselves to a very large extent in matters relating to their residential 
areas” . He added that municipalities would have the authority to delegate powers to
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the new Councils and urged them to fulfil this responsibility.22 Even now it was 
apparent that the proposed powers, which were to be delegated to the UBCs, would 
be severely circumscribed. The Minister explained that the UBCs would be given 
powers to “co-operate in the laying out o f streets, the improvement of streets, etc. and 
in future we hope also in connections with the provision of electric light, etc. and that 
they will also be able to co-operate in respect of the laying out of playgrounds.”23 The 
opposition Progressive Party dismissed the new Bill as being merely “a facade which 
pretends to give administrative powers to the urban Bantu” because any power that a 
local authority might agree to confer to the Bantu Council would have numerous 
conditions attached to it, effectively rendering it powerless. Despite these objections 
the government pressed ahead with its plan
The government’s emphasis on promoting ‘homelands’ profoundly influenced 
the form of representation it was prepared to offer urban Africans. Verwoerd insisted 
that any new local authority for urban Africans must be defined “on an ethnic basis 
because the greatest success is achieved where the relationship with traditional 
custom and the Native’s respect for his traditional authority is retained... It is 
necessary for them to revert back to this system for the sake of peace and order and 
especially for the welfare and good progress of the Native himself.”25 As early as 
1954 at a meeting with Pedi chiefs Verwoerd suggested these aims might be achieved 
by installing ‘tribal representatives’ in urban townships.26 The government claimed 
that chiefs were becoming concerned about their ‘children’ in the cities who had 
‘drifted away from the tribe’. Verwoerd outlined his two-pronged plan to address 
these concerns: “The one is to allow your ‘children’ to live together as a community 
in one portion of the urban area (ethnic grouping). The tribal chiefs must [also] have 
representatives in the cities who will be in constant touch with their people so that 
they may know where their ‘children’ can be found.”27
Even though the government acknowledged serious shortcomings among 
Advisory Boards, its initial suggestions to create new bodies with substantial powers 
to administer the townships were shelved in favour of what turned out to be little 
more than a name change. In practice the only material change to the Advisory
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Boards was the provision made for chiefs’ representatives. This was partly because 
Advisory Boards had mostly lost their radical character by the late fifties and were of 
less concern to the authorities. The silencing of the opposition in the early sixties also 
meant the government was under considerably less pressure to create township 
administrative authorities with any real powers. Under the circumstances, the 
government opted for minimal change
The UBC Act was finally promulgated in 1961, but elicited very little public 
interest. On the East Rand a division emerged in attitudes towards the UBC between 
those townships created in the fifties and sixties and the old locations. Daveyton, 
KwaThema, Thokoza and Vosloorus established UBCs, while Payneville, Benoni 
Location and Katlehong refused to do so. The Payneville Advisory Board complained 
that the creation of UBC was a step in the wrong direction. Expressing a widely held 
view (or hope) among township Councillors at the time the Board said it “was 
looking forward to the time when Native Councillors would sit side by side with their 
White Counterparts and not a Council elected on a tribal basis to implement 
tribalism.”28 Similar attitudes were articulated by the politicians of the other old 
locations. The remaining residents of the old locations had generally resided there for 
many years and in the parlance of the time were thoroughly dctribalised. In addition 
many of them were also standowners who were involved until the mid-sixties in 
opposing the government's forced removals schemes.
The Daveyton Advisory Board by contrast seemed oblivious to the flaws in 
the UBC system and was the first to apply for the creation o f an Urban Bantu 
Council, which was instituted in November 1963. Many were recent residents in the 
urban areas and had come to Daveyton via lodging or squatting in the Apex squatter 
camp. At the time the Councillors appeared convinced that a new era had dawned for 
the administration o f Daveyton, namely, that they would be given increasing 
authority to run the township. This belief was derived from an over-optimistic 
interpretation o f the legislation and faith in the willingness o f the Benoni Council to 
delegate significant powers to the UBC. Contrary to the expectations of the township 
Councillors, the inauguration of the UBC was not followed by an extension o f its
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powers. Instead the 1960s witnessed a struggle by the UBC to win even basic powers 
from an increasingly reluctant local authority.
The struggle for more powers
The Benoni Council’s instant endorsement o f the Advisory Board’s proposal 
to establish a UBC heightened expectations that the new body would differ 
substantially from its predecessor as did its inauguration in December 1963 which 
was accompanied by much fanfare and praises from the authorities. The UBC 
Councillors harboured these hopes despite clear signs to the contrary emerging during 
the parliamentary debate on the UBC Bill.29 The UBC approached its supposedly new 
role with considerable enthusiasm. Within months of being inaugurated it began to 
insist on the delegation of additional powers. The UBC’s first request was that the 
Benoni Management Committee should consult it on all matters pertaining to 
Daveyton before taking any decisions. Councillor Bookholane argued that “ In order 
that his Council should get some status it should decide on what action should be 
taken. The Town Council should not first consider matters and refer them to the 
Bantu Council.”30 Mr. S.M. Sinaba, the Daveyton resident elected to the Transkci 
Parliament, was even more forthright and appealed to Councillors to “claim for their 
rights and those of their people... The Daveyton Bantu Council had to claim for 
administrative rights. When this Council was established it was said it would have 
extra powers; but it did not seem to exercise them.”31 The Management Committee 
nevertheless refused to commit itself to prior consultation with the UBC and proved 
extremely reluctant to relinquish any power to the UBC. From this point on the UBC 
experienced one disappointment after another in its attempts to acquire additional 
powers. The UBC was confronted by what proved to be insurmountable hurdles in 
the shape o f the BAD, Provincial Administration and the local authority. Before new 
powers could be delegated to the UBC the support of these different state authorities 
was required. Even if the local authority proposed a transfer o f power, the Minister 
had the final authority and could, if  he wished, rescind any such measure. The
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legislation explicitly stipulated that the delegation of additional powers to the UBC 
could occur only with the permission of the Minister, acting on the advice o f the 
Provincial Administrator, and with the concurrence o f the white local authority.
Despite their initial disappointment, the UBC persisted for several years along 
the same course. In 1965 it requested to “be empowered to appoint and to promote 
members of the Daveyton Bantu Graded S taff’.33 The Management Committee again 
rejected this proposal, insisting that the UBC could only “have the right to make 
submissions and recommendations through the Director o f Non-European Affairs for 
consideration and approval.”34 On this matter Mathewson supported the UBC. He 
argued that such a measure would allow the UBC to acquire “a new and deep sense of 
responsibility in respect of the administration o f their particular sphere.”35 In so 
doing, he believed, the UBC would assist the Management Committee in dealing with 
difficulties it encountered in administering Daveyton. However, even Mathewson 
proposed that a ‘licensed officer’36 supervise the execution o f these responsibilities 
and who could refer matters to the Management Committee for review and final 
decision if in his opinion the UBC did not comply with certain standards in 
appointing or promoting staff.37 Notwithstanding Mathcwson’s proposed 
compromise, which was supported by the UBC, the Management Committee refused 
to accede. By mid-1965 it was apparent that an impasse had been reached between 
the UBC and the Management Committee. The Chief Bantu Commissioner’s support 
for the Management Committee further aggravated the difficulties confronting the 
UBC. For a while the UBC continued to plead its case but still without any success. 
Early in 1966 the Management Committee made appointments without even 
consulting the UBC whose objections were reduced to expressing ‘dismay’ it being 
informed about appointments and dismissals only after the Management Committee 
had taken such decisions. The Management Committee remained unperturbed and 
operated on the basis of inviting UBC members to interview applicants only when it
i n
deemed it necessary.
This episode revealed the enormous difficulties a relatively compliant UBC 
would encounter in acquiring even the most limited powers. It also highlighted the
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difference in approaches between Mathewson and the Management Committee. The 
former preferred to delegate some powers to the UBC as long as they did not 
undermine the fundamental power relations between the two bodies. He also believed 
such measures would train Africans in municipal management and, in so doing, 
prepare them to run their own affairs and thus assist the white authorities in managing 
the townships. The Management Committee, however, adhered strictly to the 
legislation and the hegemonic views in the state by refusing to delegate any 
substantial political authority to urban Africans.
Despite these early rebuffs the UBC still attempted to secure some influence 
over the important question o f finances in Daveyton. The UBC routinely 
recommended expenditure items for the budget o f the local authority, regarding this 
as an integral part o f its responsibility. Although they were allowed to submit 
proposed items of expenditure the opinion of the UBC on this vital matter was 
usually not seriously considered. For example, the UBC’s proposals for the 1964/65 
and 1965/66 budgets were totally omitted from the official budgets drawn by the 
Council. All they could hope for was that their proposals would be considered the 
following year.40 Even on trivial matters such as entertaining Ward Committee 
members, the UBC found it did not have the authority, let alone the finances, to 
proceed without the permission o f the Benoni Council.41
By 1966 the UBC seemed to have resigned itself to its continued impotence 
and adopted a different tack. Instead o f attempting to gain more power, it tried to 
convince the Benoni Council to consult more with it. Its powerlessness was revealed 
in a timid plea to be consulted in April 1966: “In order to have first hand information 
concerning the running of our affairs by the Town Council, we wondered if we could 
not have periodic meetings with the Management Committee from May 1966.”42 
Some Councillors were however prepared to voice stronger objections. Councillor 
Myataza complained bitterly in a meeting with the Mancom that “There was a feeling 
that the Management Committee ran the affairs of the Bantu Council in Daveyton and 
that in doing so, it ignored the Council. Things had been done without the Council’s 
knowledge... The Management Committee seemed to treat the Councillors as ‘toy
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councillors’.”4:3 Councillor Bookholane echoed these sentiments. According to him 
misunderstandings were inevitable in a system where there was ‘dual control’. He 
wanted the UBC and Town Council to be independent of each other and suggested 
“The Bantu Council should be directly responsible to the Department o f BAD.”44 
Others were more conciliatory. Councillor Khumalo, for example, placed his faith in 
better contact between the two councils and asked the Mancom to offer the UBC 
explanations when its requests were turned down.45 The authorities, however, 
remained unmoved by the demands of the UBC and, in a certain sense, reverted to the 
largely non-consultative relationship that had existed prior to the forties.
In a manner which was not entirely dissimilar from the 1930s and 1940s many 
Councillors fell back on the one limited area in which they could play a meaningful 
role: settling township disputes. Those who were called on to intervene in domestic 
problems, resolve squabbles between neighbours or discipline errant youth were 
usually people of some authority in the township. One of the main unofficial 
functions of the ward committees was to act, together with the councillor, as 
mediators in their respective wards, fleeted councillors, who had the support o f at 
least some, usually older and conservative residents often played the leading role in 
township dispute resolution. The authorities had an ambivalent attitude to this form of 
‘township justice.’ On the one hand, it recognised the importance of the issue and 
regularly encouraged the ‘respectable’ residents to ensure peace in the township. On 
the other hand, it was opposed to giving black residents too much authority over 
important matters such as control and security. In the late sixties this ambivalence 
was resolved in favour o f further restricting the role of the UBC as township 
mediators while at the same time permitting some scope for selected councillors to 
play a limited mediating role.
The first step in this direction was to shift more o f the responsibility for local 
dispute resolution to the selected councillors. This change was also influenced by the 
government’s desire to bring into line urban local government with the aims and 
objectives o f its ‘homelands’ policy. Selected councillors, as previously explained, 
were supposed to represent the interests o f ‘homeland’ leaders, the kings or chiefs.
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These urban ‘tribal’ (chiefs) representatives required the agreement of the local 
authority to serve on the UBC, but unlike the nominated councillors of the Advisory 
Boards, they also had an independent source of authority derived from their links to a 
‘tribal’ leader. And, most crucially, they had the support of the government which 
was determined to cultivate these ‘tribal’ connections and augment the influence of 
‘tribal authorities’ in the urban townships at the expense of elected Councillors. This 
strategy further marginalised elected councillors, which created enmity between them 
and selected councillors.
In 1967 these matters came to a head. At first there were complaints that 
selected Councillors, especially the Zulu representatives, were not confining their 
activities to their particular wards but were ‘just grabbing anybody anywhere’. 
Councillor Khumalo also accused these selected councillors o f becoming increasingly 
unco-operative.46 The government was, however, unsympathetic to the concerns of 
the elected councillors. Mr. P.S. van der Merwc of the BAD responded to the 
complaints by emphasising the government’s support for urban ‘tribal’ 
representatives:
the Government of RSA considered all Bantu people in urban areas 
as subjects of some chief or other. There was no Bantu person who 
belonged to a municipality. As far as he was concerned a chief s 
representative who was a selected member of the Council had two 
sets of functions and duties. In the first place, he had a duty to his 
chief who appointed him. As a representative of a chief he had to 
work for the people whom the chief may have in a certain urban area 
and he was responsible to the chief and this Council at home as 
regards all the problems of the subjects of that particular chief. A 
selected member was also a chiefs representative; but whilst serving 
on the Council he undertook the functions and duties of the Council.
In one instance he was the representative of the Chief and his 
Council (kgotla) at home, and in the other he was a selected member
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of a council the functions and duties of which he had to adhere to as 
a member of the council.47
The government also formalised the mediation role o f the ‘tribal 
representatives’ by establishing local ‘tribal’ boards. The Tswana Board was the first 
o f these to be created and was specifically authorised to settle disputes among 
Tswana.48 In 1970 the Benoni Council endorsed a government decree49 which denied 
elected Councillors the right to settle disputes without the permission o f the 
Township Manager. This new directive utterly disempowered the UBC as the 
Manager would heneceforth decide whether or not a dispute warranted reference to 
the police, Welfare Department o f the Bantu Affairs Commissioner.50 The UBC was 
incensed by the latest diminution o f its role. Councillor Phosa, who drafted a lengthy 
statement in response to this decree, claimed the whole community would be 
adversely affected if Councillors could not settle marital disputes or discipline 
children. He contended that the
Advisory Boards and tlic new UBC have been working band in band 
with both tbe Township Manager and the SAP -  but bow is it going 
to be now that tbe UBC has to put is bands off such an important 
matter as the settling of disputes -  Mow is our Township going to 
look like?... Over weekends when tbe Township Manager will not 
be available and when people have over-enjoyed themselves 
somehow poor victims have nobody to run to for help.51
Phosa displayed a strong chauvinism when he argued that in cases where 
husbands assaulted their wives it would be improper to sentence them to jail because 
such a measure would mean, ‘he no longer qualifies to be in the area and the next 
thing he and his family will be endorsed out of the area.’ The UBC thus wanted to 
retain the right to dispense ‘traditional’ justice, which the government had previously 
endorsed. Phosa claimed “There is no Bantu in the world who wishes to have his
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domestic affairs settled in court. All cases o f dispute are dealt with by his own people 
and it is only when no solution is forthcoming that the matter is reported to higher 
authorities.”53
However, the government was no longer interested in having any township 
structure mediate between it and township residents on political and judicial matters. 
By the late sixties crime in the townships was on the increase, especially among 
youth, and the authorities were not convinced of the ability o f UBCs to stem the 
growing tide o f youth delinquency. It was equally concerned that if the UBC were 
successful in mediating all disputes in the township, an alternative, albeit informal, 
judicial system would develop that would not necessarily be under its control. Such a 
system would also be a source o f power for the UBC or any other authoritative forum 
leading it. Reports that councillors were charging residents to settle disputes 
confirmed these fears.54 The Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Mr. Evans, was adamant 
that the UBC would have to comply with the Department’s directive and instructed 
them not to interfere in administrative matters. He confirmed that no one in the 
township would be permitted to settle disputes until proper boards were established 
for that purpose. Councillors were even deprived of the right to refer or accompany 
people to the Commissioner’s office.55 The ever-tightening grip of authoritarian rule 
was being felt at every level of urban African society. Not content with smashing the 
radical opposition, the Nationalist government systematically diminished the political 
space within which the compliant and conservative township politicians could 
operate, rendering them virtually ineffective.
The attack on residential and urban rights
In the late 1960s the government, whose political and coercive powers 
increased considerably throughout the 1960s, launched fresh attacks against the few 
rights enjoyed by urban Africans. For example, the Physical Planning and Utilisation 
o f Resources Act of 1967 placed restrictions on the use of African labour in a 
conscious attempt to reduce the white-black ratio in industry.56 This piece of
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legislation, together with a host of others promulgated in the late sixties, aimed at 
limiting the number of Africans working and living in ‘white’ urban areas. The 
Minister of BAD, M.C. Nel, appealed to local officials to rally behind the 
government’s programme to reverse the tide o f African urbanisation:
One of the chief aims of my Department is to bring to 
fruition the State policy o f reversing the stream of Bantu to 
the White areas and to bring about an exodus o f these Bantu 
to their homelands.
I want to mobilize everyone into an active and effective 
taskgroup that will co-operate on this national goal. I ask all 
o f you to widen your horizons to become nation builders 
instead of township builders.
You as my licensed officials, are not only legally obliged but 
also morally bound to promote the policy o f my Department 
and I take it as granted that I can fully rely upon you in this 
respect.
Large numbers o f Bantu employees arc engaged with no 
approved accommodation for them or without efforts even 
having been made to provide the accommodation.
Engagements without compliance with documentary and 
registration requirements are no rarities.57
The Benoni Council concurred with the overall strategic approach adopted by 
the government. In response to enquiries from the UBC about the government’s 
policies, Mathewson cautioned the township Councillors not to criticise the
CO
government’s policies. He informed the UBC that “The Minister looked upon 
Daveyton and Wattville as being in a White area. Executive power could be in the 
hands of the Bantu in their homelands. It did appear that the Minister did not want a
209
Council to talk about matters outside its jurisdiction. Matters of policy were not to be 
discussed.”59
By the early sixties when the population was more settled the demand for 
home-ownership, especially from the elite, increased. The UBC proposed the creation 
of a scheme to raise loans to assist these residents to build their own houses. 
Councillor Bookholane explained the dilemma faced by most of Daveyton’s 
population: “There was no one in a position to build a house on his own. Quite a 
number of people were prepared to raise loans to build their own homes. If the 
National Housing Commission did not provide for such loans then the Council should 
take the initiative to do so.” The Council insisted loans would only be considered 
once at least three hundred applicants were received.60 National legislation governing 
housing loans to Africans also effectively excluded almost the entire urban African 
population from qualifying for such loans. Individuals could apply for State loans of 
£250 if the cost of the house did not exceed £450. The balance of the price had to be 
paid by the prospective home-owner to the state. Anyone who wanted to build a 
house costing more than £450 had to be rich enough to bear the entire cost. 
Qualifying for loans from building societies was also completely ruled out as these 
institutions could only grant loans to people who actually held the title to the land, 
which effectively excluded residents o f the new townships.61
Residents from Bcnoni Old Location were especially affected by these 
restrictions. Many of them were home-owners in the location and wanted to purchase 
houses in the new township. Some o f them wanted to (and could afford to) improve 
their homes with the money received as compensation for the loss of their houses in 
the location. The UBC was understandably incensed and cognisant of the 
disappointment felt by many old location residents “who still looked forward to 
buying the houses they now occupied in Daveyton.” Councillor Ratale reminded the 
Council o f the significance o f purchasing house: “By buying a house”, he told the 
local authority officials present at a UBC meeting, “residents were being enabled to 
invest in a small way. They then felt that they owned something and that even if they 
had to leave the areas, they would be compensated. They improved the houses
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because they knew the houses belonged to them.”62 The government of course 
intended exactly the opposite and was determined to undermine any sense that 
Africans might develop that they would be permitted to live permanently in the urban
areas.
African homeownership in the urban areas suffered a crippling blow in 1967 
when the government decided not to allow any further house purchasing by urban 
Africans. The Department o f Bantu Administration and Development, apparently 
after consideration of the increasing demands for the allocation of sites by ‘Bantu 
falling within the higher income group for self-building purposes’ set out new 
prescriptions that undermined the already limited rights enjoyed by urban Africans. In 
particular, local authorities were instructed that, “All dwellings in urban Bantu 
residential areas should, ... , be made available to the inhabitants on a letting basis 
only.” To ensure compliance the government warned local authorities that it would 
not consider any application for the “erection of new housing schemes where the right 
of occupation of dwellings is to be sold to Bantu”. Furthermore, houses acquired by 
the municipalities due to payment default could not be resold to Africans.63 These 
restrictions were directed particularly against ‘professional Bantu’ who the 
government at the lime wanted to discourage from settling permanently in the urban 
areas. Local authorities could build better houses for these professionals but they only 
occupy such dwellings on a letting basis. The government’s policy was that “Bantu 
falling within the higher income group, should in all circumstances, be encouraged to 
erect houses of a higher standard in Bantu Township in the Homelands o f their ethnic 
group and where they can obtain title for the land.”64 Thus the government’s 
determined pursuance o f its homeland policy continually and adversely affected 
African urban residents.
Virtually every aspect o f township life was subjected to tighter control and 
brought into line with the homeland’s policy. Previously an important component of 
the government’s strategy in dealing with opposition was to foster the development of 
a reliable township elite or middle class. In the sixties though little effort was made to 
nurture the growth of a township-based entrepreneurial class. On the contrary, the
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government consciously discouraged such a development and increasingly pressed 
town councils to persuade emerging businessmen or professionals to ply their trade in 
designated ‘homelands’. According to this policy “trading by Bantu in White Areas is 
not an inherent primary opportunity for them, but should be allowed only where 
necessary, within the urban Bantu residential area for the benefit of the Bantu.”65 In 
reality this was a highly qualified right. In conformity with group area policies only 
Africans were allowed to trade in African townships. However, township businesses 
were restricted to meeting only the basic needs of residents. “The establishment of 
Bantu businesses”, the government instructed local authorities, “which do not confine 
themselves to the provision o f the daily essential domestic necessities o f  the Bantu 
which must be easily obtainable must not be allowed.”66 African traders were not 
even allowed to own more than one business in the same urban area, whether it was 
of the same type or not. Again the government’s directives in this regard were 
explicit:
The establishment in the White areas of Bantu companies and 
partnerships with the object of combining their resources in order to 
enable them to embark upon larger and more extensive business 
propositions is against policy and they must not be afforded trading 
facilities in urban Bantu residential areas.67
It was the government’s policy to encourage and if necessary, coerce, African 
entrepreneurs to establish themselves in the homelands. A flourishing middle class, it 
hoped, would enhance the economy of the ‘homelands’ and lend it some legitimacy. 
“Moneyed Bantu and Bantu companies”, insisted the government, “ought to 
establish themselves in the Bantu homelands where they can invest their capital on a 
permanent basis to the advantage o f their people and own homeland.”
This left Daveyton bereft o f shops to cater for the needs of residents. For 
example, in 1964 there was only one green grocer catering for the whole township. 
Shopkeepers in the township also faced competition from outside traders. In 1965 the
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UBC voiced its alarm “at the amount of hawking by non-Bantu that takes place on 
the roads leading to Daveyton and also in the Township. We wish to urge that a stop 
be put to this practice.”69 However, the Council was unsympathetic to their pleas 
arguing that these traders operated from land that fell outside the Council’s 
jurisdiction and could therefore not be prevented from trading. As the removal from 
the old location gained momentum and the population o f Daveyton increased, the 
demand for extra trading also mounted. Under these circumstances the shortcomings 
in the existing policy became more apparent. The UBC accused the Benoni Council 
of treating townships unfairly by, for example, not allowing African businessmen to 
establish garages or dry-cleaners. Local traders, they argued, were prejudiced because 
the small shops provided by the Council made it impossible for them to store large 
quantities of goods. They were therefore unable to buy in bulk to lower their prices in 
order to become more competitive.70 Consequently, many township residents 
preferred to shop elsewhere, using township traders only as ‘stop gap measures’. The 
restrictions of the sixties therefore left no sector o f the townships untouched. 
Workers, entrepreneurs and even the conservative elite were subjected to various 
forms of oppressive measures that made their existence in the urban townships 
increasingly precarious and despairing.
The marginalisation of African women
An important aspect o f the state’s strategy in the fifties and sixties was its 
pursuit of control over African women, especially, although not exclusively, by 
extending influx control measures to them. Pass laws for women were implemented 
more strictly in the fifties. In the sixties the government tightened its grip on African 
women by imposing a series of restrictions on them. The offensive was serious 
enough to cause the usually compliant Daveyton UBC openly to criticise the 
government. In 1974 Councillor Mnyanda expressed his outrage at the restrictive 
legislation affecting widows and their families. In unusually strident terms for a
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township Councillor he blamed the regulations for ‘the destruction of the people’ and 
described it as ‘oppression’.71
Walker has argued that the state was especially anxious to control African 
women. In her view, “what concerned the state most about African women in this 
early period of apartheid was their presence in the urban areas, and the growing 
permanency of the African community that it revealed.”72 In addition, the NP wanted 
to “bolster the myth of the reserves as the true ‘homelands’ of the African people”, 
which aim required that women be coerced into residing there in large numbers.
These arguments are especially apposite to the second phase of apartheid.
A primary concern o f the state in the fifties was the apparent disintegration of 
the African family.74 ‘Loose unions’ and ‘illegitimacy’ were blamed for the decline in 
social mores and as important contributory factors to the general lawlessness in the 
locations. Tsotsism, for example, was explained primarily as the outcome o f the 
supposed lack of parental control and authority in the townships. In his assessment of 
urban African life, Lisclcn enumerated what he believed to be the prominent social 
ills afflicting townships: “the social life is vitiated by loose morals, the incidence of 
illegitimacy is very high, parental control is ineffective, juvenile delinquency is 
prevalent, drunkenness is on the increase and life is made insecure by the unsavoury 
and dangerous activities o f rival gangs.” The underlying problem (and therefore 
solution) seemed quite obvious to Eisclen. “What is lacking”, he averred, “ is the 
steady influence o f a happy home life, strong family units and a healthy community 
spirit, factors which played such an important part in the tribal life of the Bantu.”75 
The necessity of establishing stable urban African family units became an important 
theme in the government’s overall policy to control urban Africans.
On the one hand, the authorities encouraged ‘urbanised Bantu women’ to 
settle down because their “presence had a stabilising effect on the family and on the 
community in general.”76 On the other hand, ‘undesirable’ or ‘loose women’ who did 
not contribute to building stable families became the main targets of influx control 
and ‘endorsement out’ o f the urban areas. Influx control was especially problematic 
for those women engaged in the informal location economy. Their very livelihood
214
was threatened and their options progressively limited. For the overwhelming 
majority who were not prepared to return to the rural areas, there were only two 
options available to qualify legally to stay in the urban areas -  either find formal 
employment or marry a man with section 10(1) rights.
In the old locations men, and especially single women, could live without 
detection as lodgers or squatters. Under these circumstances their continued presence 
in the town was not dictated by whether they were part of a family. In the new 
townships, however, it became virtually impossible to avoid marriage. Women were 
not allowed to own houses, which were allocated only to male family heads. As a 
result, they became more dependent on men for housing, which caused them to be 
subjected to another level of control, namely, male domination. Although women 
were also subjected to patriarchal domination in the old location, it was relatively 
easier to escape without the danger of losing the right to remain in the location. The 
precarious existence of women in the new townships became increasingly evident 
during the sixties,
The Daveyton UI3C routinely raised its concern about the plight o f women in 
the township. Of particular concern was the apparently high incidence o f men 
deserting their marital partners. In 1963 the Administration Committee o f the UBC 
raised its concern ‘that certain men stayed with women out of wedlock and eventually 
surrendered their residential permits, when they no longer wished to live with them 
thus leaving such women and their children in the lurch.’78 Many cases were reported 
of men who, after entering into a union with a woman in order qualify for a house, 
evicted her from the premises. Some of these men would enter into new marriages 
and insert the names of their new wives on the residential permit. The result was that 
the evicted woman, often with her children, were left destitute and without any 
prospect of finding a house.79 The UBC proposed that “where a man wished to do 
away with the woman with whom he had lived out of wedlock and with whom he had 
obtained housing, he should be ejected from the house and apply for another with his 
new woman.”80 The authorities held very different views and placed the 
responsibility on women, arguing that it was the responsibility of women to ensure
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that they married the men they lived with. D. Henwood, the deputy Director o f Non- 
European Affairs in Benoni, confirmed that unmarried African women who lived 
with a man had no residential rights. Only women who were in legal unions could 
consider making claims for residential rights
Many women in these positions did not qualify for section 10(1) rights and 
were therefore especially vulnerable to being ‘endorsed out’ o f the township to the 
‘homelands’. The UBC’s hoped to save some women from being forced to live in a 
‘homeland’ by differentiating them according to the length o f time they had lived in 
the urban area. It contended that many women had no option but to remain in the 
towns because they had very little connections with the rural areas. However, their 
proposals also implied that those women who retained contact with their ‘homeland’ 
could justifiably be denied a house and be sent back to the ‘homeland’. The UBC 
also urged the government that “All widows whose names are reflected on residential 
permits as the wives o f the deceased registered tenants be permitted to continue to 
occupy their houses.’’82
The state further tightened the noose on women in the early 1960s by the 
introduction of new restrictions. The 1964 Bantu Laws Amendment Act prohibited 
African women from entering the urban areas, except on a visitor’s permit. In 
September 1967 the Secretary of BAD sent the following directive to municipalities:
a) No Bantu woman, whether a widow or otherwise, or whether qualified in 
terms of section 10 of Act NO.25, or not, may be placed on a waiting list 
for accommodation on a family basis.
b) A Bantu widow, who was widowed while occupying a house with her 
husband and family who is qualified in terms of section 10(1 )(a) or (b) of 
the said Act to be in an urban area, may, if there are no other obstacles 
under hereditary law or other law, be permitted to continue occupying 
the house with her family provided she is able to pay the necessary 
rental.
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c) A Bantu widow who occupies a house as above, and who originally 
qualified in terms of section 10 (l)(c) of Act no.5 of 1945, but 
subsequently became qualified in her own right in terms of section 10 
(l)(b) may, as in the cases in (b) above, remain in the house.81
Many women did not qualify in terms of section 10(1) rights, which tended to 
increase their dependence on males. Councillor Lerutle explained the enormous 
burdens faced by African widows who found it almost impossible to find 
accommodation for themselves and their dependants. He pleaded that the policy be 
relaxed in order to permit the allocation of houses to the widows of deceased tenants, 
who would within a reasonable period after their bereavement acquire the necessary 
qualifications.84 Even those widows who qualified in terms of Section 10 (1) were 
forced to remain in the prescribed area where they were married. Failing to do so 
meant they could lose their urban rights. Again, Councillor Lerutle explained that this 
restriction prevented widows from returning to her own family’s place for a period 
bereavement. Women who were married by customary rites only also faced enormous 
problems when they were deserted by their spouses or widowed because they could 
not qualify to become tenants of the houses they occupied. The government however 
remained unperturbed by the plight o f African women. Mr. Gray, the Chief Bantu 
Affairs Commissioner, explained the state’s attitude on these matters:
The Department’s policy is to persuade such widows to settle in the 
Bantu homelands. He disagreed with the statement that the Bantu 
homelands are primitive... in terms of the law, females who transfer 
from one prescribed area to another lose their qualifications in the 
former area. Widowed daughters may return to their original places 
of domicile but they will not qualify as tenants of houses... the 
directives of the BAD left no doubt about the intention that houses 
should not be allocated to divorcees. Officials are also unable to 
assist females, who were married by Bantu Custom, whose husbands
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-  being tenants of houses -  choose to get married to other females by 
Civil Rites.85
The particularly precarious existence and plight of African women in urban 
townships reflected in the starkest terms the extent and callousness of apartheid. By 
the late sixties as the arrogance and power o f the Nationalist Party ballooned, urban 
Africans experienced the most intensive control of almost every facet o f their lives. 
The consequences of ‘high apartheid’ however extended beyond the attack on urban 
rights. It increasingly also undermined the living conditions o f the inhabitants o f the 
‘modern’ townships.
The Housing Crisis Develops
The government’s decision to promote the ‘homelands’ also resulted in a re­
allocation o f resources to the reserves. Whereas in the 1950s and early 1960s state 
expenditure on Africans was concentrated on the creation of urban townships, from 
the mid-1960s state funds were increasingly channelled to develop the ‘homelands’. 
As a result housing construction came to a standstill and living conditions 
deteriorated. The experiences in Daveyton in the late 1960s were symptomatic o f the 
general decline that afflicted most urban townships.
In the early sixties Daveyton appeared to be a resounding success for the 
authorities: more than eight thousand houses had been built, the provision o f a further 
two thousand was being planned and basic amenities and facilities had been provided. 
In addition a number of public buildings (including a beer halt and brewery, the 
Lionel Kent Centre, administration offices, shops and a sportsground) were 
completed at cost of nearly Rl million.86 By 1963 there was also a growing 
anticipation that the old location would shortly be removed, for which project 
Council applied for a government loan of R3 265 000 to construct 1653 flats and 
1918 houses. The proposal to build flats in an African township was unusual but was 
fully supported by the National Housing Commission because it would increase
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* 87population density and decrease the costs of providing essential services. The 
proposal to build flats was later rescinded without explanation and the Council 
proceeded instead to build 2387 four-roomed houses.
These developments, however, represented the apogee of development in 
Daveyton. The construction of new houses represented the last major investment in 
the township’s development during this period. Until the early sixties there was little 
evidence to suggest an impending housing crisis. However, the building of the new 
houses catering for the displaced residents of the old location brought to the surface 
the growing discontent over this issue. As soon as the Council made public its plans 
to build the 2387 new houses, demands surfaced for more houses among existing 
residents. This exposed a central flaw in apartheid’s urban project. Although a decade 
had passed since the government last built houses in Daveyton, there were no plans to 
provide additional accommodation to cater for the natural increase in population. As a 
result, by the mid-sixties the UBC was coming under public pressure to address the 
problem of the shortages of houses. In a letter of complaint to the Benoni 
municipality, Councillor Ralale highlighted the obvious dilemma facing many 
residents : “When a son got married, the family grew. It was not unusual to find 
young couples living with their parents in three-roomed houses.”8* The shortage o f 
houses was so acute in the Zulu section that the UBC was forced to request that Zulu- 
speaking applicants be accommodated elsewhere in the township.
The UBC also requested that the new houses as well as those that became 
vacant be offered first to existing Daveyton residents. The Benoni Council refused 
both requests. The UBC wanted, at a minimum, that new arrivals be located in a 
separate section (Daveyton Extension) rather than in the main township.90 
Councillors Myataza and Khumalo went so far as to accuse the municipality o f 
treating the old residents o f Daveyton unfairly by depriving them of access to the new 
houses. They contended that these residents, some of whom had been lodgers for up 
to eight years, should be given first preference.91
The authorities were unyielding and proceeded to allocate the new houses to 
residents from the old location. The UBC reluctantly acquiesced but continued to
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press the authorities to address the issue of overcrowding. In early 1966 the UBC 
conceded “that the removal o f the BBT (Benoni Bantu Township) has to be made as 
speedily as possible” but also requested “that, because the number of applicants for 
houses now residing in Daveyton was large, there be a proportionate division o f these 
houses.”92 The authorities relented, at least verbally, and agreed that of the 2387 new 
houses two thousand would be allocated to residents from the old location and the 
rest (387) would be available for occupation by lodgers.93 In the light o f this apparent 
concession the UBC attempted to secure a watertight commitment from the 
authorities by proposing “that houses be allocated to the Daveyton lodgers 
simultaneously with the residents from BBT. Taking into account the fact that 387 
houses have been earmarked for Daveyton lodgers, we see no need that those houses 
should be occupied only after all the BBT people had been housed. As and when 
houses become available, a number o f the 387 houses should be set aside for 
Daveyton lodgers. We feel that even the old houses which are being vacated should 
be made available to Daveyton lodgers.”94 However, the authorities were unwilling to 
commit themselves to any plan that could jeopardise the expeditious removal o f the 
old location.
A second and even more urgent concern of the Councillors was the allocation 
of existing houses which became vacant. This threatened both to produce civil 
dissension in Daveyton and to discredit the UBC. As Councillor Myataza put it: “the 
Council was not against the removal of Benoni Bantu Township (BBT) nor that 
residents there should be accommodated here. A situation has been created, however, 
which indicated that Daveyton people did not want the people from BBT. At one time 
it had said that the BBT residents would be accommodated in Holfontein and in 
Daveyton Extension; but now they were being accommodated in Daveyton. 
Councillors had become liars because of the many changes that were taking place 
without their knowledge.”95 How far any o f these concerns was accommodated is 
unclear. What is certain is that the UBC regularly raised concerns about the lack of 
housing but failed to convince the authorities to address the situation.
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In 1971 the UBC urged the authorities to recognise that it had become 
‘extremely urgent and necessary’ to build more houses in Daveyton. According to the 
UBC overcrowding was ubiquitous because many of the approximately eleven 
thousand dependants under 18 who moved to Daveyton in 1955 had married and had 
raised their own families. The situation had deteriorated to such an extent that it was 
quite common for up to three families to live in a small house 96 As a result the 
official waiting list was at least 200 long to which names were daily being added.97 
Three years later the UBC again raised the alarm. “Overcrowding prevails”, it 
declared. “It is not uncommon that each single room in a house is used as a 
bedroom... there is a great demand for houses.” Housing shortages affected all 
African townships. This was mainly due to the government drastically reducing its 
expenditure on housing for Africans in the late 1960s. Between 1968 and 1975 
expenditure plunged by 80%.99 In 1967/68 the state spent R14 369 000 on African 
housing in urban areas. By 1970/71 this figure was nearly halved to R7,7 million and 
by 1976/77 to a dismal R2,6 million.100 During this period the main new form of 
accommodation erected in the townships were hostels for migrant workers.
In the 1960s the use o f migrant labour was encouraged as part o f the 
government’s strategy to counter the reliance of industry on urbanised Africans.
These workers did not qualify for houses in the urban areas and were housed in hostel 
complexes that were erected in most of the Bast Rand’s townships from the mid- 
1960s. In Daveyton the construction of a hostel to accommodate 1330 single males 
was approved in 1964 to cater for the ‘increased demand for labour particularly in the 
less popular types of employment.’101 The hostel was only completed at the end of 
the 1960s. Until 1969 the hostel population of the township numbered less than a 
hundred, but by 1970 the number had increased to 1328. The expansion o f the hostels 
added a few hundred more over the following three years.102 Huge hostel complexes 
accommodating up to 31 000 inmates were also constructed in Vosloorus, Thokoza 
and Katlehong.103 The hostels were also segregated along ethnic lines.
A perennial problem faced by most township residents was the low quality of 
houses provided by the state. The amount spent on each house for Africans was tiny.
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In the fifteen years following the war the authorities spent £3 million on building 10 
000 houses for Africans in Benoni. At face value this appears to be a huge amount. 
But when compared to the £2,5 million spent during the same period on building only 
1000 municipal houses for whites, the wide disparity in investment per house is 
apparent, ten times more being spent on the average white municipal house. This 
financial prescription for African housing permitted the construction of only the most 
elementary structures, namely, the so-called NE 51/9 type. The Benoni Council 
outshone itself again with its frugality and spent only £211 per house, which 
consisted o f one bedroom, a kitchen, a shower cubicle and a living room that was 
intended also to serve as a second bedroom. Mathewson concurred with the state’s 
policies o f only providing the most basic structures and that the cost of any 
extensions to these houses would have to borne by residents.105 Such cost cutting 
precluded the provision even of such basic facilities as internal doors and resulted in 
generally poor-workmanship. By the early sixties complaints were streaming in as 
walls began to crack and other defects became more apparent. A widespread problem 
was the absence of proper ventilation because, as the Council’s chief engineer, Mr. 
Cuthbert explained, it was too costly to install the correct airbricks. Instead, in some 
instances, it was decided to leave a space between the roof and the wall.106 These 
‘cost-saving’ plans were implemented without any consideration of the well-being of 
the occupants.
Despite the mounting criticisms of the quality of the first housing scheme, the 
new houses constructed in the mid-sixties for residents from BBT suffered the same 
defects. However, this new generation of residents, who were moved from the old 
location, was much less tolerant. They often came from better and more spacious 
houses and alerted the UBC to problems almost immediately. Among their 
complaints was that
many of the new houses were fitted with lavatory doors shorter than the standard size 
door. The UBC expressed its “distaste” and urged the Council either to fit longer 
doors or to lower the existing ones. The municipality dismissed these objections and 
seemed totally oblivious of the ignominy involved. The Department of Community
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Development had allocated only R500 per house, including the costs for installing 
water and sewerage reticulation. This amount, according to Mr. Cuthbert, was 
equivalent to the £250 spent on each house built in Daveyton ten years before. Cost 
cutting was thus inevitable and if residents wanted proper doors they would have to 
purchase them at their own expense.107 In addition, none of the new houses had 
bathroom facilities, which, Mathewson explained, was not only because o f the limited 
finance available but because “shower cubicles which were provided before were
i n sused as storage space and few Africans make use o f a bath.”
Initially, residents were not allowed to make structural improvements to their 
dwellings unless they made a clear commitment to purchase their houses. In practice 
this meant they had to put down a deposit.109 The absurdity o f this policy became 
evident when residents o f the old location were moved to Daveyton and were 
accommodated in houses that were considerably smaller than the ones in the old 
location. Numerous cases were reported where people could not fit their furniture into 
their new four-roomed houses. Once confronted by this ludicrous situation where 
residents were forced to leave furniture outside their new houses, the authorities 
relented and allowed residents to alter their houses without needing to purchase 
them.110
However, the structure of the houses was of such a nature to make it virtually 
impossible to effect substantial improvements. These houses, in the words of 
Mathewson, were “a slightly modified version of the National Housing and Planning 
Commission plan type NE 51/9 [and] consisted] of two bedrooms, a living room, 
kitchen and bathroom, but [was] incapable of further extension without major 
structural alterations.”111 The ongoing deterioration of the houses was reflected in the 
monthly report of maintenance and repairs to houses. For example, in September 
1970 no less than 155 housing complaints were attended to and 106 cracked walls 
were repaired. In addition 214 street light complaints were also attended to. A 
similar list of repairs was reported on a monthly basis from the late sixties.
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The deterioration of social conditions
Other social services suffered similar declines in the sixties. Mathewson’s 
boasts about Daveyton being a ‘modern’ and autonomous town were frequently 
exposed as being mere political posturing over his personal role in the township’s 
establishment. One of the facilities promised to the new ‘modern’ town was a 
hospital, which was included in the original plans of Daveyton. At that point the 
Council agreed to donate land to the Provincial Administration for this purpose. Over 
the next fifteen years the people of Daveyton waited in vain, as the local and 
provincial authorities reneged on one promise after the other. Five years after the 
opening o f Daveyton the Provincial Administration could report only that it had 
commenced with the planning of the hospital.113 By 1964 nothing had materialised 
from these promises, but the UBC remained hopeful that a hospital would eventually 
be built. This was partly based on the indications received from Mathcwson and the 
municipality about negotiations over the siting of the hospital. Councillor 
Bookholanc urged the Council to build the hospital in the buffer strip because it 
would be more accessible to the majority of Davcyton’s residents. Mathcwson 
however required that the hospital would be built at the entrance of the township to 
allow white doctors to visit the hospital.114 By 1970 even the UBC had accepted that 
Daveyton would not have its own hospital. As a result Daveyton residents had to 
travel 20 miles to the Boksburg-Benoni Hospital. Not only was the long distance a 
burden, but the inadequate ambulance service created further inconveniences for 
residents.115 Even more disconcerting to the councillors was the state’s opposition to 
African doctors practising in urban townships, preferring them to ply their trade in the 
homelands.116 Local authorities had to apply for permission to allow African doctors 
in the townships, placing limits on the number of doctors available in Daveyton. In 
1963 Mathewson rejected a request by the UBC for a nurse to be in attendance at the 
local clinic over weekends because acceding to it would entail the employment of 
more staff. He suggested that serious cases be referred to the three doctors operating
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in the area, again abrogating responsibility for the provision of services by the local 
authority. Instead he lectured the UBC about needing to ‘educate residents not to 
assault one another. ’117
Schooling in Daveyton also reached crisis proportions in the sixties. During 
the initial phase of development eighteen primary schools were built in the township. 
Eleven of these were Lower Primary schools and six were Higher Primary. The total 
number o f pupils in 1965 was 10369, of which 6927 were in Lower Primary and 3 
272 in Higher Primary. Only 440 were in high school.118 Interestingly, the 
government did not view a High School as a necessity. The high school, which 
consisted o f ten classes, was eventually built only as a result o f pressure from the 
local chapter o f Rotary Club, which also raised half the money for the building, with 
the government providing the rest.119 In the late sixties the demand for more high 
schools increased significantly as the large number of pupils from the lower standards 
progressed and due to the influx of pupils from the old location. Daveyton’s only 
secondary school clearly could not cope with the increased demand. Councillor 
Lerutle pleaded for another school and explained the adverse consequences o f 
students being unable to find accommodation at the secondary school. According to 
him “It was not possible for many parents to send their children to boarding school 
with the result that those who had passed the Standard VI Examination and who 
could not gain admission to the secondary school were forced to roam the streets.”120
By the early seventies, Daveyton and other townships across the country were 
rapidly sliding down a spiral of poverty. The roots of this crisis were inherent in the 
early development of the townships, even when the most significant progress and 
expansion occurred, The government’s huge expenditure masked a policy of 
deliberate under-development, dictated by racist ideology and political imperative. 
Thus, in the sixties, when South Africa was experiencing its most dramatic economic 
boom, African township development ground to a halt. The enormous amount of 
resources generated by the boom went overwhelmingly to further the upliftment of 
the white population. The contrasts in the urban areas were stark: as leafy suburbs and
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shopping malls sprang up in white areas, African townships sank deeper into a mire 
of poverty.
Transport Crisis
The transport provided in the new townships was generally inadequate and 
became a source o f contention between residents and the authorities. Residents o f the 
old locations lived within walking distance from their places of work. The new 
townships by contrast were located up to ten miles away from the industrial areas, 
which confronted residents with the inconvenience of having to commute daily to 
work, as well as having to incur the extra transport costs. In some cases, such as in 
Katlehong, Thokoza, Daveyton and KwaThema, the authorities provided rail 
transport between the townships and the industrial areas of their respective towns. 
However, Vosloorus did not benefit from this and its residents were almost entirely 
dependent on one bus company, Putco, for transport.121 Even where railways were 
provided, as in Daveyton, numerous problems arose.
From the outset the rail transport in Daveyton was beset with difficulties, the 
most vexing of which was the cost o f tickets. The municipality estimated a third class 
monthly season ticket would cost commuters £ l 4s. 1 Id., compared to 13s. 4d. paid 
for a similar distance by commuters travelling between either Natalspruit and 
Germiston or Orlando and Johannesburg. In addition, the initial monthly cost o f the 
internal bus service was expected to be 13s. Thus commuters could expect to pay £l 
18s. a month on transport, a figure the authorities conceded most African workers 
could not afford.122 Conditions were therefore set for confrontation over transport. 
Within two months of the first residents settling in Daveyton commuters’ anger at the 
inadequate transport service boiled over. In early June 1955 commuters attacked 
buses in Daveyton to protest the lack of proper transport facilities.123 Three weeks 
later buses were again stoned, this time for arriving late.124 The volatile situation 
propelled the government into action. In the aftermath of the riots against the poor 
transport facilities, the General Manager of the railways announced that £1,3 million
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would be spent on electrifying the rail system between the township and Benoni’s 
industrial areas.
However, similar expenditure on transport was not forthcoming in the late 
1960s. Thus when residents from the old location moved into Daveyton Extension, 
the transport crisis came to a head. The influx o f the new residents immediately 
increased the number o f daily commuters by 1800. In 1965 the UBC requested an 
extension to the railway line to cater for the new residents, but the South African 
Railways replied it would be too expensive.126 Residents from the old location now 
had to walk more than a kilometre before they could get a train to take them to work. 
Even more serious was the unbearable congestion created at Daveyton station, a 
situation that was to have tragic consequences for commuters.
Despite repeated warnings by the UBC the authorities refused either to 
improve the facilities at the station or provide a second station. In August 1966 it was 
estimated that 10 990 commuters used the train in the morning peak hours and 
presumably a similar number in the afternoon peak hour. More than half a million 
commuters every month used the line between Daveyton and Benoni.127 A single 
station, with a single pedestrian bridge, serviced this enormous volume of human 
traffic. A disaster was waiting to happen. The UBC warned of the chaos prevailing 
daily when, during peak hours, two trains arrived simultaneously at the station 
‘causing a congestion on the one and only bridge’. Inevitably tragedy struck when 
in July 1967 seven commuters were trampled to death as they rushed to get to the 
trains on time. The UBC was understandably furious and repeated its demand for 
improvements. Under the pressure generated by the tragedy the Council claimed the 
UBC’s requests for improvements had not been rejected and were still under 
consideration. It also proposed to establish a commission of enquiry to investigate the 
incident.129 However, these proved to be mere symbolic gestures to placate the irate 
UBC and commuters. Six months after the disaster neither the inquest nor 
improvements to the facilities had been initiated. The Daveyton UBC was reportedly 
‘impatient at the delay’ and appealed for urgent action to be taken.130 But the
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authorities displayed little interest in the matter once the anger of the community had 
subsided
Despite the inadequate public transport system and the consequent growth in 
public demand for taxis, the authorities opposed the expansion of the taxi industry. 
The Railways jealously guarded their stranglehold over transport in the township and 
attended Road Transportation Board meetings specifically to oppose applications for 
taxi licences.131 Moreover, it was against government policy to encourage 
entrepreneurship in the urban townships. As a result the number of taxis allowed to 
operate in the township remained small and thus incapable of meeting the demands of 
the public, forcing them to continue using the trains. At the time people preferred 
using taxis because they were considered safer than the trains, especially in the light 
of the various tragic incidents at Daveyton station. The Benoni Management 
Committee acknowledged that the “transport requirement of Daveyton are to a certain 
extent met by taxis and an unknown number of pirate vehicles”, but its Traffic 
Department continued clamping down on unauthorised taxis.132
To make matters worse for commuters the bus service was equally 
inadequate. Until 1964 only five buses served the whole o f Daveyton. The “Daveyton 
Bus Service” complained the UBC in 1963, “is unable during peak hours to fully 
meet the demands of the Daveyton residents and many passengers are left behind.
The position is particularly bad whenever there is a breakdown or one o f the buses is 
out of action for one reason or another.”133 Two years later the situation had worsened 
considerably. Even the Benoni Management Committee admitted that “The Daveyton 
bus service is at present scarcely able to cope with the ever increasing number of 
passengers in the peak period and consequently a certain amount of overloading 
occurs and many would-be passengers are left at the bus stops.” 134 The extent o f the 
problem was revealed by the fact that daily about 364 passengers were left stranded 
due to the lack of space on buses that were already overloaded. Mathewson supported 
the UBC’s proposal for the purchase of an additional bus, but considering that the 
maximum capacity on a single-decker bus was about seventy this measure was 
clearly inadequate.
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Furthermore, it was realised that the inadequacy o f the existing fleet o f seven 
buses would “be further aggravated during 1966 when families from BBT start 
moving to Daveyton and Daveyton Extension ... This will necessitate the 
introduction of two new bus routes to serve these two widely separated areas.” 135 The 
Management Committee agreed to acquire four new buses, which were introduced in 
August 1966. Although the extended bus fleet brought about much needed 
improvement in the bus service, in October 1966 the Manager of Daveyton already 
reported that “the present fleet is still far from adequate. The four additional vehicles 
served, mainly, to overcome a long felt need for sufficient transport but do not 
provide adequately for the increase in population/passengers due to resettlement o f 
BBT residents”, which had resulted in the number o f passengers carried on buses 
every month increasing from 248 744 to 291 673.136 At the end o f 1966 Daveyton had 
a bus fleet of eleven with a proposal to increase it to thirteen. But even this proposal 
soon proved insufficient and in 1967 the Council approved a recommendation to 
increase the fleet to twenty buses. Although this measure signalled a significant 
improvement of the commuter bus system in Daveyton, the overall transport situation 
in the township remained crisis-ridden.
During the first decade of its existence, Daveyton was revered as (he model 
African township, and for good reasons. From the point of view of the authorities'it 
closely conformed to the government’s main policies and achieved the two main aims 
for which it was created, namely, the stabilisation and control of urban Africans. 
However, even as the residents of Daveyton began to experience improvements in 
their lives from the early 1960s, the government began introducing policies that 
would eventually undermine these gains. The government’s promotion o f the 
‘homelands’ system in the 1960s and the post-Sharpeville repression stripped urban 
Africans of most of the limited ‘freedoms’ and ‘rights’ which they had previously 
enjoyed. Women especially bore the brunt of the government’s tightening o f controls 
on urban Africans. Even the compliant and conservative political elite who 
functioned in the UBCs found the authorities unwilling to vest any substantive 
powers in them, which rendered these bodies ineffectual either as representatives of
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township residents or as mediators between residents and the authorities. The 
government’s single-mindedly promotion of the ‘homelands’ system occurred at the 
expense of urban African residential areas. One of the main consequences of this 
policy was that by the end of the 1960s Daveyton began to experience a decline in its 
social conditions similar to that experienced by African townships all over the 
country. The government’s unwillingness to fund further development in the 
townships created the basis for the township revolt that erupted from the mid-1970s.
230
ENDNOTES
1 D. Posel, The Making o f  Apartheid, 1948 - 1961: Conflict and Compromise, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, See Chapter 9
2 Ibid, p.232
3 Ibid, 231
4 Quoted in J. Lazar, ‘Verwoerd versus the “Visionaries”, The South African Bureau 
of Racial Affairs (Sabra) and Apartheid, 1948-1961 ’p.381 in P. Bonner, P. Delius and
D. Posel (eds), Apartheid's Genesis, 1935 -1962 , Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1993
5 Record o f proceedings o f the ninth annual conference o f the Institute of 
Administrators o f Non-European Affairs (IANA), 1960
6 Amongst other issues, the UP supported the N P’s banning of the ANC and PAC, as 
well as the declaration of a state o f emergency in the aftermath of the Sharpeville 
massacre. See D. O ’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics o f  
the National Party, 1948-1994, Ravan Press,, Johannesburg, 1996, p. 103
7 Government Publications, University of the Witwatersrand, Hansard, National 
Assembly Debates, 15 June 1961, columns 8214-8217, Mr. Ross, MP (Bcnoni)
x R and S Weide, Die volledige verkiesings uitslae van Sitid-Afrika, 1910-1986. The 
conservatism of the Brakpan white electorate was shown by the strong showing of 
arch-rightwinger, B.J. Vorstcr, in the 1948 elections when he lost by a mere two votes 
to the UP candidate.
9 Municipal Affairs, 26, 305 (January 1961), p.5
10 Ibid, Editorial entitled "Innovation in the Transvaal"
11 Ibid, 27, 313 (September, 1961) Editorial
12 University o f the Witwatersrand Library (UWL), Historical Papers (HLP), Report 
of the Daveyton UBC, 20.03.64, Minutes of the Daveyton UBC, 25.02.64
13 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton UBC, 22.07.66, Minutes of a special meeting 
of the Daveyton UBC, 21.06.66
14 G, Baines, ‘The Contradiction o f Community Politics: The African Petty 
Bourgeoisie and the New Brighton Advisory Board, c .1937-1952’ in Journal o f  
African History, 35, 1994, pp.81-82
231
15 J.E. Mathewson, The Establishment o f  a Bantu Township, Pretoria, 1957, p. 195
16 Ibid
17 Ibid, p.196
I S Record of the proceedings of the seventh annual conference of IANA, 1958, 
Quoted in speech by Eiselen
19 Record of the proceedings of the fifth annual conference of IANA, September 
1956, Address by H.F.Verwoerd
20 D, O ’Meara, Forty Lost Years, pp.101-103
The Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act was passed in 1959
22 Minister o f BAD address to parliament, Hansard, Assembly Debates, 15.06.61, 
cols. 8141-8142
23 Ibid, col. 8143
24 Ibid, contribution to the debate by Helen Suzman, col.8165
25 Record o f the proceedings o f the fifth annual conference o f IANA, September 
1956, Address by H.F.Verwoerd
26 Record of the proceedings of the seventh annual conference of IANA, 1958, 
Quoted in speech by W.M. Eiselen
27 Ibid
28 CAD, Municipality o f Springs (MSP), 1/2/1/10, Minutes of the Management 
Committee Meeting, Report o f the Payneville Advisory Board meeting held on 
21.11.61
29 Hansard, Assembly Debates, 15.06.61, cols. 8141-8142
30 UWL, HLP, Records o f Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 24.04.64
31 UWL, HLP, Records of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 11.12.64
32 UBC Act, Act 79 of 1961, Section 4(2)(e)
232
33 CAD, BA014/1050, 14, Letter from the Town Council of Benoni to The Bantu 
Affairs Commissioner, 30.11.64
34 Ibid
35 CAD, BA014/1050, 14, Minutes of the Management Committee, January 1965
36 Such a licensed officer would be empowered in term of section 22 (1) (a) o f Act 
no.25 of 1945
37 Ibid
38 CAD, BAO14/1050, 14, Memo from the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development, February 1965
39 UWL, HLP, Records of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 21.01.66
40 Ibid
41 UWL, I ILF, Records of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 22.04.66
42 Ibid
43 Ibid, Minutes of meeting with the Mancom, 26.04.66
44 Ibid
45 Ibid
46 UWL, HLP, Records of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 21.04.67, Minutes of 
the UBC meeting, 28.03.67
47 Ibid
48 UWL, HLP, Records of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 22.10.67, Minutes of 
the UBC meeting, 22.09.70
49 UWL, HLP, Records of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 23.07.70, Minutes of 
the UBC meeting, 23.06.70. Reference to a government circular by Councillor Phosa.
50 UWL, HLP, Records of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 23.07.70, Minutes of 
the UBC meeting, 23.06.70.
51 Ibid
233
52 UWL, HLP, Records of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 23.07.70, Minutes of 
the UBC meeting, 23.06.70. ‘Statement by Councillor Phosa on settlement of 
disputes’
54 Ibid
55 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 22.10.70., Minutes of the Daveyton 
UBC meeting, 22.09.70.
56 M. Legassick, ‘Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa’, 
Journal o f  Southern African Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1974
57 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 21.11.68
58 Ibid, Minutes of the UBC meeting, 29,10.68
59 Ibid
60 UWL, IILP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 22.01.65
61 SAIRR, Survey o f Race Relations, 1955-56, p.121
62 UWL, HLP, Daveyton UBC Report, 21.03.67, Minutes o f the UBC meeting, 
28.03.67
63 CAD, MB 2/3/97 AN 10 (2), Circular from the Department o f Bantu Administration 
and Development, 28.12.67
64 CAD, MB 2/3/97 AN 10 (2), Circular from the Department o f Bantu Administration 
and Development, 28.12.67
65 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 22.03.63, Circular from 
the Secretary of BAD, 14 February 1963
66 Ibid
67 Ibid
68 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 23.10.64, Minutes of 
the UBC meeting, 22.09.64
234
69 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 24.09.65
70 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 22.07.66, Minutes of 
the UBC meeting, 28.06.66
71 UWL, HLP, Reports o f the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 22.03.74, Minutes of 
the Daveyton UBC, 26.02.74
C. Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa, Onyx Press, London, 1982, 
p.127
73 Ibid, p.7
74 P. Bonner, ‘Family, Crime and Political Consciousness’, p.395
75 Record of proceedings o f the sixth annual conference of I ANA, 1957, Opening 
address by W.M.M. Eiselen
76 Ibid, Knoetze paper on “Socio-Economic problems arising from the presence or 
absence of Bantu women in the Bantu townships”
77 D. Posel, The Making o f  Apartheid, p. 206
78 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton (Advisory Board) Urban Bantu Council, 
19.04.63
79 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 19.11.65
80 Ibid
8IUWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 22.04.66, 
Administration Committee Memorandum on Widows and Divorcees
82 Ibid
83 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 22.11.67, Letter from 
the Secretary o f BAD, 5.09.67
84 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 23.01.68
85 Ibid
86 D. Humphriss, Benoni, p. 132
235
87 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 20.03.64
88 UWL, HLP, Report of the Davetyon UBC, 15.04.65, Minutes of the UBC, 23.03.65
89 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 22.07.65
90 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 22.10.65
91 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 19.11.65, Minutes of the UBC, 26.10.65
92 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 25.03.66
93 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton UBC, 25.03.66
94 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton UBC, 22.04.66
95 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 22.04.66 , Minutes of the UBC, 
26.04.66
96 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 22.06.71
97 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton UBC, 17.06.71
98 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 18.04.74
99 P. Bonner and N. Nicftagodicn, Kathorus, p.48
100 P. Hendler, Politics On The Home Front, South African Institute o f Race 
Relations, 1989, p.55
101 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton UBC, 20.03.64
I 0 } Statistics for the hostel population taken from various Reports and Minutes o f the 
Daveyton Advisory Board and UBC, 1962-1974
103 P. Bonner and N. Nieftagodien, Kathorus, p.54
104 Benoni City Times, 06.01.61
105 J. Mathewson, Bantu Township, pp. 127-128
106 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton Urban Bantu Council, 19.06.64
107 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton UBC, 20.10.66
236
108 Benoni City Times, 22.04.66
109 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 21.08.64
110 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 19.08.66
111 J. Mathewson, Bantu Township, pp. 127-128
112 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 22.10.70
113 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 20.03.64
114 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton UBC, 28.01.64
115 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 22.04.66, Minutes of the Daveyton 
UBC, 29.03.66
116 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC 22.10.70, Minutes o f the Daveyton 
UBC, 22.09.70
1,7 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 18.09.63
118 D. Humphriss, Benoni, p. 133
119 Ibid, p.138
120 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC, 21.02.69, Minutes of the Daveyton 
UBC, 28.01.69
121 P. Bonner and N. Nieftagodien, Kathoriis, p.62
122 CAD, NTS 916, 125/3/3, Memorandum on Daveyton Bantu Township, p.6
123 Benoni City Times, 03.06.55
124 Benoni City Times, 24.06.55
125 Benoni City Times, 08.07.55
126 UWL, HLP, Report of the Daveyton UBC UWL, HLP, Report of the, 20.05.65, 
Letter from the System Manager o f the South African Railways, 29.04.65
127 CAD, MB 2/3/24 Ab.3 (1), Benoni Management Committee Minutes, 27.10.66
237
128 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton UBC, 21.09.67
129 Ibid
130 The Star, 2.01.68
131 UWL, HLP, Report o f the Daveyton UBC, 19.08.71, Minutes of the Daveyton 
UBC, 27.07.71
132 CAD, MB 2/3/24 Ab.3 (1), Benoni Management Committee Minutes, 13.10.65
133 CAD, MB 2/3/24 Ab.3 (1), Benoni Management Committee Minutes, 5.12.63
134 CAD, MB 2/3/24 Ab.3 (1), Benoni Management Committee Minutes, 13.10.65
135 Ibid
136 CAD, MB 2/3/24 Ab.3 (1), Benoni Management Committee Minutes, 27.10.66
137 CAD, MB 2/3/24 Ab.3 (1), Benoni Management Committee Minutes, 10.01.67
238
CHAPTER SIX
Separate (Racialised) Development for coloureds 
and Indians in the 1960s
In the late 1950s and early 1960s the state re-examined a number of its 
principal policies relating to the black population. This was prompted to a large 
extent by the mounting of radical black opposition movement in the late 1950s. 
Even as the National Party was consolidating its electoral position, the government 
was racked by internal controversies over the efficacy of existing apartheid policies 
and the future direction thereof. A key outcome of this review process was the shift 
by the government towards the policy o f separate development. According to this 
policy the different African ethnic groups had to ‘develop’ separately in their 
designated ‘homelands’. A variation of this approach was adopted towards 
coloureds and Indians. Instead o f separate development, the government proposed 
a policy of community development for these groups, the key objective of which 
was to promote the development o f ‘racial’ communities in the group areas set 
aside for them.
This chapter discusses the shifts that occurred in the government's policies 
towards coloureds and Indians from the late 1950s. It highlights the changes in 
official policy towards Indians, which was the subject of vigorous debate in the 
state and between the government and industry. The government’s policies 
towards coloureds and Indians, which were implemented in the 1960s, amounted 
to a more sophisticated elaboration of racialisation than had hitherto been the case. 
Whereas in the 1950s the government focused on the promulgation of group areas, 
in the 1960s and 1970s it attempted to offset adverse effects caused by the 
displacement of people by some development of the group areas. This 
development was directed both at effecting social improvements and at instituting
239
racialised political structures. One of the main objectives of these policy changes 
was to engender an affinity among coloureds and Indians for group areas.
However, these efforts enjoyed little success during the period of "high apartheid’ 
in the 1960s. In the 1970s the government won some support for its policies 
mainly because it embarked on mass housing projects in the coloured group areas 
and to a lesser extent also in the Indian group areas. From the early 1960s the 
government created parallel political structures for coloureds and Indians. The first 
of these was the local Consultative Committee, which was the local equivalent of 
Urban Bantu Councils. ‘Racially’ exclusive national councils were also created to 
provide coloureds and Indians with parallel political structures, but these only had 
limited powers. An associated development was the government’s attempts to 
assert greater control over the affairs of coloureds and Indians.1 This chapter 
explores each of these developments and also assesses the socio-economic 
development of the coloured and Indian group areas on the East Rand during the 
1960s. It focuses primarily on the Indian population of the East Rand because of 
the availability of an important study on them that was conducted on behalf of the 
Bcnoni Council in the late 1960s.
‘Racial’ Community Development
In the late 1950s the government undertook a serious review of the 
functioning of the main bodies responsible for the establishment and development 
of group areas, namely the Group Areas Board (GAB), the Group Areas 
Development Board (GADB) and the Housing Commission. It appeared at the 
time that the government had come a long way to resolving the main dilemmas and 
shortcomings that had impaired the effectiveness of group areas legislation. The 
passage of the Group Areas Development Act (GADA) of 1955 and the Group 
Areas Amendment Act (GAAA) in 1957 strengthened the legislative capabilities 
of the government in pursuance of the implementation of group areas. In the late 
1950s the GAB and GADB seemed to have made considerable progress in meeting 
their objectives. For example, from April to December 1959, the GAB proclaimed
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66 group areas compared to only 170 in the period from 1950 to March 1959.2 The 
GADB had also begun to register success: the GADA was applied to 14 centres 
between April and December 1959, compared to only 15 in the years since its 
inception. Similar successes were recorded in the rate at which various permits (for 
example, for occupation and property acquisition) and trading licences were being 
issued.3 In almost all respects, therefore, the Boards responsible for creating and 
developing group areas improved their functioning.
These bureaucratic successes however belied a far more fundamental 
problem facing the government. The majority of black people continued to be 
stridently opposed to the GAA and often mobilised protests against it. For them the 
GAA meant forced removals, displacement and the imposition of a coercive 
racialised order. The implementation of group areas seemed to hold no prospect of 
a better life. On the contrary many people faced the prospect of losing properties, 
without adequate compensation. Black people, most particularly traders and stand 
and property owners, viewed the government's promise that group areas would 
lead to an improvement in their living conditions as no more than empty rhetoric 
and propaganda. As a result, the authorities found it extremely difficult to convince 
them of the supposed benefits of group areas. The government realised by the late 
fifties that its single-minded emphasis on segregation and removals had created 
deep animosity and resentment among blacks. It could no longer simply dismiss 
the objections to group areas as either irrelevant or politically motivated.
Despite the improvements in the functioning of the GAB and GADB, the 
government began to express serious misgivings about the future of the GAA. In 
1961, P.W. Botha, the Minister of Community Development, sketched a very 
gloomy picture of the functioning of the Act: “Over the past ten years”, he 
bemoaned, “we have not achieved anything positive, we have lost the support we 
initially enjoyed, and have gained a constant and growing opposition. Even our 
own people are hesitant and suspicious because apparently there is no control over 
the actions of the GAB, and the Board is not making progress in a way that can be 
defended.”4 The government invariably attributed the negative public perceptions 
about the group areas to widespread misunderstandings about the real intentions of
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the A ct5 and to the agitation by Indian political leaders.6 Recalcitrant 
municipalities were also blamed for failing to co-operate with the government in 
the implementation of group areas. Even the GAB and the GADB were criticised 
for giving undue consideration to the financial implications of implementing group 
areas: “This type of influence”, the Minister warned, “could be dangerous. Group 
areas is a matter of principle and cannot be undermined by economic 
considerations.”7
Even as the government was asserting its authority through coercion there 
remained a number of its policies that continued to provoke opposition. Nationally, 
African, coloured and Indian residents were continuing to mobilise against forced 
removals and the creation o f ‘racially’ exclusive residential areas.8 The 
government admitted that there was a ‘stigma’ attached to group areas and that the 
GAA had caused considerable suspicion and animosity among black people.9 Such 
pervasive rejection of the GAA also inhibited the government’s efforts to gain 
support for its programme to develop ‘racial’ communities. Although the creation 
of group areas was not facing a debilitating crisis, it had become apparent that the 
government required a new approach to effecting residential segregation.
In August 1961 the government established the Department of Community 
Development in order to address these problems. In so doing, it signalled an 
important shift in approach and policy towards coloureds and Indians. Whereas 
before the emphasis was on the implementation of group areas, now the 
government sought to set in place policies that would focus on the ‘separate and 
parallel’ development of these areas.10 The government also envisaged that the new 
Department would enhance the functioning of those bodies responsible for the 
GAA, by bringing them under the control of a single department, and thus improve 
the co-ordination between them. According to the government
Community Development is a term which is receiving ever-increasing 
recognition in the international sphere. In the Republic it connotes the 
series of processes aimed at uniting a community's own efforts with 
those of governmental authorities to improve the social, economic and 
cultural conditions of communities, to integrate the various
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communities of each population group into the life of the nation as 
separate but interdependent social and economic units, and to enable a 
community to contribute to its own as well as the general welfare and 
national progress. The process is made up of two essential elements, 
namely, on the one hand, territorial planning, i.e, the demarcation of 
the areas which will meet the needs of each group, the provision of a 
variety of aids, namely physical development, technical assistance, 
stimulus to economic activities, educational facilities, etc., so as to 
stimulate and foster a sense of initiative, self-help and mutual help, 
and on the other hand, participation by the community itself so that it 
may through its own initiative contribute to the improvement of its 
level of living.11
Thus, unlike separate development, community development did not aim to 
develop separate ‘nations’. Rather, it applied to Indians, coloureds and whites, who 
were perceived to be part of the South African nation, albeit as separate and 
unequal ‘racial’ communities. Previously the government did very little other than 
proclaim the existence of different ‘races’. Now it began to make conscious efforts 
to instil political and social content to those categories. The objective was to 
engender a positive association with group areas and ‘racial’ identities. To this end 
the Department of Community Development was thus established, to employ “the 
various media of the State's existing machinery to stimulate, supplement and 
support the efforts of the community to improve its standard of living”.12 As we 
have seen, the Department was entrusted with task of activating and co-ordinating 
programmes “to develop communities into independent and, as far as possible, self 
reliant socio-economic units in their own areas.”13 However, the Department also 
had to deal with the apparent abstention by local authorities in the development of 
group areas. In this regard, the government proposed that the Department take over 
the powers and the role of local authorities to develop group areas. Thus the 
primary responsibility of the Housing Commission, which now also fell under the 
authority of the Department, was to assist local authorities by granting loans for 
building purposes, and secondarily to undertake building itself. The GADB was 
primarily concerned with the development o f ‘affected properties’ in group areas,
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and secondarily to develop group areas where local authorities were not assuming 
that responsibility.14 These bodies increasingly used their powers to become more 
directly involved in the development of group areas.
Housing and Development
By the end of the 1950s the government began to acknowledge that housing 
provision for coloureds and Indians was inadequate. In 1959 the government 
appointed an inter-departmental committee to investigate the extent of this 
shortage. The committee comprised key figures involved in the creation and 
management of group areas, namely, J.H. van de Walt (chair), J.J. Marais (Group 
Areas Board), I.D. du Plessis (Coloured Affairs), W. Heckroodt (Group Areas 
Development Board) and S.D. Mentz.15 Over the following two years the 
committee interviewed those municipalities which had Indian and coloured 
populations to ascertain their respective housing needs. The committee’s report, 
which was submitted to the Minister of the Interior in 1961, confirmed the serious 
housing shortage among coloureds and Indians nationally.16 The housing problem 
was especially acute in the Western Cape and Durban, where the majority of 
coloureds and Indians respectively resided. The committee also found that that the 
majority of coloureds and Indians were very poor, and could not afford to build 
their own houses. The report painted a dismal picture of the government's 
programme of housing provision for coloureds and Indians. For example, between 
1955 and 1960 the state spent over R110 million on housing of which only about 
RIO million and R2,5 million was spent on coloured and Indian housing 
respectively.17 It was estimated that the number of houses needed by poor 
coloureds and Indians was 44 296 and 52 794 respectively (a total of 97 090), 
although it was recognised that this was probably an underestimate.18
The committee recommended that the poorest coloureds and Indians would 
have to be provided with houses in accordance with the standard of houses 
provided for Africans. Those who commanded higher incomes (namely, those who 
earned more than R140 per month) would be provided with houses equitable to
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those for lower income whites. According to the report many coloureds and 
Indians competed with whites for jobs, but their incomes were considerably lower 
than those earned by their white counterparts. It was estimated that only 9,6% of 
coloureds earned more than R80 per month.19 It proposed that measures be 
instituted to make it easier for coloureds and Indians to gain access to housing 
loans. The existing rules governing housing loans stipulated that coloureds and 
whites could get loans up to a maximum of R4500, whereas Indians were only 
entitled to a maximum of R3500 because they were perceived as a higher risk 
group.20 The committee recommended the elimination of this discrepancy in order 
to make it easier to convince Indians to comply with group areas and removals.
The committee was of the opinion that there were many Indians (and to a lesser 
extent also coloureds) who could afford to finance their own houses but refused to 
do so because of opposition to the group areas, and proposed that they also be 
provided with economic houses. It thus recommended the state should take 
financial responsibility initially for the provision of houses for all those who were 
to be relocated to their specific group areas. Unless the state undertook this 
responsibility, the committee warned, the removal of residents to group areas 
would not be effected. The committee proposed that the government should spend 
an additional R8-10 million per annum on housing for coloureds and Indians, 
which would increase the annual total to between R26-30 million.21
The committee recommended that the government introduce measures 
similar to those used to facilitate the construction of mass housing programmes for 
Africans, such as the introduction of a service levy and the use of coloured and 
Indian labour to build houses in their respective group areas.22 Both white unions 
and industrialists rejected these proposals. White unions23 in the building industry 
argued that there was already a surplus of building workers and that an increase in 
their numbers would lead to a reduction in wages. White workers were especially 
concerned that the training of coloured and Indian artisans would pose a threat to 
their monopoly of skills. The Associated Chamber of Commerce (Assocom) 
objected to the introduction of a service levy for coloureds and Indians on the 
grounds that it would increase production costs.24 The Association argued that in
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the case of Durban, where the committee proposed a limited service levy be 
introduced, employers would use it as an excuse to replace Indian workers with 
cheaper African labour. Furthermore, the burden of a service levy would fall on 
only a handful of employers because of the limited number who employed 
Indians.25
The negative responses from these institutions reflected a much broader 
lack of urgency among the authorities to deal decisively with the housing shortage 
experienced by coloureds and Indians. Despite the government’s rhetorical 
commitment to development, little was done in the 1960s on the East Rand to 
effect significant improvements in the lives of these people. The region’s Indian 
population especially lived under appalling conditions. In 1961 a local survey 
conducted of the Indian Section in the Benoni Old Location painted a graphic 
picture of the pervasive squalor there:
P in ch ed  b e tw e e n  the so l id  brick h o u se s  o f  the Indians are the squalid  
tin sh a ck s  o f  the squatters o f  B e n o n i .  1 lere the very nadir o f  hum an  
e x is t e n c e  is b e in g  c c k c d  ( s ic )  out in a w elter  o f  fo u ln ess  -  a fou lness  
c o m p o u n d e d  o f  s tagnant water, d e c a y in g  refuse, hum an excreta  and  
flics.
T h e  stench  p erco la tes  into ev ery  corner o f  this ghetto  in a w a y  that all 
the  p er fu m es  o f  A ra b ia  ca n n o t  m ask. It is a stench that c lo g s  the  
nostrils ,  that p erm ea tes  ev e r y  stitch o f  c lothing. It stays w ith  o n e  lo n g  
after this w re tch ed  p la ce  has b een  left.26
Over the following years the authorities promised to remedy this situation. 
From the outset, however, the government’s focus on the removal of Africans and 
coloureds from the old location delayed the implementation of any plans to 
improve conditions in the area. The Benoni Council and its Indian Affairs Sub- 
Committee in particular were involved in protracted negotiations over matters 
such as the compensation to be paid to African and coloured homeowners, the 
process of allocating houses vacated by the aforementioned groups to Indian 
residents from other parts of the region and which body would be responsible for
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financing the programme of forced removals.27 Notwithstanding the government’s 
earlier self-criticism of its emphasis on removals, in practice little changed during 
the early 1960s. As a result coloureds and Indians being relocated to their 
respective group areas invariably found themselves in places where virtually no 
development had occurred.
By 1965 the Indian population of Actonville stood at 5273, comprising 
933 families living in 638 houses. The influx of people from other East Rand 
towns, especially from Boksburg, was not matched by concomitant housing 
development. As a result overcrowding, especially among poorer residents, was 
ubiquitous. This problem was especially evident in Actonville Extension No.2 
where 3 300 people (578 families) were crammed into only 265 sites.28 This meant 
that on average at least twelve people (two families) were living on one site. By 
the end of 1966 the situation had improved only marginally. No new houses were 
built in Extension 2, but the number of residents living there had declined to 2 547 
(424 families). Some of this overcrowding was however displaced to Extensions 
one and three.29 At this point the removal of coloured and African residents had 
virtually been concluded. It appeared that the promise of development might now 
eventually come to fruition in the new Indian group area. The Benoni Town 
Council had earlier in 1966 outlined its plans for the development of the area:
It is anticipated that once the movement of the Bantu families from 
the Benoni Bantu Township to Daveyton Extension gets under way, 
the tempo of the Indian Development will increase and its hoped that 
by 1968 the area will be fully developed with a civic centre planned 
on modern lies comprising attractive shopping centre, library, 
Municipal offices, cinema and town hall. Nearly 500 houses designed 
by architects appointed by the Town council, will have been built 
together with modern blocks of flats. In addition, some 90 larger 
residential sites will be developed by the more affluent members of 
the Indian Community.30
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The Council announced at about the same time that it would spend R4 
million to upgrade Actonville (R1 million on shops and offices and R3 million on 
houses).31
These plans resonated with the ideas that informed the planning of 
Daveyton as a ‘modern’ township. But there was a discernible lack of urgency in 
the way the authorities approached the development of Actonville. Instead of 
experiencing a spurt of developmental growth, the Indian group area seemed to 
regress. Poorer residents especially suffered under these circumstances. In 1967 
residents being relocated from Boksburg refused to move into the houses allocated 
to them because they lacked bathrooms and running water. Their complaints 
prompted the Council to admit that “The houses are in a poor condition and as in 
the case of the houses set aside for Boksburg residents, they are steadily 
deteriorating.”33
In 1969 an even more trenchant critique of the housing situation in 
Actonville came from the Health Inspector, who had conducted a survey of the 
state of housing in Extensions two and three, lie found that 54% of houses in 
those areas ranged from being in a state ‘that they require substantial repairs and 
renovation’ to ‘being so dilapidated... that they are no longer fit for human 
occupation'.33 By this time the population of the area had risen to 6500, with only 
a few additional houses being built.
In response to the Health Inspector's report, the Medical Officer of Health 
delivered a devastating judgement on the consequences of the authority’s neglect 
of Actonville’s poor community. He reminded the Council’s Management 
Committee that “Benoni is experiencing remarkable prosperity and expansion”. 
This contrasted sharply with the abject conditions in the Indian group area, where 
there were
slums so appalling that the average Benoni citizen would vomit if he 
were to visit them. Overcrowding exists to an extent that beggars the 
imagination. Children play in the rutted streets amongst raw sewage 
and slop water. Few houses have running water inside the house...
Each room in each of the corrugated iron shanties houses at least one
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family. On one property there are not less than forty people living, 
crowded into the house, the garage and other outhouses of various 
sorts. There was one lavatory pail for these forty people... Mothers 
cope as best they can. Their bedroom, kitchen, pantry and bathroom 
are all in one room... At night the parents sleep in the one bed usually 
with the two youngest children at the foot of the bed. All the other 
children sleep on the earth floor.”34
The Director o f Non-European Affairs indicated that plans were afoot to 
construct more houses and flats to accommodate poorer residents. But it seemed 
that even when new accommodation was provided, it did not benefit those who 
needed it most. In 1970 poor Actonville residents complained that the new houses 
and flats being built were too expensive for them to afford. At least 67 families 
faced evictions because they could not afford to pay the rents. According to one 
resident, “Some people are living in broken-down cars, while some landlords have 
many properties in the township.”35 By 1971 the housing situation remained 
desperate. The Benoni City Times reported that “Many Indians feel that the lower 
income bracket people were not taken care of and houses were allocated to those 
in the higher income bracket... People are desperate. They have to rent a house, it 
is impossible to find accommodation.”36 These problems were aggravated by what 
appeared to be a common practice in the area, whereby rich residents bought 
multiple houses and leased them to poorer residents. Tenants were often charged
3 7R50 and more per month to occupy these houses.
For the majority of the East Rand's Indian population the promises of 
social improvement contained in the government’s policy of community 
development did not materialise. A detailed survey commissioned by the Benoni 
Town Council in the late 1960s on the region’s Indian population found that 
nearly 60% were living in overcrowded conditions.38 The researchers found a 
strong antipathy to forced removals: 87,4% of respondents living outside Benoni 
and 95% of households living in the peri-urban areas39 of Benoni were opposed to 
moving to Actonville. The majority of these people wanted new and better houses 
to be built for them in their existing residential areas. Two thirds of household
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heads expressed dissatisfaction with their existing accommodation.40 Many of the 
people who had been removed from Boksburg paid lower rents in Benoni, where 
they occupied municipal houses. In their previous abodes these people often had 
to pay rentals of up to R25 to unscrupulous landlords, whereas rents for the 
municipal houses ranged between R5,25 and R7,55. However, houses constructed 
in the late 1960s in Actonville were considerably more expensive, with rents 
ranging from R31 to R40. Most people could not afford these higher costs.41 
Moreover, the majority of residents who had previously lived outside Benoni 
continued to work in the towns of their origin, which meant they incurred 
additional transport costs.42
A similar pattern of neglect was also emerging in Reiger Park, the East 
Rand’s coloured group area. There too development was initially retarded by the 
government’s focus on removing African people to Vosloorus and relocating 
coloureds from other parts of the region to the group area. Thus in the early 1960s 
no attention was given to providing new houses for the poorer sections of the 
coloured community. The only housing programme initiated during this period 
was for those people who could afford to buy their properties. By 1965 the 
housing situation in Reiger Park had reached crisis proportions. The Boksburg 
Council admitted that approximately two thousand houses were required to 
accommodate the people already living in the area. In addition 1400 houses would 
have to be built for those people being relocated from other areas.43 At the time 
the majority of coloured residents were living in single rooms, huts or shacks. In 
Stirtonville, 640 families were living in single rooms.44 To make matters worse, 
the authorities proceeded to convert most houses from being sub-economic to 
being economic units. As a result families occupying two and three room houses 
saw their rents soar from R5,50 and R6,00 to R14, 42 and R 17,72 respectively.45 
The Council introduced these increases even though it acknowledged that most 
coloured families could not afford economic rentals.46 By the late 1960s the 
Council noted that
The Coloureds have been resettled for approximately four years now,
and it is quite clear from conversations with Coloureds and
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discussions at a meeting of the Consultative Committee, that the 
Coloured community at Reiger Park is becoming extremely 
discontented and dissatisfied with the slow progress being made in 
regard to the establishment of Reiger Park Extension No. I.47
In general, therefore, very few coloureds and Indians benefited from the 
implementation of group areas or from its more reformist incarnation, community 
development. Instead of experiencing social development and economic 
advancement, poor coloured and Indians, who formed the overwhelming majority 
of their populations, suffered further hardships and impoverishment during the 
1960s.
Indian traders
Indian traders, especially in the Transvaal, presented a perennial and most 
vexing dilemma to the authorities. From the end of the 19th century successive 
governments had attempted to impose restrictions on the activities of Indian 
traders. The Nationalist Parly in the 1950s sought finally to solve this issue and to 
relocate all Indian traders from the city centres into Indian group areas. In so doing, 
the government aimed to eliminate all forms of intra-racial interaction, whether in 
business or residence.
The government’s insistence on undermining Indian trade provoked 
widespread opposition, ranging from the radical South African Indian Congress 
(SAIC) to the pro-apartheid Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK). The SAIC 
was the most prominent and consistent opponent of the government’s policies. Its 
provincial chapters, the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and the Transvaal Indian 
Congress (TIC), were in the forefront of the struggles against the introduction of 
the GAA. Throughout the 1950s these organisations successfully mobilised Indian 
communities, especially traders, to frustrate the implementation of the 
government’s plans. Even the government acknowledged their success in this 
regard.48
The South African Indian Organisation (SAIO), which was established by
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conservative Indian politicians who had become disgruntled with the SAIC’s 
radicalism, also condemned aspects of the GAA. The SAIO made it clear that it 
did not oppose residential segregation in principle. In July 1959, its president, Mr. 
A.M. Moolla, told the GAB that his organisation’s attitude was that “under 
reasonable conditions, there can be no objections to the acceptance of residential 
separation, provided it was done with justice and in keeping with the needs of the 
various communities.”49 He nevertheless warned the GAB that it was too pre­
occupied with establishing residential segregation, and “did not pay sufficient 
thought to how he (the Indian) was going to live and how he was going to earn his 
livelihood to pay for the house that would be provided for him”.50 Moolla appealed 
to the government to set aside special trading areas for Indians. The SAIO argued 
that the introduction of this proposal would not make any difference to the ‘general 
concept of apartheid’, especially because in other economic spheres there already 
existed substantial interaction.51 According to this proposal Indian traders would 
enter commercial areas during the day and then return to their group areas at night. 
In this way, the SAIO argued, Indian traders would be no different from other 
black workers who commuted to and from their group areas on a daily basis.52
The SAIO suggested that the GAB make a positive overture to the Indian 
traders, not only to save them from economic ruin, but also because it would be the 
best way to undermine the SAIC’s opposition to the GAA. The SAIO hoped that 
by striking a deal with the government along these lines it would enhance its 
position in the Indian community vis-ci-vis the SAIC The SAIO committed itself to 
“fight extremism as far as possible”, meaning of course the SAIC, and impressed 
on the government that “if you want us to fight extremism, then you must grant us 
some concessions.”53 This offer seems to have made little impression on the GAB, 
whose chairman, Mr. J.J. Marais, was sceptical about the SAIO’s capacity to 
challenge the SAIC’s support in the Indian community. Specifically it doubted Mr. 
Moolla’s promise to fight extremism because it was convinced that most Indians 
actually did hate the GAB and the government.54 According to Marais, the “Indian 
community as a whole has declared war against the Group Areas.”55
In 1959 the Assocom added its voice to the growing criticisms about the
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adverse effects group areas was having on Indian traders. The Association 
supported the concept of group areas but was anxious about the potential negative 
effects of the government’s policies on the ‘normal functioning’ of the economy.56 
Assocom appealed to the government that in the implementation of the Act, “every 
effort should be made to avoid the erosion of the competitive capitalist system by 
actions which introduce risks and uncertainties which are not inherent in the 
system.”57 Assocom aired its criticisms in the context of the economic difficulties 
that faced the country in the late 1950s. It urged the government to act decisively to 
alleviate the situation because, “Until the uncertainties are removed from the 
minds of all of us, we cannot again make progress. Investment is being withheld 
because of uncertainties. And so our perturvasion (sic) arises very considerably out 
of that fact.”58
Among the issues with which the Association specifically expressed 
anxiety was the possible detrimental effects the removal of Indian traders would 
have on white wholesalers, many of whom depended on Indian traders for their 
business. Assocom complained that many wholesalers were forced to close down 
because of loss of business or due to uncertainties of the future, a situation that was 
exacerbated by economic downturn at the time. As a solution to these problems, 
the Association proposed that the government should implement the GAA 
gradually, so as to minimise disruption to the traders. It proposed that trading 
rights be removed incrementally and that current licensed owners should be 
allowed to retain trading rights during their lifetimes.59 It supported the 
implementation of residential segregation but questioned whether trading 
segregation was either central to apartheid or urgent.
The NGK provided another important source of criticism of the group areas 
policies towards Indians. This conservative religious ally of the government drew 
attention to the adverse effects that forced removals of Indians from Johannesburg 
to Lenasia would have on Indian workers. In a memorandum to the Minster of 
Interior, the NGK highlighted the economic difficulties endured by Indian workers, 
especially service workers, who had to travel long distances to be at work.60 The 
NGK also criticised the government for neglecting the housing needs of poor
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Indians, who it claimed were living under the most atrocious conditions in the city. 
It appealed to the government to provide sub-economic housing in Johannesburg 
for lower income Indians employed in the service industry to make it easier for 
them to commute to work.61 The church also accused the government of 
mishandling the issues of Indian traders. It argued that it was incorrect for the 
government to confine Indian traders to their group areas and urged the 
government to establish a special trading area for Indians in Johannesburg. The 
church contended that “To expect trade only between Ahmed and Ishmail and 
Ishmail and Ahmed in Lenasia is not the Christian thing to do.”62
The government’s first reaction, as might be expected, was to defend its 
policies. In its written reply to Assocom, the government reiterated its commitment 
to remove all Indian traders from white urban centres because it argued, among 
other things, the presence of Indian traders had a deflationary effect on property 
values and was thus detrimental to surrounding white businesses.63 While 
acknowledging that Indians in the Transvaal would be the most adversely affected 
by group areas because of their disproportionate involvement in commerce, the 
government nevertheless insisted that Indians only had themselves to blame for the 
dilemma with which they were confronted. Indians, especially Moslems, were 
accused of not wanting to do any other work.63 More positively, the government 
claimed that Indian traders would benefit from apartheid policies, as they would 
have security of tenure and be able to trade in their own areas without any 
competition from other groups.65 Having satisfied itself of the virtues of its own 
policies, the government rejected all the proposals of compromise raised by 
Assocom as impracticable. To accept the principles enunciated by Assocom, the 
memorandum concluded, “would be the negation of Apartheid as practicable 
policy.”66 However, this reluctance notwithstanding the government registered 
concern about these criticisms by two such important constituencies in the white 
community.67
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Shifts to more unworkable policies
One of the first signs of possible changes to aspects of group areas policy 
emanated from a most unlikely quarter, namely the Transvaal National Party. At 
the time that the government was involved in discussions with various groups 
about the impact of group areas on Indian traders, the provincial chapter of the 
ruling party circulated a memorandum to local authorities, adumbrating the notion 
of separating residential segregation from commercial segregation. The 
memorandum, written in June 1959 and signed by Piet Koornhof (the assistant 
secretary of the provincial party), argued that, “Residential segregation of Indians 
is absolute, in other words when a group area is declared for Indians, then all 
Indians of a town or city are removed to such a proclaimed area.” But unlike 
residential segregation, continued the document, “Commercial segregation of 
Indians is relative.”68 The memorandum affirmed the Transvaal National Party’s 
unwavering commitment to residential segregation and even berated those 
municipalities that were not complying with group areas legislation. But it 
suggested that where reasonable trading opportunities were not available to Indians 
in their group areas, then facilities should be provided to them in the urban 
centres.69
The discussions within the GAB during 1959 and 1960 give some 
indication of the shift in the attitude of the authorities. The GAB was centrally 
involved in the discussions about the future of Indian traders because it was 
ultimately responsible for the implementation of the government’s group area 
policies. Any doubt that it might express therefore necessarily suggest uncertainty 
at higher levels of the state. An early indication of these came in late 1960 when it 
noted that:
The Indian is a trading community that makes a living out of trade.
However, they must be moved and resettled, but in such a manner that 
they are not cut off from their clients. Their means of survival must 
not be taken from them because they could become a burden to the
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state at a later stage. The government has a moral obligation to secure 
their survival and therefore the problem must be addressed 
realistically - not with emotion but with reason.70
A few months later, the chairman of the GAB, J.H. Niemand, admitted that 
existing legislation affecting Indians hindered their ability to develop alternative 
means of employment. He argued that the government would be dealing a serious 
blow to the economic viability of the Indian community if it undermined their 
trade.71 What gradually emerged in the GAB position therefore was that it would 
allow Indian traders to continue operating from their existing sites until a 
permanent resolution could be found to the wider problem. However, the Board 
was wary of setting a precedent on this matter and insisted that this concession 
would apply only for a limited period. The government was by this stage willing to 
make some concessions to Indian traders but was equally desperate not to give the 
impression that it was caving into the demands o f ‘extremists’. The Minister of the 
Interior made that much clear in his talks with the SAIO when he insisted that if he 
permitted Indian traders to occupy existing sites for limited periods of time this 
change in the government policy should not be misconstrued as a sign of weakness 
on its part.72
The government now proposed a number of long term schemes to address 
the issue of Indian trading in white areas. The first of these was the proposal to 
establish huge trading complexes -  ‘Indian Bazaars' - in the main urban centres. In 
contrast to the old ‘Asiatic Bazaars’, the new Bazaars were to be modelled on the 
Bazaar in Durban and those in East Africa.73 Traders were to be given stalls in a 
single complex, which was located in the town centre. In 1960, the government set 
up a special committee to investigate the viability of establishing such a Bazaar in 
Pretoria where numerous Indian traders were located in Princess Street.74 After a 
brief investigation, the committee concluded that the Bazaar system would not 
work in the Transvaal, and especially not in Pretoria. It observed that the Durban 
Bazaar was well supported by ’all groups'. The committee argued that in the 
Transvaal there was a stigma attached to shopping at Indian centres. It questioned 
whether Afrikaners would frequent the same shops as Africans.75 This was a
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strange conclusion to reach considering that all and sundry frequented Indian shops 
in the city centres. More importantly, Indian traders also opposed the new Bazaar 
system because it would not stop their relocation to a group area. As a result of 
these objections, the new Bazaar system was not introduced in the 1960s.
However, the concept was reintroduced in the mid-1970s when the government 
used it as a means to overcome the resistance by Fageview traders against their 
removal from 14lh Avenue.76
The government’s next proposal was to remove Indians from their existing 
sites to new areas that would be accessible to potential shoppers from other group 
areas. But the government realised such a plan would also create dilemma of its 
own. According to the GAB, it was faced with a ’’choice between three evils”.77 It 
could not locate an Indian group area close to a white area because the white 
population and the Chamber of Commerce, which would view it as a threat to 
white business, would reject such a plan. The government would also not agree to 
having Indian traders in close proximity to a coloured group area because its policy 
was to assist the development of coloured economic autonomy, which would only 
have potential for success if coloured businesses were not confronted with 
competition from Indian traders. Thus, the government concluded that Africans 
were the only potential clientele for Indian traders.78 It therefore proposed that 
Indian shops be built either on the outskirts of townships or along the main roads 
connecting townships and the industrial areas. In this way, it suggested, Indians 
could attract African customers. This strategy would also not compromise the 
government's policies of separate development. The authorities argued that African 
businesses in the urban areas could not expect to be protected from competition as 
they were in the ‘homelands’79 But this proposal failed to engender any support 
from the Indian community, who remained fundamentally suspicious of any plan 
to remove them from their existing trading sites.
In the end, the government was unable to bridge the chasm that existed 
between its determination to remove Indians to group areas and the Indian 
community's opposition to any proposal perceived as a threat to their livelihoods. 
None of the government’s proposals could allay the Indian traders’ fears that being
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removed from their existing sites would not adversely affect them. As a result the 
authorities on the East Rand either continued to insist that Indians be removed or 
left them in their existing areas, under strict conditions. In either case, Indian 
traders were generally worse off than before. This was especially the case because 
a relatively high proportion of Indians on the East Rand depended on trading.
Close to 50% of Indians were employed in commerce compared to only 30,5% in 
industry.80 84,3% of traders were entirely dependent on trading for their income.81 
Moreover, there were few alternative job opportunities available to these people 
and there was a very high degree of unemployment among Indian women.82 The 
majority of residents in Actonville were Muslim and were mostly employed in 
commerce, whereas Hindus and Christians were more evenly spread between 
commerce and industry. Tamils were mostly employed in industry.83 Two-thirds of 
traders also lived on their business premises,84 which made the prospect of 
removals particularly objectionable to them.
By far the most serious problem that affected traders and over which they 
had no influence whatsoever, was the implementation of group areas upon 
Africans which resulted in the loss of most of their clientele. In the old locations 
Indian traders had a huge client base, comprising primarily the local African 
residents. The removal of Africans to the new townships therefore struck a serious 
blow to Indian businesses. The GAA determined that Indians would only be 
permitted to trade in Indian group areas. Yet, less than a third of Indian traders 
depended on Indian customers for their business.85 According to the researchers of 
the survey on Indians on the East Rand,
Traders in Actonville faced bleak times. Most of the Indian traders’ 
clientele was African, and although Wattville would continue 
providing a customer base, this would now be spread among a much 
greater number of traders. The increase in the number of Indians 
living in Actonville was unlikely to have significant positive effects, 
as most Indians preferred shopping at large departmental stores.86
258
The adverse consequences of the government’s approach to Indian traders 
were profound. In 1965 the Benoni Council announced a plan to establish the 
country’s first ‘all-Indian industrial area’ as part of a strategy to make the Indian 
community economically self-sufficient.87 However, as with other developmental 
plans, the implementation of this one was also delayed. The central government 
was not enthusiastic about the proposal and even the Council was divided over 
where to locate such an industrial area. From a socio-economic perspective, the 
government’s much lauded shift to community development in the early 1960s 
therefore had negligible positive effects on Indian residents. On the contrary, 
traders especially appeared to have experienced a deterioration in their conditions 
throughout the sixties. The other main prong in the strategy of community 
development was that o f ‘parallel’ political representation. It is to this issue that 
the chapter now turns.
Indians recognised as ‘citizens’
Until the early 1960s the government’s approach towards Indian people 
was based on the policy of repatriation.89 According to this policy Indians would 
eventually return to their rightful homeland, India. In that sense they were viewed 
as ‘temporary sojourners’ in South Africa. The government did not actively pursue 
this repatriation policy but it nevertheless had a material effect on Indian people's 
political status as well as their social conditions. Little attention was given to the 
governance and socio-economic development of the Indian population. Since 
Indians were not officially recognised as citizens of the country no attempt was 
made to incorporate them into any official political structures. Even the qualified 
franchise or indirect representation, which applied to Africans and coloureds in 
different parts of the country, was not extended to Indians. Official relations 
between the government and Indians were mediated through the Departments of 
Welfare and Interior. Within the latter department, the Directorate of Immigration 
and Asiatic Affairs was responsible for administering and controlling the internal 
and external movement of Indians.90
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In 196!, nearly a century after the arrival of Indian labourers in the country, 
the government officially abandoned the policy of repatriation. In May 1961 
leading cabinet member, Jan De Klerk, conceded in the House of Assembly that 
the country had to take responsibility for its ‘Asiatic’ population.91 Later that year 
the Prime Minister, H.F. Verwoerd, publicly approved the view that Indians should 
be regarded as an ‘independent community... in the Republic’.92 The government 
now introduced a variety of reforms. In February 1961 the Asiatic Affairs Division 
was created within the Department of the Interior, the purpose of which was to 
“serve as a channel through which the rightful needs of the Asiatic community can 
be brought under the attention of the Government.”93 By August 1961 Asiatic 
Affairs Division was upgraded to the status of a government department. The main 
objective of the new Department of Indian Affairs was to give special attention “to 
the economic and social development... as an independent community ... of the 
Indian group in the Republic.”94 A month later W.A. Maree was appointed the first 
Minister of Indian Affairs. These rapid changes signalled the government’s 
commitment to place its relations with the Indian population on a new footing.
I lowcvcr, it was still not prepared to concede genuine political rights to Indians or 
give the new department any substantive powers. Indeed, the new ministry did 
little more than take over the responsibilities performed by the Departments of 
Welfare and Interior in relation to the Indian population. The Department was thus 
bereft of any real power to intervene in matters affecting Indians on a daily basis. 
The government's most important and frequent interaction with the Indian 
population still occurred through the Department of Community Development, 
which was concerned mainly with the implementation of the GAA.
The next step in the evolution of these relations was the government’s 
decision to establish a body which would “act as a channel of consultation between 
the Government and the Indian community.”95 One of the government’s main 
concerns was that Indians were almost wholly alienated from the state. There were 
few, if any, official mechanism available for the Indian community to engage the 
government. This contributed to the propensity for Indians to voice their concerns 
through protest actions, which occurred primarily under the banner of the SAIC.
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The repression in the early 1960s, which debilitated the SAIC, created the space 
for the government to promote conservative Indian politicians. In 1963 the 
government met some of these personalities to discuss the establishment of a 
National Indian Council, which would serve as a liaison between the Indian 
community and the government. The government declared that the Council was the 
first 'recognised mouthpiece' of Indians. It nevertheless nominated all the members 
of the Council, which compromised its legitimacy from the outset. The SAIC 
rejected the establishment of the Council and even the authorities admitted that the 
body had very little support among Indian people.96 The new Council operated in 
almost complete obscurity over the following five years and made little impression 
on the politics in the Indian areas. In 1968 the government announced that the 
Council would be converted into a statutory body known as the South African 
Indian Council. This body was intended to be the equivalent of the Coloured 
Representative Council (CRC), which was supposed to represent the interests of 
coloureds nationally. Unlike the CRC, however, the Indian Council would not 
comprise of any elected members. The Minister of Indian Affairs nominated all 
twenty-five members97 of the Council to ensure that the body would remain loyal 
to the government. Despite the name change and improved statutory status, the 
new body continued to serve primarily to be a liaison body.
Coloured ‘franchise’ vitiated
When the NP came to power it immediately set about removing coloureds 
from the common voters' roll. Until the 1950s coloureds had remained on the 
common voters’ roll in the Cape Province, where they participated in elections. 
However, their franchise was qualified and they could not stand as candidates, 
which meant they could only elect white representatives to the country’s governing 
body.98 Notwithstanding their numerical weakness, the coloured electorate in a 
number of Cape constituencies was large enough to influence the outcome of 
elections. This was the main reason behind the NP's assault on the coloured vote. 
As early as 1951, the government passed the Separate Representation of Voters'
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Act, which removed coloured from the common voters' roll. The Act was widely 
criticised and its validity was challenged in the courts, which delayed its 
implementation. The government, however, was equally determined to proceed 
and used various constitutional manoeuvres to achieve its aim." In 1956 it 
eventually succeeded in promulgating the Act and, in so doing, removed the last 
group of black people from the common voters’ roll.
While the government proceeded to disenfranchise coloureds, it also began 
to create liaison bodies between it and the coloured population. Prior to this the 
Coloured Advisory Committee (CAC) had been established to advise the pre- 
Nationalist governments on matters affecting the coloured people.100 However, the 
CAC was widely condemned as representing a step towards the final removal of 
the coloured franchise. As a result this body was stillborn. In 1951 the government 
established a sub-department in the Department of the Interior, known as Coloured 
Affairs, to take over the functions of the CAC. The responsibilities of Coloured 
Affairs increased little over the years, as the government transferred some routine 
responsibilities from other Departments to Coloured Affairs, such as the 
administration of public funds for grants to be allocated to sports facilities, and 
educational and cultural activities.101 This sub-department was directly accountable 
to the Minister of the Interior and was staffed exclusively by white civil servants.
The Separate Representation of Voters' Act of 1951 had provided for the 
establishment of a Union Council for Coloured Affairs (UCCA), which would be a 
liaison body run by coloureds.102 But, as with its predecessors, this body was 
devoid of any real authority or legitimacy, and was under the strict control of the 
government. Of the twenty-seven members serving on the Council, the governor- 
general nominated fifteen, and the remaining twelve were elected by eligible 
coloured voters. The government created the UCCA as an alternative to the 
coloured (qualified) franchise and it was probably for this reason that the elections 
to this body attracted only negligible interest. Save for the participation of some 
conservative coloured organisations such as the Coloured People’s National 
Union, which was led by George Golding, few others were prepared to be 
associated with this body.
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The failure of these bodies to attract any substantial support led the 
government to review its political relationship with coloureds. In 1960 the 
government appointed the Niemand Committee to investigate the participation of 
coloureds in local government. The committee recommended that separate and 
parallel political institutions be created for coloureds, in line with those existing 
for Africans. These recommendations were embodied in the Group Areas 
Amendment Act of 1962.103 Although these proposals were initially intended to 
apply to local government, the principles underpinning them were extended to the 
national arena. Thus in 1964 the Coloured Person's Representative Council Act 
was promulgated, which set the scene for the transformation of national coloured 
politics. In terms of the Act, the UCCA was to be replaced by the Coloured 
Representative Council (CRC). However, it took another five years before the 
recommendations embodied in the Act came to fruition.
The CRC was eventually established in 1969, and according to the 
government the purpose of this body was “to enable the Coloured people of the 
Republic to exercise their democratic rights, to conduct their own affairs and 
afford them an ever increasing tempo of self determination.”l<w Unlike its 
predecessors the CRC would have a majority elected members, and possessed the 
powers to make laws but only “within the ambit of its functions”. These functions 
and powers were delegated to it by the government and remained very limited. In 
addition, the CRC had to submit any laws it wished to promulgate to the Minister 
of Coloured Relations for approval. The State President also had to agree with all 
proposed laws before they could be promulgated. Thus even within the limited 
scope provided for the CRC, very strict procedures were set in place to ensure 
compliance with overall government policy.
The government carefully managed the process leading to the 
establishment of the CRC, by ensuring that its closest ally, the Federal Party (led 
by Tom Swartz) would be the majority party in the CRC. Although the body was 
made up of a majority of elected seats, the government could appoint twenty 
members, who were all taken from the Federal Party. The Labour Party, which 
enjoyed majority support among coloured voters, participated in the CRC but was
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also critical of its limited powers. Leading Labour member, David Curry, 
contended that “The Government has given representation without giving the 
Council responsibilities. The Council has a built-in frustration complex... We are 
becoming convinced that the CRC was created so that we can just blow off 
steam.”105 Nevertheless, the Labour Party participated in these elections and lent 
some legitimacy to the CRC. For the majority of coloureds, however, especially 
those from the Western Cape, the CRC represented a reversal from the qualified 
franchise they had previously enjoyed. As a result, only a minority participated in 
the 1969 elections. The government was unable to persuade those people who had 
been on the common voters’ roll to accept the vitiated franchise offered to them in 
the late 1960s.
Racialiscd local governance
The South African Indian Council and the Coloured Representative 
Council were created to provide the space for Indians and coloureds to develop 
‘racial’ political identities on a national basis. In similar fashion, the government 
established semi-autonomous and ‘racially’ distinct local structures in the 1960s. 
These institutions were key elements in the government’s plans to legitimise the 
creation of group areas. Provision was first made for the creation of these ‘racially- 
based’ local political structures in the Group Areas Amendment Act of 1957.106 
However, these proposals were only implemented after the establishment of the 
Department of Community Development. The authorities set out a three-phase 
plan for the introduction of local authorities for coloureds and Indians.107
The first stage consisted of the creation of Consultative Committees in 
group areas where communities did not yet have the necessary experience to take 
charge of their own affairs. According to the government Indians and coloureds 
required training and time to acquire the requisite skills to run their own affairs.108 
Consultative Committees consisted entirely of nominated members. Five members 
appointed by the Provincial Administrator. Two of these members were nominated 
by the Department of Community Development, two by the Administrator and one
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by the relevant local authority.109 In this way the authorities ensured that only 
compliant people would serve on these bodies. Local authorities were legally 
required to liaise with Consultative Committees on issues relating to that particular 
group area, for example, on matters such as the provision of housing, welfare, 
recreational facilities, roads and health care. Budget proposals and local legislation 
that affected a particular area also had to be discussed with the Consultative 
Committee. The second phase in the development of local representation consisted 
of the establishment of Management Committees. A community qualified for the 
creation of a Mancom once the government was satisfied that the inhabitants of a 
particular group area had proven its ability to take on the responsibility of running 
their own affairs. Members of the Consultative Committees also had to prove their 
competency as reliable political representatives and conduits for government 
policies. Precisely what criteria were used to determine the progress made by 
communities or the Consultative Committees is unclear. Management Committees 
were also unelected bodies and enjoyed only advisory powers. In addition to 
having the same responsibilities as Consultative Committees, the Management 
Committees also had the right to inspect public buildings in its area of jurisdiction, 
to report and make recommendations on matters concerning coloured workers and 
local laws affecting people in its group area. The municipality also had to consult it 
on the financial management of its group area.110
The final stage in the evolution of these group area local committees, was 
the establishment of fully-fledged local authorities. The government envisaged that 
such committees would take on the responsibility of managing a particular group 
area. The establishment of such a committee could only occur with the permission 
of the relevant minister, and the Administrator would still appoint its members.
The government's policy of developing 'self-reliant communities' along these lines 
was consolidated in the Group Areas Amendment Act of 1962.111 By December 
1962 the Transvaal Provincial Administration passed an ordinance conforming to 
the government's proposal and set about establishing consultative committees in a 
number of group areas. By 1965 seventeen Advisory Committees and fifteen 
Management Committees had been established in the Cape Province, whereas in
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the Transvaal only three Advisory Committees and one Management Committee 
had been established.112 The authorities did not regard the East Rand’s group areas 
as developed enough to qualify for Management Committees.
The establishment of these committees also signalled the coming of age of 
collaboration politics. The politicians who were active in these bodies owed their 
political advancement more to the government than the people who they purported 
to represent. In the 1960s the government’s attempts to create legitimate parallel 
political structures in the coloured and Indian group areas enjoyed uneven support. 
There was little enthusiasm for these bodies, which had limited powers and 
comprised mostly people handpicked by the authorities. Most importantly, the 
living conditions of many coloureds and Indians either stagnated or declined 
during the 1960s, which further alienated these people from the government and 
their local acolytes. Therefore, the two main prongs of the government’s 
community development programme largely failed to make a favourable impression 
on the people it was supposed to benefit. As a result few people developed a 
positive association to group areas.
266
ENDNOTES
1 Government Publications (GP), University of the Witwatersrand (UW), Report 
on the activities of the Department of Community Development for the period 1st 
August, 1961 to 31st December, 1962, pp.5-7
2 Central Archives Depot (CAD), Group Areas Board files (GGR) 114, 74/6 (1), 
Group Areas: Public Motion (By the Minister to the Senate), 1960
3 Ibid
4 CAD, GGR 174, 88/1, Groepsgebiede, 20.04.61
5 CAD, GGR, 48, 15/4, Memorandum on the Group Areas Act, 1958. This 
memorandum was a response to a critical article which appeared in the Christian 
Science Monitor, and intended to show that the provisions of the Act “were 
designed to temper as far as possible the application of the Ac so as to ensure that 
as little dislocation and loss as possible take place.”
6 CAD, GGR 174, 88/1, Groepsgebiede, is one of numerous references to Indian 
agitation against group areas.
7 Ibid
8 CAD, GGR 113, 74/2, Group Area Board Meeting, Bcsprekings, 25.07.61, p.5. 
Sec the final chapter for a detailed discussion of the opposition to the group areas 
on the East Rand.
9 CAD, GGR 113, 74/2 (2), Bcsprekings: Ondersckretarissc, 25.07.61, p. 13
10 Ibid, p.2
1 'GP, U W, Report on the activities of the Department of Community 
Development for the period 1st August, 1961 to 31st December, 1962, p.l
12 Ibid, pp.1-2
13 Ibid, p.2
14 Ibid, pp.5-8
15 CAD, GGR 144, 79/3, ‘Verslag van die interdepartementele komitee insake die 
agterstand in behuising vir die Kleurling- en Indiersgroep in die unie’, 24.05.61
267
17
18
19
20 
21
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
22 Ibid
23 The following white unions were consulted: Federasie van Bouewerkbase, 
Blankebouwerkersunie and the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers 
of South Africa.
24 CAD, GGR 144, 79/3, ‘Verslag van die interdepartementele komitee insake die 
agterstand in behuising vir die Kleurling- en Indiersgroep in die unie’, 24.05.61
25 Ibid
26 Benoni City Times, 04.08.61
27 Intermediate Archives, Johannesburg (lAJ), Town Council of Benoni Records 
(TCB), Box 209, G 1/4. vol.4. Minutes of meeting of the Indian Affairs Sub­
committee, Benoni, 26.08.63
28IAJ, TCB, Box 212, G 1/4, vol.8, J.E. Mathcwson (Director of Non-European 
Affairs) to Benoni Town Clerk, ‘Progress and Population Report: Actonvillc’, 
30.04.65
29 CAD, Municipality of Benoni (MB) Ac7 (I), Minutes of the Management 
Committee, 15.11.66
30 IAJ, TCB, Box 214, Gl/4, vol.12. Minutes of the Management Committee, July 
1966
31 Benoni City Times, 08.04.66
32 IAJ, TCB, Box 216, Gl/4, vol.16, Minutes of the Indian Affairs Sub- 
Committee, 17.10.67
33 IAJ, TCB, Box 220, Gl/4, vol.25, Report of the Management Committee, 
24.06.69
268
34 IAJ, TCB, Box 220, Gl/4, vol.25, Report of the Management Committee, 
24.06.69
35 Benoni City Times, 15.05.70
36 Benoni City Times, 02.04.71
37 IAJ, TCB, Box 216, Gl/4, vol. 16, Minutes of the Management Committee, 
13.11.67
38 G.G. Maasdorp and P.N. Pillay, ‘The East Rand Indian Community: A socio­
economic survey conducted for the Benoni Town Council’, University of Natal, 
1970, Vol.l, p.52
39 This was reflected by the increase in the peri-urban areas’ Indian population 
from under 300 in 1960 to nearly a thousand in 1969. See Ibid, p.3
40 Ibid, p.56
41 Ibid, p.82
42 Ibid, p.81
43 Boksburg Council Records, Boksburg Library, Management Committee 
Minutes, Vraclys om woningsbehoeftes te bepaal, August 1965
44 Ibid, Report of the Town Treasurer, April 1965
45 ibid
46
47
48
49
Ibid, Report of the Director of Non-European Affairs, October 1964 
Ibid, Report of the Town Clerk, February 1968 
CAD, GGR 174, 88/1, “Groepsgebiede”
CAD, GGR 152, 81/1/5 (1), Discussions with the South African Indian
Organisation held on Friday the 30th July 1959
50 Ibid
51 Ibid
52 Ibid
269
53 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 CAD, GGR 146, 80/6, Interview between the Group Areas Board, the Minister 
of the Interior and the Associated Chamber of Commerce of South Africa, 
24.08.59
57 Ibid
58 Ibid
59 Ibid
60 CAD, GGR 150,81/1 (Vol.I) Memorandum van die sendelingse van die 
Ned.Geref Kerk onder die Indier in die Transvaal ter voorlegging aan sy edele die 
Minister van Binnelandsesake, (undated)
62 Ibid
63 CAD, GGR 146, 80/6, Memorandum on letter addressed to the Minister by the 
Associated of Chamber of Commerce dated 13.04.59
65 Ibid
66 Ibid
67 CAD, GGR 155, 81/4 (III), “Ligging van groepsgebiede vir Indiers in 
verhouding tot Bantoewoongebiedc”, 23/02/61, Document by J.H. Niemand
68 CAD, GGR 146, 80/5, General Principles and Guidelines with regard to group 
areas, (Nat ional Party of the Transvaal), June 1959. My emphasis
69 ibid
70 CAD, GGR 157, 81/4/5 (3), “Notule van vergadering in verband met die 
hervestiging van Indierhandelaars”, 12/08/60
71 CAD, GGR 155, 81/4 (III), “Ligging van groepsgebiede vir Indiers in 
verhouding tot Bantoewoonbuurtes”, 23/02/61
270
72 CAD, GGR 152, 81/1/5 (1), Discussion with the South African Indian 
Organisation held on Friday the 30th July 1959
73 CAD, GGR 157, 81/4/5 (3), Notule van besprekings gehou te Pretoria op 15 
November 1960 in verband met die hervestiging van Indierhandelaars
75 CAD, GGR 157, 81/4/5 (3), “Notule van besprekings gehou te Pretoria op 15 
November 1960 inverband mdet die hervestiging van Indierhandelaars”
76 C. Cachalia, ‘Pageview: The Uprooting of a Community, 1890 - 1980’, 
Unpublished MA Dissertation, Essex University, 1985
77 CAD, GGR 155, 81/4 (III), “Ligging”
Maasdorp and P.N. Pillay, ‘The East Rand Indian Community’, Vol.l.,
p .7 9  
P -3 7  
p .4 1  
p . 7 2  
P -7 2  
p.85
87 Benoni City Times, 30.07.65
88 Benoni City Times, 06.09.66
89 CAD, Records of the Department of Community Development (GEM) H8/1/8, 
Vol. A, W.A. Maree, the Minister of Indian Affairs, ‘The Indian in the Republic of 
South Africa -  Policy Statement’, 17.05.62
90 GP, UW, Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, ‘The Establishment of the 
Department of Indian Affairs’, pp. 1 -3
78
79
80
Ibid
Ibid
G.G. 
p . 3 9
81 Ibid,
82 Ibid,
83 Ibid,
84 Ibid,
85 Ibid,
86 Ibid,
271
91 Ibid
92 Ibid
93 Ibid, p.l
94 Quoted in Ibid
95 Ibid, p .l6
96 Ibid, p .l8
97 Ibid
98. A.J. Venter, Coloured: A Profile o f  Two Million South Africans, Human and 
Rousseau, Cape Town, 1974, p.487
99. Ibid, p.493 , including enlarging the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and 
the Senate, which gave it more support on these bodies, enabling it to win the 
requisite two-thirds majority to pass the legislation
100. Ibid, pp.491- 492. In 1934 the government appointed a commission to 
investigate and report on the socio-economic and political conditions of the coloured 
population. It took three years before the commission completed its work and another 
six years before the government implemented one of its main recommendations, 
namely, the establishment of a Coloured Advisory Council CAC
101 GP, UW, “Report of the Department of Coloured Affairs, for the Period 1st 
April 1955, to 3 Is' December 1958“
102. GP, UW, The Coloured Persons Representation Council: The Road To Self- 
Determination, undated
103. A.J. Venter, A Profile o f  Two Million South Africans, p.478
104. Ibid
105. Ibid, p.480
106. Group Areas Act, No.77 of 1957, Article 25
107. CAD, GEM 106,5/l/3/2(2), "Instelling van Departement van Gemeenskapbou", 
Article submitted by J.H. Niemand to Erika Theron for inclusion in Sabra 
Publication, 17/09/65
108. Ibid,
272
109. Ibid
110. Ibid
111. GP, UW, ‘Report on the activities of the Department of Community 
Development for the period 1st August, 1961 to 31st December, 1962’, p. 10
112. Ibid
273
CHAPTER SEVEN
Politics and identity on the East Rand in the 1950s
Previous chapters o f this thesis have discussed how the government set about 
formulating and implementing its apartheid policies on the East Rand in the 1950s. 
The strict enforcement o f ‘racial’ segregation within and control over the black urban 
population were key objectives o f these policies. In this context, the disestablishment 
o f the urban ‘black spots’ assumed a particular importance, for at least two reasons. 
First, the residents of these locations were playing a prominent role in the popular 
struggles against apartheid. Second, residential integration was becoming the norm in 
the locations because o f the lack o f accommodation for the rapidly growing 
population. In both respects, therefore, these ‘black spots’ were regarded as threats to 
the viability of apartheid.
This chapter examines the evolution and character of popular politics in the 
‘black spots’ of the East Rand during the 1950s. It focuses in particular on the 
changing relations -  the unfolding complex and varied ‘lived experiences’ -  between 
Africans, coloureds and Indians o f these locations and their effects on local political 
formations. It is argued that the social and political relations between ordinary people 
and their organisations (social and political) were profoundly influenced by the co­
existence of two opposing trends -  of integration and segregation. On the one hand, 
the government was seeking to impose compulsory segregation. On the other hand, 
many black political organisations opposed this and campaigned for integration. The 
chapter analyses the varied responses by residents to these contending policies.
It is within this context that the uneven development o f the Congress 
Movement on the East Rand is considered. The different parties that constituted the
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Congress Movement enjoyed varied support in the location o f the East Rand. Benoni 
Old Location was, however, the undisputed stronghold o f these parties in the region. 
Much of the discussion that follows therefore focuses on the politics in that location. 
It was here that the ANC and TIC forged its strongest bonds from the late 1940s, but 
the location was also the site of the most demanding test o f those bonds, especially in 
the 1952 riots. In the late 1950s as the struggle against apartheid intensified so the 
unity within the Congress Movement was consolidated.
The East R and’s ‘Black Spots’: ‘Homes to a strange nation’
The dense concentration of ‘black spots’ on the East Rand placed the region at 
the centre of the urban black experience. Until the end o f the 1950s these areas were 
characterised by their demographic variety (by the 1940s almost every ‘black spot’ in 
the region had a mixture of African, coloured and Indian people), social and cultural 
vitality and most notably as arenas of frequent and often intense political struggles. 
Some of the most important distinctions and variations were between urbanised and 
semi-urbanised or migrant Africans, urban youth and compound inmates, home- 
owners and lodgers, those living in houses and squatters, the educated elite and 
ordinary residents. The ‘racial’ diversity of these locations was possibly one o f their 
most distinctive features, especially in the context of South Africa’s history o f strict 
‘racial’ residential segregation. These factors combined to create a rich and in many 
ways a unique amalgam of urban experiences, which in critical aspects defined the 
process of proletarianisation o f South Africa’s black population.
The main purpose for establishing locations in the early part o f the 20th 
century was to impose a basic ‘racial’ residential segregation in the urban areas. 
Segregation between white and blacks was largely achieved. However, the authorities 
had less success in keeping Africans, coloureds and Indians, who often lived in the 
same location, apart. The East Rand’s ‘black spots’ were overwhelmingly populated 
by African people, although most of them accommodated some coloureds and 
Indians. The regional coloured and Indian populations were relatively small and their
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numbers in each location varied from less than ten to a few thousand. In 1960 there 
were 9 349 and 6 544 coloureds and Indians respectively living in the region.1 The 
majority was however concentrated in Payneville, Dukathole, Stirtonville and Benoni 
Bantu Township. Alberton location had a negligible number of coloured and Indian 
residents, and Brakpan location had only one Indian family (the reason why it became 
known as the Orange Free State o f the East Rand).2
Although the government had placed Africans, coloureds and Indians in the 
same ‘black spots’, it nevertheless attempted to impose some basic segregation on 
them. Various laws were promulgated to enforce residential segregation. For 
example, the ‘native location’ regulations prohibited other ‘races’ from entering the 
‘native location’ without a permit. The success of these measures in keeping people 
apart varied considerably between locations and over time, and depended on the 
ability of the local authorities to monitor adherence to the laws. But the presence o f 
these different ‘racial’ groups in one residential area made integration inevitable, 
although the extent of the process o f socio-political melding depended on a variety o f 
factors. Overcrowding, political struggles and the realities of everyday life 
contributed to undermining segregation.
A distinctive feature o f many of the East Rand’s locations was the presence of 
so-called ‘Asiatic Bazaars’. Some o f these ‘Asiatic Bazaars’ originated in the 
previous century under the Boer Republic and they were governed by a different set 
of regulations than those applying to the ‘native’ locations. These areas were 
specifically set aside for Indian and Chinese residents, where they were allowed to 
trade and live. ‘Asiatic Bazaars’ were therefore among the first mechanisms to create 
‘racial’ residential segregation. Despite the distinct physical separation between the 
‘Asiatic Bazaars’ and the rest o f the location, these measures enjoyed only limited 
success as a means of segregation. Due to the limitations imposed on African 
commercial activities in urban areas, the ‘Asiatic Bazaars’ became the commercial 
meccas in the locations. Especially over weekends when miners descended on these 
areas to shop, the ‘Asiatic Bazaars’ became centres of commercial interaction. In this 
way segregation was constantly challenged. In Dukathole and Benoni Old Location
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the interaction between Indian residents and the inhabitants o f ‘native section’ 
locations was even more common because only single streets separated the two areas. 
As a result these streets became zones of interaction, rather than being the ‘racial 
barriers’ which the government intended them to be. Similar conditions existed also 
in Stirtonville. In Payneville, however, the ‘native location’ was ring-fenced, which 
virtually restricted contact between Africans and Indians to trade.
In contrast, the physical divisions that the government attempted to impose 
between Africans and coloureds were invariably less rigid. Coloureds on the East 
Rand did not live in separate residential areas, but in the ‘native locations’. In most 
cases they resided in specially demarcated areas known as Cape Sections/Stands, but 
in some locations such separate provision was not made. Unlike the ‘Asiatic 
Bazaars’, these coloured sections were not governed by separate laws. Instead, they 
fell under the same jurisdiction as the rest of the ‘native location’. In Payneville the 
Cape Stands stood right in the middle of the location. In Benoni Old Location the 
Cape Section was separated by a street from the ‘native location’, whereas in 
Dukathole and Stirtonville there was not even that. As a result, the Cape Stands in 
Dukathole was virtually indistinguishable from the rest of the location.3
These arbitrary divisions succeeded in entrenching ‘racial’ segregation up 
until the 1940s. But as the pressures of overcrowding mounted from the mid-1940s 
they became increasingly fudged as residents, especially Africans, who sought 
accommodation wherever they could find it. By the early fifties African lodgers were 
found in backyards in all sections o f the locations, finally shattering the brittle 
demarcations between people. The housing shortage also affected coloureds and 
Indians, and they too became lodgers in areas not legally set aside for them. However, 
it was extremely rare to find Indians living in the ‘native’ section, partly because they 
required a permit to do so (and therefore permission from the authorities) and partly 
because those sections were usually the most congested, which made it unlikely that 
they would find accommodation there.4 Coloureds faced similar legal impediments to 
living in the ‘native’ sections, but it was easier for them to do so without detection, 
especially in Stirtonville and Dukathole. Under the conditions of extreme
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overcrowding the authorities also tended to turn a blind eye to the regular flouting of 
residential segregation. The most common practice seems to have been for Africans 
and coloureds to acquire rooms or backyard shacks in the ‘Asiatic Bazaars’, where 
there was generally more space available than elsewhere in the location. In 1956 the 
Benoni City Times reported that coloureds had ‘invaded’ the Asiatic Bazaar. Some 
Indian residents complained that Indian landlords were allowing coloureds to lodge 
on their properties at the expense o f working class Indians, who were also struggling 
to find accommodation.5 In Benoni Old Location some Indians also lived in the Cape 
Section. For example, P.R. Deeva occupied a house in the Cape Section and also 
owned a tailor’s shop there.6
As a result, by the 1950s the locations of the East Rand had reached much 
higher levels of integration than in the previous period. A resident of Dukathole 
described the location as “mingled mass of humanity of blacks, coloureds, Indians 
and Chinese.”7 George Du Plessis, a resident of the Cape Section in Benoni, 
remembers the old location as a place where people “grew up together as one big 
family”. Street divisions existed only as nominal forms o f segregation and did not 
prevent extensive interaction between people. George’s family had regular contact 
with families from the ‘native’ section, especially the Putini’s who were leading ANC
Q
figures. As a result, such interaction seemed completely normal to the young George. 
Kenny Madalane, a resident o f Payneville similarly recalls a generally close 
relationship between coloureds and Africans: “I was right there in Cape Stands where 
the coloureds were... We had a very good relationship with coloured families. We 
married one another, it was just mixed marriages.”9 Jimmy Jacobs, a long-standing 
resident o f the Cape Stand in Payneville concurs: “There was no such thing as colour 
in Payneville... There was no such things as he is coloured or he is a black.”10 Moses 
Magudulela aptly described Payneville as home to a ‘strange nation’.11
It is not uncommon for former residents of these multi-racial ‘black spots’ to 
refer to the existence of single communities. Informants from Benoni Old Location 
point to the harmonious relations between residents from seemingly diverse 
backgrounds. The realities o f everyday life tended to blur divisions. There were
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myriad points o f social connection between people living in the same location. 
Valerie Klou and her netball teammates regularly walked from the Cape Section 
through the ‘native section’ to the Asiatic Bazaar without fear. People from every 
section knew them and sometimes boys from the ‘native section’ escorted them to 
their various destinations.12 Besides, most o f the shops were located in the Asiatic 
Bazaar and coloureds had to travel through the location to do their shopping. Cinemas 
were very popular and were frequented by everyone. Africans and coloureds also 
used the same shebeens, which were primarily found in the ‘native section’. The 
‘native section’ was also home to relatively cheap home brewed liquor. George Du 
Plessis has vivid memories o f his daily excursions into the ‘native’ section to buy 
liquor for his father:
I used to come out of school and had to go buy him this beer, ‘kaffir’ 
beer in the black township. I had to walk from our house, we were 
living in 3rd Street to about 9"' Street... I used to go with that little 
paraffin tin and go buy two shilling worth of beer. And then, not long 
after six o’clock lie’ll send me again. That woman there, Mrs.
Mashaba, was the best beer maker.1'1
Most Africans and coloureds were also Christian and frequently attended the 
same churches, which further facilitated social interaction between them. However, 
religion tended to deepen existing divisions between Indians and the rest of the 
population. Indians were mostly Muslim or Hindu, which kept them apart from the 
rest o f the community. Residents from Payneville recall that there was very little 
religious interaction between Indians and the residents of the location proper.14 
However, religious differences were for the most part overshadowed by other 
experiences. One central point o f intersection was around trading. For Kenny 
Madalane the relationship between Africans and Indians o f Payneville was primarily 
commercial:
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When you take it with the Indian community, we used to go and shop 
there. They used to come and visit, they used to come and sell 
bananas, samoosas and other things. They went house to house and 
there was nothing wrong. I don’t remember having a problem with 
the Indians and Chinese, who also came into the township with what 
we called Fah Fee}5
The ring-fence around Payneville constrained other forms of interaction 
between the ‘Asiatic Bazaar’ and the location. The Indian population was 
overwhelmingly involved in commercial activities, which dictated to a large extent 
the nature o f their daily interaction with other residents. In locations such as Benoni 
Old Location and Dukathole, Indian home-owners also became landlords as Africans 
and coloureds sought accommodation in the ‘Asiatic Bazaars’. As a result the 
perception of them being businessmen was entrenched. As important as these 
particular relations were, they did not constitute insurmountable obstacles to the 
forging of social and political relations between Indians and Africans especially. With 
the exception of Payneville and Brakpan, Indian residents were regarded as integral 
members of the location community.
Sport was hugely popular in the locations and most people recall a wide range 
of such activities taking place over weekends. Soccer was especially popular and each 
location contained a host of teams, which were mostly organised along ‘racial’ lines. 
Regional federations were similarly divided. Each location therefore contained teams 
from the African, coloured and Indian federations, which did not compete against one 
another but instead travelled to other locations to play teams from the same racial 
federation. These ‘racial’ demarcations were underwritten by the authorities who only 
recognised ‘racially’ divided teams and provided municipal facilities on this basis. 
However, in the 1950s these divisions again began to give way under the combined 
pressure o f the changing residential patterns and efforts by leading sports 
personalities to challenge the racial status quo began to leave their impression. It now 
became quite common for the ‘racially’ constituted teams from the same location to
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play against one another. More significant was the decision by numerous players to 
join teams o f their choice, against the prescriptions laid down by the authorities.16
These changes prompted the formation of the East Rand Inter-Race Soccer 
Board, which attempted to unite the different federations under a single controlling 
body and to organise and encourage competition across the traditional divisions. Bob 
Triegaardt was the president of the Board, which also contained prominent sports 
personalities from most of the East Rand’s locations. According to Triegaardt the 
new body was more of a ‘multi-racial federation’:
There was an East Rand Indian Football Association and a Coloured 
Association, and African Association. Different but governed by one 
mother-body. Separate bodies because they lived in separate areas.
There were different racial teams from each of the areas. Benoni was 
the headquarters of the different associations.17
Valerie Klou remembers a similar process of integration taking place in 
netball during the 1950s. T he team she played for, Callics, was located in the 
Benoni’s Cape Section and consisted only of coloureds. However, they played all 
their games in the location against Indian and African competitors.18 Previously, 
residential-based teams were ‘racially’ exclusive, which reflected the ‘racial’ make­
up of those areas. But, as the different sections o f the locations became more 
integrated these residential-based teams began to reflect the new reality.
In some instances young activists openly defied the status quo. TIC members 
were especially prominent in these efforts. P.R. Deeva, who was known as 
‘sportsman’ throughout Benoni Old Location, “felt [strongly] that all these racial 
organisations must go.” In 1940 Deeva and his cousin joined the Benoni Bantu Boys 
Club (an exclusive African boxing club). He later became treasurer of the club.19 
They then ‘infiltrated’ soccer and tennis clubs to pursue similar aims. Along with 
other TIC activists Deeva formed a mixed tennis team in Benoni Location, although 
they had difficulties convincing coloureds to join. In the 1950s Deeva, his wife and
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the young De Jager brothers joined the Bantu Tennis Club much to the chagrin of the 
authorities, which immediately attempted to break up the non-racial tennis clubs. On 
one occasion the new non-racial team won a local competition but the all-coloured 
team complained about the presence o f Indians and coloureds in the ‘native’ team and 
called for it to be disqualified. The municipality intervened and insisted they conform 
to the rules of segregation, which they refused, preferring to forfeit their victory.20 
When the municipality closed the tennis courts because they were being utilised by 
mixed teams, Deeva, Johnny De Jager and Dennis Brutus organised a campaign to 
expose the municipality’s racism. The authorities however refused to concede and 
kept the courts locked up. The result was that tennis rapidly declined as a popular 
sport in the location.21
Education was another sphere of both separation and mixing. Most Africans 
attended schools run by mission churches. These schools often allowed coloured 
pupils to enrol. In addition there were also separate coloured schools. Indians rarely 
attended such schools because o f their religious differences. In Payneville, where 
there were no schools for Indians, scholars daily had to travel to Bcnoni to attend 
school. In Bcnoni segregation was not strictly enforced at primary school level. 
George Du Plessis remembers African students attending the Bcnoni Coloured and 
Indian Primary School. However, the authorities seemed to have enforced much 
stricter segregation at the main high school in the area, William Hills High School, 
which was reserved exclusively for coloureds and Indians (and, in fact, was staffed 
primarily by coloured teachers).23
The erosion of physical racial barriers and the widespread integration between 
Africans, coloureds and Indians had a profound effect on the consciousness o f the 
residents o f the old locations. For these residents life in the old locations contrasted 
sharply with the personal and social dislocation caused by forced removals and the 
segregated lives imposed on black people by the Group Areas Act. These sentiments 
capture one aspect o f the relations between inhabitants o f the old locations. As 
alluded to above there were also various points o f tension between them, which
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sometimes assumed a ‘racial’ character. These opposing tendencies were also evident 
in the politics of the period.
The ‘multi-racial’ Congress Movement
The 1950s witnessed an intensification of popular struggles against white 
minority rule. The Congress Movement, led by the ANC, emerged as the pre-eminent 
liberation movement in the course o f these struggles. Black people -  Africans, 
coloureds and Indians -  were mobilised in large numbers under this common political 
banner. The East Rand became a stronghold of the anti-apartheid movement, 
especially of the ANC. The Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) and the South African 
Coloured People’s Organisation (SACPO), which organised Indians and coloureds 
respectively, w'ere also popular. On the East Rand their support varied considerably 
between locations. Both were able, however, to build relatively influential 
organisations in Benoni.
The Congress Movement brought together autonomous and ‘racially’ 
exclusive organisations under a single political banner. Throughout the 1950s but 
especially in the latter half of the decade (after the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 
1955) the different components o f the Congress Movement forged a closer unity as 
the struggle against apartheid intensified. At the same time each of them operated 
autonomously. Nationally and locally their political agendas and interventions 
differed, albeit with the same objective of opposing apartheid laws. The varying 
trajectories followed by these organisations reflected the varying concerns of their 
constituencies. These differences were especially manifest at a local level. The 
educated elite from the old locations also dominated the leadership of the Congress 
organisations. Bonner has argued that the ANC drew its support primarily from the 
settled urban population, and particularly from the urban elite.24 The educated elite 
among Indians and coloureds similarly dominated the TIC and SACPO respectively. 
It may be argued, therefore, that the alliances formed by these organisations (first 
between the ANC and TIC, and later under the banner of the Congress Movement
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also the SACPO) were principally alliances of the progressive or radical elites from 
the respective ‘racial groups’ which these organisations represented.
Co-operation between the ANC and TIC preceded the founding of the 
Congress Alliance. The Doctors’ Pact of 1946 illustrated the co-operation between 
the leaders o f these movements. The relatively close relationship between these 
organisations was aided by the presence in each of leading Communist Party 
members. The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was the only political 
organisation at the time that consciously recruited members from various ‘racial’ 
backgrounds and was committed to building a non-racial political movement. The 
party was especially influential on the East Rand and recruited a number of local 
African leaders into its ranks. In Benoni young Indian activists participated in the 
CPSA night schools and subsequently either joined or became sympathisers o f the 
party.25 After its banning in 1950, the party pursued its political aims within the 
Congress Movement. The elevation of young radicals to leading positions in the ANC 
and SAIC from the mid-1940s also contributed to the forging of an alliance between 
them. From the mid-1940s both organisations adopted a more confrontational stance 
to the government. The South African Indian Congress embarked on a Gandhi-style 
passive resistance campaign to mobilise opposition to the Pegging Acts in the mid- 
1940s. Front this time the SAIC played a leading role in the struggles against 
segregation and the Group Areas Act in particular.
The ANC’s radicalisation was led by the Youth Leaguers, among who were 
Mandela, Sisulu, Tarnbo and Mbeki. These young radicals transformed the ANC 
from a moderate elitist organisation to a more radical organisation willing to engage 
in mass struggles and to confront the government. In the late 1940s they wrested 
control o f the ANC from the moderate leadership. Their ascendancy was marked by 
the adoption by the ANC of the radical Programme of Action in 1949, which 
represented an important turning point in the organisation’s history. The new 
leadership signalled its intentions to confront the government by calling stay-aways 
in 1950 to protest the proscription o f the Communist Party and apartheid policies 
generally.
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The East Rand was an important site of combined struggles mounted by these 
organisations. Activists such as Diza Putini, Edward Cindi, Yusuf Cachalia, the 
Deeva brothers, David Bopape and Dinah Made became household names in their 
locations. Benoni Old Location became the focal point o f political struggles in the 
region and consequently where the alliance between these organisations appeared the 
strongest. The Indian Congress’ successful mobilisation for the defiance campaign 
against the Pegging Acts was the model on which the Congress Movement’s 
Defiance Campaign of 1952 was based. The jointly organised Defiance Campaign of 
1952 was intended to signal the united opposition o f black people (at the core of 
which was the ANC and SAIC) against apartheid. The decision to choose Stirtonville 
as the place to launch the campaign confirmed the importance o f the region to the 
opposition movement. But before this turning point in the history o f black opposition 
was reached, the relations between the Africans and Indians were sorely tested in the 
heart o f the region’s opposition movement, namely, Benoni Old Location.
ANC-TIC unity tested
The alliance between the ANC and TIC appeared strongest in Benoni Old 
Location. Outside the formal political structures, however, the political alliance 
between Africans and Indians was less secure. Competition between Indian 
businessmen and aspirant African entrepreneurs, who resented Indian businessmen’s 
monopoly over commerce in the location, was the most serious bone o f contention. 
The congested state of both areas in the location also contributed to the tension in the 
area. In particular, unscrupulous Indian landlords who exploited their tenants added to 
the resentment against Indian businessmen. In 1951 and 1952 the relationship 
between the ANC and TIC were put to the test as these tensions boiled over into open 
conflict.
In April 1951, the chairman of the Benoni Native Affairs Committee informed 
the Town Council that there were two main causes for the enmity between the ‘races’. 
First was the overcrowding in the location and second “the rapid evolution towards
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western civilisation of the Native peoples; an evolution which has developed in them 
a growing sense o f their own rights... their rights to trade among themselves.” The 
Council concurred that the main problem was “resentment among natives, already 
rife, ... against non-native competition.”
The stark disparities in commercial activities controlled by Indians and 
Africans in the location are revealed in the following statistics:
TABLE EIGHT
Businesses owned by Indians and Africans in Benoni Old Location,
195127
Indians Africans
Population 1 200 36 000
Number of sites 264 3 100
Number of trading sites 46 42
Number of trading licences 121 87
Number of taxi licences 51 29
In 1951 a dispute erupted over the question o f Indian domination o f the local 
taxi industry. The problem was aggravated by the refusal o f the Transportation Board 
to award additional taxi licences to Africans, which created a perception of 
favouratism towards Indians. African taxi owners initially sought redress by 
appealing to the Benoni Location Advisory Board, which requested the Council to 
urge the Transportation Board to issue taxi licences on a ‘pro rata basis’. The 
Transportation Board, however, ignored these half-hearted pleas and continued its 
practice o f issuing the lion’s share o f licences to Indians. As a result of this rebuff, the 
aggrieved African taxi owners sought a different solution.
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It was at this point that Noni Monare became embroiled in the dispute. It is 
likely that Monare himself was an aspirant taxi owner as he had previously driven 
taxis owned by P.R. Deeva. Monare had for some time attempted to establish 
himself as a businessman in the location but enjoyed only mixed success. Monare 
may also have harboured political aspirations and may have viewed the taxi dispute 
as an opportunity to advance on both fronts. On the 16th April 1951, Monare and 
Head Constable Johnson organised a meeting at Monare’s house on 3rd Street 
between the Indian and African taxi owners, where the latter group “voiced their 
grievances about the monopoly o f the taxi business by the Asiatics”. They pointed out 
that Indians owned as many as five taxis, as well as shops. African entrepreneurs, 
they argued, had only limited access to business opportunities and depended on the 
taxi business to gain a foothold in commerce. The African taxi owners reportedly 
demanded that Indians relinquish their licences to those African taxi owners who 
were refused licences by the Transportation Board. This the Indian taxi owners 
refused to concede to and the meeting ended without resolution. The parties did 
nevertheless agree to convene a further meeting, which took place at the Star 
Bioscope on the 20th April. At this second gathering, Indian taxi owners objected to 
the presence of non-taxi owners in the delegation of the African taxi owners. After 
failing to reach an agreement on this matter, the African delegation walked out o f the 
meeting. They immediately reconvened at another venue, where it was decided to call 
a boycott of Indian-owned taxis. The already tense situation was further inflamed 
when Monare was shot in the leg by an unknown assailant.29
In a shrewd political manoeuvre, the taxi boycott was immediately politicised 
by the decision to drape African-owned taxis with yellow, green and black flags -  the 
colours of the ANC. It is unlikely the local ANC leaders officially endorsed this 
measure as they seem to have had no involvement in this dispute. The Advisory 
Board attempted to intervene and reconcile the opposing parties, but with little effect. 
It also tried to get the boycott called off, but without success. Monare and the African 
taxi owners seemed determined to press ahead with their action. It is unclear how
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long the boycott lasted or whether it managed to mobilise support among location 
residents.
Monare apparently believed the taxi boycott was a failure because “the 
Indians changed their taxis and called them by their boys’ surnames. They fetched 
money in the night, they cancelled the certificates with lawyers and made 
agreements.”30 The authorities nevertheless seem to have taken some notice o f the 
boycott because the following year it awarded more licences to African taxi owners. 
In 1951, 29, 15 and 41 licences were issued to Africans, coloureds and Indians 
respectively. But in 1952, 34 licences were issued to Africans compared to only 25 to 
Indians, which represented an increase of nearly 150% in the number of taxi licences 
issues to Africans.31
The following year the same issues again burst to the open, this time with 
such ferocity that they threatened to cause irreparable damage to relations between 
Africans and Indians. In July 1952 Benoni Old Location was suddenly engulfed by 
what became known locally as the ‘Korean War’.32 On 4 July 1952 an Indian shop- 
owner, Faizel, beat to death a young African boy who he accused of stealing from his 
shop.33 Residents from both areas o f the location were outraged. Faizel was a 
notorious conservative and was on bad terms with TIC activists, who immediately 
denounced Faizel for his actions. Initially, it appeared this assuaged the feelings 
among many adult African residents who considered Faizel should be punished but 
accepted that he was not representative of the attitude o f Indians to Africans.34
However, for Noni Monare the situation presented an opportunity not only to 
avenge the callous death o f the young boy but also to teach Indian traders a lesson. 
Monare held very strong anti-Indian views. He even supported the creation o f group 
areas where Indians and Africans could engage in businesses separately. 
Notwithstanding or perhaps consonant with his radical populism, Monare wrote a 
letter to a leading government official, T.E. Donges, to express his antipathy towards 
Indian businessmen:
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I would like to let you know that I am supporting the Group Areas 
Act. It seems to me that Benoni Municipality is against the Group 
Areas Act because through my knowledge I know that Act is 
existing. To my surprise I still see Indians building very expensive 
houses and Bioscopes in Benoni Location, the very centre where riots 
occurred recently between the Africans and Indians... The Indians 
are very ‘immoral’, they are the cause of strained feelings between 
the Africans and the whites in this country. The exploitation of 
Africans by Indians is very high especially here in Benoni.35
In the days before the boy’s funeral Monare mobilised youth (including tsotsis 
and ANC Youth League members) in the location, as well as those from as far as 
Alexandra and Sophiatown.36 At the end of the funeral service Monare delivered a 
fiery speech in which he appealed to the mourners “to stand bold as a black nation”.37 
After the funeral he led his band o f youthful supporters on a march to the Indian 
section where they proceeded to attack businesses. As shop after shop was gutted to 
the ground Monare’s supporters chanted “Korea, Korea”. Over the next fortnight the 
situation in the location remained poised on knife’s edge as more attacks were 
launched against Indian shops. Some feared Benoni might witness a repeat o f the 
devastating so-called ‘race riots’ in Durban in 1949.
The length of time it took to restore calm in the location as well as Monare’s 
close relationship with Constable Johnston (who was also involved in the taxi 
dispute) raised the question of police complicity. P.R. Deeva argues that when the 
police arrived in the location they did little to stop the violence.38 The Benoni Town 
council, while almost probably non-complicit, was certainly keen to capitalise on the 
dispute. According to the chairman of the Native Affairs Committee,
There can be little doubt that the conditions and ugly inter-racial 
atmosphere, gradually but continually gaining in intensity as among 
the Asiatic, Coloured and Native populations in the Non-European 
areas to-day, cannot be overlooked, and under the present day
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conditions all the elements are present that will without undue 
exitement (sic) or agitation lead to disorders which may result in 
bloodshed.39
The authorities had their own reasons for highlighting ‘racial’ tensions, or 
misconstruing any conflict in the location as illustrations o f ‘racial’ animosity. Their 
solution was to endorse the politically contentious issue o f Group Areas:
Whilst there may be provisions in the [Group Areas] Act with which 
we do not all agree and whilst, also its application in certain areas of 
the Union will undoubtedly create hardship, it is felt that in the case 
of Benoni its application will eventually prove to be in the best 
interest of all section of the population.40
Monare’s Korean movement threw the opposition alliance into much greater 
disarray. From the moment o f the first attacks on the Indians shops, local Congress 
leaders frantically tried to assert their authority over the location’s population in an 
effort to stop the violence. Deeva organised his own youth defence group, called the 
‘wrench’, which was composed of African youth loyal to the Congress leaders. 
However, Congress support rested mainly on the older and more established residents 
who were not involved in the violence. Monare drew his following from the ranks of 
the unemployed, the youth or those struggling to establish themselves in the urban 
locations -  precisely those constituencies the Congress Movement failed to attract 
into its ranks. The national leaders o f the Congress Movement were equally perturbed 
by the turn of events in one their political strongholds. Mandela, Sisulu, Tambo and 
Dadoo approached the local Congress leaders to find out how they could have 
allowed such a crisis to develop. Tambo, who lived in Wattville, became directly 
involved in efforts to bring about peace.41 They engaged in a series of public displays 
of unity between Africans and Indians to show African residents that not all Indians 
were anti-African and that many o f them were part of the liberation struggle. ANC
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and TIC leaders called meetings, visited residents and marched through the street to 
appeal to residents to stop the violence.42
The turning point in the crisis occurred when local TIC leader, P.R. Deeva, 
convinced the leader of the Basotho gang (the Russians or maRashea) to protect the 
Indian section from attacks by Monare’s group. Many of them lived as lodgers in the 
Indian section and were not prepared to sit back and allow their dwellings to be 
destroyed by location youth. Monare who was a Basotho also attempted to solicit the 
support o f the Russians but was outmanoeuvred by the equally astute Deeva.43 
Monare probably failed because his main support base, the location youth, were the 
traditional foes o f the more rustic Russians. Monare and his supporters baulked at the 
prospect o f a confrontation with the Russians, who had a reputation of unmatched 
ruthlessness. The intervention o f the Russians thus put an end to the attacks on the 
Indians Section. The Congress leaders also managed to isolate Monare from the older 
and more settled residents. As the tide began to turn against Monare, the police began 
to act more decisively against rioters. For example, Monare and other leaders were 
arrested. Within a few weeks peace was restored and the ‘Korean’ movement was at 
an end.
The Congress leadership was however clearly stunned by these events, which 
had exposed serious flaws in the Congress Movement. The outbreak of the ‘Korean 
War’ coincided with preparations for the vital Defiance Campaign, which in many 
senses represented the strongest show of unity between these two organisations. It 
responded by making Monare the leader of the regional Youth League, a position 
which he utilised later to lead the struggle against Bantu Education in Benoni. In so 
doing, the Congress Movement took an important step to bringing Monare’s 
supporters into their sphere o f influence. Monare’s political career in Benoni was 
abruptly ended in 1955 when he was deported to Lesotho because of his prominent 
role in the education boycott.44
Residents of the old location remember normal relations being restored 
surprisingly quickly after the conflict ended. Indian businesses were immediately re­
opened and the Indian section regained its status as the commercial centre of the
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location. The imbalances in trading relations were also restored but there was no 
recurrence of the events of the early 1950s. Indeed residents of the old location 
remember relations between Africans and Indians being especially harmonious after 
the ‘Korean War’. The launch of the Defiance Campaign so soon after the violence in 
Benoni was also fortuitous because it demonstrated the unity of African and Indian 
leaders against the apartheid government. Mandela and Dadoo together were among 
the first to defy apartheid laws and court imprisonment. These symbolic gestures of 
unity contributed hugely to healing the wounds of the conflicts in Benoni.
The Defiance Campaign also marked the turning point in the transformation 
of the ANC into a popular mass organisation. Nationally and in almost every location 
on the East Rand the support for the ANC swelled over the next few years. Its 
reputation as the main liberation movement was augmented by important campaigns 
such as the potato boycott, the anti-Bantu Education struggles, the launch of the 
Freedom Charter and the anti-pass campaigns. East Rand locations were in the 
forefront of many of these campaigns. Benoni and Germiston locations, for example, 
witnessed among the best-organised struggles against the introduction o f Bantu 
Education. Congress activists, parents and teachers set up alternative schools (the 
cultural clubs) and even though these eventually floundered, they nonetheless 
demonstrated the strong support the ANC had been able to build in these locations.
In all of these struggles the ANC and SAIC appeared as inseparable alliance 
partners. Indian Congress leaders were prominent at the launch o f the Freedom 
Charter, many of them were part o f the Treason Trial of 1956 and they joined the 
thousands o f women who marched to Pretoria to oppose pass laws. Besides these 
national campaigns the struggle against group areas, for more housing and better 
living conditions helped forge closer links between the impoverished residents o f the 
locations. Here Benoni again assumed its place as a leading Congress stronghold. By 
contrast, the politics in the coloured communities on the East Rand proceeded along a 
rather different trajectory.
292
East Rand coloured politics emerges from its slumber
When P.R. Deeva moved to the Coloured Section o f Benoni Location he 
received a mixed reception. Many coloured residents welcomed him to the area 
because he was well-known. But there were some who objected to the presence o f an 
Indian person in the Coloured Section. At the height o f the ‘Korean W ar’ his 
neighbours complained that his presence in the Coloured Section threatened to bring 
the conflict to the area, which was untouched by the violence.45 George du Plessis, 
who was active in Congress politics from 1950, hardly remembers the ‘Korean W ar’, 
an indication of how little impact this crucial episode in the location’s history had on 
the lives of coloured residents.46 This point also illustrates the extent to which many 
coloureds remained distant from the main political movements, at least until the mid- 
1950s. Despite the prominent role played by political activists such as Mary Moodley 
in the struggles led by the Congress Movement throughout the 1950s, the relationship 
between coloured political movements and the Congress Movement remained 
ambivalent. It was only in the latter part of the decade under the impetus o f 
radicalised political struggles that a closer relationship was forged between the 
Coloured People’s Congress (later SACPO) and the rest o f the Congress Movement 
on the East Rand.
This ambiguity between coloured political movements and the Congress 
Movement was an expression of the complex nature of coloured identity. This 
question has been among the most vexed in South African politics and has stubbornly 
defied simplistic characterisation. Among the defining features o f coloured identity 
have been its contradictoriness, political malleability (that have made it prone to 
perennial manipulation), regional variations and constant redefinition since the turn of 
the 20th century by both the ruling class and the people defined as coloured. Various 
factors have influenced the evolving character of coloured identity: the ebbs and 
flows of the national liberation struggle, the economic fortunes o f the country and, of 
course, the government’s policies. In the latter case the passage o f the Group Areas
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and Population Registration Acts in 1950 served to enforce a stricter division between 
coloureds, Africans and whites.
The construction o f a discreet coloured identity proved far from easy, 
especially in the urban locations of the Witwatersrand where the lines o f ‘racial’ 
demarcation were often blurred. Compared to the urban centres of the Western Cape 
there was a greater familial and social overlapping between Africans and coloureds in 
the ‘black spots’ of the East Rand. Not all coloureds accepted the association made 
between them and Africans. For sections of the coloured population this association 
implied being subjected to the same oppressive and impoverished conditions as 
experienced by Africans. They preferred to stress their apparent social and cultural 
proximity to the white population in the hope that it would spare them from social 
deprivation. They were prepared to accept the relative privileges accruing from their 
secondary status in apartheid’s racial hierarchy. As Dugmore has argued ‘being 
coloured’ meant exemption “from lower wages, pass laws, certain taxes, residential 
restrictions and, at some levels, particular types of social and police abuse and 
harassment.”47 Other coloureds, however, viewed apartheid as the problem and 
aligned themselves to a united struggle by black people to overthrow the system.
More than any ‘racial’ group, coloureds were constantly pulled in opposite political 
directions. This produced a very different kind of politics than was the case among 
Africans and Indians. The very pronounced divergent tendencies among coloureds 
were also reflected in the varying attitudes over their association with Africans and 
whites.
Danny Cassel, now a well-known businessman in Reiger Park, was born into 
a relatively non-political family48 that straddled the racially defined barriers in ways 
that were quite common on the Witwatersrand. His father came from the Transkei 
and his mother’s family lived in Payneville, from where they were evicted because of 
his grandfather’s regular confrontations with the authorities over his illegal beer 
brewing activities. Danny’s parents first lived in Alexandra township and in 1960 
moved to Stirtonville where his father engaged in a number of small businesses. For 
example, Cassel senior kept five cows in his yard and sold milk to his neighbours.
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According to Danny his family was indistinguishable from their African neighbours. 
Two of his aunts married African men and, at the time, “no-one cared who you 
married”.49 The question o f a separate coloured identity was not a primary issue in the 
daily lives o f the Cassel family.
Cravin Collis50 was born in Benoni’s Cape Section and was classified as 
coloured. However, his formal racial classification has always been an enigma to him
because
I grew up in a family with black extraction... My second name is 
Mxolisi... I could not be a racist, it would be contradictory.51
Jimmy Jacobs o f Payneville has a similar genealogy: his mother was coloured 
and father Zulu. He speaks Afrikaans and Zulu fluently and was raised in a mixed 
environment in the Cape Stands. Like Collis he was classified coloured, but was often 
mistaken by the police as African. As a result he was frequently harassed by the 
police and asked to produce a pass. Only his ability to speak Afrikaans fluently 
convinced the police that he was coloured. Mis fluency in Zulu, on the other hand, 
made him more acceptable among the Africans of the location.52 There was therefore 
a significant section of coloureds in the locations of the Witwatersrand who shared 
numerous bonds with their African counterparts, to the extent that their supposed 
coloured identity was not an issue.
Co-existing with this trend was the opposite tendency that emphasised 
coloured separateness (from Africans) and wanted to promote closer bonds with 
whites. Jimmy Jacobs recalls that not everyone in the Cape Stands shared his colour­
blindness. There were more than a few coloureds “who wanted to be whiter than 
white” and insisted they were different from the Africans in the location.53 A section 
of the coloured population in Benoni shared the same attitude. Cravin Collis recalls 
that they tried to show their affinity to whites by emphasising their fluency in 
Afrikaans.54 During the period under discussion a number o f organisations emerged 
which promoted the idea o f the ‘natural affinity’ between coloureds and whites. One
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such organisation was the Transvaal Coloured People’s Association (TCPA). This 
never achieved any sustained mass support but was courted by the authorities because 
o f its conservative politics. In the early 1950s, the TCPA enthusiastically endorsed 
the Group Areas Act and called for its speedy implementation so that coloured people 
could be removed from the locations where they were living together with Africans. 
In 1950, for example, the Springs branch of the TCPA submitted a memorandum to the 
local authority, in which it appealed for the immediate establishment of a separate 
coloured township:
For all the years we have lived among natives in circumstances which are foreign 
to our customs and habits. Under these circumstances the younger generation 
degenerates very quickly.
When we arrived here we were promised that our residence here was temporary, 
but in spite of repeated applications for the removal of the coloureds, nothing 
positive has been done for us in this direction; on the contrary all privileges have 
been denied us.
We arc concerned to learn that the Asiatic, a foreigner, has been exempted from 
all these circumstances wherein we, the coloured population, suffer. We arc very 
much concerned to learn that after all these years of living with and faithfulness 
to the European authority we are compared with the native.55
This memorandum was a crude attempt to distinguish coloureds from other 
blacks by pleading affinity to whites and loyalty to the government. The obsequiousness 
evident in the memorandum reflected a growing desperation among coloureds to 
improve their living conditions. In this vein the TCPA appealed to the Council to 
provide “Facilities for the coloured on economic and industrial grounds”. Such 
economic advancement it believed should be designed to ensure the “furtherance of 
coloured interests in general as a separate race with its own tradition and national 
pride.”55 The memorandum was signed by 105 coloured residents from Payneville, 
indicating relatively solid support for the policies of organisations such as the TCPA. 
The Group Areas Act seemed to provide an opportunity to escape the overcrowded and
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indigent conditions of the Cape Stands. Coloureds from Stirtonville made similar 
demands and called for land to be set aside for them outside the ‘native location’.57
The coloured elite, particularly businessmen, also especially experienced 
frustration in the ‘native location’. They were not permitted to engage in any business 
activities because Payneville was a ‘native location’, which meant only African 
businesses could operate there. The thriving trade of the Asiatic Section compounded 
their sense of injustice. To them the creation of a group area promised the prospect of 
their own businesses free from competition from other ‘racial’ groups. For these people 
the pro-apartheid policies of the TCPA appeared attractive. Although the TCPA 
appeared unable to build a loyal following, its ideas nevertheless resonated among 
sections of the region’s coloured population. The TCPA’s failure to translate the support 
for its policies into a viable organisation, was also experienced by other political 
organisations. Previous attempts by political movements to mobilise the coloured 
population of the Transvaal found them to be disinterested in formal politics.
Generally coloured people of the East Rand remained aloof from politics. In 
Dukathole, Payneville and Stirtonville coloureds rarely made an impression in the local 
political arena. Even the main national campaigns led by coloured organisations, such as 
the struggle against the removal of coloureds from the common voters’ roll, failed to 
attract much support on the Witwatersrand, probably because Transvaal coloureds did 
not have the right to vote. Occasionally political organisations attempted to mobilise 
coloureds around specific issues, but these efforts rarely succeeded. The pre-eminent 
coloured political organisation during the first half of the twentieth century, the African 
People’s Organisation (APO), failed to establish any substantial support in the 
Transvaal. The APO briefly appeared on the political scene in Benoni in 1945 when it 
organised a public meeting (which was attended by about 100 people) to demand that 
more houses be built for coloureds.58 The Communist Party was similarly unable to 
recruit even young coloured intellectuals into its ranks in the way it succeeded in doing 
among Indians. Coloureds thus remained on the periphery o f organised politics.
Here again Benoni proved to be an exception. Until the mid-1950s most 
coloureds in the location were also generally averse to becoming involved in politics. In
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the early 1950s a handful of coloured activists became involved in Congress politics, 
Mary Moodley being by far the most prominent. But it would take some time before she 
and others of her ilk would be able to assert any political significant influence in the 
area. Before that politics in the Cape Section undertook a detour via the Coloured 
Advisory Committee.
In August 1951 the Benoni Council decided to establish liaison committees 
for coloureds and Indians that would function in a similar fashion to the Advisory 
Boards.59 On 26 September the same year the first Coloured Advisory Committee 
(CAC) was elected consisting of G. Carr, W. Pietersen, P. De Jager, Bob Triegaardt, 
A. Jansen and P. York.60 Two months later the Benoni Asiatic Standowners and 
Tenants Liaison Committee was established comprising C.S. Moodley, Faizel Ellahi, 
P. Singh, S.M. Ally, Wing Son and T.J. Poonsamy.61 The differences between the 
politics in the Indian and coloured populations at the time were reflected in the 
divergent histories of their respective committees that were created by the Council. 
The Asiatic Liaison Committee was virtually stillborn despite the presence on it o f 
one the Indian Section’s political luminaries, C.S. Moodley, who had previously been 
a leading figure in the TIC. But the dominant position of the TIC and its implacable 
opposition to the Asiatic Liaison Committee left the Council’s initiative without any 
popular support or legitimacy.
The CAC enjoyed more legitimacy despite criticisms from the more radical 
activists aligned to the Congress movement, who asserted that these bodies had no 
powers to effect material improvements in people’s lives and reinforced racial 
divisions. This was because in the early 1950s the radicals were weak and their 
criticisms did not find an echo among ordinary coloured people. In addition, the 
presence o f G. Carr,62 an outspoken critic o f the government and an ANC supporter, 
enhanced the reputation of the CAC. So too did the membership of Bob Triegaardt, 
who was a respected senior teacher at William Hills High School and who had been 
involved in various welfare projects in the coloured section. Most members of the 
committee were moderate and did not perceive their functions as political.63 But
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whatever their political stand, committee members were in there to demand 
improvements in the lives o f coloured residents from the Council.
Within months o f its establishment the CAC embarked on a campaign to 
acquire more houses and land for coloured residents. It also sought to secure the 
creation o f a new coloured township by invoking the Group Areas Act. However, the 
Land Tenure Advisory Board rejected the request on the grounds that such an area 
could not be established prior to the production of a detailed plan for group areas for 
the town.64 The CAC also insisted that coloured businessmen be given preferential 
treatment in coloured areas, reflecting the same concern that African entrepreneurs 
had about Indian businessmen’s monopoly o f commerce in the location. Bob 
Triegaardt was especially an avid proponent of this view.65
The CAC’s primary concern was housing. The Cape Section, like the rest of 
the Bcnoni Old Location, had become seriously overcrowded. Slum conditions were 
rapidly developing in the coloured section, where at least 2662 people were crammed 
into only 370 houses.66 The council acknowledged that “Gross overcrowding is 
rampant” in the coloured section where more than half o f the existing houses were 
declared unsuitable for habitation and privately acknowledged that at least 219 new 
houses were required to meet the existing needs.67
The CAC repeatedly warned the Council of the deteriorating conditions in the 
Cape Sections and reacted with incredulity when the Council claimed to be unaware 
of the situation. At a meeting with the Council, Mr. G. Carr estimated that about 100 
coloured families were in desperate need of houses. In a veiled threat he warned the 
Council that unless it addressed the housing crisis the people would find ‘other means 
of dealing with the situation’. But the CAC also promised to co-operate with the 
Council if  it was consulted before decisions were taken on housing matters.68
In January 1953 the Benoni branch of the TCPA despatched a memorandum 
to the council to add its voice to the growing chorus of complaints about the situation 
in the Cape Section. It characterised the recent rent increases as unfair because 
services remained decrepit. And, in similar vein to its intervention in Payneville, the 
TCPA accused the Council of discriminating against coloured businessmen because
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the authorities constantly turned down applications for business licences from them. 
Its memorandum to the Council averred that,
As the council grants licences to Indians and Natives liberally, the 
Association is of the opinion that Coloured applications should be 
viewed in the same light. This differentiation on the part of the 
Council toward our people has in the past had a detrimental effect on 
the Coloureds, and it has of necessity resulted in Coloureds being 
unscrupulously exploited by shopkeepers of other races.69
Notwithstanding its strong views on this matter, the TCPA seemed to have
disappeared from Benoni’s political landscape almost as quickly as it had appeared.
This left the CAC as the principal voice representing the interests of the people o f the
Cape Section. The CAC continued to press the Council to build more houses and
mobilised support in the community to back its demands. By the end o f 1953 the
Council itself expressed the fear that the situation was in danger o f spiralling out o f
control and that there might be a repetition of the squatter problem in the coloured
section. It also conceded to the demand of CAC not to implement the proposed rent 
• 70increases,
In March 1954 the CAC also accused the Council of discriminating against 
coloureds and of favouring other races. It protested that,
Benoni has achieved outstanding success in solving the housing crisis 
for Europeans and Africans. This however cannot be said for its 
housing to the local Coloured population. The Sub-Economic and 
Economic houses built by the Benoni Council are insufficient to meet 
the needs of the Coloured population with the result that the majority 
of our people are forced to live under appalling conditions in the so 
called ‘Cape Section’.71
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The CAC appealed to the authorities to make more land available and to 
permit coloureds to build their own houses. In what had by this time become a 
common political tactic employed by coloured politicians to win concession from the 
authorities, the CAC also invoked the purported close bonds between coloured and 
whites. In the memorandum submitted to the Council, the CAC argued that it was an
unpleasant paradox that a community which it generally admitted 
closely approximates European standards of culture, attainment and 
living should exist in filth and squalor in a town where the housing 
conditions of all other groups are being improved with such marked 
success... The Benoni Council have given the country a lead in many 
important aspects of Non-European Administration ... All this has 
resulted in a more contented, progressive native population. We feel 
that assistance on the lines proposed above, would produce the same
results in the Coloured Community, and remove the feeling of
72frustration and suspicion that exists in our ranks.
But the Council remained unmoved by the CAC’s appeals and made only 
half-hearted attempts to address coloured people’s concerns. In mid-1954 the 
Council decided to convert houses in the Cape Section from sub-economic to 
economic units as well as giving residents the option to purchase these houses. This 
decision was accompanied by a huge increase in rentals (or the repayment amount) 
from the £1.17.6 to £4.6.1.73 The increases affected only 35 sub-economic houses but 
nevertheless incensed residents, not only because of the leap in rents but also because 
the Council still appeared to avoid the central issue o f the lack of houses. By 1955 
impatience over the Council’s failure to provide houses mounted and was reflected in 
the adoption of a more radical stance by some of CAC’s members. The Council’s 
decision in 1955 to conduct a social survey in the Cape Section to ascertain which 
residents were employed in Benoni caused a further outcry in the community. It was 
obvious that Council wanted to disqualify those residents who were not employed in 
Benoni from housing provision. In November 1955 CAC called a public meeting to
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oppose the council’s proposed socio-economic survey, which it labelled as “the 
greatest threat to our personal freedom”. It also stridently objected to the council’s 
threat to evict coloured lodgers from the Asiatic section.74 Over 200 residents 
attended the meeting, which itself suggested a shift in the political mood among 
coloureds. The political temperature o f the meeting was also raised by the Council’s 
proposal to suspend its recognition o f CAC. Clearly, the authorities had become 
concerned about the radicalisation o f a committee it had hoped would be a platform 
for moderate politicians. Even now the CAC was divided on the approach it should 
adopt to the Council. The moderates, led by Bob Triegaardt, favoured a conciliatory 
tack. The radicals, led by George Carr, were more confrontational. The November 
meeting generally supported the oppositional stance adopted by Mr. Carr and his 
supporters. When he called on the committee to defy the council and refuse to resign 
he was ‘unanimously applauded’. He also used the opportunity publicly to accuse the 
township manager, J.E. Mathewson, o f working hand in hand with Verwocrd and 
asserted that the CAC would stand together with the Kleurling Volskbond in 
opposing the ejectment of coloureds from the Asiatic Section.75
The public association with the Kleurling Volksbond was curious, to say the 
least. The Transvaalsc Kleurling Volksbond was notoriously conservative. It 
supported separate representation for coloureds and was especially vocal about 
developing a coloured nationhood.76 Carr’s threat may have been designed to show 
the Council that the CAC was willing to mobilise broader support for its campaign. In 
the event the alliance did not materialise. By this time the Congress-aligned South 
African Coloured People’s Organisation (SACPO) was emerging as a key player in 
the politics o f the coloured sections. In 1956 SACPO added its voice to the growing 
chorus o f opposition to the Council’s plan to evict coloureds from the Indian 
section.77
SACPO was formed in 1953 as the successor to the Franchise Action Council 
(FRAC)78. FRAC’s campaign against the implementation o f the separate voters’ roll 
brought it closer to the Congress movement, a trend that was accelerated with the 
formation o f SACPO.79 SACPO soon became integral to the Congress Movement and
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in the late 1950s changed its name to the Coloured People’s Congress (to bring it in 
line with the nomenclature o f the Congress Alliance). Van Der Ross claims that at the 
launch of SACPO there was considerable debate over the inclusion of the word 
‘Coloured’ in the name o f the new organisation. The decision to retain it was based 
on the belief that it was necessary “to achieve a situation where an acknowledged 
Coloured political organisation could liaise at top-level with Black, Indian and White 
organisations o f similar views.” In this sense SACPO typified the multi-racial 
political approach current at the time. It proclaimed allegiance to the Freedom Charter 
(with its explicitly non-racial principles) and supported the struggle against 
oppression. However, the organisation saw its primary task to mobilise “Coloured
ft Ipeople against any attacks upon their political and economic and social rights.”
A small group of radicals had been active for some time in Benoni. At the 
centre stood Mary Moodley, a Congress stalwart, and the De Jager brothers, who 
began their political careers in the Non-European Unity Movement. George Du 
Plessis, another young Congress activist, remembers a defining moment in his life 
being the May 1950 strike:
my political consciousness arose on the 1 May 1950 when Aunt 
Mary Moodley led a march and requested that students be part of 
May Day protest. What happened there is that on the 1 May 1950 1 
was already in Std.6 and we were sitting there at the William Hills 
High School and we saw all this. I looked at the window and saw this 
fat woman. I did not know her. She was walking in front with a lot of 
Africans and coloureds following her. And she came to the school, 
first the primary school on the right hand side and the principal and 
rang the bell and told the children that was about 10 o’clock to go 
home. Then she came to the high school and the same thing 
happened. Mr. Jansen, the principal, also rang the bell and said OK
children you are dismissed, go home. And to me it was something
82that really arose me. I actually took my books and followed them.
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Aunt Mary Moodley inspired a whole generation of coloured activists from 
Benoni. P.R. Deeva remembers her as a woman of outstanding principle and 
commitment.83 Her own children, particularly Joyce, became staunch anti-apartheid 
campaigners. In the early sixties the two of them served jail sentences and were 
placed under house arrest for long periods. Joyce eventually left the country to join 
the ANC in exile.84 Aunt Mary introduced youth like George to politics. “I was 
fifteen years old”, remembers George o f his political initiation, “and Aunt Mary took 
hold of me and I started selling these newspapers, like the New Age, the Spark and 
quite a lot o f political newspapers. Most o f the time I used to keep half o f the money. 
She never used to count them and never used to worry, as long as we go out door to
Of
door and sell these papers or even give it out free of charge.” She regularly arranged 
for these young recruits to meet key ANC figures like Tambo and Sisulu for political 
discussions. By the mid-1950s SACPO had developed a strong presence in the Cape 
Section and was led by a group o f well-trained young activists.
In the late 1950s these young militants successfully challenged the moderates 
for the leadership of CAC. The main protagonist in this move was Derek Dc Jager, a 
young lawyer who as a student established links with the Non-European Unity 
Movement (NEUM). His brother, John De Jager, had also been a member o f the 
Society of Young Africans (SOYA) while a student at the University o f the 
Witwatersrand. From the mid-1950s they had become increasingly disillusioned with 
the sectarian politics of the NEUM and decided to place their energies in the 
Congress Movement.86 Under their leadership the Cape Section’s young radicals87 
took over CAC and renamed it the Benoni Coloured People’s Vigilance Association.
De Jager and his supporters were astute enough not to ditch all the moderate 
leaders. Bob Triegaardt, who was respected in the community, was kept on the 
committee. George Carr was retained because of his radicalism. In additiion they 
decided not to bring Aunt Mary onto the executive because she was too closely 
associated with the Congress Movement. The Vigilance Association was very 
popular but the young radicals were uncertain whether coloureds in general were
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ready to endorse the Congress Movement. They felt that coloureds were relatively 
conservative. According to John de Jager many coloureds were “happy to sit on the 
fence because they felt they were not as bad off as Africans.”88 In a further gesture 
towards pragmatism the Vigilance Association retained the formal relationship its 
predecessor had with the Council. It wanted to use this to extract concessions from 
the Council, such as the right to distribute houses to coloureds. The Vigilance 
Association was especially successful in providing accommodation to those people 
who lived in a notoriously insalubrious section of the Indian Section, called Rooiyard. 
In this way the Vigilance Association established itself as the leading voice of 
coloured people in the old location in the late 1950s. Congress supporters dominated 
the leadership of the Vigilance Association, which thus acted as an intermediate 
structure between ordinary coloureds and the Congress Movement. Coloureds could 
therefore be associated with the Congress Movement without formally joining it.
By the end of the 1950s, therefore, a significant layer of coloured activists had 
joined their counterparts in the ANC and TIC in an unprecedented show of unity 
against the government. The constituent parts of the multi-racial Congress Movement 
had varying support on the Bast Rand and Bcnoni probably represented its strongest 
base in the region. For example, in 1956 hundreds of Africans, coloureds and Indians 
marched to the Bcnoni Town Hall to submit a petition opposing the demolition of 
shacks and houses in the ‘Asiatic Bazaar’.89 Demonstration o f this sort transcended 
the narrow ‘racial’ interests that were evident in the previous period. It also suggested 
that a new non-racial class unity was starting to emerge in some ‘black spots’. Events 
such as the Amato Textile strike o f  1958, in which shopstewards Don Mateman and 
Ed Cindi (local leaders of SACPO and the ANC respectively) played leading roles90, 
also cemented the incipient working class unity taking shape among Benoni’s black 
population. However, the 1958 General Strike received mixed support from coloured 
workers, primarily because o f the political nature o f that action.91 Moreover, just as 
this political unity reached new heights, it was torn asunder by the state’s twin 
onslaught o f repression and forced removals.
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The ‘black spots’ o f the East Rand represented a challenge to the Nationalist 
government on various fronts. Their ‘multi-racial’ character defied the rigid 
segregationist view of the government, which made them prime targets for 
‘disestablishment’. Although relations between the ‘races’ were often ambiguous, in 
the 1950s a greater class unity was being forged in the face o f a series o f attacks by 
the government on various aspects o f the lives of the residents of these ‘black spots’. 
Despite the serious tensions between Indian landlords or traders and aspirant African 
entrepreneurs, a new and common political front was being created under the banner 
o f the Congress movement. However, this was a fragile unity that did not always 
transcend the apparently narrow interests of the various ‘races’. Thus coloured 
militants were often simultaneously involved in the broader struggles being waged by 
the ‘multi-racial’ Congress movement, while also campaigning on behalf o f their 
‘own’ (coloured) constituency. These dynamic and contradictory processes were most 
vividly illustrated in the Benoni old location during the 1950s. It was here that the 
ANC-TIC unity was most severely tested and where the Congress movement 
developed its strongest support from all sectors of the location. The final chapter 
considers how forced removals, repression and the introduction of racialised political 
structures affected this community in the 1960s.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Forced Removals and ‘Racial’ Politics in the 1960s
From the late 1950s the government’s grand scheme of enforcing 
compulsory ‘racial’ residential segregation rapidly gained momentum. By this 
time it had overcome many of the legal and bureaucratic obstacles which had 
hitherto delayed the implementation of its plans. The most serious problem the 
authorities continued to face, however, was the mounting black opposition 
movement, whose increasingly radical mobilisation threatened key aspects of 
apartheid policies. However the Sharpeville shooting in 1960 and the repression 
that followed it, decisively swung the balance of forces in favour of the state. In 
1960 the ANC and PAC were banned and the first national state of emergency 
was declared. Thousands of their members were detained under the emergency 
regulations and hundreds were tried for sabotage.1 The promulgation of special 
pieces of legislation2 to augment the repressive machinery of the state allowed it 
to detain, torture and on occasion even kill political opponents with impunity. 
These measures crippled the liberation organisations. The life sentences imposed 
on prominent figures, such as the Rivonia trialists stripped the movement of some 
of its most capable leaders. Hundreds also went into exile to escape the state’s 
repression and to attempt to rebuild the movement. This was further to denude the 
internal movement of many of its leading figures. The South African Congress of 
Trade Unions, which was not banned, suffered especially heavily as a result of the 
loss of its top officials.
The first part of this chapter discusses how this repression affected the 
struggle against forced removals on the East Rand, and particularly in Benoni. It 
shows how the silencing of local militants undermined the struggle against forced 
removals. All the main radical organisations on the East Rand were either banned 
or splintered under the pressure of repression. In some instances new
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organisations emerged to wage the campaigns against removals, but ultimately 
these efforts also foundered.
The 1960s are traditionally characterised as a period of political 
quiescence. When compared to the politically volatile decades that preceded and 
succeeded it, this description seems indisputable. But this is also an over- 
simplistic characterisation, which tends to overlook the opposition that did occur. 
Admittedly these struggles occurred only episodically and were primarily 
localised. Nevertheless, as this chapter shows there were oppositional ‘sounds in 
the silence’,3 albeit constrained by repression and confined to a ‘racially’ divided 
political framework.
The second part of the chapter looks at the development of new forms of 
‘racial’ politics in the group areas on the East Rand. It shows that the government 
deliberately created a space in which conservative politicians could operate.
Under the circumstances a new breed of politician emerged. These people initially 
enjoyed little public support, relied on the authorities to maintain their political 
status and were prone to corruption. From the late 1960s these politicians began to 
gain some support because of the social development that occurred in the group 
areas, for which the government allowed them to take the credit. These political 
figures were, however, challenged in their residential areas. The government’s 
racialiscd political structures also created the space for new forms of opposition to 
emerge. Various opposition organisations sprang up in the coloured and Indian 
group areas, although they only made a limited impression. The coloured Labour 
Party was one organisation which was prepared to operate within the ‘racially’ 
exclusive parameters enforced by the government, while simultaneously 
articulating strong criticisms of apartheid. At least in the first few years of its 
existence the Labour Party was perceived as being genuinely against ‘separate 
development' and as a supporter of non-racialism. Young and old militants in the 
East Rand’s coloured group areas joined the party despite the contradictions 
inherent in its policies. The opposition movements that emerged in the 1960s 
differed considerably from the liberation organisations of the 1950s and 1970/80s. 
They were less radical, generally did not possess mass support and rarely
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organised militant action. However muted though they were the voices of 
opposition were not absent.
Forced removals implemented
The government’s programme of forced removals gained momentum in 
the late 1950s. In 1958 Alberton old location was disestablished and its entire 
African population forcibly relocated to Thokoza. This signalled the start of an 
intense effort by the government to remove all ‘black spots’ in the region. As the 
government’s regional restructuring plan became finalised it also became evident 
that despite protests from the local authority, Benoni Old Location would become 
the regional Indian group area.
The people of Benoni Old Location responded by uniting in a common 
campaign to stop the dismantling of their community. The ANC, TIC and SACPO 
were all involved but the struggle was effectively spearheaded by local 
organisations (which were generally led by local Congress Movement members). 
At the time the Congress Movement was pre-occupied by national political 
campaigns such as the 1958 General Strike, opposition to the National Party in the 
1958 election and the anti-pass campaign. Consequently little attention was given 
to local issues. In Benoni a plethora of local bodies sprang up to lead the fight 
against forced removals, the most important being the Vigilance Association, the 
Benoni District Indian Commercial Association, the African Vigilance 
Committee, the African Traders and Workers and the Transvaal Chinese 
Association. Even the Advisory Board supported the campaign. Sections of the 
local white community also opposed certain aspects of the government’s group 
areas plan, particularly the removal of coloureds to Boksburg. This striking show 
of unity to save the old location was unique on the East Rand.
The anti-removals campaign took the form of marches, petitions and 
public meetings, all of which were well supported by the residents of the old 
location. At one such public meeting, which was jointly organised by the 
Vigilance Association and the Indian Association, more than three hundred people 
packed the venue. The address by the representative of the Transvaal Chinese
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Association captured the prevailing mood in the location. Mr. A. Oshry explained 
that the Chinese people living in Benoni “do not ask for a special area to be set 
aside for them... they do not want to move from where they are.”4 Leo Lovell, 
Benoni’s Member of Parliament and an ardent critic of apartheid also addressed 
the meeting. He became a central figure in the campaign both as an opposition 
politician and the as the legal representative of some of the abovementioned 
organisations.
This gathering campaign against removals was stopped in its tracks by the 
repression that followed the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. Prominent local figures 
such as Mary Moodley, Joyce Moodley, Baby Singh, Diza Putini, Ed Cindi and 
Don Mateman were arrested. Some were detained for extended periods and others 
were placed under house arrest. Still others went into hiding or withdrew from 
public political activities.5 Thus bereft of some its most capable political leaders 
and denied the possibility of mass mobilisation, the campaign against the 
disestablishment of Benoni Old Location was checked.
Leo Lovell now became even more prominent in the campaign as the 
Vigilance Association came to rely on him to convince the local authority not to 
proceed with the removals. He had previously succeeded in getting four hundred 
white residents of Benoni to sign a petition in opposition to the removals.6 John 
De Jager remembers him making a string of stirring speeches against the 
removals, which endeared him to the black community but also earned him the 
wrath of the white establishment.7 Notwithstanding Lovell's passionate 
commitment to the cause, this increasing dependence on his support reflected the 
weakness of the previously united campaigns of local black organisations. A 
number of other factors also contributed to the fracturing and collapse of the anti­
removals struggle in Benoni.
The state’s plan to convert Benoni Old Location into the regional group 
area for Indians produced a divided response from local Indian residents. On the 
one hand, many traders decried the expected loss of clientele that would result 
from the removal of coloureds and Africans. On the other hand, they realised that 
the removals would also ease the extreme congestion and make available more 
houses to Indian residents. For the numerous families crammed into single rooms
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or into backyard shacks the prospect of acquiring house held the same appeal as it 
did for Africans who had earlier had been moved to Daveyton and KwaThema. 
Most of these residents did not necessarily support group areas but neither did 
they actively oppose them. Under these circumstances, TIC activists found it 
especially difficult to mobilise any significant support among ordinary Indians 
against the removals.
The TIC had much less success in mobilising support among Boksburg’s 
Indian residents, who were known throughout the region as being politically 
conservative. When Indians first settled in Boksburg in 1885 many of them began 
working as labourers in the coal mines, which they continued to do into the 1960s. 
Others worked in the service industry. The Indian community of Boksburg 
therefore had a much bigger proportion of workers in their ranks compared to 
their counterparts in Benoni and Springs. Although a trading class did emerge, it 
remained relatively small and lacked the influence enjoyed by traders in other 
‘Asiatic Bazaars’. Local Indian leaders tried to use the role of Indians in the 
town’s economy as a reason why they should not be relocated:
On the whole we feel that we are a hard working community, not 
afraid of work. Our people do manual work on the mines. Our honesty 
and reliability are never in doubt on the mines, for not only, do our 
people tend to all the Pump Stations on the 1ZRPM but so reliable are 
our workers that, never has an Indian ever been found drunk, late or 
asleep on duty. Indians do sanitation work on the mines, and who can 
say it is not an honest living. Our waiters we say without fear of
g
contradiction are among the best if not the best.
But the Boksburg TIC seemed to have failed to build support among this 
working class constituency. As a result, Indians of this area were never drawn into 
the anti-apartheid campaigns of the Congress Movement on the same scale as in 
Benoni. The conservative leaders of the community boasted that they had rejected 
attempts by the TIC to enlist their support:
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The Congresses came from other towns, to appeal to us, to stop this 
co-operation with the authorities, we were branded sell-outs. But it is 
History now that we drove them away for good from Boksburg. We 
accepted the act as the Law of a fair and just land.
The authorities acknowledged Indians from Boksburg were very 
unpopular on the East Rand because they supported the Group Areas Act.10 Indian 
workers tended to support the creation of a group area in Boksburg because they 
hoped it would result in them acquiring more houses. Traders in Boksburg 
endorsed the call for the creation of a group area because they hoped in this way 
to avoid being removed to Benoni and in the process lose their clientele in 
Boksburg. The TIC’s principled opposition to group areas therefore engendered 
little enthusiasm in the local community.
Beyond that, the TIC was perceived to have focused its campaign on 
defending the rights of traders. Its intervention at the local Group Areas Board 
hearings consisted almost exclusively of objecting to the deleterious effects the 
removals would have on prominent Indian shop owners plying their trade in the 
centre of Boksburg." In particular, the TIC's legal representative, George Bizos, 
attempted to prevent the removal from the centre of town of the Bhyat family 
business. Bizos accused the authorities of reneging on an agreement between 
Mahatma Ghandi and Jan Smuts, which gave the Bhyats trading and residential 
rights in the centre of Boksburg.12 Since the turn of the century, the Bhyat family 
had built a flourishing business, which had become among the most profitable 
stores in the town with a monthly turnover of between £4500 and £5000.13 The 
TIC was thus pre-occupied by the injustice perpetrated against the Bhyats at the 
expense of the concerns of the poorer sections of the community.
Once the GAB hearings had been completed, there was little evidence of 
the TIC campaigning against the group areas in Boksburg. As a result, the 
conservative leaders were able to play the dominant role in Boksburg. These 
leaders had been campaigning for a group area in Boksburg from 1950 and, at 
least until the late 1950s, they enjoyed the support of the Council in this 
endeavour.
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The TIC’s influence over the Indian population in Benoni disintegrated as 
a result of the repression it suffered. Without its political authority the divergent 
interests of various groups quickly splintered. In the early sixties Benoni’s Indian 
community became less involved in the anti-removals struggle because they were 
no longer directly threatened by the removals. TIC campaigners thus found it 
difficult to convince Indian residents to support the campaign. Even traders 
resigned themselves and began to place their hopes in the influx of an Indian 
clientele from other parts of the region. The TIC in places such as Pretoria and 
Pageview successfully sustained itself by focusing almost exclusively on the 
struggle against forced removals, which directly threatened to destroy Indian 
businesses. The same situation did not apply to Benoni and as a result the local 
TIC’s influence in the community quickly dwindled.
In the post Sharpeville situation the unity that had been built between the 
different factions on the Benoni Coloured Vigilance Association likewise came 
unstuck. The Association’s public position was that no-one should move to the 
new regional group area for coloureds, Reiger Park. However, from the early 
1960s, the moderates on the committee began to change their views, arguing that 
the removal was inevitable and that coloureds should seek the best possible deal 
for themselves. The declaration of group areas for Benoni in November 1962 
seemed to confirm this view, Meanwhile municipal houses had become available 
for coloureds in Stirtonville and the authorities also began to sell private 
properties in Rciger Park.14 One of the debates that pre-occupied the Vigilance 
Association at this point was whether homc-owners in Benoni’s coloured section 
should sell their properties to the municipality or to private buyers.15 This debate, 
which took place mainly among the moderates on the Association, showed that an 
important shift had occurred from opposing the removals to considering what 
would be the best deal for home-owners who were preparing to move to Reiger 
Park.
One of the first people to break ranks was long-standing Vigilance 
Association member, Bob Triegaardt. He acknowledged that people “were 
reluctant to come to Reiger Park because we were fairly well established” but felt 
at the time “there was nothing much we could do, definitely nothing we could
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do”. As a result he decided to sell his house in the old location “So that I could 
invest on this side [Reiger Park]. I had something 1 could put in so I could build 
on a more elaborate scale. For instance 1 bought three sites, and I built across 
two... 1 thought of my children. That’s why I took more sites. At the time I could 
afford it.” His decision caused deep resentment in the community who felt 
betrayed. Triegaardt admits that, “There was not a good feeling at first. People 
were not happy about it.”16 Soon businessmen followed his example and sought 
out the best sites in Reiger Park. The floodgates had now been opened and 
according to Cravin Collis,
There was a mad rush for that kind of property. Initially people in 
Benoni were hesitant, others saw it as an opportunity. Some key 
stands were bought by key people. There was an element of 
opportunism. People who said we should not move, they in the 
meantime acquired property. They came first into this so-called 
coloured area.17
The Vigilance Association also found it difficult to convince lodgers to 
heed its call not to move. George Du Plcssis remembers that,
the people that actually ran for these houses were the people who 
were living in the backyards, people who were living in the Indian 
Section... So when most of the blacks from Stirtonville were 
removed, those people, although we told them not to move, they did.
Some of them came here [to Reiger Park] and they looked at 
Galevievv and said, God why. Also when they moved there the 
Council told them all we are going to charge you is £2 a month. So 
you will get your free water and all that for £2 a month. Here you are 
paying £3 or £4 a month for a little shack in the yard. So those were 
the people we could not stop. So they came and filled up these houses 
from all over.18
For a while the radical faction of the Vigilance Association remained 
resolute. De Jager and his comrades believed it would be incorrect for them to
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submit after having struggled so hard to oppose the removals and having appealed 
to residents not to move.19 But the resistance had been broken and their refusal to 
move became merely symbolic. By 1963 George Du Plessis and a host of other 
former local Congress figures had moved to Reiger Park. George first lived in a 
two-roomed house in Stirtonville and then bought a property in the new extension. 
John de Jager preferred to move out of Benoni and Mary Moodley rented a house 
in Actonville.20
Once the coloured people’s resistance to the removals was broken, the 
African home-owners of the old location were virtually left on their own to fight 
the government’s plans. It was a fight they were unlikely to win. Pressure was 
mounting to effect the completion of the racial restructuring of the East Rand, and 
the continued presence of Africans in Benoni Old Location (the designated Indian 
group area) was viewed as a main obstacle to the realisation of this plan. In 1963 
the central government expressed its impatience at the slow pace of the removals 
from the old location and called for the urgent acceleration of the process so that 
the region’s Indian population could be settled there.21 Indeed, almost as soon as 
coloureds vacated their houses, Indian people from the Indian Section and other 
parts of the East Region began replacing them.
Whereas the opposition to the removal of coloureds received widespread 
support from Benoni’s white community, including from the Town Council, 
negligible support for the plight of African residents was forthcoming. Leo Lovell 
remained the lone voice from that community who continued to oppose the 
removals. The Council was for its part committed to its own plans of moving all 
African people of Benoni, except those residing in Wattville, to Daveyton. In the 
early sixties plans for the establishment of Daveyton Extension were already well- 
advanced, a clear sign of the local authority’s intentions to proceed with the 
removals. Support for African residents was therefore to a large extent confined to 
the location.
Despite the odds being stacked against them, African residents, many of 
whom were long-standing urbanites and also home-owners, were not prepared to 
submit to the dictates of the government without a fight. In the absence of the 
Congress Movement, residents formed the Benoni and Wattville Residents’
321
Association to lead the struggle against the removals. The local Advisory Board 
was generally perceived as too compliant and ineffective to lead the struggle in 
the absence of the ANC. Since the mid-1950s the Advisory Board had retreated 
into almost complete obscurity. And even when the liberation organisations were 
smashed by the state, it failed to restore any meaningful political role to itself.
In contrast, the Payneville Advisory Board was in the forefront of the 
struggle against forced removals from the late 1950s. This was due to the 
continued membership on that Board of radicals such as P.P. Legodi.22 In the late 
1950s and early 1960s the Payneville Advisory Board became the main 
representative of home-owners in the location and especially after 1960 it 
vociferously campaigned for the interest of its constituency.23 Between 1958 and 
1964 the Payneville Advisory Board was continuously at loggerheads with the 
local authority, fighting against the removals and when that did not succeed, it 
used various measures to stall the process before finally campaigning to win the 
best compensation for home-owners.
The moribund state of the Benoni Advisory Board elicited regular calls for 
it to disband. For example, in 1963 the Residents’ Association accused the 
Advisory Board of being ineffective and of failing to keep the community 
informed about the Council's plans especially in relation to property valuations 
for the purpose of compensation payments. As far as Simon Ntuli, the General 
Secretary of the Association, was concerned,
the Advisory Board does not exist. We wrote them a letter after a 
meeting of 1000 residents passed a resolution demanding their 
resignation. That was four months ago. They have not responded as
Whether Ntuli’s claim of 1000 residents at a meeting is true or not, 
residents remember this time in the old location as one of heightened political 
activity. Regular public meetings were held at the Davey Social Centre and at 
cinemas in the Indian Section. Marches and demonstrations were also organised. 
Simon Ntuli and a Mr. Gumede were among the prominent figures in the 
opposition movement.25 One measure of success was that the Association was
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prohibited from holding meetings in the location.26 The Association’s campaign 
also forced the Advisory Board into action. A reportedly ‘stormy session’ with the 
Management Committee, saw the Advisory Board request the Council to explain 
“everything about the removal, including, which body was responsible for the 
removals, who was going to pay for it”. The Board even informed the Council that 
the removals were undemocratic.27 After this episode, however, the Advisory 
Board once again disappeared from the scene.
As the pressure in the location mounted against the removal, the Council 
stepped its campaign up a gear. In mid-1963 the Council’s Welfare Committee 
conducted a socio-economic survey under the pretext of gathering information. 
Residents were angered by what they saw as underhand methods employed by the 
Council to get them to agree to move. Their fears seemed confirmed when 
‘blackjacks’ forced some residents to complete and sign the forms.28 The clearest 
indication that the removal of Africans would proceed was the formulation and 
endorsement of detailed plans for the payment of compensation. In this regard the 
authorities were a few steps ahead of the residents. By the time group areas were 
formally declared in Benoni a detailed plan existed not only about how 
compensation would be determined but what amounts would be paid for each 
property in the old location. The Minister appointed a valuator to determine the 
basic value of properties. Although properly owners formally had the right to 
object to the valuator’s determination the procedure to alter the amount was 
cumbersome29 and was generally viewed by residents as futile. More than two 
thirds of African families received less than R500 compensation (more than 50% 
actually received less than R300 and less than 20% received more than R1000) for 
properties many had spent years and considerable sum of money upgrading.30 The 
already paltry amounts were further reduced by the deduction of the cost of 
houses constructed in Daveyton. The cost of the standard 51/9 type houses was 
estimated at R642, considerably more than the compensation received by most.31 
O f the 2100 families who were to be relocated, only 300 families could afford the 
cost of municipal housing on the basis of compensation received.32
Over the next few years some attempts were made to continue the anti­
removal campaign, but the mass support that it previously enjoyed gradually
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dissipated. In late 1966 some homeowners were still attempting to use legal 
means to prevent the disestablishment of BBT. Assisted by Leo Lovell, these 
residents made an ultimately vain attempt to question the Council’s legal authority 
to proceed with the disestablishment of the BBT and to stop it from advertising 
affected properties for sale to prospective Indian residents.33 At that stage the 
Benoni and Wattville Action Committee was leading the campaign. Its public 
statements were strident and particularly critical of Indian residents who had 
occupied houses vacated by residents who had moved to Daveyton. In a pamphlet 
distributed in the location in 1966 the Action Committee announced, ‘Benoni Old 
Location is not moving to Daveyton and is not given to Indians’. The pamphlet 
claimed it would take another decade before the removals were effected and 
appealed to residents to take on more lodgers, presumably to complicate the task 
of the authorities. The Action Committee implored the remaining residents to 
stand firm and not submit as other had done before them:
Wc are very sorry for the Indians. They must find their own 
Location. We are sorry for the cowards who ran away to 
Daveyton. Their cheap compensation money will get finished and 
they will know this: East, West, North, South, Daveyton,
Holfontcin, Home is Best.34
Their impassioned appeal may have resonated with the mood of many 
residents, but could not at this stage generate mass support. Most tellingly more 
than 1 600 families had already been removed to Daveyton, which undermined 
any possible effective mass mobilization. In early 1967 the last residents of 
Benoni Old Location were removed to Daveyton Extension or Skotiphola, as it 
was colloquially known. Thus by the mid 1960s the integrated community of 
Benoni Old Location and the other ‘black spots’ of the East Rand had been 
forcibly separated and consigned to ‘racially exclusive’ residential areas, where 
the government hoped to inculcate new ethnic and racial identities in residents. 
The disestablishment o f Benoni Old Location and other ‘black spots’ ended an era 
during which the development of a relatively united black urban working class
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seemed a real possibility. Now, instead, the implementation of group areas 
ushered in a period o f ‘racially’ divided politics.
Actonville in the 1960s - Politics of Patronage and Corruption
The demise of the TIC as the main political organisation of Indian people 
on the East Rand was one of the distinctive features of the post-Sharpeville 
period. Although the organisation was not banned, many of its leaders felt the 
brunt of the government’s repression. A large number were detained, placed under 
house arrest, tried under security legislation and a few prominent members were 
among the first to die in detention. As a consequence a number of TIC activists 
chose to go into exile, while many slumped into political inactivity. Others, like 
P.R. Deeva, chose to become involved in social welfare activities in their 
communities. For them this was one way of contributing to the advancement of 
poor people, under conditions when ‘it was not possible to wage a successful mass 
struggle against the government’.35 The political vacuum left by the TIC was not 
easily filled. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the TIC stood virtually 
unchallenged as the main political voice of Indians on the East Rand. Pretenders 
to its hegemonic position found little support, even among conservative elements. 
Abram-Mayct, a long-time political opponent of the TIC, acknowledges its 
predominant role in the 1950s.36
In the first half of the 1960s some TIC activists were involved in the anti­
removals campaigns but in the main formal (especially oppositional) politics had 
been badgered into quiescence. It would take until the early 1970s for party 
politics to re-emerge in Actonville and then on an entirely different basis than in 
the 1950s. In the intervening period the political life of the East Rand’s main 
Indian group area was dominated by the newly formed Indian Consultative 
Committee (ICC) and centred on the question of housing.
The establishment of the ICC in 1965 was the government’s attempt to fill 
the political vacuum left by the demise of TIC with conservative and compliant 
politicians. The government’s intentions were revealed by the manner it went 
about seeking members to serve on the ICC. In 1964 the government approached
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leading personalities in the community to accept nomination onto the ICC.
Among the people to whom overtures were made were Abram-Mayet, G.R. 
Moodley and P.R. Deeva. After a meeting in Pretoria with government officials 
they all agreed not to accept the government’s invitation because the ICC was 
nothing more than an advisory committee, designed to promote the interest of the 
government. However, soon after this meeting G.R. Moodley and Abram-Mayet 
broke ranks and accepted the government’s offer.37 Actonville became one of only 
a few Indian group areas where the government could find enough conservative 
politicians willing to serve on an ICC.
The ICC was launched the following year amidst considerable fanfare.
The public launch was attended by members of the government, the Provincial 
Administration and local authorities from across the East Rand. The authorities 
claimed that more than a thousand residents attended the launch.38 Special 
entertainment was laid on to attract the interest of the public. The Benoni City 
Timex hailed the establishment of the committee as the dawn of “a new era in the 
history of local government and ... as a forward step to bestowing on the Indian 
community a greater say in the management of its own civic affairs.” The first 
five members of the committee were praised as being among Actonvillc's 
‘foremost citizens’.39 Mayct, who became the first chairman of the ICC was hailed 
as the “father of the people”.40
The authorities heaped lavish praises on these moderate politicians in an 
attempt to elevate their standing in the community. This was understandable, as 
all of them, except G.R. Moodley, had played only peripheral roles in the politics 
of Actonville until their appointment to the ICC.41 The authorities attempted to 
paint a positive picture of the ICC and of Mayet in particular. In 1967 the 
Department of Indian Affairs promised to establish the Transvaal Indian College 
in Actonville as part of a broader plan to diversify the employment opportunities 
open to Indians.42 Actonville was chosen above places such as Pretoria and 
Lenasia because of the loyalty displayed by the ICC. The ICC applauded the 
decision and also called for the establishment of an industrial township in 
Actonville “for Indian entrepreneurs to invest their capital”, which would “ensure 
[the development in] Actonville [of] a sound and stable middle class
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community.”43 Mayet described himself and his committee as “men who are 
courageous and can stand by their convictions, who are realistic and imaginative 
and not emotional.”44
It was nevertheless difficult for these politicians to counter the perception 
that they were mere ‘stooges’ of the government. Before candidates were even 
considered for appointment to the ICC their political history was checked. They 
also had to receive clearance from the security police,45 which reflected the 
government’s apprehension about filling the positions on the ICC with reliable 
people. The local authority also warned the ICC not to become oppositional. At 
the launch of the ICC, Councillor Smith advised Mayet and his cohorts to exercise 
patience and not to expect results too quickly. In a thinly disguised threat he 
warned them not to “cross swords with the Council and don’t try to shock 
them.”46
The ICC’s conservatism was illustrated by Mayet’s attempts to confine the 
membership of the ICC to staunch supporters of the government. Mayet also 
seemed to have viewed the ICC as his personal political fiefdom. A case in point 
was his intervention to block the appointment of Mr. C. Daya to the ICC in 1966. 
In a confidential letter to the authorities, Mayet accused C. Daya of being disloyal 
to South Africa and claimed he could not be trusted as he was a follower of 
Mahatma Gandi and Pandit Nehru. Mayet was especially offended by Daya’s 
criticism of his public honouring of H.F. Vcrwoerd after the latter’s assassination. 
Most revealingly, Mayet would only support Daya's nomination on condition that 
he publicly declared his support for separate development and the removal of 
African people from the old location to make way for Indians.47 At the same time 
Mayet endorsed the nomination of another candidate, Mr. Singh, because'of his 
support for government policy. Mayet was rewarded for his support by his 
appointment as chairman of the ICC until 1969. Buoyed by this success, Mayet 
attempted the following year to block the re-appointment of G.R. Moodley on 
similar grounds to those which he applied to Daya. Ironically, the Provincial 
Administration, which had appointed Moodley, acknowledged Mayet’s propensity 
to label his detractors as ‘left wing’.48 As a result Mayet’s objections were
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dismissed and Moodley re-appointed. Such episodes further undermined the 
ICC’s credibility in the community.
The ICC was an unelected body and therefore the extent of its popular 
support was never tested. The authorities appointed all members of the ICC and it 
enjoyed only advisory powers. The lack of popular accountability plus the 
government’s desperation to maintain the support of its hand-picked 
representatives created ideal ground for breeding corruption and self-enrichment. 
Patronage quickly became the distinctive feature of the ICC. At the centre of this 
network was ICC chairman, Abram-Mayet, who the authorities admitted was 
embroiled in controversy from the time he was appointed to the ICC.49
The inter-related problems of corruption and patronage were most vividly 
illustrated in the process of allocating houses and businesses. Although the final 
decision over housing allocation rested with the Town Council, the ICC exercised 
considerable influence in so far as it made recommendations to the Council on the 
matter. It was perceived as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the authorities in the area and 
was therefore meant to be in touch with the needs of the community. The acute 
shortage of houses in Actonville made access to accommodation the priority 
concern for residents, especially for those who were moved from other parts of the 
East Rand and for lodgers from the old location.
In August 1966 the Benoni Town Council announced plans to sell 108 
houses previously owned by African residents to Indians.50 Scores of people 
applied for these houses but found the process of allocating houses seriously 
flawed and riven by corruption. A petition signed by 172 residents and numerous 
affidavits submitted to the Council accused the ICC of impropriety and listed 
examples of corruption perpetrated by Mayet.51 The most common allegation 
made against the ICC was that of bribery. ICC members were blatant in expecting 
some reward from residents who were allocated houses. Mayet in particular was 
accused of abusing his position for self-enrichment. When houses became 
available he awarded two of the better houses to himself and his wife. At the time 
he did not even reside in the area and therefore leased these houses as a source of 
income. It was common for better-off residents to purchase multiple properties, 
which were then leased to tenants. Rich residents, like Mayet, therefore precluded
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these people from purchasing houses. In a particularly outrageous instance of 
abuse of power, Mayet allegedly asked Cynthia Moodley to become a concubine 
for his friend (Ramie) in return for ensuring the success of her father's application 
for a house. Her refusal was met with a notice to vacate the house.52
Within the first couple of years of the existence of the ICC numerous 
complaints and formal charges were brought against Mayet. However, the 
authorities (especially the Benoni Town Council) refused to take act against the 
man they regarded as their main supporter in the township. The Transvaal 
Provincial Administration was concerned that the community was divided but 
claimed not to have any incriminating evidence against Mayet, and left the matter 
in the hands of the municipality. The Director of Non-European Affairs for his 
part did not believe “the position call[ed] for any undue concern.”53 Official 
tolerance and, in reality, reward for such blatant abuse of power by the supporters 
of the government further alienated the ICC from the community. Despite a 
generalised dissatisfaction with Mayet and the ICC, most people initially believed 
it would be futile to attempt to do anything about it because the government 
supported him.54
Mayet was unrepentant and lashed out at his critics. He claimed the 
campaign was organised by “dissidents who have failed in the past to secure 
nomination to the Indian Consultative Committee” and that a personal feud 
existed between him and Mr. Naickcr, one of the main organisers of the petition. 
He accused Mr. Naicker of being anti-Christian, which seemed to be nothing more 
than a blatant attempt to discredit his opponents before the ‘Christian’ authorities. 
Most seriously Mayet claimed his opponents “were backed by men who were 
active in the hey-days of the left-wing organisations whose objects were to fight 
authority, good government and order wherever possible... the recent acts of the 
group concerned... is this time making a comeback bid, under the cloak of pro- 
governtism (sic).”55
Mayet’s concern that former TIC members were behind the campaign to 
expose his corruption was not unfounded. One of the first signs of the growing 
dissatisfaction centred on the renaming of streets in Actonville. More than 250
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residents signed a petition to this effect in one of the first post-Sharpeville 
demonstrations of discontent in Actonville. The petitioners argued that it was
not becoming to have streets and avenues named such as Mayet 
Drive, Moodley Street, Karolia Street (presumably names of the 
Indian Consultative Committee members) and other handpicked 
names since this an apparent form of despotism as far as the great 
majority of the Indian people in this area are concerned.56
It is unclear exactly who organised the petition but it seems to have been 
part of the growing opposition that emerged from previous TIC activists. In 
September 1966 a group of prominent local leaders formed the Benoni Indian 
Ratepayers Association “to make representation to the relevant Authorities with 
regard to the Social and Civic needs of the Indian People, and to be vigilant over 
future developments in the area.’’57 The new Association was led by C.S. Moodley 
(nephew of the G.R. Moodley, a leading member of the ICC) and B.R. Dewa, a 
well-known TIC activist.58. Although the aims of the Ratepayers Association 
could hardly be described as radical, it deliberately set out to expose the 
incompetence and malpractices of the ICC.
The emergence of the Ratepayers Association also signalled a split in the 
already depicted ranks of the local TIC. Until then the organisation had 
maintained its principled opposition to any involvement in government created 
bodies. However, a number of prominent TIC members, led by B.R. Dewa and 
Dr. Mia, believed that the position was outdated. They agreed the ICC was 
essentially a tool of the government, but were concerned that the allocation of 
houses was being left in the hands of corrupt politicians.59 The central aim of the 
Association was therefore to remove Mayet and his supporters from the ICC and 
replace them with reputable leaders who would allocate houses on an equitable 
basis. B.R. Dewa in fact sought nomination onto the ICC but was probably 
excluded on the basis of his previous appearance on the blacklist of the police.60 
Other TIC members, such as P.R. Deeva, disagreed with the new tactic pursued 
by their comrades and continued to dissociate themselves from the ICC. Thus the 
more radical wing of the already weak TIC was further marginalised. The TIC as
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a whole was further weakened and, as a result, the Ratepayers Association became 
the main opposition to Mayet and his supporters.
Initially the Ratepayers Association failed to make a serious impression.
Its first two attempts at a mass launch in 1966 attracted only about one hundred 
people. These initial setbacks did not deter the Association and in January 1967 a 
new and more vigorous campaign was launched against the ICC. A series of 
public meeting were convened and a door-to-door campaign was embarked upon 
to mobilise support for the Association’s demands. Such was the effect of their 
campaign that Mr. G.R. Moodley publicly associated himself with it, causing a rift 
in the ICC. Mayet’s reaction reflected his concern about the support garnered by 
the Association. He urged the authorities to act against the Association’s leaders 
because, according to him, they endangered the future of the town and the 
development of Indian local administration.61
The Association’s attempt to unseat Mayet did not immediately succeed 
primarily because the authorities were not prepared to see their key supporter 
removed by more radical elements. The allegations made against Mayet were not 
considered serious enough by the Benoni Council for it to discontinue supporting 
him. Because members of the ICC were appointed it was necessary for the 
Association to convince the authorities to appoint new members in place of the 
ones they had previously supported. The Association's attempts to mobilise public 
support had little effect on the opinion of the authorities. Moreover, its campaign 
focused on discrediting individuals, rather than the institution, so the campaign 
could not be too critical in case public opinion was transformed into active 
opposition, which would in itself not have been permitted by the authorities. So 
the Association was hamstrung by its own limited aims, namely, to replace the 
existing members of the ICC with its own leaders, as well as by the threat of 
further repression by the state.
The Association persisted over subsequent years to expose the corruption 
of the ICC. By the end of the decade Mayet's improprieties had discredited him 
throughout the community. He was even removed from all leading positions in 
local Muslim organisations. In 1971 the authorities could no longer ignore the 
situation and he was replaced as chairman of the ICC. The Ratepayers and
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Tenants Association this time produced concrete evidence of corruption by 
Mayet,62 but the authorities refused to remove him from membership of the ICC 
despite the overwhelming evidence against him. Their argument was that they 
could only act decisively if he was found guilty in a court of law.63 As this did not 
happen Mayet was able to retain his position and continue his practices.
An even more important development was also taking place in the group 
areas. From the late 1960s the government began to provide new houses (and 
flats) to alleviate overcrowding. The government created bodies such as the ICC 
now began to be viewed in a more positive light. They were portrayed as being 
partly responsible for the building of these houses for which the government 
allowed them to take the credit. Few people were persuaded by the government’s 
racist policies of segregation and separate development. Group areas received 
only minimal support on the East Rand and was mostly rejected. But once the 
removals had been effected and group areas became an unavoidable reality, 
residents in these areas turned their attention to making the best of the given 
situation. The desire for housing became the overriding priority. P.R. Deeva 
acknowledges that the state’s ability to provide housing to many of the Indian 
people was a trump card, not only for the government but also their allies in the 
community. Despite the ICC's association with corruption, it was widely believed 
to have played a positive role in providing houses. Mayet especially was a key 
beneficiary of this attitude. From being overwhelmingly sceptical and even 
negative about group areas and the ICC in particular, many Actonville residents 
began to believe that the system would provide them with some material benefits. 
Mayet’s victory in the first elections held in Actonville in 1973 confirmed this 
shift.
Coloured politics and identity in Rciger Park
The repression of the early 1960s also adversely affected progressive 
organisations among coloureds. SACPO, which had been weaker than either the 
ANC or TIC, disappeared almost immediately from the political scene on the East 
Rand. In Benoni, the Vigilance Association disintegrated under the impact of
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forced removals. As in other black areas in the early 1960s Reiger Park 
experienced a precipitous decline in organised political activity. But in contrast to 
these areas where virtual political quiescence continued until the early 1970s, 
Reiger Park’s political re-awakening occurred in the mid-1960s. The earlier 
revival of organised politics in the coloured group area was due in part to the 
establishment of the Coloured Representative Council (CRC) in 1969 (for which 
elections were held) in anticipation of which a number of political parties were 
launched. Coloured group areas thus witnessed the inauguration of a novel form 
of party politics from the mid 1960s, namely, politics that were allowed to 
function only within the narrow, racially determined parameters set out by the 
government.
Various parties were launched to contest the CRC elections, ranging in 
their political approach from conservative coloured nationalists to critics of the 
government. Inextricably intertwined in this political process was the central 
question of coloured identity. The nurturing of a coloured political identity was an 
important objective of the government from the early part of the twentieth 
century. After 1948 the National Party especially pursued this objective with 
vigour and single-minded determination. Group areas and separate development 
were regarded as pivotal planks in its strategy to inculcate a distinct coloured 
identity and ‘coloured politics’, which would form part of the overall racial 
political system.
Achieving the ideological objective of fostering a distinct coloured 
political identity proved a far more difficult and complex process than the 
government might have anticipated. The experiences in Reiger Park in the 1960s 
showed that even when the state appeared omnipotent it could not automatically 
impose its ideological imperatives on the subjugated population. Reiger Park’s 
diverse population was initially not amenable to embracing the uniform racial 
political identity prescribed for them from above.
The complexities of coloured identity have already been alluded to. The 
inherent contradictoriness o f ‘being coloured’ was particularly evident in the 
integrated ‘black spots’ on the Witwatersrand. In these areas the diverse ‘lived 
experiences’ of coloureds produced simultaneously overlapping and divergent
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views about ‘colouredness’. These central features o f ‘colouredness’ were 
transferred to Reiger Park despite the fundamentally different ‘lived experiences’
-  of ‘racial’ exclusivity -  prevailing in the group area. In addition, the diverse 
origins of the people moved to Reiger Park proved to be a major cause of division 
and antagonism. Class divisions also began to be expressed more explicitly even 
though the coloured middle class remained relatively small and economically 
weak. Hence in the early years of Reiger Park’s history the government and its 
local adherents found it extremely difficult to inculcate a sense of a common and 
exclusive racial identity in the residents of this group area.
The government’s pursuit of its racial objectives was further complicated 
by a pervasive antipathy among coloureds towards its policies of group areas and 
separate development. At this stage the community’s resentment of the group 
areas was especially intense. Few people supported the concept of racial 
segregation, but hoped their removal to group areas would result in significant 
improvements in their lives. Until the early 1970s, however, the government 
delivered on very few of its promises. As a result the whole process of forced 
removals left a very bitter taste in the mouths of the majority of coloureds. In the 
mid-1970s the Thcron Commission reported that the application of the Group 
Areas Act had caused considerable bitterness among coloureds. It identified at 
least ten points o f ‘major friction' arising from this central piece of government 
policy. Among the most important were the lack of proper housing and facilities, 
financial loss and removal of people from the places of residence of their choice.64 
The people from Benoni felt especially disrupted by the removals because they 
had developed a relatively strong sense of community in the old location. In 
Reiger Park old social networks were destroyed, resulting in a deep sense of 
alienation being experienced by new residents. Valerie Klou’s bitterness about the 
removal must have been shared by many:
We did not like living in Reiger Park at all. We felt we belong to 
Benoni. Everybody knew each other, everybody was friendly 
with each other. There was no ill-feeling. For two or three years, 
everybody’s nerves were on edge because when weekend came
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people did not know what would happen. And the gangs felt they 
belonged to Boksburg and we were the intruders.65
Many people also worked in the towns from which they had been removed 
and were now forced to commute daily to these areas at significant expense. Very 
few coloureds in Reiger Park experienced any demonstrable improvements in 
their lives and they were mainly confined to the small middle class section of the 
township. For the rest life seemed to be worse. In the words of Valerie Klou: “We 
lost our freedom when we came here. We did not feel free anymore.”66
Reiger Park became home to coloureds from the East Rand as well as from 
areas as far as Herschel (in the Eastern Cape) and the Northern Cape. By mid- 
1965 about 8000 coloured people had been resettled in Reiger Park, comprising 
1107 families from Benoni, 170 from Germiston, 38 from Putfontein and 33 from 
Heidelberg. A further 298 families originated from Boksburg and an undisclosed 
number came from the outlying areas.67 It is unclear precisely how many from 
outside the East Rand were moved to Reiger Park, but there were probably only a 
few dozen families. The diverse origins of Reiger Park’s population laid down 
some of most antagonistic lines of division during the first decade or so of the 
area’s history. George Du Plcssis' vivid description of the hostile relations in 
Reiger Park at the time is worth quoting in detail:
The only people we had trouble with were the Herschel and 
Germiston people. Benoni coloureds were the kind of elite 
people. More a cultured type of people. Even those who were 
living in the shacks that got houses here were people who knew 
jazz and culture and so on. The Germiston people were just a lot 
of spirits drinkers. It’s not that we want to degrade them. Very 
few of the Germiston people were on top. But if you’ve gone to 
Dukathole you could see how they lived there. There was not 
anything that inspired them. With us there were ballroom dancing 
group, soccer group, political groups, religious groups. There was 
always something to do where people got prominent... Trying to 
readjust themselves with the different types of people coming in,
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whether you like it or not it’s not easy. Here living together it was 
terrible. Different cultures, different ways of living. People living 
opposite each other. Especially in Galeview. There you had one 
toilet for two families. And the fellows from Benoni would clean 
their toilets but the fellows from Germiston never knew that the
toilet must ever be cleaned. So there was always frictions and
68fights, until they had to build toilets for everyone.
He particularly singles out the people from Herschel for scathing criticism. 
According to him they were ‘domkoppe’. Ironically for someone steeped in 
progressive politics George Du Plessis ascribes the ‘backwardness’ of the 
Herschelites to assimilation of numerous African customs: “When they came here 
they still had indabas, they still smoked those long pipes.” The Herschelites, with 
their rural roots, kept together to protect themselves against urban youth.
Everyone knew they were dangerous because “ if you interfere with anybody from 
Herschel the whole families will come together and they will talk about it and 
then they will go out with their kierics to go and bugger you up. And the police 
were afraid of them.”69 Some of these Herschelites had been small farmers in the 
Eastern Cape but were forced to give up their farms when the government 
introduced its new ‘homelands' policy in 1959. They were thus aggrieved by the 
government’s forced removals policy, but in a curious twist of political logic they 
resented Africans even more for taking over their farms. In a further paradox, the 
Herschelites became among the most ardent supporters of coloured nationalist 
ideas, despite their much closer affinity to Africans.
In the 1960s Reiger Park became a notorious haven for gangs, which were 
mostly formed by youth originating from different towns on the East Rand. In 
1965 the police reported a sharp increase in gang violence in the area, which court 
records confirmed as coinciding with the arrival of people from other parts of the 
East Rand.70 Boksburg youth were the first to form gangs because they regarded 
the newcomers as intruders in their area. The new arrivals in Reiger Park were 
also easy prey because of their unfamiliarity with the area. Boksburg youth gangs 
mainly targeted Benoni residents. The fiercest of these gangs -  Big Fish, the Dirty 
Dozen, Vultures, Vikings and Tigers - consisted of youth from Boksburg and
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Germiston. Big Fish (named after its leader) was the most notorious of the lot and 
consisted of Boksburg youth who openly despised youth from Benoni. They ran a 
reign of terror in the township and were feared by everyone, except the 
Herschelites.71 Initially the youth from Benoni were unable to counter the menace 
posed by these gangs and were attacked with impunity. But they too eventually 
became impatient and formed their own gangs. Inter-gang fights became such a 
common feature in Reiger Park that people were afraid to walk around.72
The enmity between Benoni residents, on the one hand, and Dukathole and 
Stirtonville residents, on the other hand, seemed to be ubiquitous.73 Benoni’s 
coloureds adopted a condescending demeanour towards coloureds from other 
towns who, in turn, despised the elitist attitude and perceived arrogance of the 
former. When Reiger Park was established a proportionally larger number of 
Benoni residents could afford to buy houses in the new ‘middle class’ extension 
of the township. The impression therefore existed that they benefited from the 
group areas policies at the expense of poorer residents, many of whom came from 
other towns. The manner in which leading figures from Benoni acquired 
properties and businesses in the new township reinforced this attitude. Residents 
from Stirtonville were especially aggrieved by the apparent domination of Benoni 
residents of their town. The discrepancy in the living conditions between those 
living in the new middle class area, where freehold was also available, and those 
residents who were squeezed into the municipal houses in Galeview and 
Stirtonville was stark. In the latter areas families were forced to live in one or two 
rooms, with only the most elementary facilities. In some instances the bucket 
system was still in operation. A class division thus emerged that was perceived to 
coincide also with people’s places of origin. This perception seemed pervasive 
despite the majority of former Benoni residents living in the poorer sections of 
Boksburg.
So while there was some acceptance of the description coloured, there was 
much greater emphasis placed on these other social divisions, which in turn 
shaped the character of politics in this coloured group area during the first decade 
of its existence. The Theron Commission reported in the mid-1970s that the 
majority of coloureds identified positively with the definition of coloured.
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However, this was mostly a manifestation of their preference to associate with 
other coloureds, not an unusual finding considering that people lived in ‘racially 
exclusive’ areas and had very little contact with other ‘races’. At the same time 
the Commission found there were “considerable differences within the ranks of 
the coloureds as regards the intensity of their sense of coloured identity.” For 
example, coloureds in the Cape and urban-based coloureds identified less with the 
concept. On the other hand, Afrikaans speakers had a stronger identification with 
the idea of a coloured identity.74 The idea o f ‘colouredness’ was far from uniform 
and was certainly subject to considerable contestation.
Coloured Nationalism
In 1963 the Boksburg Council formed a local Coloured Consultative 
Committee (CCC) for Boksburg onto which conservative politicians were 
appointed. J.J. Collins and C. September, both principals of local schools, were its 
most prominent members.75 Like its counterpart in Actonvillc the CCC was 
merely an advisory body but, unlike the ICC under Mayct, the CCC had very little 
impact on the politics of Rciger Park. Instead, political parties vying for support in 
the first CRC elections dominated the political scene from the mid-1960s.
The National Coloured People's Party (NCPP), an ultra conservative 
Transvaal-based organisation, was the first party make its mark in the area. Dr. 
Clifford Smith initially led the party but was soon replaced by Mr. C. September, 
the leader of Reiger Park’s CCC. The NCPP was a staunch supporter of the 
government’s policy of separate development and, according to R. Van Der Ross, 
it was especially anti-Indian and anti-Muslim.76 Until his appointment to the CCC, 
September played no role in politics. He lived and taught in Benoni before the 
removals to Reiger Park, where his activities seemed to have been confined to 
teaching and serving on the local Anglican parish council.77 In Reiger Park he 
earned notoriety for his persistent attempts to evict African and Indian people 
from the township and for refusing to accept at his school any child who, in his 
racist opinion, did not look coloured.78 As chairman of the CCC he tried from 
1967 to convince the authorities to invoke the policies of the Group Areas Act in
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order to get rid of a popular Indian doctor, Dr. Ebrahim, from the area. However, 
his witch-hunt failed as residents rallied behind the doctor, and sent a petition to 
the authorities demanding that he be allowed to practice in Reiger Park.79 The 
racist policies of the NCPP were succinctly captured in September’s appeal in 
1969 to the BoksburgTown council to ‘extradite’ Africans and Indians:
There are several Africans in the township and, although they are 
holders of Coloured identity cards, we regard this as an 
abomination and injustice to the Coloured community...
Coloureds are proud of their nationality and have no wish to 
become anything else. That is why 1 am making this earnest 
appeal to the Town Council to help us before we are swallowed 
by other nationalities.80
Cravin Collis who was part of a group of radical students in Reiger Park in 
the late 1960s believes September was “an excellent educator, but poor politician 
[who] read the situation wrongly. lie believed in a so-called pure coloured 
approach. He would have opted for a homeland.”81 September was a strong 
advocate of coloured exclusivity, which he believed could best be achieved by 
supporting apartheid. Few people were, however, attracted to these ideas at the 
time.
September also appeared strangely out of touch with what was happening 
in the area. A case in point was the crime wave that engulfed the area in the mid­
sixties. When the Anglican priest, Reverend Habberton, complained about the 
high levels of crime in the township, September was totally incensed. He 
immediately issued a public statement on behalf of the CCC expressing “grave 
displeasure, profound shock and deep regret” at the “unfounded and unjustified 
allegations”. The statement went on to assert that “The ordinary law-abiding 
Coloured lives a decent Christian life.” The Town Council fully supported 
September's denials. Yet a month later the police complained of vicious gang 
fights especially between the Viking and Vultures. Court records revealed a string 
of cases involving youth from Reiger Park with charges ranging from theft to 
murder.83
339
September and his party also seemed to have fundamentally misread the 
main issues affecting residents. Ever the defender of separate development he 
argued that “The resettlement has proved a boon to the majority of Coloureds and 
has resulted in better living and working conditions for them.”84 His defence of 
the government’s policies occurred at the time when the residents of Reiger Park 
were confronted by housing shortages and steep rent increases. By mid 1966 
Reiger Park’s coloured population had increased to approximately 10 000 and it 
was already claimed that a saturation point had been reached.85 Overcrowding in 
the poor working class sections was becoming ubiquitous.
Coloured people had hardly settled in the new group area when they were 
hit by rent increases. In 1965 the Boksburg Council began implementing its plan 
to convert the sub-economic housing schemes to economic ones. The effect o f the 
plan was substantial rent increases for tenants in Stirtonville and Galeview. It was 
proposed to increase the rent of the four-roomed and three-roomed houses in 
Galeview from R5 and R4,50 to R7,90 and R6 per month respectively. The 
increases in Stirtonville were even greater: the rents for three-roomed houses 
increased from R6 to R11,72 and for two-roomed houses from R5,50 to R14,42.86 
These huge hikes proved well beyond the means of many families. Within months 
of the introduction of the rent increases the number of families in arrears rocketed 
to over one hundred. In April 1965 the total owed in arrears stood at RI370 but by 
August it had more than trebled to R4316.87 Poorer people, for example those who 
had been lodgers in the Indian Section in Benoni, mostly occupied these 
dwellings. Many of them willingly left the insalubrious and expensive 
accommodation in the old location in the hope that their living conditions would 
improve in the new group area. They were quickly disappointed. These people 
now became aggrieved. Residents were disappointed by the ineffectiveness of the 
CCC,88 but in the absence of alternatives they looked to September to represent 
their views. Poorer people especially hoped he would deliver more houses and 
effect social improvements in the area. George Du Plessis admits that September 
enjoyed support among the poorest people:
340
That’s the beauty of it. The doubles, he got all his support from 
the very poor people, the singles and Galeview, the three rooms.
So he got most of his support from them and not from the people 
here... there was already a housing shortage. The areas was built 
for 10 000 people but very soon there were [many more]. So 
accidents trebled, violence also, homelessness started. He knew
about that and he thought he can perhaps ask them [the
89government] for houses and more ground.
By the late 1960s this conditional support had dissipated further as he 
failed to deliver and as other political parties successfully mobilised support for 
their policies. In the CRC elections of 1969 the NCPP won only one seat 
nationally.90 September and Clifford Smith lost their local contests and as a result 
their party rapidly faded into obscurity.
The Labour Party
This growing discontent among coloureds was channeled from the mid- 
1960s mainly into the newly formed Labour Party. The formation of the Labour 
Party in 1966 was a watershed in the politics of the 1960s and specifically in 
‘coloured politics'. Unlike other parties formed in anticipation of the CRC 
elections the Labour Party vocally opposed apartheid. The preamble of its 
constitution explicitly opposed “all forms of racial discrimination”. The party also 
claimed it would campaign “for effective participation of all people in the 
government of the country.”91 Such public criticisms of the government at the 
height of apartheid were unheard of and earned the Labour Party the ire of the 
authorities. It was nevertheless reluctantly tolerated because its leaders, such as 
R.E. van der Ross, were known moderates92 and the party intended in any event to 
participate in the CRC elections, despite its criticisms of separate representation. 
Notwithstanding its advocacy for non-racialism, it was an exclusive coloured 
political party operating in a system it purportedly rejected. These contradictions 
between the party’s rhetoric and practice featured centrally throughout its history.
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In the 1960s the Labour Party represented a legitimate voice of opposition 
for many young coloured radicals. When compared to the pro-government parties 
around at the time, the Labour Party unquestionably occupied the left end of the 
spectrum, albeit o f ‘coloured politics’. For Cravin Collis the Labour Party
was the then allowed left-wing. It pursued the policies of the ANC 
given the constraints. It was a non-racial party. It believed South 
Africa should be shared by everybody.93
George Du Plessis shared this view and became an enthusiastic local 
leader of the party in the 1960s. He was first attracted to the Labour Party because 
the government labeled it ‘communist’. Above all else the party appeared to 
endorse the policies of the Congress Movement, which he had supported in the 
1950s. He recalls studying the Labour Party’s constitution and found that it
had almost everything that the Freedom Charter had in it. There 
should be affordable houses for people, education should be free, 
hospitalisation should be free. Beautiful things. And when the LP 
started, I can tell you this much, we were some of the first that 
went to Sonny Leon and Mr. Domingo in Bosmont to say that 
we’ll start the LP. It was when the government regarded the LP 
as the terrorist group, the revolutionaries, the communists. We 
were called every bad name under the sun as far as the 
government was concerned. It was not easy. I remember I was 
picked up now and again for just being in the LP.94
These ideas also attracted many other young radical such as Don Materra, 
Mohamed Dangor and Hennie Ferris into the ranks of the Labour Party.95 The 
idea that the party represented a continuation of the Congress Movement 
resonated strongly among such individuals. George Du Plessis claims the ANC in 
exile supported their entry into the Labour Party, an opinion shared by Dangor. 
The ANC and CPC for their part publicly criticised the Labour Party for being 
‘outright opportunist' and of “kowtowing to the Nationalists with hopes that they
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could win anything for the Coloured community by waving about racialist and 
opportunist policies and rejecting unity with other groups.”96 The CPC also 
opposed the CRC elections, which it viewed as being ‘undemocratic’.97
A branch of the party was formed in Reiger Park under the leadership of 
Simon Mentor, a local teacher who had been dismissed from his post and was 
then employed in a factory in the area. The oppositional policies of the party also 
attracted interest and support from a group of students at the local high school, 
especially the matriculant class of 1969. Two of the most prominent members of 
the latter group were Cravin Collis and Johnny Issel.98 These students organised 
demonstrations against the first CRC elections and only supported the Labour 
Party because of its promise to disrupt the CRC. From the late 1960s the Labour 
Party was unquestionably the most popular party among coloureds nationally. It 
maintained this position throughout the 1970s, although the level of support for 
parties participating in government structures declined at the same time.
The party was nevertheless riddled by contradictions. It claimed to be a 
workers’ party but its constitution explicitly repudiated communism.99 It claimed 
to be a non-racial party but accepted the law that prohibited members of other 
‘races’ from joining it, albeit under protest. Perhaps most important, the Labour 
Party purported to oppose the undemocratic and non-representative structures 
established by the government, but participated in the CRC elections, which in 
turn lent these structures some legitimacy. In the 1960s and early 1970s the party 
leadership successfully managed these obvious contradictions by arguing the 
party was intervening in the CRC in order to disrupt it. The radical matriculants of 
Reiger Park accepted this as a legitimate tactic. They believed the Labour Party 
“would go in to wreck the system, make it unworkable. To participate and to show 
it up as a fraud.”100
Reflecting on his support for the Labour Party at the time, George Du 
Plessis acknowledges that there was a contradiction. But he argues,
I could either sit back and say wait until I believe in non- 
racialism and do nothing. Be an arm-chair politician. We were 
living in a coloured township where all the blacks have moved 
out. 1 could go to Daveyton and speak to my friends and do
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nothing. Or I can be more active, do something and educate the
. 101 people.
For as long as the Labour Party appeared to be a genuine opposition to 
apartheid, activists of George’s calibre were willing to support it. In reality though 
its attempts to make the system ‘unworkable’ were largely symbolic and 
ephemeral. The party boycotted the opening ceremony of the CRC and refused to 
participate in budgetary debates. However, from 1972 it abandoned this tactic and 
began participating fully in the important budget process.102 Although the party 
retained a rhetorical opposition to apartheid, in practice it was more intimately 
drawn into the political system of separate development and representation, the 
very policies it previously rejected. From the early 1970s it also accepted 
executive positions on the CRC.103
As a result tensions emerged between the leaders of the Labour Party who 
justified this as a tactic designed to alter the system from within and those 
militants who remained committed to ‘wrecking’ the entire system. In the early 
and mid 1970s a number of young radicals, including Don Materra, Johnny Issel 
and George Du Plessis, parted ways with the Labour Party. Their growing 
disillusionment with the direction undertaken by the Labour Party was intensified 
by the emergence of a more radical political alternative-the Black Consciousness 
Movement (BCM). The arrival of BCM on to the political scene represented a 
turning point in the political lives of people like George Du Plessis. When he 
joined the Labour Party “there was no other political alternative available at the 
time, the realities of the situation limited the scope for radical alternatives. I knew 
at the time we could not have a non-racial type of thing.” But, he recalls the 
profound influence of Black Consciousness at the time:
when BC came up, people felt we can belong to other 
parties. They cannot have everybody put into jail.104
George remembers being influenced by students from the area. Johnny 
Issel, Cravin Collis and other colleagues from the matriculation class of 1969
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enrolled at the University of the Western Cape in 1970 where they were 
immediately exposed to the BCM. They were influenced by fiery speeches by the 
likes of Barney Pityana, Strini Moodley and Themba Sono. According to Cravin 
Collis the students were exposed to
A totally different ideological explanation about blackness. It was 
a refreshing thing to hear. We were slightly in a state of limbo.
We started reading books by Fanon, Stokeley Carmichael,
Malcolm X. The ideological framework these guys explained 
made total sense to me. For instance you’re black and should be 
proud, black awareness, black actualisation.105
Collis believed the Labour Party embraced these ideas. The party’s 
leadership consciously, and perhaps opportunistically, adopted some of the 
political discourse of Black Consciousness. David Curry, the deputy leader of the 
party, defended the Labour Party's association with black consciousness. In his 
view,
Black identity is basically not a colour identity but a discovery by the 
person of his own worth and dignity. The oppressed classes, the so- 
called ‘non-Whites’, need this identity so that they can escape from 
the dehumanising process that is practised in South Africa. The term 
‘Black’ is just a label given to this self-awakening... Black 
consciousness is discarding class structure the Whites have given 
us.106
In this way the Labour Party succeeded in retaining the support of even 
some young militants, like Collis. For most of the radical minority, however, the 
Labour Party had become anachronistic. For them the call for black unity was 
primary and parties that continued to be ‘racially exclusive’ and that worked in the 
system became obstacles to the struggle for black emancipation.
Nonetheless, the Labour Party continued to build on its already huge 
support among coloureds. The party’s popularity was confirmed in the elections
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of 1969 when it won 26 out of the 40 seats on the CRC that were up for contest. It 
was denied control of the CRC by the government’s appointment of a further 
twenty members from the pro-government Federal Party. The Labour Party’s 
strong showing in all the elections was due largely to its vociferous criticisms of 
the government, which resonated with the deep dissatisfaction felt by most 
coloureds. However, despite the party’s overwhelming support nationally, it did 
not win the Reiger Park seat. The Labour Party’s support was largely drawn from 
the middle class section of the area. These people were attracted to the party’s 
political programme, especially its opposition to group areas. Many of them came 
from Benoni and still felt deep resentment over the forced removals. But the party 
failed to make serious inroads in the poorer, working class sections of the 
community. The Labour Party seemed to have paid less attention to bread and 
butter issues, which were of course most important to the poorer sections of the 
community. As a result it was perceived mainly as a party for the elite, especially 
those from Benoni.
Jac Rabic’s Victory
The Federal Party, which until 1969 enjoyed hardly any following in the 
Transvaal, was the surprise winner of East Rand for the CRC. The Federal Party 
was the first coloured party to be formed, in July 1964, after the government 
announced plans to hold elections to the new body. Under the leadership of Tom 
Swartz, the Federal Party became a close ally of the government and openly 
endorsed the policies of separate development and group areas. Its economic 
policy explicitly called for the “protection of the Coloured People against 
infiltration by other races in their business areas”.107 The party’s weak showing in 
the elections was mainly due to its conservatism. It attempted to mobilise support 
for the ideas of coloured separateness but found coloured people, especially in the 
urban areas, generally unreceptive to these ideas. Why then did it win in Reiger 
Park? More pertinently, did its victory mean that the residents of Reiger Park 
supported coloured nationalist ideas?
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A few months before the 1969 elections it appeared the NCPP and Labour 
Party would be the only parties in the running for the East Rand seat. However, 
only months before the election the Federal Party convinced Jac Rabie to leave his 
hometown, Potchefstroom, to contest the election in Reiger Park. According to 
Rabie he did not even know where the place was and it took him some time before 
he found Federal Party supporters in the area. At that stage the party was the 
weakest of the main parties, with only twenty members in the local branch.108 But, 
as his opponents soon discovered, Rabie was ambitious and determined to win the 
seat. His modus operandi caught the other parties by surprise. Cravin Collis who 
campaigned against the Federal Party reveals a grudging respect for Rabie:
Rabie is a political animal. He is a politician by birth, he is a 
different kind of fish. He eats and drinks politics. Rabie could 
link politics to delivery. He was shrewd politician in terms of 
pragmatic things.100
Above all else Rabie successfully exploited the divisions in the community 
while promising at the same time that he would deliver houses. He was able to 
ward off the threat posed by September by accusing him, as the chairman of the 
CCC, of being responsible for not delivering houses and social amenities to poor 
people. Rabie argued that September had had six years to deliver on his promises, 
but had failed to do so and therefore could not be trusted with the leadership of the 
community. He was also able to downplay his parly's conservative politics by 
criticising September's rigid nationalist position. September, in turn, accused 
Rabie of not being a ‘pure coloured' because he looked like an Indian, but could 
not win much support for his racist invective. Moreover, September’s racist 
outbursts allowed Rabie to conceal his own party’s pro-segregation policies. He 
even publicly criticised apartheid.110
However, it was the manner in which he dealt with the Labour Party that 
illustrated his awareness of the divisions in Reiger Park and his astute ability -  or 
shrewd opportunism -  to exploit them. A central plank in Rabie’s campaign was 
to accuse the middle class residents of Reiger Park of having sold out their poorer 
neighbours. He constantly reminded his growing band of supporters that these
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were the people who opposed forced removals, but were the first to ‘grab the best 
houses’. He singled out Bob Triegaardt as a prime example of how the middle 
class sold out the working class.111 Rabie rarely played the ‘race’ card. Instead, 
this conservative politician used the ‘class card’ to win against a party that 
claimed to be a ‘workers’ party’. His cause was hugely assisted when his 
opponent labeled him a ‘location rat’, which pejorative label they thought would 
weaken his campaign. Instead this type of attack against Rabie only won him 
more support among the people living in the ‘location’ of Reiger Park. . Thus, the 
Labour Party’s support among the township’s elite (especially those originating 
from Benoni) turned out to be its undoing. Rabie’s criticisms of the established 
leaders of Reiger Park were successful because he was new in the area and was 
untainted by the internecine conflicts that characterised politics in Reiger Park 
throughout the 1960s.
Rabie also argues that the Labour Party’s criticisms of the CRC did not 
receive the same positive reception as it did in the Cape. Unlike coloureds in the 
Cape, those living in the Transvaal had never possessed the franchise. The 
removal of coloureds from the common voters’ roll especially affected people 
from the Cape, who perceived it as a major blow against their democratic rights 
and from whom there was a universal rejection of the separate voters’ roll 
introduced in the 1950s. Thus the creation of the CRC, and the concomitant 
racialised voting, held few attractions to coloureds from the Cape. The Labour 
Party’s promise o f ‘wrecking’ the system therefore had a much greater appeal to 
them. But for coloureds in the Transvaal the flawed franchise given to them by the 
government was a novel experience. In the Cape, the CRC election was viewed as 
a step back, in the Transvaal it seemed to open the way for further political 
advances. As a result there was an 81,5% poll in Reiger Park.112 Finally, Rabie 
won the elections because he successfully canvassed in the outlying areas of the 
constituency, which included all the areas on the East Rand, as well as the 
adjacent peri-urban and rural areas. His opponents completely ignored coloured 
voters outside Reiger Park, much to their detriment.
Therefore, in contrast to his colleagues in the Federal Party, Rabie did not 
contest the elections on the party’s political programme. He recognised the limited
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support pro-apartheid ideas had among coloureds at the time. Whereas the Labour 
Party and the CNNP campaigned on the basis of their respective and divergent 
party programmes, Rabie did so by promising to improve the lot of poor people. 
Whether he was committed to effecting such improvements was a secondary issue 
at the time.
From 1969 Jac Rabie won every election held in Reiger Park with 
increased majorities each time. He was able to secure his position primarily 
because from 1970 the government began to provide housing and amenities in the 
area. In 1970, for example, a new extension (the so-called MMs) consisting of 152 
houses were built. The authorities allowed Rabie to take the credit for these 
developments. Rabie and his cohorts in Reiger Park also effectively played one 
section of the state against the other to win some reforms for residents. The 
Boksburg Council objected to any extension of Reiger Park and refused to 
negotiate with Rabie over this matter. However, Rabie went over their heads and 
appealed directly to the Department of Community Development, which was 
more aware of the housing crisis facing coloureds nationally. At this stage the 
central government proved more willing to make more land available for coloured 
group areas. Rabie convinced the Department of Community Development to 
intercede in the dispute between it and the Council, which resulted in the Council 
conceding the creation of further extensions to Reiger Park. It was also during this 
time that the policy of separate development gained more support because it began 
to be associated with material improvements in the lives of the poorest sections of 
the coloured community.
From the time the government announced its plans to establish the CRC, 
Reiger Park (as well as other coloured group areas) entered a new era of politics. 
Party politics, which had previously been absent among the East Rand’s coloured 
population, burst onto the scene and gained momentum in the run-up to the first 
elections to the CRC in 1969. Two distinct trends emerged in ‘coloured politics’ 
during this period. First, was the birth of a new breed of politician, whose 
character and existence were determined by its close association with the 
government. These politicians generally had no previous record of community or 
political involvement, enjoyed little public support and were invariably
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conservative. The emergence of party politics also created the space, albeit very 
limited, within which oppositional groups could operate. The Labour Party 
effectively used this space to articulate its objections to apartheid, while 
simultaneously participating in ‘racially’ exclusive structures. Politics in the 
Indian group area was less developed than in Reiger Park, mainly because the 
government had delayed creating a national structure such as the CRC for Indians. 
In addition, the TIC, the predominant political organisation of Indians on the East 
Rand since the 1940s suffered heavily under the state’s repression. Without it, 
politics in Actonville was subdued and alternative political organisations found it 
extremely difficult to build any meaningful support, even in the 1970s. As a result 
the activities of the Consultative Committee became the focal point of politics in 
the area. Despite this parochialism, opposing political trends also developed in 
Actonville. Abram-Mayet represented the strong pro-government tendency, which 
controlled the ICC from its inception. His opponents were largely drawn from the 
ranks of the T IC. The latter were not as well organised as the critics of the 
government in the coloured group areas, but nevertheless used the limited space 
available to them to articulate oppositional views. These local examples of 
opposition suggest that the politics of the 1960s were far more textured and varied 
than has been suggested by the literature on the period. This is hardly surprising 
considering that there existed deep-seated animosity towards the government in 
the wake of the forced removals and repression. The state’s repression and forced 
removal dealt severe blows to the black opposition movement. However, even at 
the height of the apartheid state’s power, the voices of opposition in the black 
communities were never completely silenced.
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CONCLUSION
This study has shown how urban apartheid came to be implemented on the 
East Rand from 1948 to 1973. It has stressed that the key imperatives behind this 
exercise in urban social engineering were the stabilisation and control of the urban 
black population, and the imposition of compulsory ‘racial’ segregation. The 
achievement of these objectives became especially urgent during the 1940s when 
the urban areas were engulfed in crises caused by the rapid industrial expansion 
and the ensuing mass influx of tens of thousands of job-seekers, especially 
Africans, into the urban areas. It has been argued that the inability of the state, and 
particularly the local authorities, to manage this transformation was the prime 
cause of these strains escalating into a full crisis. The urban black population 
responded to this situation be engaging in numerous struggles to improve their 
living conditions. The white population for their part was gripped by the fear of 
being swamped by a politically militant black population. Industrialists were 
concerned about the instability of labour, which threatened to undermine their 
businesses. Under these pressures the slate began to formulate policies to address 
the urban crisis.
The thesis has demonstrated that the Nationalist Party adopted many of the 
policies developed by the United Party in the 1940s when it came to power in 
1948. Some emphasis has therefore been placed on the continuities between the 
policies of these two parties, especially in relation to the urban black population. 
Whereas the United Party often prevaricated in the adoption and implementation 
of these policies, the Nationalist Party pursued them with single-minded 
determination.
Yet, the Nationalist Party did not come to power with a blue-print of 
apartheid. Hence a central piece of apartheid legislation, the Group Areas Act, 
was bereft of details and strategy of how it would be implemented. A primary 
focus of this study is the attempts by the apartheid government to provide the 
detailed plans, strategies and mechanisms to realise its ideological objectives. The 
government only began to give serious attention to these matters towards the end
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of its first term of office. After adopting the recommendations of the Mentz and 
Subsidiary Planning Committees, the government was armed with a ‘grand plan’ 
for the restructuring of the East Rand and the scene was apparently set for the 
rapid ‘racial' restructuring of the region.
However, throughout the 1950s the government was unable to implement 
this ‘grand plan’. The mounting black resistance in the 1950s, and especially the 
Transvaal Indian Congress’ opposition to the GAA, placed serious obstacles 
before the government. The opposition that emanated from local authorities and 
other local white institution also caused considerable delays in the implementation 
of the government’s policies. A central theme in the thesis is the examination of 
the local government-central government relations. During this period the balance 
of power between the central government and local authorities, and between the 
state and the black population was still too evenly balanced for the authorities 
simply to impose its policies as it wished and local authorities were able to exert 
considerable influence on the process of the implementation of apartheid. Thus 
the introduction of group areas in the East Rand was delayed until the 1960s 
because local authorities objected on certain issues.
The government enjoyed much greater success in the 1960s in 
implementing its policies, from the early 1960s forced removals escalated and 
group areas were declared. But as a consequence of poor planning on its part, as 
well as the continued objections from black communities and certain 
municipalities, the government was forced to abandon its ‘grand plan’ for group 
areas on the East Rand.
The one area where the authorities did succeed in implementing an 
important part of its restructuring of the East Rand was the establishment of 
Daveyton. This study has stressed the importance of Daveyton's establishment 
because it represented a major success of practiced apartheid. During the first ten 
years of its existence Daveyton was regularly hailed as having solved a serious 
squatter problem and for providing housing to thousands of African residents. It 
has been demonstrated that this township played a crucial role in stabilising and 
controlling Benoni’s restive African population. In the early 1960s this was 
augmented by improved job opportunities. Many of the first residents of Daveyton
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also had positive views about it. They were squatters and lodgers in the old 
location and thus benefited from the mass housing provision in the new township.
This thesis has argued that the successes represented by Daveyton were 
made possible by the political convergence between the conservative United 
Party-dominated Benoni Council and the practical wing of the Nationalist that 
controlled the government. The study also highlights the pivotal role played by 
local ‘native affairs’ officials in shaping and determining the implementation of 
urban apartheid. Thus J.E. Mathewson’s concurrence with the views espoused by 
Verwoerd on stabilising urban Africans was a critical factor in the development of 
a co-operative relationship between these tiers of the state. It is suggested that if 
any township were to succeed as a model of apartheid engineering it would have 
been Daveyton.
However, even as the township's successes were being lauded, the 
government began to introduce policies that would ultimately undermine these 
successes. The thesis supports and expands on Posel’s view that the policy 
changes introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s marked a turning point in 
apartheid. The shift to apartheid’s second phase was characterised by the policies 
o f ‘separate development' and 'community development’. This involved both the 
promotion of the ‘homelands’ for Africans and Tacialiscd' governance for 
coloureds and Indians. The establishment of these bodies illustrated the 
government's policy of separate political representation, which aimed to develop 
national and local political structures in which the different black ‘races’ could 
exercise the limited political ‘rights’ given to them. A primary consequence of 
this shift in policy was that the ‘rights’ of urban Africans came under systematic 
attack in the 1960s.
This study places the residents of the urban ‘black spots’ of the East Rand 
at the centre of its analysis and narrative. Their struggles, trials and tribulations 
and suffering are constantly highlighted. Urban ‘black spots’ were, in the words of 
an informant, ‘homes to strange nation’. The social and political relations between 
the various ‘races’ in these locations are subjected to scrutiny. This thesis argued 
that they were diverse and ambiguous, and were simultaneously prone to conflict 
and harmony. It also rejects any simplistic characterisation of these relations.
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Notwithstanding the numerous social cleavages that existed among the residents 
of these locations, the 1950s witnessed the emergence of nascent black working 
class unity. This occurred unevenly but was most developed in Benoni Old 
Location where the Congress Movement gave political expression to it in the late 
1950s. The resistance against forced removals in the late 1950 was an important 
example of this unity.
However, as the thesis shows, this unity was shattered by the repression of 
the early 1960s. The effects of this repression and the institution o f ‘racialised’ 
political structures fundamentally altered the character of politics in the 1960s. 
The thesis analyses the ways in which the government attempted to engender 
support for group areas, but failed to convince the majority of coloured and 
Indians whose main experience of the government’s policies was of displacement 
and social decline.
This study has stressed the importance of analysing the making of 
apartheid during the 1960s. The analysis provided here shows some of the stresses 
and strains that were developing during this period o f ‘high apartheid’. Moreover, 
it highlights the revival of political opposition from the mid-1960s. The rapidly 
declining social conditions of African townships from the late 1960s contributed 
significantly to igniting the political upsurge of the 1970s. The stabilisation of the 
urban working class provided the primary actors in that revolutionary movement. 
Thus any analysis of the huge anti-apartheid struggles of the 1970s and 1980s, 
which have received so much scholarly attention, should necessarily proceed from 
an understanding of the dynamic processes of the 1960s.
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